

## Appendix

As we go to print, the Government has issued the revised circulars to local authority associations for comment. Three sections of the consolidated circular have been issued separately and sent to all local authorities:

ES1/1984 The Government's Planning Assumptions for Civil Defence


ES2/1984 The Revised Arrangements for Wartime Machinery of Government

ES6/1984 War Emergency Planning for the Fire Service  
The circular ES2/1984 announces a reorganisation of regional structure for civil defence. In this appendix we summarise the changes that have been announced.

The reorganisation means that Britain will be divided into 11 Regions, 8 in England and one each in Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales. Each Region will be under the control of a Government Minister acting as the Regional Commissioner. Each Region is divided into two Zones, except for Greater London and Northern Ireland which have one only. The Regional Commissioner would have his headquarters in one Zone. In the other Zone a Deputy Regional Commissioner would be in charge of a second headquarters, but would be under the command of the Regional Commissioner. It is intended that the Regional Commissioner would coordinate operations over the whole Region.

In effect, the reorganisation has removed a tier from the civil defence structure – that of the Sub-Regional HQ. In the old organisation, the Sub-Regional HQs were of considerable importance. It was intended that they would be established before an attack, with Regional HQs coming into operation after the attack. With the reorganisation, the Regional HQs become the focus of authority and the next tier down will be the County HQs.

# The Civil Defence Campaign Guide



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# Introduction

This guide has been produced to provide the information which CND groups, councillors and council staff can use to campaign against the new Civil Defence Regulations.

When the civil defence exercise 'Hard Rock' was cancelled in 1982 the Government claimed it would force councils to take a greater role in civil defence. Since then, although it has succeeded in getting new legal duties through Parliament, it has consistently lost the public argument. The British Medical Association, the Royal College of Nursing, the World Health Organisation and most recently, the Washington conference on studies of the Nuclear Winter, have all undermined the credibility of the Government's plans.

Nuclear free zone authorities are challenging the Government to provide the basic planning assumptions on which any civil defence plans or activities must be based - which are the most likely targets, what are the likely effects of an attack on such targets, and why are supplies and top politicians moved out of cities while the urban population is told to 'stay put'? It is clear that the Government is in a state of confusion. At the time of writing it has not provided a satisfactory response to these challenges. It has not even produced the long-promised revised guidance circulars for local authorities.

We hope this guide will provide useful information and argument - and most important of all, ideas for campaigning activities. Please contact the Nuclear Free Zone Officer at CND, 11 Goodwin Street, N4 3HQ for further information.

**\* See Appendix**



# The Civil Defence Regulations 1983

## Introduction

The Government's civil defence exercise 'Hard Rock' planned for Autumn 1982 was cancelled because many local authorities refused to take part. The Government announced that it would introduce powers to force councils to participate in future 'war games'. These came into force on December 1, 1983.

## The Legal Background

Civil defence is governed by the Civil Defence Act 1948 and Regulations made under this Act. It does not include planning for civil emergencies, which is covered by the Local Government Act of 1972. The 1974 Regulations were the lynchpin of the civil defence programme, but only forced councils to make plans. The 1983 Regulations go much further.

## New Features of the Regulations

### a) Provision of Emergency Control Centre


Councils must establish, equip and maintain premises which could be used as emergency control centres. The GLC is required to provide 5 centres; counties, 2 each; districts and boroughs, 1 each.

The cost of providing centres which could operate effectively under attack conditions would be colossal. The Government is not making grants available to cover the capital costs of building new centres, but expects councils to adapt and strengthen existing premises.

There is no duty to provide public shelters – in fact Government grants for this have been withdrawn.

### b) Staff Training:

The government bowed to pressure and did not introduce a direct duty on council staff to participate in civil defence. However, councils must train 'an appropriate' number of staff and send specified staff on Home Office training courses. County councils have a duty to train certain staff from boroughs or districts in their area.



In place of the cancelled Hard Rock, CND ran its own highly successful counter-operation Hard Luck.

### c) Recruitment of Volunteers:


County councils are compelled to recruit, train and make use of volunteers for civil defence. A target of 350,000 has been mentioned. District and borough councils must help them. There is concern about training volunteers in the use of council's equipment given the potential for strike-breaking.

### d) Participation in Civil Defence Exercises:

All councils have a direct duty to participate in civil defence exercises as required by the Government. This is a tacit admission that the Government's plans and assumptions command such little support that they can only be implemented by compulsion.

### e) New Areas of Planning:

County councils and the GLC will have to keep their plans up to date. A number of new areas of planning are introduced: planning to use buildings, structures, excavations and other features of land for public shelters; planning to provide and



'In a nuclear war, the Women's Royal Voluntary Service would provide the same services we have always provided in peace time' – Baroness Pike, former WRVS chair

maintain a rescue service; and planning to secure the help of voluntary organisations.

### f) Enforcement:

The Minister has discretionary powers to give individual authorities specific instructions on how they are to conduct their new duties. This opens the way for the 157 'nuclear free' councils to be subject to particular pressure. Failure to carry out the instructions issued by the Government could lead to Commissioners being sent in to do the work, with the cost being charged to the council. The Government could withhold grant aid, leaving it open for ratepayers court action to try to surcharge individual councillors for the extra costs.

## Financial Implications

The Regulations will involve major new costs for local authorities in providing emergency control centres, training volunteers, and covering staff involved in planning or training.

Most local authority civil defence functions were grant aided at the rate of 75%. Under the new Regulations, further 'approved' expenditure on training and exercising of staff and volunteers, and on the provision and maintenance of communications equipment, will be completely reimbursed.

However, increased total expenditure could bring councils into support grant penalty zones after an exemption period in 1984/5.

## Response of the Local Authorities

All the local authority associations raised objections to the Regulations. A conference of the 157 councils that have declared their areas 'nuclear free zones' agreed on January 27 1984 that:


There can be no protection of the population of this country while it remains a nuclear weapons state, against the terrifying consequences of a nuclear war. By creating the impression of 'civil defence' the Government seeks to mislead the public about the real effects of nuclear warfare and to make the possible use of nuclear weapons appear survivable and acceptable.

Conference firmly believes that the only sane defence against nuclear war is to determinedly campaign for the preservation of peace.

Conference should state its belief that the Regulations are ill-drafted, contradictory, impractical to implement and designed deliberately to further mislead the public about the effects of nuclear war.

Lawyers have pointed out that local authorities cannot effectively plan to meet the effects of a nuclear attack until the Government makes its planning assumptions clear. Local authorities have been urged to demand information from the Home Office on:

- (a) likely warning time before attack;
- (b) likely targets and the scale and nature of attack in area of authority;
- (c) effects of such attacks;
- (d) likely effect of and problems caused outside authorities area;



- (e) emergency powers to be granted to authorities; and
- (f) details of the Government's own civil defence regional planning.

Local authorities should ask the Home Office whether it accepts the evidence that even after a limited nuclear exchange there could be a 'nuclear winter' lasting for months.

For a more detailed briefing on the 1983 Civil Defence Regulations write to:

J. Hetherington Esq.  
Secretary to the Nuclear Free Zones National Steering Committee  
P.O Box 532  
Town Hall  
Manchester  
M60 2LA

# Government Organisation for Civil Defence

See Appendix for details of the reorganisation of regional structure, announced July 1984

## National Government

The UK Commanders in Chief Committee (UKCICC) will be in charge of military operations in war-time. This junta would rule Britain from its substantial secret premises near Salisbury. Senior Ministers will attempt to reach another secret bunker, known in Whitehall as the 'Maggie Bunker', thought to be located at Corsham near Bath.

## Regions and Sub-Regions


The UK will be divided into 12 Regions, nine in England and one each in Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales. Each region will be under the control of a Regional Commissioner; some are divided into two Sub-Regions (Northern Ireland has one and Scotland has three), with a Sub-Regional Control and a Sub-Regional Commissioner. The Government anticipates that there will be an early period when the Regional administrative machine is not fully operational, and at this time the Sub-Regions will be the governing bodies.

Regional staff will include representatives of all Government departments, the armed services, the police, the fire service and public utilities. Sub-Regional staff will be similar to that of Regions. Regional HQs are supposed to operate only after an attack, but Sub-Regional controls will be established before an attack.

## County Headquarters

Each County Council must maintain a staff and wartime headquarters at or near its county hall, with a standby headquarters at some other part of the county. This will normally be a lower level of control, but will take over county duties if the country headquarters is destroyed.

The Chief Executive of the County Council will be the war-



Operating a Carrier Control Point in a police station.


time County Controller, empowered to exercise the full functions of the local authority as an officer in the chain of Regional Government. For as long as circumstances permit he/she will consult the County War Emergency Committee of councillors about general policy.

## Borough/District Headquarters

Districts form their own wartime headquarters at or near their borough or district offices, and the Chief Executive of the Council will be District Controller.

## Other Headquarters

Larger rural areas may be divided into smaller sub-districts. Groups of rural parishes may form areas with no executive powers, for communications only.




Sub-Regional Headquarters for the administration of England after a nuclear attack: SRHQ 72, Bold Head, Devon.



Rollestone Army Camp near Larkhill, on Salisbury Plain, turned into a prison camp. Plans for 'internment areas', which would probably use similar facilities, are well advanced.

Parish organisation is being encouraged by County Emergency Planning Officers and the Home Office. In many areas, however, lower levels of organisation exist in theory rather than in practice.

Below is a diagram of a theoretical regional hierarchy.



There are suggestions that a re-organisation of regional structures is underway.

## The United Kingdom Monitoring and Warning Organisation (UMWMO)

The approach of nuclear missiles or bombers will be relayed from US satellite warning systems to the UK Regional Air Operations Centre at High Wycombe. From there the warning will be relayed by the UKWMO network to 'carrier control centres' in 250 major police stations. The UKWMO network relies on existing telephone lines, superimposing the warning system on lines used for the speaking clock. When the signal has been received, the 'carrier control points' alert 18,000 power and hand operated sirens sited on police station roofs, in ROC bunkers, on top of green steel poles in city streets and on other public buildings including schools.

The ROC forms part of the UKWMO. It is staffed by volunteers and has 873 bunkers spread over Britain at roughly 14 mile intervals. Its purpose is to locate bomb bursts and to measure the strength of blasts and intensity of fallout.

## Police Role

The tasks of the police after an attack are listed in local authority briefing documents. Much of this work would fall on the recently formed Police Support Units – mobile units trained to deal with a range of emergency conditions, including strikes, civil riots and civil defence.

When the attack warning is sounded the units, in liaison with the army, will impound all petrol, move food to designated centres and take control of the Emergency Service Routes. One estimate suggests that about 10% of the police force has received this training.



Police role: police powers would include that of execution.

## Resources

The most comprehensive account of the Government's organisation for civil defence is to be found in *War Plan UK* by Duncan Campbell (Granada). Also useful is *Civil Defence in Britain* by George Crossley (Bradford Peace Studies Papers).

Various pamphlets have been published on regional civil defence organisation. For example: *Target North West* by R. Poole and S. Wright (Richardson Institute for Peace and Conflict Research), *Civil Defence and Nuclear War in the North East*, by M. Spence (Days of Hope Bookshop, 115 Westgate Road, Newcastle), *Warplan Brighton*, by Brighton CND, and *Civil Defence in Humberside* by C. Challen (4, Dudley Avenue, Hull).

# Campaigning Ideas

Civil defence campaigning has immediacy because every council in the country is supposed to have a local war plan, an emergency control centre, and to have designated staff to take part in civil defence exercises.

## Gathering Information

To campaign effectively CND groups will need to be informed of the local civil defence situation. The best place to start is to consult council minutes, and those of the relevant committee, in the local library. It might be possible to see a copy of the local war plan by getting a sympathetic councillor to obtain a copy. Formal letters could be written to the council's Emergency Planning Officer and Chairperson of the Emergency Planning Committee seeking interviews. It is also worth checking *War Plan UK* by Duncan Campbell which might contain information on your area.


A picture of the local civil defence network will begin to emerge. The local war plan will show which hospitals, parks and schools are involved. The location of ROC posts and local emergency control centres will be established.

Publications and contacts from Scientists Against Nuclear Arms and the Medical Campaign Against Nuclear Weapons can be used to build up information about how any possible nuclear attack might affect your area. The pack prepared by CND for its 'Hard Luck' exercise also showed likely targets and effects (CND regions should have casualty figures).

## Imaginative Actions

Conventional campaigning through public meetings, leafleting and exhibitions are all worthwhile, but civil defence presents many opportunities for imaginative events:

- (i) volunteering: joining the council volunteer force could give the chance to find out what the training involves; to feed in basic facts about the effectiveness of civil defence; or to work with sympathetic councils which are running exercises in a way which shows up the fallacy of civil defence.
- (ii) rates bills: these can be paid on planks of wood or sandbags (you can legally write a cheque on almost anything). Groups of payees could use their 'cheques' to build a mock shelter in front of the council offices.
- (iii) prior preparation for ROC exercises: the first task would be to identify the ROC bunkers in your areas. Sometimes there is only a warning of a day or so about an exercise which is taking place. Prior preparations could include getting in a stock of 'blood stained' bandages for victims who can go and sit on top of the local ROC bunker.
- (iv) people mentioned in civil defence exercises: specific campaigns can be aimed at them. For example, expectant mothers and the elderly who will be removed from hospitals in a crisis; school teachers and dentists who have roles in 'community care centres'; the disabled, high rise flat dwellers and caravan dwellers who are advised to contact their local



Peace campaigners obstruct contractors pouring concrete during the building of Mid-Glamorgan County Wartime HQ.

councils to find alternative accommodation in a crisis; and house owners where a 'billeting questionnaire' might be useful.

- (v) shelter building: ideas here include organising a shelter building race; a treasure hunt for shelter material; or highlighting the nuclear winter by staging an igloo-building race.
- (vi) post-holocaust meals: you could try cooking some of the menus suggested in war plans and official guides. Perhaps a raffle could be held for the lucky winners of the bowls of gruel.

## Publicity

There are many ways to use information about local civil defence arrangements. Firstly civil defence disclosures are newsworthy, and evoke responses in newspapers, radio and TV. Press releases can be followed up with letters to newspapers and phone-ins to the local radio and TV – these can be used to keep the issue alive.

Findings can be published in a leaflet or pamphlet, along



No Bunkers Here

with diagrams to illustrate the effects of an attack on the area. An exhibition could also be put together for use in local libraries or other public buildings. It can then be offered to trade unions, community centres, churches, adult education centres and voluntary groups. A tape/slide show is another very effective way of bringing home to people the local preparations for nuclear war.



Kilburn CND act out government civil defence advice during local festival.

## Approaching Local Authorities

Having discovered the council's policy, you will need to make direct approaches to political groups, especially the controlling group, and to individual councillors. Be prepared to find that many councillors know little of specific arrangements for bunkers, communications and equipment, and few have read the Home Office instructions or attended the official training courses.

A list of all councillors can be obtained from the Council Year Book, the Chief Executive or the Member's Secretariat.

A message to the public from Peace campaigners on Greater Manchester's County Wartime HQ.



Ellen Crow

Individual councillors can be approached by letter, then telephone, followed up by a visit. Encourage supporters in specialist groups, such as SANA and the MCANW to join the lobbying. You could also aim for a regular mailing to councillors.

Keep a note of each councillor's response and build up a picture of where they stand on civil defence. There may be some who will be prepared to raise questions on behalf of CND, or other groups. You may win the argument for the public right to know, even with pro-civil-defence councillors.

Lastly, find out when the council is discussing civil defence matters and try to organise a lobby with interested trade unions, churches, SANA and the MCANW. Banners, posters and exhibitions could be taken to the town hall.

## Contacting Local Trade Unions

All the unions whose members are directly affected by the Government's new civil defence plans have expressed their strong opposition to what they see as a dangerous fraud.

One of the priorities for local CND campaigners should be to make contact with local union branches and to seek to involve them in campaigning. CND groups could consider the following activities:

- (i) offering local union branches a speaker on why CND is opposed to civil defence against nuclear war.
- (ii) asking local union branches or regions to jointly sponsor a dayschool or conference on civil defence and nuclear war. Such dayschools have already been held in Brighton and Newcastle.
- (iii) in some areas local CND groups have joined with local unions to jointly sponsor and endorse leaflets opposing the regulations. CND members have then distributed the leaflets outside hospitals, fire stations and town halls. Five national unions – NUPE, NALGO, FBU, COHSE and the TGWU – have jointly published a leaflet with Trade Union CND opposing the Government's plans. Your members could distribute this leaflet.
- (iv) a representative of the local unions could be invited to address your group to outline the reasons why the union has taken the stand that it has.


# Reasons for Opposing Civil Defence

Everyone fully supports the principle of an effective, adequately funded network designed to cope with natural disasters, fire and industrial accidents. However these preparations are entirely separate from civil defence preparations, which are concerned only with the effects of a hostile attack. There are important reasons why CND believes it is necessary to oppose civil defence arrangements while the UK remains a nuclear weapons state.

Civil defence in a nuclear weapons state ties in closely with military strategy. The Home Office Training Manual for Scientific Advisers explains: 'No defence strategy based on deterrence can be convincing if it fails to include an element for Home Defence. A potential attacker must be persuaded that the nation is ready to accept and survive an attack, at least to the extent of being able to retaliate.' Civil preparedness in this context appears to relate far more to the maintenance of Government and ensuring that a dissenting population will not interfere with arrangements to move to a war footing, than to any measures to protect the public.

## Destabilising effects

Civil defence preparations by a nuclear weapons state are generally interpreted as part of war preparations by their opponents. Major civil defence works or setting in train an evacuation programme could add significantly to the tensions of an international crisis. This was one of the reasons why plans were not implemented during the Cuba missile crisis. As the warning period for attacks grows shorter and the pressure for a launch-on-warning strategy increases this factor becomes even more significant.



## The threat to civil liberties

The vast bulk of civil defence plans are concerned with the preservation of political and military control structures. Massive bunkers, with space for hundreds of officials, expensive communications networks, plans to restrict major roads for military use only and to implement emergency measures to stifle dissent in the run up to war – all these are kept secret from the public.

Investigative journalists have revealed plans for summary executions, priority for VIP casualties, the blocking of main

roads out of cities and the details of military exercises which prepare to deal with civilian demonstrations and resistance in the 'transition-to-war' phase.

## Conclusion

Even if there was a comprehensive civil defence system which could provide effective short-term protection against the effects of nuclear attack for the general public, there would be no protection against the long-term results. The British Medical Association has commented that it is difficult to see how much more than a small fraction of the initial survivors could escape famine and disease in the following years, particularly when the Nuclear Winter is taken into account. (See Section 9.)

Yet US statesmen talk complacently about the US capability to win a protracted nuclear exchange: 'You have the survivability of command and control, a survivability of industrial potential, protection of your citizens and you have the capa-

city that inflicts more damage on the opposition than it inflicts on you. That's the way to come out on top in a nuclear war.'

– Vice-President Bush *The Observer*, February 1983.  
No one who seriously examined the likely consequences of a nuclear war and scale of the contribution that any civil defence measures might make could seriously support the first use of nuclear weapons in response to conventional attack. Yet this is NATO policy and the UK has opposed a UN resolution (37/78j) calling on nuclear weapons states to declare that they will not be the first to use nuclear weapons.

CND cannot accept that civil defence is anything other than a public confidence trick while it remains such an important part of the Government's nuclear posture. We would welcome an open and informed debate on the effectiveness of civil defence measures. The presence of nuclear weapons in the UK makes this country a priority target for any nuclear attack. We must remove these targets before we can begin to consider whether effective civil defence could be provided for the population.




## Misleading the public

Civil defence plans and the statements of those involved in their preparation frequently give the impression that most people will survive a nuclear war if they take a few basic precautions such as staying put, whitewashing their windows and sheltering under the kitchen table. Most of the Government's proposals for the public are highly impractical, highly ineffective or both.

People who can be persuaded that they have a reasonable chance of surviving nuclear war are more likely to become dangerously complacent about the increasing dangers of the arms race and more likely to accept military strategies which envisage first use of nuclear weapons – nuclear war fighting plans which aim to "win" a nuclear exchange – and the idea that a nuclear war could be limited in some way.

## Military Implications

The journal of the Institute of Strategic Studies, *Survival*, has noted the value of civil defence measures 'because of their intrinsic potential for limiting damage and because of their potential for creating a greater degree of public support for a given strategy... Both the potential values of civil defence are important to the creation of a more comprehensive and broadly supported theatre nuclear posture in the Alliance.' (July/August 1981 page 162).



Routes: this is a section of the roads in Britain which the government intends to seal off from civilian use before an attack on Britain.

# Trade Unions and the Regulations

The new Civil Defence Regulations have important implications for council workers and their trade unions.

## Civil Defence Training

Councils will have to make sure that staff who would have wartime roles are sent on training courses run by the Home Office or the county councils themselves. This might only involve the most senior officers – for example the Chief Executive, who will be the wartime controller of the area or the Director of Works, who may be in charge of the disposal of the dead after a nuclear attack – but there is a good chance that other members of staff will also be asked to attend. Some local authorities already have plans for training courses for cooks to learn how to prepare post-holocaust meals; library staff may be asked to train in how to advise the public to find the materials for building their own 'Protect and Survive' shelters; parks staff may be trained in how to dig mass graves when there will be no fuel for machinery; Direct Works Departments could be trained in how to create shelters out of ruins.

There is unlikely to be any additional cover for other areas of work while staff are occupied with civil defence. This will mean greater pressure on staff.

## Civil Defence Exercises

The Government is planning to run regular civil defence exercises in which counties, district and borough councils will have to participate. Staff from any department could be told to take part and act out their wartime roles. Some staff will have been designated to local emergency control centres. These exercises can take place late into the night and sometimes overnight for several days running.

## Training Volunteers


Employees will be asked to organise volunteers' training and suitable exercises, both of which are likely to take place at evenings and weekends, to suit volunteers. There is a risk that a volunteer force, trained in the use of council equipment, could be used for strike-breaking at a later date.

## What Trade Unionists Can Do

All the trade unions directly affected by the Government's civil defence plans have expressed their strong opposition. As Ken Cameron, the General Secretary of the Fire Brigades Union, says: "The Government's civil defence plans are the greatest con-trick in history. They are an attempt to con the British people into believing you can have a nuclear war and come out of it unscratched. We are not going to give credibility to the Government's war games."

While the unions have very good policies there is a grave need to develop greater understanding and support among union members of the reasons for their union's policies. As a worker in the health service, fire brigade or local government there are a number of ways that you can campaign in support of your union's policy. First of all attend your branch meeting and if the branch has not taken a stand on the issue consider moving a resolution on the subject. (See the model resolution in the next section.) Depending on the response, it may be possible to persuade your branch to undertake a major campaign against the regulations. If so, there are a number of ideas that might be useful:

- (i) a speaker from the Medical Campaign Against Nuclear Weapons or Scientists Against Nuclear Arms could be invited to speak at a branch meeting. Videos like 'A Guide to Armageddon' could also be shown.
- (ii) five national unions – the FBU, NUPE, NALGO, COHSE and the TGWU – have jointly produced a leaflet opposing the Government's plans. Your branch could ensure that all members receive a copy of the leaflet. NALGO has also produced a 20-page pamphlet entitled 'Civil Defence; Bunkers or Bonkers?'. As many NALGO members as possible should see a copy of this.



- (iii) as an additional educational tool the branch could sponsor a petition opposing the Government's civil defence plans and circulate it amongst branch members. This is an ideal way to develop discussion around the issue.

(iv) local branches should also approach their employer enquiring as to their intended course of action. Do they, for example, intend to try and compel workers to participate in the Government's civil defence exercises? Will they allow conscientious objection to the regulations?

(v) local branches could also sponsor a dayschool on the regulations and how they affect members. Trade Union CND will be able to help with speakers and resources.

## Model Resolution for Trade Union Branches

'This branch views with deep concern the introduction of new so-called civil defence duties for local councils. We oppose:

- a) the intention of using local government workers for nuclear war games and other preparations;
- b) increased expenditure on civil defence especially at a time when other areas of local government are being cut;
- c) training of volunteers in wartime roles which could enable them to be used as a strike-breaking force;
- d) any attempt to delude people that, while Britain remains a 'nuclear weapons state' and prime target, there can be any effective civil defence against nuclear attack.

This branch affirms that it will take such action as may be necessary to protect any member who may be prejudiced in any way as a result of following his or her conscience in this matter and refusing to take part.

This branch will:

- i) inform the local authority management side of this resolution and demand that they should provide the right of conscientious objection to all employees;
- ii) issue information to all branch members informing them of the implications of the regulations and urging them not to take part in any civil defence activity;
- iii) invite a speaker from the Medical Campaign Against Nuclear Weapons, Scientists Against Nuclear Weapons or the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, to a forthcoming branch meeting to discuss the effectiveness of civil defence against nuclear attack and the reasons for opposing the regulations;
- iv) notify the union's Divisional/Regional Council and National Executive of this resolution asking what action has been taken to oppose the regulations so far, what is being planned and what publicity and information materials are available for branches to use;
- v) contact representatives of other unions locally whose members may be affected by these regulations to discuss a joint campaign and publicity;
- vi) investigate the possibility of working with other local government, fire and health service unions, CND, the Medical Campaign Against Nuclear Weapons and Scientists Against Nuclear Arms, to produce a local study of the likely effects of a nuclear attack and the impracticality of civil defence planning.'

## Resources

For more information on Trade Unions and Civil Defence and about the promotion of CND's aims in the trade union movement write to Andrew Hewett, TUCND, 11 Goodwin St. London N4 3HQ.

# Trade Unions Policies on Civil Defence

Many British trade union have passed conference resolutions opposing civil defence; others have written to the TUC or direct to the Home Office. Below are extracts from some of the union statements.

**National Association of Local Government Officers (NALGO):** The 1983 annual conference passed a resolution condemning 'Government plans to increase the planning duties of public authorities and the attempt to conscript unwilling workers into taking part in war planning, which is an insufferable abuse of the civil limitations of public employees. Conference believes that these plans are a sham, designed to mislead the public into thinking that a nuclear war is survivable.'

The resolution instructed the union's National Executive to oppose 'any attempt to conscript workers into nuclear war preparations or any training of volunteers in emergency services roles which might enable them to be used as strike breakers.'

The National Executive should inform members that they would have the support of the union 'if they refuse to take part on grounds of personal conscience or on the grounds that his/her contract of employment has been unilaterally varied, and to draw up contingency plans to protect members.'

**Association of Supervisory, Technical and Managerial Staffs (ASTMS):** The 1983 annual conference of the union said it was totally opposed to: (i) 'any attempt to conscript local government employees into preparations for nuclear war; (ii) any increased expenditure on civil defence, especially at a time when all other areas are being cut; (iii) any training of volunteers in emergency service roles which might enable them to be used as strike breakers; (iv) any attempt to delude people that civil defence could protect them from a nuclear attack on Britain as a nuclear weapons state, and the use of public funds by the present Government to spread propoganda in favour of nuclear weapons.

**British Association of Social Workers:** The 1982 conference said: '... the Government's plan for civil defence in the face of nuclear attack is unrealistic, inadequate and inhuman.' The union therefore offered full support to any member who objected to being involved in war planning exercises and guaranteed assistance to members facing disciplinary action as a consequence of taking such a stance.

**Fire Brigades Union:** The 1983 conference said: 'As an organisation we refuse to participate in any form of plans or exercises which are only a crude attempt to give credibility to the Government's war games.'

**Confederation of Health Service Employees:** '... This conference (1982) notes with concern the increasing militarisation of society. It instructs the Executive Committee to take such action as may be necessary to protect any members of the union whose work may be in any way prejudiced as a result of following their conscience in the matter of nuclear weapons... Conference believes there is no defence against nuclear war.'

**National Union of Public Employees:** Conference believes that plans for civil defence in a nuclear war are not only a waste of money but a deliberate attempt to deceive the people and persuade them that they would survive such a war. Conference therefore notes with extreme concern the government's intentions, through the 1983 Civil Defence Regulations, to increase the so-called civil defence duties of local authorities and calls on Labour councils to refuse to cooperate with these plans. Conference is totally opposed to:

- (i) any attempt to use local government employees for nuclear war preparations;
- (ii) any increased expenditure on civil defence, especially at a time when all other areas are being cut;
- (iii) any training of volunteers in emergency service roles which might enable them to be used as strike breakers;
- (iv) any attempt to delude people that "civil defence" would protect them from a nuclear attack on Britain.

This Conference therefore directs the Executive Council to immediately begin planning for support for such action, including strike action, as may be necessary to protect any member who may be in any way prejudiced as a result of following his or her conscience in this matter. This Conference further directs the Executive Council to:

- (i) write to the Home Office stating this Union's opposition to the new regulations;
  - (ii) raise the issue in the TUC Local Government Committee (and the Labour Party NEC) urging a labour movement campaign against so-called "civil defence";
  - (iii) urge sponsored MPs to oppose any further regulations in Parliament.
- (i) Branches should inform their local authorities and/or



- health authorities of the Union's opposition.
- (ii) Branches should inform local MPs of their opposition and this resolution.
  - (iii) Branches should hold special branch meetings to consider their own most appropriate responses to local authority defence plans which involve members in their area.

Conference declares that for this country the only defence against nuclear war is nuclear disarmament and recognises that the arrival of cruise missiles into the UK will dramatically alter the nature of the campaigns which oppose both cruise and other missiles in Britain. In view of this, Conference believes that its support for CND must include support for the principle of non-violent direct action. Furthermore, we resolve:

- (i) to instruct the Executive Council to develop in conjunction with other trade unions and CND a clear programme of trade union action as part of this campaign;
- (ii) to give full support to all Branches and members who become involved in non-violent direct action as part of this campaign;
- (iii) that further supplies of NUPE's excellent "Peace Pack" be made freely available for distribution through Branches.

1984 Conference

**National Graphical Association:** 'We believe that the powers the Government intends to take unto itself in pursuit of Conservative Party policies are a direct infringement on the liberty of British citizens. We believe that there are ample grounds to doubt whether these policies have the majority support which would justify the power over individuals the Government intends to take in these regulations. Furthermore, the implications of the Government's action in making further inroads into Local Authority democratic autonomy by the use of the power of law are unacceptable...' - Letter to the TUC.

**Wales TUC:** 'Conference congratulates all local authorities in Wales on establishing Wales as a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone... Conference calls on the General Council... to utilise to the full all its available resources to combat Civil Defence Regulations and to oppose the building of concrete bunkers or any similar work which will aid this nuclear madness...' - 1983 conference.

**Trades Union Congress:** '... The TUC is opposed in principle to the Government seeking powers to, in effect, conscript local government workers in the preparations for Britain's defence in a nuclear war... The TUC is opposed to any increase in expenditure on Civil Defence at a time when vital local authority services are being reduced because of Government imposed expenditure cutbacks...' 'More generally, the TUC is concerned that the increased emphasis on Civil Defence might help foster the dangerous illusion that the nation could survive a nuclear war. The fact is that even a limited nuclear exchange would cause devastation and suffering on a huge scale, and any Government measures that suggest that this could be satisfactorily contained are futile and dangerous' - TUC Statement, 1983.

## Effects of a Nuclear Attack on Britain


The general effects of a nuclear attack on Britain are now widely realised, but, as a reminder, we briefly list here some of the consequences.

'Doomsday', which contains the most comprehensive and scientific, computerised analysis of a nuclear attack, says: '... even a moderate level of attack would be likely to result in at least four-fifths of the country's population being killed and injured by the direct effects, 65 per cent of all buildings in the country being seriously damaged, set on fire or demolished and 70 per cent of the inhabited area of Britain being subjected to levels of radiation from fallout which would be fatal to any person (and most animals) in the open.' (*Doomsday*, by Openshaw, Steadman and Greene, Blackwell, 1983).

The Government brief in the 1980 Square Leg civil defence exercise showed an attack of 205 megatons (one megaton equals one million tons of high explosive); this is equivalent, at a moderate estimate, to 13,000 bombs of the type that destroyed Hiroshima. The estimate was much reduced in later Home Office figures, but compared with the number of bombs available for attack on this country it is comparatively modest. Certainly with the coming of cruise missiles it must now be greatly increased. The Secretary of State for Defence (Air) said in the House of Commons on 6 March, 1980: 'More than 1,000 megatons would be needed to destroy the ground-launched cruise missiles once they were dispersed'.

The British Medical Association has estimated that one medium-size H-bomb exploded on a city would produce enough casualties to overwhelm the medical services of the entire country. For example, there are not enough hospital facilities to care for even a small fraction of the people who would suffer extensive burns.

Consequences of an attack may be divided roughly into the immediate and the long-term effects. The immediate effects would be death from blast and heat; people would be vaporised by the heat wave, cut to pieces by flying glass and other objects, flung against walls by enormously powerful winds and buried by falling buildings. Power, water and the electricity supply would be cut off, transport and communications wrecked.




The horrors of nuclear war: painting by atom bomb survivor Masoto Yamashita.

The after effects would be, if anything, even more disastrous. Firestorms would destroy many areas, incinerating people in shelters and those lying injured in the open or in houses. Epidemics would sweep the country as a result of the wreckage of the sewage system, the presence of millions of rotting bodies and the rapid increase of rats and insects unaffected by fallout. Many thousands would die slowly in agony from radiation disease. The increase of cancer and birth defects would be notable results of radiation among those who did not starve to death.

*Doomsday* refers to the original Doomsday Book, saying that it gave a total estimated population in 1086 of about 1¼ million. It adds 'It is quite conceivable that a nuclear attack of the magnitude we face today would leave at the end of the following year, say, only a comparable number surviving under conditions which would make the daily life of the eleventh century seem like a paradise.' (This summary does not take into account the effects of a nuclear winter, described in Section 9.)


### Resources

The most comprehensive account of the likely effects of a nuclear attack on Britain is in *Doomsday* by S. Openshaw, P. Steadman, and O. Green (Blackwell 1983). Also useful are: *London After The Bomb* by Owen Greene and others, published by Oxford University Press, 1982. (What a nuclear attack on a large city really means). *Crucible of Despair: the effects of nuclear war*. By Anthony Tucker and John Gleisner, published by Menard Press, 1982. (A short account of the effects of nuclear weapons). *The Medical Effects of Nuclear War*. (The Report of the British Medical Association's Board of Science and Education), John Wiley & Sons, Chichester, 1983. All these are available from the CND Bookshop, 227 Seven Sisters Road, London N4 2DA. Send SAE for a full catalogue.




## The Nuclear Winter

### A BLACK CLOUD OF SOOT AND DUST SPREADS OVER THE NORTHERN HEMISPHERE AND INTO THE SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE




#### TWO DAYS

Thousands of smoke plumes, each hundreds of miles long, causing patchy cloud cover, mostly in mid-latitudes.




#### ONE WEEK

Middle latitudes densely covered. Patchy cover elsewhere.



#### TWO WEEKS

Entire northern hemisphere covered with dust and soot cloud.



#### ONE MONTH

Spreads into Southern hemisphere

Nuclear war: a Martian-eye view. The climatic effects of nuclear war are almost certain to spread from the Northern Hemisphere with its (relatively) high concentration of nuclear targets, big cities and combatant nations, to the (relatively) non-aligned and non-nuclear South. This revelation is one of the most important political conclusions of the nuclear winter findings and could lead to renewed international pressure for disarmament.

In 1982-83, a group of scientists from three research centres in the US made a series of new studies on the effects of nuclear war on the earth's atmosphere, with particular attention to the effects of dust and smoke from fires caused by nuclear explosions. The preliminary results of these studies were of dramatic significance. In April 1983, a five-day Conference, involving some 100 nuclear and atmospheric physicists, and biologists, reviewed these results. It emerged that two major US and USSR research groups had come to identical results.

These studies showed that if there is a nuclear war in which 5000 megatons (only about a third of the nuclear arsenals of the US and USSR) are exploded, with 20% of the explosive power concentrated on urban/industrial targets in the Northern Hemisphere, then:

- An unbroken pall of darkness could cover the Northern Hemisphere, spreading rapidly into the Southern Hemisphere. Within a week after the war, the amount of sunlight at ground level could be reduced to just a few per cent of normal, which would halt or severely limit plant growth. The consequence of this would cascade through all food chains.
- A harsh 'nuclear winter' could result. There could be a rapid and dramatic drop in land temperatures to sub-freezing levels for several months, large disturbances in global circulation patterns and dramatic changes in local weather. Even if

the war were to occur in the summer, many areas might be subject to continuous snowfall for months. This would substantially reduce the chances of human survival. A spring or summer war could kill or damage virtually all crops in the Northern Hemisphere.

- Exposure to radioactive fallout could be worse than previously predicted. The drastic effects of smoke upon the atmosphere could cause fallout on an intermediate timescale, extending over many days and weeks.


In addition to the heavy fallout downwind of groundbursts, this intermediate fallout would expose people in the Northern mid-latitudes to an additional radioactive dose, increasing the probability of infectious disease, cancer, genetic and embryonic effects.

- Fires would have serious and unanticipated consequences. Uncontrolled fires could sweep over wide areas. Urban fires would generate large amounts of deadly toxins from the combustion of synthetic materials.

- Ozone depletion could increase exposure to ultra-violet light. After smoke cleared, UV doses roughly 1.6 times normal could be reaching the surface. Immune systems of human and other animals are suppressed by low doses of UV. This would lead to an increase in disease. Protracted exposure may also lead to blindness.

- Tropical forests could disappear. If darkness or cold, or both, were to become widespread in the tropics, the tropical forests, which are the major reservoir of organic diversity, could largely disappear. This could lead to the extinction of the majority of species on earth.

It is even thought that similar effects could result from relatively 'small' nuclear exchanges down to an attack of 100



● **Carl Sagan Video 'The Global Atmosphere'** 5 minute video presentation used by Carl Sagan to present visually the 'nuclear winter' concept. VHS

● **SANA Video "NUCLEAR WINTER"** How could nuclear war trigger a climatic catastrophe? What would be the consequences for plants and animals – and for human survival? What are the policy implications for nuclear disarmament and for Civil Defence? How did a poet see the impact of a relatively small climatic disturbance in 'The lost summer of 1816'? This 30 minute video, presented by Prof. Michael Pentz, Dr. Irene Ridge and Dame Peggy Ashcroft should provide some of the answers. (VHS) Available from SANA, 112 Newport Road, New Bradwell, Milton Keynes MK13 0AA.

● **Slide presentation and speakers notes** A chronological visual presentation in some detail of 'Nuclear winter'.

● **Nuclear Winter – A New Dimension For The Nuclear Debate** 60 page A5 booklet covering: Conclusions of the Washington Conference; Research work before and after; Areas of uncertainty and criticism; Implications for nuclear strategy, civil defence and the peace movement

● **SANA Information Leaflet** Describing the 'Nuclear winter' findings and implications for Peace Movement. 4 A5 pp. Available from SANA, 112 Newport Road, New Bradwell, Milton Keynes MK13 0AA.

● **A Mass Leaflet on the Nuclear Winter** Camera ready art work for a mass leaflet (A4 folded 3 times). Space for local group information. Suitable for groups to reproduce and distribute.

CND Publications has published a leaflet on the Nuclear Winter. This is available from CND Sales, 227 Seven Sisters Road, London N4 2DA for £2.70 per 100, including postage.

Mushroom cloud: All dust and smoke from nuclear explosions can contribute to the 'nuclear winter' syndrome. But most damage would be done by soot and smoke which absorbs sunlight. Dust, in the higher reaches of the atmosphere, will also reflect sunlight. Much of the dust and smoke will be radioactive. The smoke will also be chemically active, bringing about unpredictable chemical reaction in the upper atmosphere.

megatons on cities. These predictions demonstrate the ultimate absurdity of civil defence.

The Home Office continues to try to justify its 'civil defence' measures by arguing that 'there will be millions of survivors' after a nuclear war and that measures must be taken for 'national recovery' within a framework of proper government and 'law and order'. No doubt many of the top political and military people imagine that they will be safe in their deep bunkers and can come out and rule the country in the aftermath. Well-to-do people, especially in rural areas far from known targets, who are providing themselves with elaborate and expensive nuclear shelters, may have similar illusions.

The real nature of 'the world after nuclear war' needs to be understood clearly, especially by Local Authorities that may be forced by Government legislation to take part in the misleading 'civil defence' exercises organised by the Home Office.

## Resources

SANA have the following available:

● **Official Summary of Conference Findings** from the Washington Conference held in October 1983. 6 A4 pp.

● **Science papers on the Nuclear Winter** including the 'TTAPS' paper (physics), the Ehrlich et al paper (biology), presented at the Washington Conference. Other papers available on request including the Anne Ehrlich paper, printed in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists April 1984

## Questions and Answers

### Isn't civil defence planning like wearing a seat belt – a prudent measure in case things go wrong?

It is no good putting on your seat belt if you are racing towards the cliff-edge. You need to apply the brakes and reverse. Far from being prudent, civil defence preparations are dangerous if they encourage the Government to believe we can survive a nuclear war.

### Isn't taking part in civil defence a humanitarian duty?

Of course anybody who survived the immediate aftermath would do whatever they could to ease suffering. But medical people, firefighters and many local authorities recognise they have a more immediate duty – to speak out to prevent nuclear war and to refuse to take part in the civil defence deception that there can be survival in any real sense after a nuclear war.

The Government's claims to humanity look pretty thin while it forces cut-backs in the health service, and firefighters have no proper breathing equipment for dealing with peacetime fires. These cuts cost lives now while resources are thrown away on Trident and the charade of civil defence.

The medical profession, which has a genuine claim to humanity, has recognised that the medical services could not cope with the casualties which could result from even one bomb.


Why is the Government forcing health and fire authorities to take on war planning staff when they are short of staff to save lives now? Why do they allow the US to build hospitals in this country which will be used for US servicemen in the event of a nuclear war when we need more hospital beds now?

It would be humanitarian to reduce the risk of war and the number of potential targets. This Government, on the contrary, has increased both by bringing in US-controlled cruise missiles.

### But couldn't Government civil defence preparations save millions of lives?

The Government has never been able to substantiate this claim. It has refused to make available the full calculations on which its casualty estimates are based. In fact the British Medical Association (BMA) report on the Medical Effects of Nuclear War showed that Home Office casualty figures were seriously in error – producing estimates up to 2½ times lower than other scientific authorities.

Government advice to the public is to 'stay put' in the event of a nuclear attack and build 'Protect and Survive' type shelters. These would collapse under the blast pressures likely to




be produced in large parts of the country. Grants for building public shelters were stopped when the new Civil Defence Regulations were introduced. Even if there was a large scale public shelter scheme lives could only be saved in the short term as there are no provisions against the long term effects, such as the Nuclear Winter.

### We might not suffer an all-out attack. Couldn't it be a demonstration shot, limited nuclear attack, or accidental shot?

Few military strategists believe in the idea of a 'demonstration' or 'warning' shot. The risks are too high – a country detecting an attack would probably launch its own missiles because it would rather 'use them than lose them'.

According to the BMA report, even in a so-called 'limited' attack on Britain, there would be 38.6 million deaths in the few weeks following the attack. These figures do not include deaths which would result from firestorms, famines and epidemics, let alone the Nuclear Winter.



Raymond Briggs

The risk of the accidental release of nuclear weapons increases. Estimates suggest that US military computers malfunction on average every two weeks. If launched by accident, missiles cannot be recalled. NATO's new weapons, particularly Pershing with its short flight time, push the USSR into adopting a 'launch on warning' policy to prevent the destruction of their missiles in their silos. Such a policy drastically reduces the time available to spot computer errors.

**Wouldn't civil defence plans help if there is a natural disaster?**


Civil defence is concerned with the effects of attack by a foreign power. It is legally distinct from planning for emergencies and accidents.

The Government provides no grants to councils for civil emergency planning, unlike civil defence. There is no legal duty to undertake it although, of course, most councils do. Nuclear Free Zones have been moving staff from war planning to civil emergencies with good results. More is needed to help planning for such things as chemical explosions. But the effect of the new Regulations is to take staff away from this area.

Most civil defence plans would be useless for dealing with civil emergencies. Underground control centres are not much help for dealing with flooding. Plans to disperse medical personnel, fire engines and drugs are the opposite to those needed for civil contingencies, or indeed in response to any conventional attack, which would call for the concentration of resources.

**Why don't we have civil defence like the Swiss and Swedish?**

Switzerland and Sweden have taken political decisions not to develop nuclear weapons or belong to a military alliance. Therefore their civil defence is not tied to a nuclear weapons strategy and cannot be seen as destabilising and a sign that they are preparing to fight a nuclear war. NATO policy however is based on the threat to use nuclear weapons first. British civil defence propaganda aims to make this threat appear 'credible'.



"...IN ENGLAND'S GREEN AND PLEASANT LAND..."


Swiss and Swedish civil defence is designed to deal with the overspill effects of a nuclear war involving the superpowers – perhaps a few megatons direct, plus fallout from other countries. Britain, which is crammed full of military bases and facilities, can expect an attack of the order of at least several hundred megatons.

Since their civil defence programmes were begun, back in the 1950s, new facts have come to light which suggest that even these relatively complex precautions could well be entirely futile. Not only will these countries have to deal with the long term effects of radioactive fallout, epidemics, water pollution and social, economic and political breakdown in neighbouring countries, but, in common with the rest of the world, they might have to face the threat of a Nuclear Winter.

**Why does the Soviet Union spend so much on civil defence?**

The USSR has the same political motivations for civil defence as other nuclear powers – to reassure the public; to control the public and allow the military war preparations to proceed at a time of tension, and to help convince the enemy that the threat to use nuclear weapons is not an empty bluff.

The efficiency of the USSR civil defence programme has been grossly exaggerated. US technical studies show that Soviet civil defence would be largely ineffective just like ours. Ordinary people in the USSR are as sceptical about civil defence plans as the British public. The Russian slang for civil defence is 'grob' which means coffin.



It is true that in the short term a higher proportion of the Soviet population might survive the immediate effects of a nuclear attack than in Britain. But this is because people are much more widely dispersed over a much larger area and military targets are not so close to the centres of population. This 'advantage' would mean little in the long term because of the destruction of the social and economic infrastructure and the likely effects of the Nuclear Winter.

**Weren't the people who argued before the second world war that civil defence could not protect us from the effects of bombing in fact wrong?**

Yes, before the second world war the Government was




Government advice for the protection of the public against nuclear attack has been justifiably ridiculed.

unsympathetic to calls for public protection. It claimed that preparations would alarm the public, but did build deep military bunkers. This Government has a similar patronising attitude to the public – providing us with advice on 'do-it-yourself' shelters and telling us to stay put while it builds deep bunkers for politicians and military commanders.

The groups of people who did most to help the public during the air-raids of the second world war – the firefighters, nurses and doctors – have been widely critical of the Government's civil defence preparations, and maintain that there can be no effective protection against the effects of a nuclear attack. Prevention is the only cure.

The scale of death and destruction in both world wars was horrifying but it is nothing compared to the likely results of any nuclear war.



**Won't the deterrent prevent this from happening?**

Nuclear strategy is not static, there is an increasing risk. By the end of the decade the technology may exist for the US to consider itself capable of launching a successful first strike with an 'acceptable' level of retaliation. The USSR should reach the same stage a few years later. This, in addition to the idea of fighting a 'limited' nuclear war, will create an extremely unstable situation.

Negotiations have got nowhere after 35 years – we cannot rely on them alone to make progress. Unilateral nuclear disarmament initiatives are needed to break the stalemate and create a climate within which reciprocal moves can be made.

**Resources**

CND Publications have published a more complete Questions and Answers leaflet on civil defence. This is available from CND Sales, 227 Seven Sisters Road, London N4 2DA, for 85p per 10 copies, inclusive of postage.

## 'What they say'

### The Official View

'It seems likely that any initial nuclear strike would be a massive one, aimed at making the country attacked totally ineffective militarily, politically and industrially. In particular, the means of nuclear retaliation would be primary targets...' *Home Office Training Manual for Scientific Advisers.*

'There would be no question of implementing emergency feeding arrangements during the pre-attack period for those who chose to ignore the Government's advice to stay in their homes...' *Home Office Circular ES1/79.*

'(casualty) sorting (must) be repeated and continuous, it must be ruthless if it is to be effective; it would often be necessary to give priority to the less severely injured casualties and have regard to the nation's need in the phase of recovery...' *DHSS Guidance Notes.*

### Civil Defence is Foolish

'If you go in with a power shovel or hand shovel and clear off the top inch of dirt, mound it off somewhere out of the way, you've gotten rid of the radiation in that area... If there are enough shovels to go round everybody's going to make it...' *Thomas K. Jones, US Deputy Under Secretary of Defence.*

'I'd hope to be up within three weeks to try to get some sort of organisation going, at least trying to get round educating people to get things like their room swept out...' *Graham Bate - A Nuclear Shelter Owner.*

'They (the WRVS) hope to keep a "meals on wheels" service running for the elderly and handicapped, and provide a "books on wheels" and a "jigsaws on wheels" service...' *Lady Pike, Chairperson of the WRVS, 30/3/81.*

### Civil Defence is Futile

'The NHS could not deal with the casualties that might be expected following the detonation of a single one megaton weapon over the UK' *British Medical Association Report on the Medical Effects of Nuclear War.*

'It is an illusion that civil defence would save significant numbers of lives or significantly decrease the effects of nuclear war...' *International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, March 1981.*

'The vulnerability of the environment is the last word in the argument against the usefulness of shelters. There is no hole big enough to hide all of nature in...' *Jonathan Schell in 'The Fate of the Earth'.*

'Statements appear that nuclear war can be won, that a limited nuclear war can be waged, that humanity and the biosphere will persist even in conditions of total nuclear catastrophe. This is an illusion...' *Dr E.I. Chazov, Director, National Cardiology Research Centre, USSR.*

'As the British Government's White Paper on Defence put it as long ago as 1957, there are no means of protecting the population against the consequences of nuclear attack. There are none today, when the scale of attack that could be envisaged is at least a hundred times greater than it was 20 years ago...' *Lord Zuckerman, former Chief Scientific Adviser to the Ministry of Defence.*

### The Government underestimates the effects of nuclear attack

'The combined effect of all the differences between (SANA's) own and the Home Office's computer model is for the former to predict twice or even two and a half times the total number of casualties for an identical pattern and weight of attack... the Working Party believes... that the projections from SANA give a more realistic estimate of the blast, heat and radiation effects...' *BMA Report on the Medical Effects of Nuclear War.*

'It is difficult to conclude that errors in the Home Office casualty model, when taken together, are not a deliberate attempt to minimise the perceived consequences of a nuclear attack...' *'The Nuclear Casebook', MCANW.*

'Solely for the purpose of survival planning, it can be assumed that the population survival rate would range from 60% in the worst affected areas to 90% in the least damaged areas' *Home Office Circular ES3/73.*

### Civil Defence is part of Nuclear Strategy

'... civil preparedness should be adequate if the credibility of the military deterrent strategy was to be maintained. Military and civil preparedness was closely related.' *Mr Leon Brittan, Home Secretary, in the House of Commons, February 21, 1980.*

'No defence policy based on deterrence can be convincing if it fails to include an element for Home Defence. A potential attacker must be persuaded that the nation is ready to accept and survive an attack, at least to the extent of being able to retaliate.' *Home Office Manual for Scientific Advisers.*

### Civil defence means Social Control

The *Police Manual of Home Defence* states that police war duties include: 'special measures to maintain internal security, with particular reference to the detention or restriction of movement of subversive or potentially subversive people...'.

'Priority should be given to the Essential Service Routes which, so far as is possible, should be kept clear of refugees and non-essential traffic.'

### Civil Defence is Dangerous

'The most serious danger is that the desensitised populations of the major powers, fed statistics implying that there will be plenty of survivors and persuaded that "nukes" are merely an extension of conventional weaponry, will allow Governments to consider nuclear war as a rational possibility.' *'Comprehending the Bomb', Antony Tucker, The Guardian, April 25, 1980.*

'All (civil defence) does is give the illusion that you can have a nice neat, humane, limited war. And that's the most dangerous delusion that Mankind's ever dreamed up...' *Admiral Gene Laroque, former Pentagon Military Planner.*

'You have a survivability of command and control, a survivability of industrial potential, protection of your citizens, and you have a capacity that inflicts more damage on the opposition than it inflicts on you. That's the way to come out on top in a nuclear war...' *George Bush, US Vice President, February 1983.*

