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## Contributors

### CORRECTION

In the May/June issue of *Resurgence*, the article *Non-Violence in the West (I)* was published under the name of GEOFFREY ASHE. The article was, in fact, written by PETER TWILLEY, to whom *Non-Violence in the West (II)* was correctly attributed. We apologise to both writers for this mistake.

**HENRI CHOPIN's** cover he calls "Frogs' legs, extra-political collage" (Apr. 1968). Chopin says he was "born in 1922 according to the civil servants, and born of all ages, according to himself". In 1950-52 he created "a space-art, against all the established appellations of art". In 1957 he invented "a personal language, which is suggestive and not discursive and didactic... a projection of life, rather than individual expression." He "loves life and refuses merely to exist," and he "denies any Hitlers, de Gaulles or Wilsons the right to direct him", saying, "Just ask yourselves what in fact they are qualified in... Think of all those who have killed, in the name of right, from Alexander to our days." He continues to "group together authors and men who have freed themselves completely of the Word", and to "destroy all lying speeches, even when they are sincere."

Our tribute to **SIR HERBERT READ** (1893-1968) is printed alongside one of his last articles that we feel it is appropriate to publish now.

We are finally publishing three poems translated by **JOHN STEVENS WADE** (from the Dutch of **NICO VERHOEVEN**, **BERT VOETEN** and **CLARA EGGINK**), which we have held back for some months in the hope of contacting Mr. Wade for further information about himself and the poets he has rendered into such fair-sounding English. Poems by him have appeared in *The Nation*, *The Cambridge Review*, *West Coast Review*, *The Dubliner*, *Exit*, *Etc.* He is an American living—when he sent us the poems—in Cornwall. We should like to get in touch with him again.

**LEOPOLD KOHR** was born in 1909 in Austria and studied at the Universities of Innsbruck, Paris and Vienna. He is a prolific writer, and has lectured and broadcast extensively in North America. He is now Professor of Economics at the University of Puerto Rico, and he has been the economic adviser of Anguilla since that island declared its independence a year ago. His book, *The Breakdown of Nations* (1957) was reviewed in *Resurgence* 9 (Sept./Oct. 1967), and the article published here is based on a chapter of his book, *The Overdeveloped Nations*, which is not yet available in English. Kohr will be a key speaker at The Fourth World Conference in London (Aug. 5th-9th 1968), which is being convened under the somewhat controversial title of his earlier book.

**ROGER FRANKLIN**, who is helping to edit *Resurgence*, has a background in science and a long-standing concern to find ways to a more peaceful world. He is at present studying and writing, and seeking new constructive approaches.

## EDITORIAL

# THE REVOLUTION

At last it has begun. Many people have long been aware that our technological societies are dying, and that only a major change of direction can save them. But on the precise nature or extent of that change there has been little agreement or understanding. The so-called radicals and leftists have been content to assume that the problem has been simply one of a failure to apply the ideology of their particular sect, and that if communist or socialist leaders have chosen courses which have led to more war, more waste, or more mass immiseration, then the failure has been a personal one of leadership, and not one that involves a fresh appraisal of the problem.

It is, of course, absurd to seek to explain the history of any period in terms of this or that leader's 'betrayal', or of the 'cult of personality', or by the supposed errors of 'revisionism', and it is even more absurd to seek to explain the drift of events in the complex societies of this century in such terms.

Our societies are dying because they are out of control and are pursuing courses which have disaster structured into their assumptions. One need only plot a graph of fuel consumption and known fuel reserves (about which, of course, there is a lot of guesswork in more than one direction), of population trends and food potential, of the mounting scale of diseases caused by stress or deprivation, of the use of high-powered pesticides and other dangerous chemicals, of the spread of thermonuclear weapons and of the appalling new range of gas and germ weapons in a historical climate where the sanctity of human life, to say nothing of its dignity, count for less and less against a rising tide of intolerance and hate, to see that unless these trends are reversed some catastrophic consequences are bound to break before very long.

These are mainly matters of statistical assessment, but they are none the less real; to grasp what is happening to individual human persons under the stresses of our rotten megapolitan societies may make greater demands on our imaginative capacities.

There are all sorts of reasons why filing people up in skyscraper blocks of flats is a sure recipe for sociological calamity; the same holds true for herding people into huge impersonal workplaces, for piling them into subtopian agglomerations governed by faceless municipal officers, or for subjecting them to the calculated cacaphony of high pressure advertising, to the crush, din and stress of modern urban transport and the uninhibited intrusions of modern marketing methods. All these situations have a common element: the forces determining them are impersonal—the profit motive, the lust for power in politics, the bureaucratic neurosis for tidiness, and so on. None of them is the product of the wishes of the people whose lives they control and confine.

But man is not born to suffer a perpetual existence of battery-hen docility, whatever the architects, planners and bureaucrats may conjure to

the contrary. Apart from his quest for love and truth, he seeks perpetually to create. As if it were an answer to this need, the satisfied ones are apt to point proudly to the advances of voting rights and democracy made over the last century; but in doing so they ignore that the mechanism of the ballot box, especially in the business of party organisation, selecting of candidates and the financing of electoral campaigns, has become so corrupt (a minority gathering spoils of power and fat salaries at the expense of the majority) as to cease to be either meaningful or honourable.

Some may think, indeed professors of politics frequently do, that the position of the citizen is safeguarded here by the existence of rival parties. Whether this contention *could* be true is a moot point; in the societies where it is supposed to operate, it is demonstrably false. A party with serious electoral prospects cannot campaign on a single major issue (such as, e.g., unilateral nuclear disarmament); to do so would be to alienate a margin of its own supporters and to fail to attract the margin of support from the centre that is needed for success at the polls. Elections are decided at the margin, hence the need for a 'package deal' programme which will attract rather than repel a sufficient margin of uncommitted voters. Since we live in mass societies and are all subjected to the same conditioning forces, it follows that the uncommitted will ordinarily only respond favourably to what they are conditioned to, and that they will tend to respond negatively to anything of a contrary nature (as any peace activist well knows). Hence the phenomenon of 'the consensus' that dominates modern politics, with which all main parties seek to identify—instead of projecting distinct policies—and which robs the electorate of any significant choice.

### A Persuaded Society

What then determines the consensus? The question admits a great many answers, but of one it does not. The consensus is not determined by the mass of the people themselves, as the working of any advertising agency will readily confirm. It is indeed in the effects of the work of such agencies, and the forces that finance them, that a large part of the answer is to be found. A society manipulated by hidden persuaders is a persuaded one. Of what then is it persuaded? The advertisers themselves provide that answer; it is persuaded that an unlimited propensity for the consumption of goods sold for profit is the supreme value of our civilisation. To this end the magnificence of man, to say nothing of an ordinary concern for human well-being and self-fulfilment is lost in the worship (it is surely nothing less) of such false gods as the gross national product, the drive for more exports (to pay for more imports as a means to greater exports...), the 'value of the pound', and so on.

These, by long usage, have come to be the criteria by which a society's well-being is measured, and by which the play of politics is judged. Yet it would be possible for the consumption of cars, T.V. sets, hair driers, washing-up machines, electric toothbrushes, front door chimes, cornflakes, iced lollies, frozen fish-fingers, plastic dog-collars and a large range of similar junk to decrease by fifty per cent. in one year without a ripple of hardship in the community at large. Why then all the fret and fuss to increase their consumption without limit?

To contemplate this process, and all the waste, ugliness, discord, stress, and danger it brings in its train is to be jolted afresh into an awareness that profound questions about the nature of man and the basic purpose of his societies are being ignored, or given answers the falsity of which the glib rhetoric of mass politics can no longer conceal.

Mankind today is confronted with a common biological challenge: 'adapt your mental processes to the new dangers your own folly has largely created, or perish'. It is a dawning awareness of the terrible proportions of this challenge that has begun to grip young minds in every part of the planet and which has suddenly injected an enormously hopeful note into contemporary affairs.

It is to be expected that the revolution will express signs of confusion, that it will repeat some of the errors that have helped to create the conditions that have prompted the revolt, and that it will tend at times to be expressed through a romanticism at once superfluous and misleading. But occasional calls for yet another 'new mass movement' a hankering after the windy and inadequate generalisations of marxism (at least in some of its modern manifestations), or the growth of an absurd mystique around the glamorous, but fundamentally sterile tactics of the late Che Guevara, or for that matter around the portentous platitudes that pass for the thoughts of Chairman Mao, cannot disguise the fact that the events of the May Revolution contain the seeds of something wholly new and positive in the human outlook. That, indeed, is why it merits the title of 'revolution'.

### Autonomous Revolt

All modern experience of revolution teaches that if the scale of operations of organisation, of government, or of social structure becomes too large, then the first casualty of this disease of giantism is the revolution itself. Real revolutionary power can only be operated on the basis of a multitude of small *autonomous* bodies. Any attempt to impair this autonomy, for whatever apparently commendable reasons of administrative convenience, 'unity of action' (which soon becomes a mere synonym for uniformity under 'the leader'), and so forth inevitably calls into being machinery that begins as administration and ends as oppression. Words like freedom and liberty have been the slogans of every revolution in modern history, and because this elementary lesson was not taken to heart or even understood, their use has simply paved the way for Cromwell, and the developments that have led to the infamy of Porton and Polaris submarines, to the federal monstrosity of the U.S.A., to Napoleon and the Napoleonic revivals of Napoleon III and General de Gaulle, to Stalin, the Stalinist terror and the crushing of the Hungarian Revolution by the peace-loving work-

ers' tanks of the Russian Empire, and to the bloodshed and terror of Mao's China twenty years after he came to power.

There are many signs that the students are aware of this danger. 'Student Power' is not being interpreted as power for students as a class in the same glib, deceptive way the left has sloganized for so long about 'the working class'. Power is seen as being in the hands of the students in each particular college or university, or, where this may be too large, in each particular faculty. There were signs that the factory workers in Paris had also grasped the point, but in both cases it is important to stress that it is too early to be quite sure whether the phase of localised control and decision-making was a transient tactical one, or whether it was indeed the quite cardinal strategic point of the revolution itself.

### Non-Violence

The revolution is remarkable, in any event, for another distinctive feature. Despite occasional gusts of bellicosity, and despite an occasional attempt to answer police thuggery in kind, the revolution has adhered to the practice of non-violence. Whether the students and factory workers know it or not, this approach is an integral aspect of real revolution where power is taken over at the base; for just as a real change of power relationships on a large scale can seldom be achieved other than by violence, or at least by military organisation, so meaningful change at the base is aborted if violence is used. The reason, of course, is simply that in such a violent struggle the big battalions will always win. Conversely, non-violent forms of struggle favour the small battalions, simply because it stems from a philosophy which works only on the basis of the personal, freely given commitment and initiative of each individual. By forcing a multitude of face-to-face non-violent confrontations, a decentralised revolution may be able to succeed, where it would have been quickly and bloodily suppressed if it took to arms and faced the professionals in a pitched battle. This is why the decision of the police to occupy or re-occupy the Sorbonne or any other local centre is of little significance if the students are determined, once the occupation ends, to non-violently affirm their own authority.

After the charade of the recent elections, we are waiting to see if they will. Meanwhile a new initiative may come from somewhere else.

*"The most effective long-term weapons against any stupid establishment are constant reasoned argument and equally constant ridicule. Paving stones, petrol bombs, broken windows and blazing cars frighten the mass of don't-knows in the middle, who then turn to the people to the right of them who promise to restore order."*

J. B. Priestley, 'Home Thoughts From Home,'  
New Statesman 28 June 68

## Herbert Read

# The Self and the Community

## SIR HERBERT READ

*Much has been written about Sir Herbert Read since he died on June 12th, and there is little that can usefully be added here about his work as an art critic, philosopher and poet. But for Resurgence he occupies a special place in our affections since he was the first public figure of note to become one of our firm supporters. Despite the many pressing calls on his time he never hesitated to write to us with advice, or to send us some financial help when our prospects looked particularly black. It was at his suggestion that we printed the remarkable article on "The Sacred City" by Thomas Merton which appeared in our last issue, and only two weeks before he died he sent us an appraisal of the work of Mahatma Gandhi. We had intended to use this for a special centenary issue on Gandhi that we are planning, but we publish it now as our tribute to the author's memory and to mark our sorrow at the passing of a good and gifted man who befriended us.*

Since Gandhi died, a martyr to his cause, it does not seem that his influence has grown throughout the world: it may even have diminished. I do not speak of his reputation in India, because I have no intimate knowledge of the climate of opinion there. But from a distance one sees only political confusion, and a determination to go forward with plans for industrialization and militarization which are contrary to the teaching of the Mahatma. I shall speak only of the state of mind among thoughtful people in Europe and America, and this moves towards despair and indifference rather than towards any effective non-violent resistance to the ever-increasing evils of modern civilization. Certain groups of poets and players have revolted against the social conventions of our time, and they will often express a belief in some form of Oriental mysticism, but their main desire is to escape from social responsibilities, from reality itself, and for this reason they often resort to narcotics of various kinds. They are far from any conscious self-discipline, and totally unaware that Satyagraha is a science, a constructive programme that requires in the first place sacrifice of personal vanity and of all forms of self-display or 'exhibitionism'.

There are, of course, strong groups of pacifists in Europe and America, but they are very confused in their principles. They will be against war in the abstract, against the use of force as a sanction for political policies. But when it comes to a special case, such as the Israeli attack on Egypt, they will be ready to condone the use of force, or to stand aside and secretly rejoice in the successful outcome of this particular military action. There are others who will be pacifists when it is a question of opposing the American aggression in Vietnam, but advocates of the use of force to bring down the Smith régime in Rhodesia. When two aggressors are locked in conflict, as the communists and non-

communists are in South-East Asia, the pacifist's sympathies are likely to be with the communists, and though these sympathies may not be translated into action, even the signing of a manifesto in favour of one militant party is an act of violence—a cowardly act of violence. Better to fight than stand aside and cheer!

The most anomalous position into which a pacifist can be misled is the support of the various organizations advocating the establishment of some form of World Government. All forms of government, as Gandhi often pointed out (and as Tolstoy before him pointed out) inevitably seek the sanction of force, and all the plans for a World Government that I have seen make provision for an international police force, to which would be entrusted the final task of "enforcing" the decisions of an international (or supernational) tribunal. Force does not become sanctified by being denationalized—indeed, such a rootless (and ruthless) universal force would lose some of the inhibitions that still restrain a national force. Nations (and races) are organic; a World Government, or an International Police Force, is an inhuman fabrication. The history of totalitarianism shows the progressive dehumanization of the organizations called into being by the myth of unity.

In general the pacifist movements of Europe and America have been outlets for suppressed feelings of aggression, as some of their opponents have been quick to point out. It has not been realized that what Gandhi called Satyagraha is not merely, or even chiefly, a political attitude. It is a *moral* attitude and involves the whole mind of man. But again, it is not a question of man in the abstract, or man as a species. We must begin with the individual man, with our own self, in fact. Satyagraha is, indeed, the psychological process of individuation, as described by Jung. Man cannot make peace with man until he has made peace within

himself, peace between his self and his environment, which includes all other individuals with whom he comes into contact. Bharatan Kuma-rappa, in his editorial note to Gandhi's *COLLECTED WRITINGS ON NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE* (Schocken Books, New York, 1951) writes that 'the practice of non-violence in the political sphere is not, therefore, a mere matter of preaching or even of establishing arbitration courts or Leagues of Nations, but involves building up brick by brick with patience and industry a new non-violent social and economic order. It depends ultimately on banishing violence from the heart of the individual, and making him a transformed disciplined person.' I quarrel only with the word I have emphasized; for "ultimately" I would substitute "primarily". 'Gandhi's contribution,' continues Mr. Kumarappa, 'lay in evolving the necessary technique and showing by example how all this can be done.'

### Self-discipline

To insist on self-discipline as the first necessity may seem like an evasion of the social problems that confront us on all sides and are the immediate cause of all the conflict in the world. But it cannot be helped: an uncertain disciple, one without a clear understanding of what Satyagraha means, will do more harm than good in the world, spreading confusion and despair.

Gandhi always insisted on the necessity of training for the individual before he was fit to take part in non-violent resistance. This training would be arduous—more arduous than military training, which does not touch the inner life of man. It would be as arduous as the training of those monks and friars who established Christ's gospel in the Age of Faith. When those monks and friars relaxed their discipline Christ's gospel ceased to be effective. Satyagraha is a religious faith—indeed, a distillation of the essential truth embodied in all the great religions. But religions are not established in a day, nor are they established by preaching. They are established by works—by the behaviour of individuals trained in a common discipline. Such individuals should indeed combine and have a common strategy, but, as Gandhi said, 'generally speaking this work of peace can only be done by local men in their own localities'. It can only be done by personal presence and visible example. This is not to decry the activities of a great organizer of peace such as Vinoba, for from a world point of view Vinoba, too, is a local man working for peace in his own locality, a man of deeds and not of words.

The social conditions in the advanced industrial countries of Europe and America are so different from those prevailing in India that we still seek a method of training willing disciples in the arduous path of non-violent resistance, and I confess that I see no easy success in solving the problem. Merely to declare oneself a pacifist and an anarchist (as I have done) is an idle gesture, though one's words and actions may influence a few people. But many of the methods advocated by Gandhi are not applicable to the complex industrial societies of Europe and America, corrupted by the overwhelming desire for worldly wealth distracted by the incessant impact of mass media of entertainment. A voice in this wilderness is extinguished by the roar of machines. The social disease of alienation has so eaten into the fabric of our industrial society

that the task of re-unification (or individuation, for individuation, as a psychological process, is a healing of alienated man) is not merely daunting, but essentially absurd. Nevertheless, as Camus said, one must embrace the absurd 'Vivre, c'est faire vivre l'absurde'. But to reach this absurd conclusion is to establish a point of departure. To reason, to make rational plans such as those already mentioned for a World Government, is to ignore man's innate irrationality. To make man into a rational being is neither possible nor desirable; it would deprive him of the will to live, which is not a rational plan, but a blind instinct. Gandhi recognized this and therefore admitted that Satyagraha 'presupposes the living presence and guidance of God. The leader depends not on his own strength but on that of God. He acts as the Voice within guides him'. Always Gandhi turns to his irrational motivation. But the alienated minds of Western man do not (and cannot) hear this Voice. Their minds must be healed before they can communicate with God, or with any inner voice.

We continue to use the word "God" but it may be that modern man will refuse to use such mythic language. But he will learn to recognize the reality that was represented by such a word in the past. When he uses such a term as "the unconscious" he has already admitted the presence within him of an inner Voice, however difficult it may be to understand this Voice. It is true that there are materialists who deny the existence of the unconscious, but they cannot explain the irrationality of human society or offer any consolation to the afflicted. Their materialism makes them impotent. They are people who are incapable of self-realization, the first necessity in any process of social adaptation.

### Inner Unity

I believe that Gandhi, towards the end of his life, came to believe that the harmony, justice and freedom which we desire for the community can only be achieved by individuals who have attained a state of harmony in their own minds. I find this view confirmed by Thomas Merton in his Introduction to *GANDHI ON NON-VIOLENCE* (New Directions, New York, 1965):

'In Gandhi's mind, non-violence was not simply a political tactic which was supremely useful and efficacious in liberating his people from foreign rule, in order that India might then concentrate on realizing its own national identity. On the contrary, the spirit of non-violence sprang from an inner realization of spiritual unity in himself. The whole Gandhian concept of non-violent action and *satyagraha* is incomprehensible if it is thought to be a means of achieving unity rather than as the fruit of inner unity already achieved.

'Indeed this is the explanation for Gandhi's apparent failure (which became evident to him at the end of his own life). He saw that his followers had not reached the inner unity that he had realized in himself, and that their *satyagraha* was to a great extent a pretence, since they believed it to be a means to achieve unity and freedom, while he saw that it must necessarily be the fruit of inner freedom.'

To those whose minds are dedicated to movements and collective efforts of all kinds this may seem to be a pessimistic conclusion. But if it is generally accepted, it might be the beginning of a new era in politics. The processes would necessarily

be piece-meal and slow, confined to individuals and small communities, and it is possible that catastrophic events will overtake us, and destroy the civilization we would save. But it would not be the first time in the history of the world that civilization has been preserved by the patience and humility, the suffering and sacrifice, of a few lonely individuals, a few isolated communities.

### Silent dialogue

I have mentioned four of the requisite virtues, but there is a fifth which subsumes them all and which Gandhi did not hesitate to call love. In the West this word has been so abused and degraded that I for one find it faltering on my lips. Even

charity, the word based on the Latin *caritas* and used in the authorized version of the New Testament, is now a word of double meaning, and certainly does not convey what we mean by love in the context of human salvation. The degradation of sacred words corresponds to the spiritual degradation of modern man. An alienated vocabulary full of confusion reflects an alienated mind. The restoration of a true meaning to words like love is only possible as part of a process of spiritual healing. Meanwhile a *silent* dialogue may take place among the few, and this dialogic relation, as Martin Buber called it, is a question not of words, but of mutuality, of 'an abstract but mutual experience of inclusion'. This may reduce the apparent effectiveness of a political movement, but the first necessity is to learn to distrust words, even the word love, and to confront each other in deeds.

## The Tenderness that is Silence

Softly, on the moonlight strings there rustles a tree finger.

The wing beat of the owl is a thought of sound.

His call doesn't unload the silence.

Far, far to the west the surf sighs.

The earth lifts itself with dampness and fruitfulness.

And two,  
whom tenderness has turned almost to mist, say :

Hush, we love.

Softly, there is the first grass covered by snow.

A shy dark animal slides over the glimmering white  
and threatens soundlessly.

The moon stands wild and tottering in the wind.

The sea lifts itself in a long dark swelling.

And two,  
who from their warm dread have turned almost  
to glass, say :

Hush, we must die.

(from the Dutch of Clara Eggink)

## Sky-scraper Economics

*Resurgence offers no apologies for again publishing the writing of Leopold Kohr at some length. This article, although written three years ago, is more appropriate than ever today, as more and more people in Wales and in Scotland seek independence for their countries, and as an ever widening discussion opens on new political and economic structures for Britain and for Europe. There are not many of the usual questions asked about the "Fourth World" approach that are not adequately answered in Kohr's brilliant and lively discussion.*

When nearly 80,000 Welshmen voted in the British General Elections of 1959 for *Plaid Cymru*, a party advocating the establishment of a separate Welsh state within the British Commonwealth, they gave new vigour to an old Celtic ambition. But coming as it did at the very time when the newly created European Economic Community seemed to produce the first dazzling figures showing the advantage of large-scale association, it also instilled new life into old doubts about the economic soundness of the dream. For even if one grants that a separate Welsh state would show greater concern for its two-and-a-half million Celts than a British Government which, after all, must also and primarily attend to the needs of fifty million Englishmen, would contraction into its own narrow confines not result in severe economic disruptions? Cut off from the British market, would this not lead to a loss in the savings of mass production, to lower living standards, higher unemployment, more severe depressions? It is therefore not without reason that even sympathisers with the national aspirations of the Welsh should ask what economics has to say to this. Would Wales not simply be too small to be viable?

In point of fact, economics provides not the weakest, but one of the strongest sets of arguments for the separate existence of small states, be they Wales, Denmark, Iceland, or Switzerland—the seeming miracle of the European Common Market notwithstanding. The riches of the Italian peninsula are the product not of a united Italian economy which all but dissipated them in a series of sterile wars, but of the unaffiliated small city states to whose divisionist competition and manageable proportions we owe the matchless splendour of Florence, Venice, Siena, Genoa, Verona, Parma, Perugia, and what not. The richest German regions are to this day those which until not so long ago were the small sovereign states of Hamburg, Bremen, Hesse, Wurttemberg, Bavaria, Saxony rather than the large power of Prussia. Historically, smallness, even in the absence of natural resources, can thus hardly be considered an obstacle preventing countries from getting rich. On the contrary.

### Global Market

One of the numerous reasons for this is that the size of the market on which a country's economic life depends has nothing whatever to do with the size of the country. The market accounting for the

wealth of Great Britain is not Great Britain but the world. Without the latter, Great Britain in its present organization would collapse tomorrow. But to enjoy a global market, no British economist would suggest that Great Britain must also be united with the rest of the world politically. By the same token, to have access to the market of England, there is no need to be united with her politically, quite apart from the fact that, just as in the case of England, the Welsh market would not be England but the world. As the American colonies realized at an early date—and, for that matter, a host of countries ranging from Canada to Iceland, from Norway to Austria, from Ghana to Israel, whose withdrawal from larger communities constituted not the end but the beginning of a dramatic rise—separation never entails loss of markets. Indeed, generally the very opposite is true. A national market becomes an international one. Even for those who consider smallness an economic prison, foreign trade—as the 32 eminent participants of the 1957 Lisbon Conference of the International Economic Association concluded with such rare unanimity—is always an "escape" from it.

Another and infinitely more important cause enabling small countries to rival large ones in riches and high personal living standards is, however, of quite different kind. This is the absence of those geometrically multiplying problems of scale which affect overcrowded societies in the same manner as costs affect the profitability of sky-scrapers once the latter begin to exceed a certain size. For above the height of 50 or 60 floors, cost space increases faster than pay space. This goes on until, at the height of 400 floors, the sheer problem of servicing the building would assume such proportions that the entire sky-scraper would have to consist of nothing but lifts necessary to transport the people who would have had room in it if the space needed for transporting them had not deprived them of all space needed for housing them. In spite of its splendour and phenomenal beehive productivity, all the giant structure could offer us is employment as lift boys!

By the same reasoning, the admittedly superior productivity of overgrown states can do little to benefit the economic welfare of the individual citizen. For it is more than compensated by the geometrically rising costs of maintaining a government large enough to cope with problems whose swollen scale continuously threatens to outpace the resources of even the richest power. This means that high living standards must at last be recognized to depend not only on high productivity (or, as socialists tend to stress, on just distribution), but

above all on the ability of a country to keep the cost of its social machinery down to proportions which permit the fruit of high productivity to be absorbed by the citizens rather than by the fear and problem-ridden state. Only a relatively small state, with its proportionately diminished problems of administration and co-ordination can afford this, even as only a smaller sky-scraper leaves enough space to contain flats or offices, and not just an impressive array of lifts.

But what about the famous savings of mass production in which large states take such inordinate pride? In the first place, as we have just seen, to the extent that mass production depends on large markets rather than large countries, they are available also to small states. Think of the industries of Iceland, Denmark, Sweden, or Luxembourg (even before the latter's absorption in Benelux and the Common Market); or of Switzerland, which has been able to develop exporting industries that put her at the top of all countries in the world in this category. Secondly: since the conditions of mass production vary with the nature of the product from hair-pins to cars, the domestic market of moderately sized countries will often be large enough to permit optimum plant development and its accompanying savings in unit costs even in the absence of foreign trade. Only the heaviest equipment—moon-rockets, hydrogen bombs—seems to require larger areas than those at the disposal of smaller nations, and in this case the question is whether they are really that much needed for a good life. Thirdly, as Egypt, Laos, Morocco, Ghana, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and many others have demonstrated, small countries enjoy paradoxically such an enormous bargaining and blackmailing advantages in the tug of war raging between jealous great powers trembling for their support,<sup>1</sup> that they have little difficulty in extorting sizeable chunks of the latter's low-cost production and diverting them into their own economies at savings considerably greater than those of their efficient and abused suppliers. And lastly, where small countries do fall short in exploiting the economies of large scale to the fullest, they may bask in the knowledge of benefiting from the not less significant economies of small scale.

These often prove so great that Switzerland, for example, followed closely by such other small countries as Sweden and Belgium, ranks far ahead of such great powers as Britain, West Germany, Italy and France in "economic potential, productivity and welfare," being second only to the United States in this respect. In degree of industrialization, she ranks first, with 53.6 per cent, followed by Belgium with 51 per cent, Germany with 49 per cent, the United Kingdom with 47.5 per cent, Sweden with 40.5 per cent, and trailed by the United States with 40 per cent, Italy with 36.3 per cent, and France with 35 per cent. As far as her gross investment is concerned, which represents 20 per cent. of her gross social production, she is likewise ahead of all other countries. And perhaps most significantly, considering that 80 per cent. of her industries employ fewer than 50 workers, Switzerland seems to compensate through industrial peace if not all, at least a large part of what others might gain through greater technological productivity. Thus, while the United States loses through strikes 530 working days annually per 1000 persons employed, and France 410, Japan 280, and Germany 100, the Swiss rate is 18. This is not because

<sup>1</sup>See Annette Baker Fox, *The Power of Small Nations*, London, Cambridge University Press, 1960.

Swiss workers are more modest in their wage claims. It is because the human scale of small industrial units permits, like the bloodless "manoeuvre" wars of the Middle Ages, both the faster comprehension and the swifter settlement of disputes without the need of more forceful means of persuasion.<sup>2</sup>

### Waste

Nevertheless the fact remains that the "discontinuities" represented by narrow political boundaries do have a discouraging effect on the full utilization of potentially available world markets and, as a result, on unlimited expansion, so that some of the most significant savings achieved by large-scale business in large-scale powers may indeed be lost in small ones. But even this is not necessarily a drawback. For what do the savings of scale mainly consist in? Man power! Which means that in their bulk these technological savings are economically and socially no savings at all! They are waste! To the extent that smaller countries, ad-

<sup>2</sup>See *The Economic Consequences of the Size of Nations*, edited by Austin Robinson, London, MacMillan, 1960, p. 54 ff.

*"After the disaster of 1864, when parts of Denmark became building stones for Bismark's new German empire, we discovered a new set of principles which the Germans and the Japanese did not stumble upon until after the Second World War. We discarded what seemed to have been an iron law for 5,000 years.*

*"Whenever a king or an emperor wanted to make his state richer and stronger he tried to expand his territory by war. We can now formulate a new law, discovered by Denmark after 1864: war is outdated. Today you become richer and stronger by expanding your production within your given territory, however small it happens to be.*

*"This successful phase of Danesmanship required four new instruments; they came in pairs—education and democracy, and industrialization and foreign trade. The first pair multiplied our human forces tremendously; the second pair did the same to production and trade.*

*"All this took place in a Denmark that had lost two-fifths of the realm, and had shrunk to its smallest ever. In this way Denmark became one of the most affluent countries in the world; a Mecca to be visited by guests from Asia, Africa and Latin America, wanting to learn the secret of doing away with poverty.*

*"In Denmark we found the ideal testing grounds for these new principles. For not only was the country ridiculously small; ten thousand years ago our forefathers had also seen to it that the country of their choice contained practically no natural resources.*

*"Consequently, since even the farmers had to import large amounts of foreign raw materials, it did not matter what we decided to produce. Which accounts for the fact that our industrial export today exceeds the agricultural."*

Arne Sorenson, "Warriors who gave up war," *The Times* 25 April 1968.

justing their industrial horizons in the main to the more easily surveyable and controllable limits of their political boundaries, enjoy fewer of the doubtful excess savings of mass production, they benefit socially more by their correspondingly greater economic ability to absorb manpower. And this is precisely because of their inability to absorb, at their more modest scale of activities, labour-saving machinery with such abandon that the process becomes self-defeating.

However, in fairness one must admit that large states are not only capable of saving costs through mass production; through government intervention they are also in a position to re-absorb those whom the efficiency of mass production has made unemployed. Granted! But re-absorb where? in economic production? If this were possible, government intervention would not be necessary in the first place since the private sector of the economy would never have ejected them for long enough to burden the government with the task of scooping them up. If government assistance is nevertheless required, it can only mean that neither the private nor the public sector is able to absorb them economically. This is particularly true in those countries whose size-fostered overdevelopment has brought to the threshold of the millenium: the age of automation which is characterized by the fact that its innovations, unlike those leading to earlier forms of technological unemployment, deprive people of work not temporarily but permanently. Hence the consternation with which American economists have suddenly discovered that employment is no longer rising but declining with productivity, and that unemployment has become as acute a problem in prosperity as it used to be in depression, or even worse, considering that now "perhaps no more than 20 or 30 per cent. of the population can provide everything for the 100 per cent."<sup>3</sup> For there is no super-prosperity conceivable that could solve the problems of the depressing effect of automated prosperity in the sense that prosperity could solve the problems of a conventional recession.

### Political Employment

The only way in which government can therefore re-employ the economically unemployable in the enormous numbers released daily by efficiency and progress (which it must both foster and dread), is by enlarging its always available political areas of employment. In less sophisticated times, these would have included more clearly nonsensical and, on that account, more directly functional work projects such as those of the French Revolution which provided for the alternative digging and filling of holes in the parks of Paris. However, since featherbedding of this sort is no longer compatible with the concepts of human dignity espoused by the more rational labour unions of our own time, the government of a modern industrial great power has no choice but to fall back on its two principal reserve pools of political employment—bureaucracy and army. These not only ensure a more dignified employment; they have also the advantage that their absorptive capacity is practically infinite.

As a result, one part of the unemployable of large countries is nowadays turned into bureaucratic supervisors (there being no room for additional primary officials doing the real work); the other—into soldiers. Economically, the gain is nil,

<sup>3</sup>Sir Leon Bagrit in *The Listener*, Dec. 10, 1964.

as was well illustrated by Mr. Krushchev's complaint that production in the Soviet Union, which has always boasted of its full employment, is impeded by too many supervisors supervising supervisors. What he did not say was that this was one of the very causes of the vaunted full employment.<sup>4</sup> However, since by far the greater part of unemployables is turned into soldiers—who, like the Paris hole diggers, are interminably kept busy with doing, undoing, doing; stretching, bending, stretching; assembling, dispersing, assembling; coming to attention, relaxing, coming to attention—we must once more arrive at the conclusion that it is large power rather than, as Marx suggested, capitalist power, that is inherently militarist. For an army, so carefully prepared and solicitously kept busy—whatever the nature of its original and relatively uncostly make-work purpose<sup>5</sup>—is ultimately bound to be put to exercise if for no other reason than that its members might otherwise lose their self-respect by realizing that they are nothing but society's hole diggers and gap fillers. For all this, it is not unreasonable to believe with Sir Leon Bagrit that "both capitalism and communism will find common denominators as a result of the forces let loose by the productive power of automation" (*The Listener*, Dec. 10, 1964).

What we really find in efficient large powers is therefore not full employment but hidden unemployment, its size being proportionate to the size of their armies plus that part of their bureaucracy that owes its existence to the operation of Parkinson's Law.<sup>6</sup> Even their vaunted mass-production efficiency is therefore largely an illusionary or, better perhaps, a self-liquidating asset. For what-

<sup>4</sup>As Theodore Shabad writes in the *New York Times* of June 30, 1965, under Stalin, when "the size of the work force was centrally decided without regard to actual needs" (italics mine), "the problem of employment was considered solved once and for all," and as a result "the Government agencies concerned with labour problems were abolished and all sociological research was stopped or sharply curtailed." But now, with the rising success of automation, labour is released in such multitudes that even Russia's traditional disregard for actual needs is no longer able to avoid the consequences of technological unemployment. This is further aggravated by an ill-timed economic reform that diminishes central direction and permits individual plant managers "to determine the size of the labour force needed to accomplish assigned production objectives" in line with labour-saving profit and efficiency principles rather than with a view towards employing people "without regard to actual needs."

<sup>5</sup>This can still be recognized by the fact that the pay of the common soldier is adjusted to the rate of doles rather than of prevailing productivity wages.

<sup>6</sup>As Sir Leon Bagrit says in his fifth Reith Lecture on Automation (*The Listener*, Dec. 10, 1964), many knowledgeable economists doubt this. They feel that the increased efficiency "is itself sufficiently powerful to generate its own corrective forces in the sense that new jobs arise as old ones disappear." And the 1964 *Manpower Report* of the American Bureau of Labor Statistics seems to bear this out. Though automation has severely reduced agricultural employment, this report shows that between 1957 and 1963 there was a growth in non-farming employment of more than 4,000,000 persons. This would indeed seem to indicate "that increased productivity brings increased employment with it and so there is nothing to worry about." But is this increased employment caused by the increased productivity of automation? Or is it not rather the result of an increase in non-productive jobs created by government? As Sir Leon shows in a breakdown of the Manpower Report figures, only a miniscule 5 per cent. of the more than 4 million new job opportunities were created by industry itself. "Direct employment by federal, state, and local governments accounted for 45 per cent. of this extra employment, government purchasing for nearly 20 per cent."

—Continued on page 12.

## On The Helmets

On the helmets of thunderheads  
there romps an amorous spring sun.  
The city builds itself a watchtower  
and admires itself in bird flight.  
The cafe terraces become an El Dorado again  
with their parasols and light activity.  
The whole day is no album of photos;  
in the evening one turns the pages and sighs.  
In the evening one thinks of the coming day,  
of the night with the embezzled light,  
of the evening itself: a fence of worries  
twilights the book. One closes it.

(from the Dutch of Nico Verhoeven)

## With An Eye On Tomorrow

Here under the smoke of my dreams  
on the longest day of my life  
I lie with open premises  
spread out like a landscape,  
kidneystreets and heartregion open  
handways open and footloose.

You can see at all hours  
see me without cost

through an eyeglass of cheap cider  
on the hill called Good Morning  
on a blushing Lebanon morning  
on the morning of now

good morning.

(from the Dutch of Bert Voeten)

ever large powers may economize through technological efficiency and automation, is swallowed up on the one hand by their scale of cyclical disruption, industrial strife, and the difficulties arising from their excessive need of co-ordination, and on the other, by the sterile cost of their military establishment<sup>7</sup> and the man-hungry inefficiency of a bureaucracy whose performance, beyond a certain point, varies inversely with its size.

The additional advantage of government-created employment of both the military and the bureaucratic variety is that the more dispensable, sterile, and high-faluting it is, the greater are its educational requirements. One may therefore say that, in addition to an army and bureaucracy, education is rapidly emerging as the third government-sponsored receptacle of automation unemployment, opening both new employment opportunities for an army of teachers, and delaying employment needs for the armies of students as a result of the longer time it takes to acquire the necessary degrees to qualify for jobs that are unnecessary in the first place.

### End to Stagnation

There is thus little reason to assume that the political separation of Wales and England would lead to economic decay. It did not in the case of the separation of the American colonies, nor of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, or Ghana. Nor was the decay the consequence of the similar sep-

cent, and other non-profit making [non-economic] institutions for a further 16 per cent." In other words, 95 per cent. of the 4,000,000 newly employed persons (assuming that the 14 unexplained per cent. were absorbed by military occupations) would have been doomed to idleness had the government not opened its gates to them by creating a vast pool of sterile, unproductive employment of the kind condemned by the physiocrats, Adam Smith, or Saint-Simon (in *L'Organisation*), but hailed as a last salvation in an age "when perhaps no more than 20 or 30 per cent. of the population can provide everything necessary for the 100 per cent."

<sup>7</sup>Even if one disregards the economics of unemployment which looms behind the maintenance of large armies, and concentrates on the more conventional economics of defence, the scales will still not tip in favour of great powers. True, Prof. Austin Robinson (op. cit., p. 223 ff), whose concept of ideal size, as that of most of us, seems somewhat influenced by the size of his own country, England, comes in his paper on *The Size of the Nation and the Cost of Administration*, read before the aforementioned 1957 Lisbon Conference, to the conclusion, that, in matters of military defence, it is small and not large national size that is at a disadvantage. Since the burden of defence is determined by the length of the frontier—another panel member relates it to the population number of a country's enemies—and the length of the frontier increases at an arithmetic ratio with the growth of a country while area and population contained by it increase at a geometric ratio, Professor Robinson reasons that defence costs per head will therefore be larger and more burdensome in smaller than in bigger countries. Yet the accompanying table, listing the per capita defence costs for the United States, Great Britain, France and Italy as 100, 46, 37 and 12 in that order, indicates the exact opposite. And so does historic experience, considering that in their strictly military aspects defence costs seem neither related to the length of a frontier nor the size of an enemy population but to fear, to *Angst*. And *Angst* has shown a tendency not to diminish but to increase with the size of a nation. The souvenir shops of tiny Liechtenstein sell a postcard of the principality's last soldier—dismissed more than twenty years ago because it is lacking not in boundaries but fear. By contrast, already Saint Augustine doubted the superior defence value of large nations when he asked the Romans a question that might today be asked of Russians and Americans: "What wisdom should any man show in glorying in the largeness of empire, all their joy but a glass, bright and brittle, and evermore in fear and danger of breaking?"

arations of Austria from post-war Germany, Iceland from Denmark, Norway from Sweden, Egypt from Turkey, Belgium from France. On the contrary! In each case, it set an end to stagnation. In spite of the gloomy predictions of established schools of interpretation, they proved in each case to be the opportunity, the great innovation that, far from interfering with economic progress, seems to have been the very cause of its spectacular rise.<sup>8</sup> Maybe, if our scale economists and unionists are right, all these countries would be better off today had they remained filially united. Maybe! Yet they themselves feel rather positive that they could never have had it better, and never had it so good. And this is true not only with regard to their own condition. For the energy released by their dramatic ascent (particularly during their early years when their alien, "other-directed" economy became self-centred and "inner-directed") boosted along with their own development also that of their motherlands simply because these, too, could not but benefit from the lifting power gained from the reduction of their size and their loss of excess weight. France, Germany, Sweden, Denmark, Great Britain, and Turkey became therefore richer than ever before after amputations that so many of their aggrieved citizens thought could not be survived.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>8</sup>Lest my selection be considered unfair, reference must be made to the continuing stagnation long after independence of a small nation such as Ireland. Does this contradict my argument? My answer is, give her a chance. Even among small countries, some proceed faster, some more slowly. In the case of Ireland, her dragging sluggish backwardness was in the first place caused not by her independent existence as a small state but by her obviously highly unprofitable centuries-long union with a completely disinterested large England whose far-flung world involvement was so great that she could hardly be expected to concern herself with a region so small, though it was at her doorstep. The response of the Irish was to launch that crippling mass emigration that filled the manpower needs of America from domestic service and the New York police force all the way up to the presidency, while it depopulated their own country as dangerously as the policy of the communist regime of the East Germans depopulated theirs. This lasted so long that like a conditioned reflex, emigration continued even after independence had put a stop to the conditioner. And it is this, not lack of resources, or the "handicap" of small size that is responsible for Ireland having started her development so slowly and so late. Now that she has at last begun moving, she will soon bless herself for having only the area of Ireland and not of India on which to bestow her talent and her resources.

[N.B.: A letter in *New Society* (June 13, 1968) says "Scots are beginning to note Eire's success in achieving an average annual rate of economic growth of about 4 per cent. in the face of problems greater than even Scotland faces."—ED.]

<sup>9</sup>Compare in this connection John Strachey's pamphlet, *The Great Awakening* (1961) in which the author reasons within a Marxist frame of reference why the former colonies need not fear a revival of imperialism. During earlier periods, the search for surplus value forced capitalist businessmen to secure foreign markets through political domination because of the domestic unprofitableness of monopoly capitalism. Since the loss of empire, however, the rise of living standards has raised the purchasing power of the workers of capitalist countries to such an extent that domestic markets are no longer unprofitable, and militarily secure foreign markets therefore are no longer needed. As Mr. Strachey points out, metropolitan countries are now wealthier than ever, while imperialism, far from being profitable, has become a costly extravagance depressing no longer the exploited but the "exploiters". True, Mr. Strachey attributes the rise in the living standards of workers to the Keynesian revolution. But how much stimulus did this revolution get from imperial disintegration and territorial contraction without which it could neither have been afforded, nor needed, nor tolerated.

From a strictly economic point of view, rather than object to a Welsh state on the ground that it would be too small, it would actually be more sensible to go even a step further and, along the lines pioneered by Nikita Krushchev in the Soviet Union,<sup>10</sup> create regional autonomies also on the soil of the other Celtic nations of Great Britain, such as Scotland and Cornwall and, for good measure, loosen up and federalize England herself.

### The New Colossus

However, there is a last question that must still be answered. For whatever facts and arguments I may have marshalled in favour of the economic soundness and, indeed, the superior over-all efficiency in human terms of the small state and of *Kleinstaaterei* as against the wastes of modern skyscraper and Tower-of-Babel unifications, there is one snag. And a big one at that. What about the spectacular and unprecedented economic advance achieved in Europe after six<sup>11</sup> of her war ravaged nations decided to scrap their discords, join forces and, though three of them were already highly integrated great powers in their own right, to merge their destiny in a still larger union: the European Economic Community.

Yes, what about it? Certainly the success of the European Economic Community or, as it is now more generally called, the Common Market, has been dramatic. In fact so much so that it has not only inspired imitators in all corners of the world, reaching from Africa to Latin America; it has at last managed to break the resistance of even its greatest antagonist, Great Britain, who, viewing the new colossus across the Channel at first with disdain, then with humour, and finally with apprehension, became suddenly obsessed with such a dwarf complex that, in an attack of panic, she renounced her ancient aloofness and applied for admission.

But this is about all that can be said in the Community's favour. As far as its unprecedented development is concerned, it is neither unprecedented nor due to the union. The advance of the small Icelandic republic on the Arctic Circle was as spectacular. And so was that of tropical Puerto Rico, a small island state with a population of less than two-and-a-half million. In the case of the latter, it is often suggested that the cause of her rise is the fact that she forms part of the tremendous common market of the United States. But it has been part of that market since 1898. Yet nothing happened to disturb her somnolence until 1942,

<sup>10</sup>Reports from the Soviet Union indicate a modification of the country's division into 105 economic districts effected in 1957, and their regrouping into 17 regions with populations from 8 to 14 million. Only one region, presumably around Moscow, is to have a population of 25 million. The Russian Soviet Republic alone will have 10 such regions, the Ukrainian 3. The purpose is not only to make the individual regions ultimately so self-sufficient that in case of war the loss of one should not affect the rest any more than a torpedo crashing into one of the numerous sealed-off compartments of a modern battleship affects the latter's seaworthiness; but also, through competition and the manageability of small scale they should contribute to the more rapid development of the vast underdeveloped regions that still exist in the Soviet Union.

<sup>11</sup>Actually, the Common Market comprises not six but eight members. Monaco, united with France in a customs union since 1865, and San Marino with Italy since 1862, should not be omitted from the count merely because they are small. They are as sovereign as the rest.

and not much until 1952 when the great energy-releasing event occurred: her transformation from part to whole; from a distant outpost of a great United States into a tense, small, self-centred and self-governed near-sovereign commonwealth. Suddenly, what could not be done by Americans, so famous for their efficiency and know-how, in half a century, could be done by Puerto Ricans, so famous for their tropical indolence,<sup>12</sup> in barely ten years, during which they designed and executed that blue-print for rapid development that has become known as *Operation Bootstrap*.

But if the success of the Common Market is not due to the union of its members, what else is responsible for it? There are a variety of causes.

The first is the "miracle" of German recovery. This set in long before the Treaty of Rome of 1957 established the Common Market, and was due to the coincidence of two factors of which each would have provided the boost for an economic revival in a highly industrialized society singly. Jointly they acted like a space rocket. One was the total ruination of the German economy as a result of the greatest war destruction and post-war reparation dismantlement ever inflicted on a nation. The other: the Allied prohibition of German re-militarization. This gave the country both the tremendous opportunity for new economic action and the manpower needed to undertake the task of reconstruction at a pace so rapid that it created the illusion of a miracle being performed. Yet the situation was fundamentally not much different from that of ancient Thebes whose frequent destruction at the hand of invading armies was responsible for the fact that, as Pausanias tells us, to the surprise of travellers, Thebes alone among the aging cities of Greece looked always modern, gleaming, and lively—the last in fashion. In the case of Germany, the twin ravages of destruction and dismantlement were moreover distributed throughout the country so evenly that local and private initiative could spring up everywhere at the same time without requiring co-ordination and direction from a central authority which, even if it had been attempted, could hardly have encompassed the magnitude of the task. This in turn accounted for the little understood temporary resurrection and success of a vigorously competitive free enterprise system such as the saturated stage of overdevelopment existing in the less war-damaged victorious integrated large

<sup>12</sup>One of my colleagues drew attention to the possibility of misunderstanding in the word "indolence". Looking it up in the dictionary, I find indeed that "indolent" is defined as habitually lazy, slothful—not exactly the nicest of attributes. However, indolence has also a different connotation, and it is in this sense that it is to be understood here. It is often used in describing the way of life of my native Austria, and I have always felt rather flattered when people used it in describing me. If the dictionary sense occurs to you, please rest assured that what I mean to convey is the idea of easy-going, musing, unacquisitively serene, peaceful of soul, and generous of heart (which, true enough, to many harassed men striving for rapid worldly improvement may mean habitually lazy or slothful). However, I use it in the sense of Keats who wrote an Ode on which he places "honied indolence" high above Love, Ambition, and even Poesie, the demons haunting him. But for once, he let them escape:

"They faded, and, forsooth! I wanted wings:  
O folly! What is Love! and where is it?  
And for that poor Ambition! it springs  
From a man's little heart's short fever-fit.  
For Poesie!—no, — she has no joy, —  
At least for me, — so sweet as drowsy noons,  
And evenings steep'd in honied indolence;  
O, for an age so shelter'd from annoy,  
That I may never know how change the moons  
Or hear the voice of busy common-sense!"

powers had long made impossible.<sup>13</sup>

## Loss of Empire

The second cause of European revival originated likewise in conditions that preceded the establishment of the Common Market. This was the energy releasing effect of national contraction experienced by all the major members of the future European Economic Community as a result of the loss of empire in the case of France, Italy, the Netherlands, and subsequently also of Belgium, and of the loss of half her territory in the case of Germany. Able to apply their undiminished talent and industrial strength to a reduced scale, the inevitable advance in productive efficiency soon showed itself in two ways: the unexpected speed with which particularly the smaller countries freed themselves of their dependence on American aid; and in daring new projects such as the resumption of land reclamation from the Dutch seas on a scale that would have been impossible as long as national energies were consumed in the administration of distant empires.<sup>14</sup> If less attention was paid to this, it was because of the emotional shock that for a long time beclouded the mind of nations after it dawned on them that the war they had thought they had won was lost by them as much as by the defeated. How little the loss of empire can have meant, except in terms of national vanity, becomes obvious when one realizes that, for instance, the vast Belgian colonial holdings were, according to Professor Duquesne de la Vinella of the University of Louvain, "as unimportant as tourism in Switzerland in raising *per capita* income. Income from capital invested in Belgium's overseas territories made up only 1 to 2 per cent. of national income, though the income from trade with overseas territories represented 5 or 6 per cent."<sup>15</sup>—a figure that will undoubtedly increase now that these territories have gained their independence, just as British trade income increased after the independence of American colonies.

The third cause had, for once, actually a connection with the establishment of an economic union. Entering into a partnership with a Germany still

galloping ahead at full speed for the reasons mentioned,<sup>16</sup> it was only natural that the new associates should for a while be carried along by the momentum and benefit from the spread across their former economic boundaries of the opportunities, the élan, and the action generated in the devastation of German defeat. Though the spectacle of victorious powers joining the vanquished in order to escape the bankruptcy of victory must have seemed a baffling paradox, it was not more paradoxical than Bismark's declaration after the Franco-Prussian War that the next time he wins a victory he will demand of the defeated country not that it *pay reparations to Germany* but that it *accept reparations from Germany*. For the result of the record payment extracted on that occasion from France was that, while the defeated nation modernised her industrial equipment and worked herself into a flourishing prosperity in order to get rid of her obligations as fast as possible, her enthusiastic deliveries were one of the main reasons that pushed victorious Germany into obsolescence and depression.<sup>17</sup> What all the member of the Common Market have therefore belatedly done was no more than to adopt Bismark's wise counsel, and carry it one step further.

This means that even where union did produce benefits, they were not of the kind usually implied by the defenders of scale and "sky-scraper" economies. In fact, as the *Monthly Review* of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York pointed out in its April number of 1959 with respect to one of the main arguments for union: in the case of the majority of enterprises, the domestic markets of most member states of the European Economic Community were in all likelihood alone sufficiently large to convey the full advantages of mass production even without their unification.

The mere increase in market size could therefore have added little in benefits not already enjoyed and, had it not been for the establishment of an Investment Bank for developing its backward areas, would probably have worsened rather than improved the latter's conditions. This is the more likely as the retarded territories are characteristically parts not of the smaller but "mostly" of "the larger countries of the union"<sup>18</sup> Why the Southern part of Italy, for example, should be less

neglected as part of a still larger European economic complex than it was in an already excessively large Italian state, which could do nothing for its suffering Southern brethren but extend warm sympathies from their prosperous compatriots thriving on the advanced economy of the North, would therefore be difficult to understand except for precisely the new investment bank specifically designed for relieving large countries of the shameful consequences and incapacities of their excessive size. But there is of course no reason why such an investment bank could not just as easily have been organized nationally or outside the Common Market. Nor is there any reason to believe that the grant of political autonomy to the South within an Italian federation of states would not have achieved the same results and faster, through the mere stimulation of local ambition that follows every acquisition of a significant share in sovereignty.

Finally, there is a fourth cause that contributed to the initial success of the Common Market. This was the passionate conviction amongst the nations concerned that their union would usher in a new age of prosperity. As a result, an infective psychology of action arose, similar to the surging optimism that helps bring about a revival at the end of a depression when businessmen become agitated by the conviction that stagnation has lasted so long that a change for the better cannot be far away. Actually, what businessmen never realize is that it is not the expected change that causes their conviction, but their conviction that causes the change. By the same token, what caused the success of the Common Market was not the Common Market but the conviction that it would be a success. But *any* conviction maintained with a similar action-producing enthusiasm would have led to similar results. It would have made no difference had the aim involved been the abolition or the dismemberment of nations; their socialization or their return to capitalism; the introduction of authoritarianism or of democratic methods; colonization; communism or fascism; centralization or decentralization; sense or nonsense—anything so long as it led to movement.

## Overdeveloped

As a result, though the current success of the European Economic Community cannot be doubted, it rests on a set of circumstances so exceptional and transient that there is no reason to assume that it will last, or that it will be any better equipped than other similarly size-plagued social organism to withstand the pressures of scale building up as integration proceeds. Even though it still continues growing—this is precisely it: for growth in the mature is as doubtful a blessing as the continued swelling of a balloon. When it is largest and seems proudest it explodes. This is the pathetic difference between growth problems affecting the too small and those affecting the too big, between the problems of the underdeveloped and those of the overdeveloped. But because of the outward similarity of the two, many of the afflicted aging giants keep mistaking their senility for adolescence. They think of the last amorous flare-up of the flickering spiral of life as a sign of returning youth, instead of recognizing it as the gently mocking way by which nature likes to hint that one's days are counted.

So for all the temporary success of the Common Market it is hardly a compelling argument against

"When you discuss membership of the European Common Market with the great majority of the Danes, you will discover that they want economic and technical co-operation only. So far as our hearts are concerned, they are to be protected by a strong fortress of national emotions."  
Arne Sorensen.

the idea that the logical solution of the scale problem of our age must of necessity lie in the opposite direction: not in further amalgamation of the already overgrown societies of our day but in the reduction of their size. Indeed, this seems to dawn on the leaders of the Common Market itself, to judge by the repeatedly expressed fear of Dr. Adenauer that the enterprise might become too unwieldy, or from proposals such as that made by M. Robert Marjolin, Vice-President of the Commission of the European Economic Community (backed in December 1961 by the Brussels Conference for Regional Economies) to the effect that all member states ought to split themselves up into uniformly small regions of 2 to 5 million inhabitants. Thus, after a decade of obsession with the economics of growth, at least the practitioners if not the theorists are beginning to feel that what really counts in our time is the economics of size, of place, of form.

Returning to the starting point of this article, we thus arrive at two conclusions: 1. that a country such as Wales is certainly not too small to be economically viable, not any more so than is Denmark, Switzerland, Catalonia, Burgundy, Brittany, Wurttemberg, or any region of similar size; and 2. that for a great power such as Great Britain, if she is anxious to diminish the scale of her problems, the most sensible course in her present stage of overdevelopment would not be to join a Common Market already crowded by three other overdeveloped nations, but to decentralize herself into a loosely linked and freely trading system of manageable and self-managed autonomous small units by restoring statehood not only to her ancient Celtic nations but also to some of her Anglo-Saxon regions. There should be room for at least ten of them.

However, as should be mentioned in conclusion, once political units are reduced to optimum size by means of division, there is no reason why in the relatively few areas of unavoidably joint interest they should not be loosely linked in economic unions or better still, in limited international product and service unions such as the already existing coal, steel, dining and sleeping car, or postal unions. Like the electricity, heating, water and lift unions of apartment houses, such unions unite where union makes sense, in certain economic respects, and keep separate where separation makes sense, in political, social and cultural matters. However, to be successful, none of the members of such unions must be of such disproportionate size that it could disrupt the association of all through the excessive physical power of one.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>19</sup>See in this connection the author's *Customs Unions—A Tool For Peace*, Washington, Foundation for Foreign Affairs, 1949; *History of the Common Market in Journal of Economic History*, September 1960; and *The Third Alternative*, in Cambridge Opinion, November, 1962.

<sup>13</sup>A precedent for this can be found in NEP, the New Economic Policy, instituted in 1921, through which the Soviet government encouraged the temporary return of capitalist business before eliminating it anew in 1928.

<sup>14</sup>Also the welfare-state aspects improved dramatically with the loss of empire, as was shown, for example in Great Britain. In 1899, when the power and glory of empire was at its greatest, Joseph Rowntree recorded that 27.84 per cent. of the citizens of his native York (30.7 per cent. in the case of London), or 43 per cent. in terms of only the working class, were in a state of destitution. According to the same author, this figure stood still at a shocking 31 per cent. in 1936, when the empire was no longer quite so impressive but still in command of the enormous area of India. Only in 1951, when the empire was at last all but liquidated, and the British economy had begun to serve the United Kingdom rather than the world, did the figure of working class destitution show a dramatic change, shrivelling in the space of a few years to a mere 3 per cent. And this was due no longer to low wages but to old age. The more Britain shrank, the easier it became to divert her resources from the power state to the welfare state, and turn destitution into affluence.

<sup>15</sup>Austin Robinson, op. cit., p. 357. One could also ask why, if empire was really such an economic advantage for its heart lands, capital cities of empireless countries such as Stockholm, Prague, Munich, Dresden, Florence, Berne, can hardly be said to be less splendid and prosperous than London, Paris, Madrid, or Brussels.

<sup>16</sup>One may ask why the same reasons—destruction, contraction, etc., did not produce the same kind of prosperity also in East Germany. The reason for this is that unlike the Western European countries, whose own advanced industrialization, lack of excessive war destruction, and availability of manpower resulting from imperial contraction could absorb only that much from West-Germany, the underdeveloped condition of the immense Soviet block with which East Germany became linked has continued to this day to act as a sponge of practically unlimited absorptive capacity for what otherwise might have piled up for the benefit of the latter. This overshadows the fact that East Germany, though not benefiting from it, has actually become the sixth largest industrial producer in the world, after the U.S.A., U.S.S.R., West Germany, Great Britain and France.

<sup>17</sup>This is why America, after World War I, caused a number of her debtor nations to default not because they could not pay, but because America would not accept their deliveries. The sole exception was in the case of Finland which, glorying in the role of the only honest debtor, was permitted in an often photographed ceremony to hand over year after year her annual instalment because her debt was so insignificant that her repayment could hardly add to the poverty of a creditor suffering from *embarras de richesse*.

<sup>18</sup>Austin Robinson, op. cit., pp. 424-425.

# Quotes from The Revolution . . .

*“ Ne changer pas d'employeurs changer l'emploi de la vie ”*

Paris slogan

**“It is a total protest not only against specific shortcomings but also at the same time against the entire system of values, against the entire system of objectives, against the entire system of performances required and practiced in the established society.”**

Herbert Marcuse

**“The student situation is only a more acute form of the powerlessness that pervades our whole centralised, depersonalised society. There is too wide a gap between the people who make decisions, those who carry them out, and the people they affect.”**

Chris Reeve, Merton College, Oxford.

*“Students are demonstrating against established hierarchies—whether they be elites of the right or of the left. They are demonstrating against being used by the present system and educated for the benefit of that system.”*

Mike Winstanley, Birmingham University.

*“In human terms the students' ideals are . . . naïve but so were the aspirations . . . of the early Christians. The voice of the students should be heeded for the very reason that they too are 'in' but not 'of' the society in which they live. They are a minority and they are creative. From all such groups stem the great changes of history . . .”*

F. B. Le Marquand, letter in The Times.

**“How does the students' revolt fit into analyses of class and power? The answer is: it doesn't. We must learn a new language.”**

John Rex, New Society.

**“ . . . the present system . . . is highly centralised and bureaucratic where technology is either an end in itself or is used for the production of goods for profit, whether they are essential or not . . . The working class, and not only the working class, is still 'swept inescapably, namelessly and almost shapelessly into the industrial system'. Technology, as it is used today, is a direct threat to our very existence . . .”**

John Rety, P. G. Turner, editors of Freedom.

*“I want to rouse people from the apathy they demonstrate about the way their lives are lived, rather than to impose my opinions on others, I want them to start thinking, talking and learning.”*

Chris Whitebread, Clare College, Cambridge.

# Quotes from The Revolution . . .

*“ Ne changer pas d'employeurs changer l'emploi de la vie ”*

Paris slogan

*“What my friends and I are protesting about are: one, a global situation in which hunger and deprivation coexist with conspicuous consumption, without the conspicuous consumers being willing to do anything effective to rectify the balance; . . . two, a 'peace' based on the threat of mutual annihilation . . . three, the centralisation . . . of effective power in ever fewer hands, with the corollary that ordinary people everywhere have an ever smaller say in the ordering of their affairs.”*

Terence Heelas, CND.

**“Everyone who thinks he really cares about democracy . . . should ask himself precisely what control he thinks he has over his country's destinies by being generously allowed to chose between two increasingly identical teams of 'leaders' at intervals of five years or so. The real power is wielded by the big industrialists and financiers aided and abetted by the government (whether labour or conservative)”**

A. Foster Carter, Balliol College, Oxford.

**“ . . . industrialism, like militarism, can be a lopsided figure. Both can represent a near invincible force; both can be ecumenical in their aims and tyrannical in their purpose; both can be oppressive to individuality and to creativeness. If they are not resisted and regulated their empire becomes supreme.”**

F. B. Le Marquand.

*“They equate revolution with spontaneity, participation, communication, imagination, love, youth. . . They are against the consumer society, paternalism, bureaucracy, impersonal party programs, and static party hierarchies. Revolution must not become ossified. It is la revolution permanente.”*

Stephen Spender, “Paris in the Spring”  
New York Review of Books.

*“We should not try to define this movement in terms of specific issues because it is precisely an attempt to revolutionise structures not contents . . . The vagueness of the movement is its asset: it wants to create the conditions for reforms and to maintain them for all times. It does not want this or that reform in order to fall quiet afterwards.”*

John Butt, letter in New Statesman.

**“What structural reforms would they like to see? They don't really know, but it is possible to detect behind their confusion the same protests as students have made about the paternalistic, hierarchical and authoritarian structure of French society—whether their immediate target is a university, the government, the industry or the unions. Inside the factory one slogan reads 'Today five per cent of workers' children go to university, we want that to change'. They all want something to change, young and old, Frenchman or immigrant, men and women, and they are determined to go on until something does change.”**

John Gretton, “Paris Sit-in”  
New Society.

# Correspondence

## Salvaging Civilisation

Although I do not agree with everything, naturally, I never knew that such sheer quality of humanist thought could yet emerge from worn-out old England. Where else can one find an editorial of the quality of this May/June one, for instance? I am sometimes sent the famous fat, rich American "Ramparts", but I am bound to say I think you beat them basically on quality of outlook. They devote so much space to sensational journalistic disclosures, and although the exposures are revealing and helpful, I have doubts as to their inspirational worth (the latter being your own strong point). Their emphasis on dubious hippiedom, their multitudinous destructive and minimal constructive social criticism, and their lack of any very clear philosophical ideals, is all in strong contrast to your localist-democratic idealism. Whether they aim at anything much better than the technocratic society mentioned at the end of that amazing Monte Alban article you reprinted with such superb discernment, is not absolutely clear to me. But it IS clear to me that you have a group of people who see modern world troubles with rare, true depth, and suggest sincere ways out. Maybe some of these suggestions are more hopeful than practical (if Gandhian Ahimsa is impracticable without Hinduism, can "Christian" England be Hinduised to render it feasible there?), but if our "civilisation" is already beyond saving, as I myself certainly think, its finest dying flames will be devoted to salvaging its best corners in an inspiring glow for the future. In that direction, at least, your journal's thought seems to me uniquely valuable.

Your financial difficulties show the "quality" of modern England, from which I rightly fled in horror nearly twenty years ago (the fact that Israeli politicians have by now shown themselves to be no better than others is not my fault). Even so, I cannot see why the few remaining well-off Oxbridge students' parents cannot be persuaded on reasonable philosophical-culture grounds to subsidise you as you deserve.

That was a provocative letter from Mr. Higgins of Pontefract wasn't it? Hard words about the Bruderhof, but I fear something in them: I have not latest news. Yet the solidly successful Israeli kibbutzim get no mention from him, although the collective profit is ploughed back into the business for development, with gently rising living standards as return for hard work, the number of scroungers is negligible owing to the intense force of communal public opinion and strong supervision by constantly changing committees and highly critical general meetings (this being mutual and generalised, it is **not** enslavement!), and people with a "sense of vocation" may develop it to an increasing extent, but must resign membership if they refuse to do their full share of dirty and other work. All this is possible because there really IS "an established set of principles by which one's actions are guided." So what is wrong

with the efficiently designed anarchist commune which the kibbutz actually is and which I believe you stand for in no small measure? (See my "Purest Democracy in the World" for fairly full details.) Oh, I know there are defects; kibbutz members too are only human. There is an inevitable intellectual elite (but it is so strongly controlled by electoral and other rules that it can never dominate to a dangerous degree); hired labour still exists, although greatly and vigorously reduced; and the kibbutz cannot be pacifist, or neither Israel nor the kibbutz would exist, unfortunately. (There is no little peace-action thought in the kibbutz, but not enough, owing to surrounding circumstances, sad to say.) And the thirty Japanese kibbutzim send students here and learn all they can from the Israeli movement; they at least see that there is an invigorating model for bringing fresh hope to a tired world gone wrong.

Very best wishes.

Avraham C. Ben-Yosef.

Kibbutz Sasa,  
Doar Na Merom Hagalil,  
Israel.

## Wrong Answer

"An Answer to Race Hate", (Resurgence May/June), may include some ultimate answers, but it does not really give a satisfactory solution to our immediate problem, with its tie to British immigration policies. A simple ban on all immigration is not easy to justify, even if we are at last realising that our standard of living and our numbers cannot be raised together for much longer. The point is that we are living *relatively* very well in Britain, and it is hardly ethical to close our doors now, after our past mistakes in empire building have left many other areas equally crowded and a great deal poorer — Mauritius, and some of the West Indies, for instance. If further immigration would reduce our standard of living but raise that of the immigrants, we are really not justified morally in keeping them out. We may be justified practically, but then, as most would-be immigrants are coloured, we are right back with Enoch Powell.

Roger Franklin.

Loom Cottage,  
36, Loom Lane, Radlett, Herts.

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## Correspondence—contd.

### Communication

I am extremely impressed with your good work, the quality of the writing, but particularly the dedication which you obviously give to your cause.

While I do not agree entirely with all the methods of your fourth world movement, I can certainly go along with your general aims. I feel that we who favor a radical reconstruction of social institutions must communicate more, and more effectively.

## THE FOURTH WORLD

The Fourth World nearly happened in France in May. Those who took over the universities and factories were demonstrating the superfluous nature of massive state power in a country that "is still grotesquely centralised and hierarchical", and where "a conservative central Government is protected by a para-military police force."\* Whatever the outcome, the concept of 'all power to the people' has been reaffirmed in a dramatic and, it may well prove, irresistible form.

The message certainly got through to De Gaulle himself, for, in his responding speech of May 24 he eloquently summarized Fourth World concerns, saying, "There is to be seen in [the present events] all the signs which show the necessity of a mutation of our society, and everything indicates that this mutation should include a more extensive participation of everyone in the conduct and result of the activities which directly concerns them." Nonetheless, his recommendations for implementation of the mutation harked backwards rather than to the future: a formulation of law-and-order plus promises of reform reminiscent of Johnson's reaction to the burning of American cities.

Then Anthony Wedgwood Benn, Britain's Minister of Technology, had a try at interpreting worldwide discontent. People wanted a much greater say, he said, and unrest stemmed from a sense of exclusion from the decision-making process. Rumours that Mr. Benn's new comprehension of what constitutes a democratic choice will lead to his resignation should be discounted.

The editors of the *International Herald Tribune* summarized the principles of The Fourth World neatly and precisely in a leader entitled "The New Tribalism," while Paul Johnson wrote in a *New Statesman* report from Paris that the "young people look for a fourth choice."

Better than comment, however, has been the response of students at Hornsey, and in many British colleges and universities where, by take-over actions they have tried to show how they would like the institutions in which they participate to be run.

As the tragedy of Biafra continues, an increasing number of people are coming to realize that

I am very interested to contact student-intellectual writers and publishers around the world. I have particular difficulty finding contacts in developing countries. Are you aware of anyone in possession of comprehensive lists (either world wide or area) of such persons and publications? I would very much appreciate any help you could give me.

Although I live somewhat in the country, I would like very much to try to help, or at least meet any of your people who come to Japan.

Justin W. Dart, Jr.

399, Dai, Hongo Mura,  
Higashi-Chikuma-Gun,  
Nagano-Ken, Japan.

while the Biafrans are fighting for their personal and national survival, they are also struggling for the general cause of self-determination of peoples, to which the governments of the world, capitalist and communist, have given lip service for so long.

The recognition by four African governments, and (of equal practical importance) by Oxfam, has helped the Biafran cause. There seems to be little doubt that if Britain, in addition to stopping the supplies of arms to Lagos, were to recognize Biafra, the conditions for a negotiated settlement would rapidly develop. One wonders how many in the British government realize how their crime of withholding recognition, added to that of supplying arms to Nigeria amounts to a grave responsibility for the continuation of this unnecessary and bloody war. Such sins of omission and commission cannot be cancelled out by a small hand-out to the victims, or by trying to get negotiations started that will remain hopelessly deadlocked so long as Biafra is not recognized as having as much right to exist as any other nation.

As the truce begins to break up, the Nagas' struggle for independence against Indian imperialism is again in the news with fighting in which Indian troops suffered a reverse. An *Observer* article\* gives a full picture of how The Fourth World is trying to break out all over Burma and the eastern part of India. Nationalist leaders of nine historic peoples are envisioning a new grouping of small and medium-sized nations to replace the huge states constructed by the former imperialists. There might be a loose federation, but one which, unlike most federations, would allow the freedom to withdraw.

Besides the Nagas and Mizos, with the state of Manipur between, the article shows a map with areas populated by Shans, Kachins, Chins, Karens, Arakans, Mons, and Ahoms. The leaders of these peoples look at the sorry economic conditions of the large states in which they are now submerged and then compare them with the relative prosperity of smaller nations like Thailand (and one could add Malaya). These "new Asian nationalists believe that their major task during the next generation is to modernise their emerging nation-states without destroying the traditional values, customary law, and social fabric which make possible the necessary discipline and honesty of their peoples. They are convinced that they can succeed in their undertaking only if they can themselves

\*Times Leader, May 14, 1968.

\*"Asia's Next War?" by Robert Dickson Crane, 23 June, 1968.

determine in what way and at what speed their nations will modernise. They also believe that regional co-operation can be made really effective over the long run only if this co-operation is free rather than coerced either from within or without."

There is a danger of American interference in support of the existing 'great powers,' motivated, like the Vietnam War by a fear of China. The result of such interference would be a series of Vietnam-like conflicts in which the nationalists would ultimately triumph, but at great cost, and owing all too much to Chinese aid. So America must be persuaded to keep out. Or, "better still, it should publicly reassert its traditional support of the principle of self-determination of peoples," for, "the vision and responsibility of those who lead the emerging nation-States of South-East Asia may offer the only hope for genuine freedom and independence in this part of the world."

It is separately reported from India that the *Bodos* of Assam are demanding an autonomous region too. Police fired on demonstrators in May; there were fifty injured and over a thousand arrests.

Pakistan also has its troubles, as more autonomy is called for in the frontier district of *Peshawar*, which borders on Afghanistan. There was a large demonstration in April, when 10,000 supporters of Abdul Ghaffer Khan ("the frontier Gandhi") and his son marched to commemorate martyrs from Peshawar killed in 1930 when demonstrating against the British.

Nearby, in *Kashmir*, in addition to Shaikh Abdullah's non-violent campaign for self-determination, an underground National Liberation Front has been organized, which is trying to become self-sufficient in arms—it disdains involvement with Pakistan or China. A spokesman complained of Mr. Kosygin's efforts to obtain a settlement of the Kashmir dispute, saying, "He is constantly talking to Pakistan or India. Has he once attempted to find out what the Kashmiris want?"

The *Times* has recently reported that *Nauru* is indeed independent, the world's tiniest nation, and has elected its first president.

All is not so smooth sailing for *Anguilla*, although during one year of de-facto independence she has "met the cost of day to day administration from her own internal resources, has new buildings and roads to her credit, has balanced her budget, and is managing to live within her very limited means." This report from the Rector of Anguilla, in a letter to *The Times*, mentions difficulties in handling criminal cases without an official judiciary. More serious is the continuing threat of invasion by Mr. Bradshaw's forces on St. Kitts, possibly financed by selling promises of Anguilla's beaches to unscrupulous developers—and also by British funds that are theoretically intended for Anguilla. Dr. Herbert, leader of the St. Kitts opposition, was recently in London, where he spoke of a possible mini-Biafra, and likened Mr. Bradshaw to Haiti's notorious "Papa Doc" Duvalier.

In a letter to Liberation magazine, Paul Goodman says he is disturbed that Anguillans are "seeking recognition from 'the United States, the United Nations, Great Britain' ". "Why," he asks, "would they want to know that kind of people? They would do better to make friends with respectable groups like the Lower East Side Action Project, the village of North Stratford, New Hampshire, the student government of San Francisco State College, and so forth. There is no need to go slumming. In their inexperience they do not con-

cretely foresee what recognition by the United States, for instance, entails: an occasion might arise when somebody would have to speak politely to, or even give some skin to, Hubert Humphrey."

The idea of independence was still quite marginal in the recent *Bermuda* disturbances and elections, but it was mentioned in some reports. At least it was clear that the automatic devaluation by Bermuda that followed Britain's was an example of a subservience that might not be too easy to maintain in the future.

The aftermath of empire is still a troublesome responsibility for Britain. It is at its most difficult in the case of *Belize* (British Honduras), where it appears that the granting of independence might well result in a bloody Biafra-like struggle with Guatemala. To avoid this kind of situation in so many places—Nagaland, Swaziland, Gibraltar, the Falklands, Anguilla . . . the peoples of The Fourth World may need to devise more adequate institutional machinery to establish just claims to independence, and to apply moral and active non-violent pressures in support of such claims. This is a long step from power politics and "realistic" reliance on military alliances and military decisions, but a future without some alternative to these looks rather grim.

The territory of *Papua-New Guinea* is moving gradually towards independence from Australian rule, and "independence could be as close as 1970". Lord Casey, Governor General of Australia said that Papua and New Guinea would "become a self-governing country, developed for independence, if and when it is clearly demonstrated by a majority of the indigenous population that this is what they wish."

The same principle of self-determination was given by Julius Nyerere, President of Tanzania, as a reason for his country being the first to recognize Biafra—followed by Gabon, the Ivory Coast, Zambia (and Oxfam). Nyerere, while he maintains a belief in the value of unity within his own country and beyond, and will work for such unity, says that he would not think of bombing into submission any people who might decide to separate from Tanzania.

President Kaunda of *Zambia* continues to lead his country in the direction of real independence, which means cutting the lines that keep so many ex-colonies economically dependent on outside forces that are ultimately exploitive—e.g. Africa Digest says of West African co-operation, "There are rules, made in Paris, which inhibit commerce between franc zone states and sterling and dollar neighbours". Zambia's recent reforms "will provide more jobs for Zambian Africans rather than an economic stimulus," and, as The Economist comments, "in a relatively poor country, a redistribution of opportunity to the many does have a legitimate claim against the growth of aggregate gross national product." Is this a concept that Britain might begin to apply to itself?

In Spain, Franco has cancelled, after thirty years, some expressions "hurtful" to the people of the *Basque* provinces of Guipuzcoa and Vizcaya contained in a decree that removed the autonomy they had enjoyed under the Second Republic. They are no longer labelled "traitors," but it is not clear whether they are yet permitted public use of the

Basque language, one of the oldest in the Iberian peninsula. On the other hand, *Catalan* and other workers are being sentenced to prison for belonging to illegal "workers' commissions".

An interesting article in *The Times* (May 17) pointed out that the main difficulty of reaching any settlement in Palestine after twenty years of conflict is that the *Palestine* Arabs are now a people without a territory, as the Palestine Jews once were. It suggests that they be given a territory on which "they can achieve a collective life, social and economic institutions, out of which a common will may emerge." Then the final boundaries and status of their territory can be negotiated. The article suggested a U.N. trusteeship, administered by a neutral power, which could help form and protect such a new Arab country, probably using some of the territories recently conquered by Israel as a start.

The *Isle of Man* is to issue "British" passports, with "Isle of Man" embossed on the front, and the three legs of Man crest inside. Does that put them 'one up' on the Scots?

If the devolution of political power in England is still some way from most people's thoughts, at least it is feasible in one region besides Cornwall. In a *Times Supplement*, John Chartres describes Yorkshire quite objectively, and with no thoughts of a political break. But we find him writing: "Yorkshire, someone once said, is not so much a county as a miniature nation, and a well diversified mini-nation at that." And again, "One has the feeling that if civil war broke out and Yorkshire was blockaded, its citizens could manage very nicely, thank you, without outside help." He goes on to say that Yorkshire has been able to absorb a large number of coloured immigrants in the Bradford and Huddersfield area, with "few outward signs of stress", that there is a "low incidence of industrial disputes in the wool industry and that Yorkshire cricket is proverbial.\* But Yorkshire people resent being "put upon" by outsiders who try to poach their best labour in the name of North East Development. So, with a population nearly equal to Scotland's, with a full range of industries, agriculture and fisheries, all producing, on an average, about the same per head as the U.K. as a whole, Yorkshire could well wave goodbye to Westminster, once it has arranged for a fair share of the North Sea gas, which should be easy as the gas industry is already run on exemplary decentralist lines.

The Scottish National Party made tremendous gains, as they had expected, in the local elections, and continue to make a steady progress that confounds their critics, native and foreign. We hope they will continue to set such a fine example of the way to devolve power peacefully and rationally. Already they are busily discussing an appropriate foreign policy for an independent *Scotland*, and much of the talk is of freedom from military and economic entanglements; defence expenditure can then be cut down to an appropriate level for a small country that has no pretensions to being a policeman in far off lands. However, perhaps Scotland can also help in setting up some Fourth World mediation that can act more effectively than the U.N. has in such disputes as Biafra.

A conference was held recently in Coventry in which 150 delegates from 25 countries discussed

\*Literally in the international class, as of 1968!

"People and Cities". It started from the premise that "the affluent and the desperately poor may be poles apart, but one thing they have in common . . . is that people everywhere are suddenly realising that they have no say in what sort of cities they want to live in. The non-participation, or 'alienation' of the ordinary man in his urban setting has obviously become a crucial issue of the decade, wherever he lives. It is one of the complaints which seem to link, for example, Scottish nationalists and rebellious Paris students."\*

In some optimistic conclusions, the conference found that resources for major changes are available, and money is no problem. Visualizing a "world city, or Ecumenopolis" one spokesman said, "Now is the time to plan so that the small cell is preserved within it which suits the scale of human feelings".

An interesting example of urban humanization was reported recently from Norwich. A shopping street was temporarily closed to traffic for repairs and, to their surprise, the shopkeepers found that business improved. Now the town has decided to close the street to traffic permanently. And it seems rather more than a coincidence that Cumbernauld, which won an award as the best-designed town in the world, has just elected Scottish National Party members to 18 of its 21 council seats (in a 70 per cent. poll).

The proposal to divide the London Telephone Directories into 36 smaller district directories appears to have come from the Thomson organization and to be based on commercial motives (more advertising). However, the idea of breaking up 'The Great Wen' into units of a more human size is not without merit, even though the best place to begin is not with telephone directories. To whom should we look for an overall plan to restore a better balance of life in great urban conglomerations like London?—some London Regionalists, perhaps?

\*Roy Perrott, in Observer of 30 June 68.

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## "... A Little Lower Than The Angels"?

"Man kills through fear, and fear is hydra-headed. Once we start slaying, there is no end to it. An eternity would not suffice to vanquish the demons who torture us. Who put the demons there? That is for each one of us to ask himself. Let every man search his own heart. Neither God nor the Devil is responsible, and certainly not such puny monsters as Hitler, Mussolini, Stalin et alii. Certainly not such bugaboos as Catholicism, Capitalism, Communism. Who put the demons there in our hearts to torture us?"†

If any hope remains for the future of our species, for an escape from the catastrophes that increasingly threaten, it lies, partly at least, in a better understanding of our real nature. We may owe far more than we yet realise to those who are helping to widen such understanding, and particularly to those who are now inquiring into the basic instinctual drives that underlie many of our seemingly irrational actions. These drives have been partially explored before in studies of the less emotionally stable members of our own species, and by rather misleading studies of other species of animals under artificial conditions of captivity or domestication. But the little knowledge thus gained may in fact have been a dangerous thing, leading us away from real solutions to our problems.

Recently a new school of exploration in the field of social instincts has been popularized by Robert Ardrey, Desmond Morris and Konrad Lorenz (cf. review of "On Aggression" in *Resurgence* 4). These writers are trying to persuade us to abandon the conceit whereby man "holds dominion over the animals". They try to do this by exposing bonds that tie us tighter than we like to admit to the animal kingdom. Their new approach has not been widely welcomed by most scientists, who point out that the case is far from proved, but while these writers admit that they are presenting only an initial thesis, asking questions, and merely speculating on most of the answers, the very posing of the questions does much to reveal the importance of a full inquiry into these areas.

Robert Ardrey's books, *African Genesis*\* and *The Territorial Imperative*\*\* bring together a large collection of studies in ethology ("the study of innate behaviour patterns in animals"), and in anthropology. They take the Copernican revolution into a new area, where man still feels he holds a special and central position. As a result we may need to begin a revision of a good many of the fundamental premises of sociology and psychology, and also of our political thinking.

†Henry Miller in "The Colossus of Maroussi", quoted by Claud Cockburn in "I Claud...".

\*Collins, 1961 and Fontana paper-back 1967.

\*\*Collins, 1967 (36s.). Published in U.S.A. in 1966; extracts were in *Life* magazine.

Ardrey establishes quite plainly that throughout a wide range of species the drive for status, one might say for power, often expressed by the implacable assertion of control (ownership) of a 'given territory' is very fundamental; it even takes precedence over sex, and sexual relationships can seldom be initiated before the proper status, generally of the male, has been secured.

Ardrey's earlier book, *African Genesis*, enters boldly into an anthropological controversy about which group of fossils represents the remains of the real ancestors of modern man. The point at issue is not merely the geographical centre from which our ancestors originated, but concerns the kind of animal those ancestors were. If Ardrey, and the anthropologists like Raymond Dart whose case he supports are right, we are descended from primates who were forced by hostile climatic changes to turn carnivorous a few million years ago, forming groups to catch large prey, and learning to wield weapons even before developing the larger brain that has brought our unique capability for symbolic thought and language.

In *The Territorial Imperative*, Ardrey describes the group behaviour of primates and of other social species in relation to tribal territories. The behaviour of some species of monkey are strikingly similar to the ways of man when it comes to patrolling the borders of a chosen territory — a combination of threat, bluff and skirmishing in which the advantage of a high morale is always held by defenders fighting on their own soil. Furthermore, the instinct that brings an attachment to a particular familiar territory can be traced clearly through the whole animal kingdom — from planarium worms to birds and primates, and even back down to single cell creatures. While unable to offer any new explanation of this mysterious sense of location and of navigational skills shown by so many species, Ardrey's discussion reveals the extent of the mystery — and of our ignorance — through many fascinating examples. He thus reinforces his contention that most of the animal kingdom is instinctively aware of and concerned about space and territory — and it would be surprising if man were an exception.

### Instinctive Drives

However, it is during some general observations about psychology and social-psychology, rather than in the specific discussion of the "territorial imperative", that Ardrey's examination of our instincts becomes most significant. In the first place, by revealing so many of our ties to the animal world, he expands the area in which we can expect to find an instinctual explanation of behaviour. Although it has been fashionable for some time now to consider that the behaviour of man can be almost infinitely modified by his environment, apart from some basic survival and sexual drives, Ardrey's exploration of animal behaviour forces us to consider a number of

other instinctive drives that also seem to be a significant force even in man. It is not easy to describe precisely what Ardrey considers are the most basic of these instinctive drives; he summarizes them as a need for identity, for stimulation, and, rather less urgently, for security. It is the need for identity that results in the attitude toward territory in animals, and toward property, power and position in man (and also in some higher animals). The need for stimulation, the avoidance of boredom, which also takes precedence over security, gives a general explanation of the group behaviour of men and of monkeys when faced with rivals across a border. It must also lie behind the curiosity that stimulates scientific investigation and invention, and the creativity that leads to art. If Ardrey is right, and it is hard to remain unconvinced about this, any social organisation we build that ignores the instinctive need for stimulation is almost certain to fall apart. The need for excitement, interest, stimulation that we all feel throughout our lives cannot be set aside by any planned and comfortable environment — hence the limited attraction and success of the welfare state.

The same need for stimulation, but described as an insatiable curiosity, is attributed to man as a basic instinct by Desmond Morris in *The Naked Ape*.\* This book, like those of Ardrey, sets out to centre man down in the animal kingdom and examine his animal nature. It is a less fundamental approach, primarily concerned with relating our personal, everyday behaviour, such as smiles, small-talk and sexual responses to the equivalent proceedings in other primates. So far as it goes, it confirms Ardrey's contention that much of our behaviour is derived from our animal heritage, and can be explained only in this way. But what Morris's book lacks is a proper examination of our social relations going beyond the family group. A further limitation is that his explanations seldom penetrate further than the scientific "how" connection — such as how our physical difference from other primates arises out of a retardation in the development rate: we never physically "grow up". His explanations of our naked skins, and of our increased sexiness as compared with other primates seem rather contrived and unconvincing; however, in conclusions similar to Ardrey's, Morris does stress the need felt by families for their own unique 'territories', as part of a search for identity; and his understanding of man's friendly and hostile reactions — responses that hold the key to our present survival — correspond to the conclusions of Konrad Lorenz, and of Ardrey with regard to crowding and territory. A certain way to build hostility is to crowd people (and other species of animals) too closely together. So Morris stresses the urgent need to limit our numbers, saying, "... any religious or other 'moralizing' factions that oppose... (contraception)... must face the fact that they are engaged in dangerous war-mongering."

### Group Survival

The conclusions that one reaches after reading Ardrey, Morris and Lorenz are that we must revolutionize our thinking about the way in

\*Jonathan Cape, 1967, 30s.; McGraw Hill, U.S.A., 1968.

which we organize our environment to improve the human condition. For Ardrey especially has revealed that we are creatures driven by instincts rather different from those that many psychologists and philosophers have assumed to be obvious. We seek security and preservation, but not so much for our individual selves as for the group and species to which we belong. It has often been overlooked that natural selection has maintained in existence the species and subspecies that are best suited for survival as a group: this means that those species survive in which individuals will sacrifice their interests, and even their lives, for the welfare of the group.

"What the record indicates is that in the major disasters in our history, individual aggressiveness for selfish motives played an almost negligible part compared to unselfish loyalty and devotion to tribe, nation, religion or political ideology. Tribal wars, national wars, civil wars, religious wars, world wars are waged in the purported interest of the community, not of the individual, to decide issues that are far removed from the personal self-interest of the combatants. No doubt the lust for rape and plunder provided delightful incentives for a minority, but for the great majority the primary motive was fanatical loyalty, to the point of self-sacrifice, to king and country, leader or group.

"In other words, the main trouble with man appears to be, not that he is an excessively aggressive creature, but an excessively loyal and devoted creature..."\*

This instinctive capacity for group cooperation has helped us as we have learned to live within groups of ever increasing size; but always a new degree of amity is bought at the cost of increasing enmity at the boundaries of the territories held by our group. This pattern of "amity-enmity", Ardrey points out, once ensured space and survival amongst smaller groups of primates, which could spread out into relatively empty territories. The tragic absurdity of this continuing pattern of behaviour, brought with us from our primeval background is all too clear to the rational mind as we see groups of hundreds of millions of people working together with considerable harmony and dedicating their efforts to increasing the well-being and prosperity of their 'national' group — and yet becoming ever more hostile and suspicious of similar groups, working with similar purpose for similar ends according to a similar vision of a better life. Will it ever be possible for us to outgrow this "amity-enmity" complex that produces such inappropriate behaviour in men today? Or will we have to endure a continuing balance of hostility and fear, ever increasing in instability, until we destroy most of our species, or until some hostile force from outer space uses this instinct to finally unite us into a world society?

It is possible that in the concept of the "territorial imperative" Ardrey has begun to develop a political theory that will help us toward greater political stability. In his second book, he takes great pains to refute the "Frustration-Aggression" theory of individual and group violence that is so popular with psychologists; but he would not agree either with the "size theory of aggression" as proposed, for example, by Leopold Kohr. None-

\*Arthur Koestler, "What's Wrong With Us?", *Observer*, 28 April 1968.

theless, in certain situations, the size of the defended territory is naturally quite small, due to historical circumstances, and in these cases, the 'territorial imperative' may be the most important ingredient. Ardrey does recognize the factor of size in relation to Africa, and writes,

"Tribal loyalties were uniformly paramount. Black nationalism held meaning only to northern whites, usually painfully ignorant of the man in the bush, or in the ambitions for power of that handful of white-educated blacks who came to be known as black Europeans. The talk in northern circles was of 'viable nations' as if economics constituted a significant force in the establishment of national identities. The independence movement was real enough, but its emotional basis was a tribal demand first for freedom from the rule of the white man, but second, and finally, from the centralized rule of the black man as well."

But he goes on to stress that the force of the "amity-enmity" complex can act regardless of size, and has, for instance, unified the divisive forces within South Africa into a strong single nation prepared to face an outside world that is almost totally hostile.

A combination of the "amity-enmity" complex, increasing internal morale in proportion to the external threat, with the "territorial imperative" can cause a people to maintain a spectacular defence in the face of great odds. This was once shown in Finland and Britain; today it is demonstrated in Vietnam, Biafra and Israel. One might hope that this inherent superiority of the defence of 'tribal' territory could eventually bring more stability in a world of smaller states; aggressors would find it too costly and difficult to take over the territories of unwilling people who, whether using a violent or non-violent defence, would have the advantage of morale built on instinctive feelings. However, such defence would be futile unless the ultimate moral depravity of genocide were universally proscribed — along with the weapons that make it possible. If we can count on an increasing moral revulsion to genocide, of the kind that has brought the possibility of peace in Vietnam, then it may be possible to envisage a stable "Fourth World" built of states in which the emotions of the "territorial imperative" are turned to constructive purpose — to a pride and rivalry between states built on real achievement, rather than on ferocious weapons.

### Stable States

Finally, one can take Ardrey's basic drives—identity, stimulation and security—and expand them into a fuller picture of individual and group needs, as has been done, often rather misleadingly, with the basic drives proposed by various schools of psychology.

To begin with, one can consider just what the establishment and maintenance of identity means in practice. Would it not be related to a drive to create things, to achieve lasting recognition, and to pursue prestige—a step beyond Morris's mere curiosity? Were the pyramids built by the Pharaohs as a final demonstration of their identity? The existence of so many other massive monuments in other parts of the world would indicate

that some primary force in human nature plays a part. But, in less spectacular ways, how many of us are without a feeling that we would like to do something distinctive, something specially our own, and, if possible, something lasting.

The point is that our modern culture, or at least our methods of production that emphasize quantity above quality and distinctiveness, leads to a frustration of much of this identity drive. So, with few creative outlets, some seek identity through sheer quantity of accumulation in money, or power; but others are as likely to turn to destructive methods of expressing their uniqueness—for it is all too clear that it is possible to achieve a notorious identity by spreading terror and destruction.

While the consumption of mass-produced products frustrates the human need for identity, a productive system based on division of labour and an impersonal welfare state prevents most people from obtaining any real stimulation from their environment; they are prevented from leading rewarding lives. Instead they have to look for compensatory stimulation, for relief from boredom, in sport (generally spectator-sport), or more destructively by seeking sensation through crime, drugs, gambling, etc. Indeed, the demand for vicarious stimulation through crime and violence is responsible for the complete distortion of our communication media, and of much of the entertainment industry as well.

### Stimulating Occupations

What can be done to bring the way we live more into line with our instinctive needs?

Many professional people now do quietly creative work that they find intrinsically rewarding, and much routine mechanical work is already being automated, but still the majority of workers can hardly be said to find their work stimulating or rewarding; if they did not have to provide for their material needs—to seek security—they would lack the interest to continue work at all.

If we admit that we cannot produce everything we need through stimulating occupations and work that is rewarding in itself, we must seek ways to minimise the amount of dull and arduous work, and to share it within the community so as to reduce the effect on each individual. And in deciding what is to be produced, the way in which it will be made must be considered just as much as the subsequent use value; we need to balance the use value against any tedious (or unpleasant, or dangerous) work that is needed in production, in considering the total cost. It seems unlikely that any such planning of total social costs, to the environment, as well as to the workers, can take place properly within a market economy based on commodities, nor where economies of scale through a high degree of division of labour are sought as a final goal.

The social and political changes that need to be made in human society in the light of the aspects of our animal heritage revealed by Ardrey and others are very great. Some of them are changes that enlightened people have been demanding all along; but others, such as the need to avoid boredom, have seldom been considered as of primary importance. Yet, if Ardrey is right, we continue to ignore them at our peril.

## John Papworth

# PARIS NOTEBOOK

"The students have made a revolution but they don't know what to do with it". This was the verdict of *The Times*, and it is a true one. How silly of the students to feel 'betrayed' by the workers when they themselves do not know where they are going. Yes, of course, but do not underestimate the capacity of the students to learn, and the students are learning fast.

I went first to Nanterre. The landscape is lunar and Paris seems a million light years away, even though the car journey there is less than half-an-hour. What possessed the French authorities to build a new university in such an isolated place? Perhaps cheap land and the idea of locating an always potentially troublesome fraternity in an outlandish spot were joint attractions for the bureaucrats. How were they to know that inadvertently they were sparking off a world revolution?

Nanterre represents to an ultimate degree the kind of frustrations that modern society is imposing on people. Tall, soulless, concrete blocks, repellent to the eye, are devoid of any kind of grace or beauty, and quite infuriating to use. With its lecture rooms, offices, auditoriums, refectory and so on it may have seemed, from a drawing board, to have everything; but in terms of man as a creature of spirit and life it has nothing. To herd thousands of the brightest spirits of young France into this hole and to expect them to acquiesce and conform is tantamount to storing gasoline in a volcano.

But to do this when all authority systems today offer the young nothing but the prospect of death! The marvel is not that the revolution has happened, but that people have been quiescent for so long. What a long night of conformist despair it has been; what a clean, refreshing note of life and hope is now heard!

The entrance was guarded by students carrying sticks; all the doors of the entire campus were locked except one; they were not risking any sudden invasion by the fuzz if they could help it. The truth is that none of this really avails, and the fuzz could be in possession of the place at any time they liked, especially night-time (when I arrived), provided they were prepared to kill a few students.

Who was I? What did I want? No good saying these questions have troubled me all my life. I produced several hundred copies of IT, and all barriers melted.

Inside, the place was almost deserted, but the fire of revolution was everywhere—a silent road of night-time toytown dreamland waiting for the morning. Everywhere posters, notices and slogans; slogans with felt-tipped pens giving life at last to those vacant concrete acres of empty wall space. "Workers & Students Unite," "Che Lives," "Power for the People," "Down with Gaullism," "Gaullism is Fascism," "Anarchy," and so on. And endless notices about commissions for this or that problem, indicating that every single aspect of the life of the university was being evaluated

and worked out on the new basis of student power. A revolt against an authority system which in various ways is bent on destroying life; a revolt by means of the poster and the slogan, whose instruments are not guns but felt-tipped pens and duplicators.

It is almost impossible to convey the full range of political thinking here: Marxists, Trots, Anarchos, Socialists, Liberals and others are having a field day. So are others: "Invent new sexual perversions" implored one notice scrawled on a staircase wall, and "Homosexuals destroy your inhibitions" urged another. Some of the old political groups are seeking to capture the revolution for their own ends, but my impression is of something deeper going on, something altogether new, a quite new rebellion against any form of power whether it talks nationalism, capitalism, class war, or anything else that predicates the role of students.

Students here wait to decide for themselves what they want, and no prestructured attitudes of socialists, communists, conservatives, anarchists or of any other body is going to be allowed to ride rough-shod over that.

Some of the professors have joined the revolution and are sitting in (and welcome) on student commissions to decide the new life of the campus. Even the Rector has joined some of the discussions, and his large domestic apartment at the top of the central block is about the only part of the campus the students have not occupied. Students now run the porters lodge (the porters just sit around and relax), they man the telephone exchange and furnish free calls to anywhere, they operate the refectory and occupy nearly all the professors' rooms.

I found one door labelled C.I.A. and wondered how on earth such a body could take time off from murdering members of the Kennedy clan to openly subvert the revolution here. It proved to be the office of the 'Centre d'Informations Angliciste'. Come back tomorrow for a talk, they said, we are tired now. Bring your sleeping bag and kip where you like.

I had arrived the day after the Whitsun holiday. The press liars had been saying the strike was over, but it wasn't. The next day, one student at the 'phone was taking down notes on the percentages of strikers holding out and he was jubilant that the strike remained solid. But the first flush of things was clearly over; students were relaxed, but also a trifle subdued, and several even wondered if the student revolt could hold out after the inevitable return of the workers.

I wandered from one faculty to another and everywhere groups were holding discussions, not just casual affairs but serious business-like ones with adequate procedural formalities to ensure the business was covered and recorded. Talk, talk, talk, the steam of the revolution designed to ensure it reached its goals and, unlike all previous revolutions, does not go off the rails.

\* \* \*

Then a visit to the Odeon. Imagine the Royal Court or the Aldwych Theatre taken over by students for non-stop round the clock discussions on the state of the country and the world! More talk, more posters, more slogans, more leaflets. It is as though a mighty elemental force has burst through an encrusted death grip. At last people are communicating with each other. The long night of conformity is over. The iron in the soul has melted. What are we waiting for?

I sat amid the new-gilt and red-plush and students took turns to control the discussion from the central gangway. A report of specific details of police brutality was given, and it sounded like a flashback to the Nuremberg trial. Dare de Gaulle or anyone risk a repetition in trying to eject the students?

Then on to the Sorbonne, a florid, ornate and rambling catacomb of a building surrounding a large courtyard. As I arrived one huge audience was pouring out of the vast auditorium from a meeting of liberal savants such as Rene Dumont, and another was arriving for a communist discussion on the world situation today. Again the posters, the leaflets, the slogans, and the literature of every shade of opinion that regards itself as 'left'. Somehow that courtyard is the cradle of the revolution. Amid the cries of the literature sellers, the rattle of the boxes taking yet another collection 'for the wounded,' the endless arguments of different groups of all ages, distracted neither by the noise of other groups, the melée of children playing around, or even by the rain or the onset of night, one sensed that this was no mere revolution of 'workers' who would shortly find they had new taskmasters and new forms of tyranny to contend with; this was a new kind of revolution altogether, a revolution of the mind concerned not as much to destroy the old order as simply to dismiss it.

But what to replace it with? This is where the discussions come in and this is what they are all about. Who will decide? On what basis? For what purposes?

I bumped into Ralph Schoenemann who gave me an earful of 19th Century Marxist romanticism as his explanation of what is going on. I gather his particular sect strongly disapproves of 'revisionism'. Some people find Bertrand Russell's secre-

tary rather sinister, but he is really an immensely likeable and old-fashioned idealist who would cheerfully sacrifice his life to the cause of our enslavement, and mine to his special brand of Marxism.

The revolution is attracting many of his outlook who see it as a golden opportunity to get their hands on the reins of power. I doubt if they will succeed and the students of the communist countries, especially China, could tell them a thing or two why. For the students of Paris have already unleashed something that will sweep the world. Never mind the headlines about Belgrade and Hornsey, look at Paris itself. In the vast, ornate corridors of the Sorbonne I saw many elderly people wandering around and looking their fill. They stared in bewilderment at the stale, quaint, phoney, dingy murals of yesteryear and then stared at the posters and the slogans.

Outside I ran into a staid, middle-aged and highly cultured catholic businessman—a representative of the bourgeoisie if ever there was one. He told me that his neighbourhood was having meetings all the time. He was full of quiet enthusiasm. "For the first time," he said, with a hint of emotion, "people are actually communicating. At elections, twenty people would turn up for a meeting, now 350 come nearly every night. This is a wonderful period for all of us, it has enlarged our experience and we are all discussing, not just workers or intellectuals or bosses, but all together. We must build something new."

I wandered around Paris and caught everywhere the whispers of a people going mad with sanity. Posters and slogans everywhere and seldom far from a group having a discussion, Paris seemed like some vast Speaker's Corner at Marble Arch, but it is a pitch that has discarded the dross of crankiness and which is concerned only with revolution for real.

They told me the neighbourhood meetings are going on all over Paris. That is why the revolution is real and why it will be worldwide whether de Gaulle or his brutes turn the students and the people out of the university or not. Paris has focused the light of a million suns onto the imagination of mankind, and from such illumination there can be no turning back.

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