

Civil War & Civil Peace: Libertarian Aragon 1936-37

Graham Kelsey

On 12 April 1931 the people of Spain went to the polls. The political upheaval which followed constituted the Spanish bourgeois revolution. The inability of the victors to translate it into social and economic terms alienated their working class support completely. In this failure to effect genuine social and economic reform lay the seeds of the resulting civil war. That conflict, however, was to offer those who did have the necessary energy and courage the opportunity of promoting real change. In the region of Aragon, in particular, village trade unionists succeeded in laying the foundations of a new truly democratic society, creating civil peace even in the midst of civil war.

The national elections to the Cortes, held at the start of 1936, had constituted for liberal-republicans and their socialist political allies an opportunity to put the clock back some five years when the Spanish Second Republic had been created upon a wave of widespread support and popular enthusiasm. Certainly the aspirations and expectations first aroused at the Republic's birth in April 1931 were in large part reborn with the Popular front's victory in the February 1936 elections. Now, however, the Republicans' room for manoeuvre was considerably smaller, far too small in fact as events were to show. Already by May opposition to the new government from among its working class supporters, beginning to appreciate as Vicente Ballester had insisted in Zaragoza in January that they could expect nothing from such politicians, (1) had begun to develop quite markedly. Moreover, working class awareness and thus demands for social and economic improvement, which had in 1931 been primarily urban in context, was in 1936 increasingly rural as well. This reflected firstly, the degree to which the political polarisation effected by the February elections had awoken Spain's rural populace, and secondly, in the particular case of Aragon at least, the

Spain: Aragon.

Sp

Folios toward

The Anarchist Encyclopædia

Anarchism is a concrete political and social philosophy with its own history, indeed, its own precise geography, with a defined outlook that has influenced a great many other political theories, with its adherents, past and present, ranging from those known by virtue of their anarchist ideas to those famous in other fields because of their contribution to science, art, literature, industrial organisation or militancy.

It has attracted a great many thinkers and philosophers, those who have accepted it and those who have dismissed it. Its influence on the working class, though nowadays less than it once was, has always provided a hard clear cut alternative to marxism, state socialism and parliamentary democracy, and still provides a vigorous attack as an unquashable minority.

Though authoritarian ideas have triumphed generally in economic matters, and centralism has dominated political thinking, the anti-authoritarian, anti-centralist ideas of anarchism have come to the fore in social life and are

becomingly increasingly influential - albeit distorted in a meritocratic way by being subordinated to authoritarian capitalist systems - in organisation theory, co-operative ventures, industrial project teams, teamwork in social services, educational theory, and indeed, most ironically, in military units such as the SAS.

THE ANARCHIST ENCYCLOPAEDIA (ISSN 0267-6141) will attempt to reaffirm anarchism as the only viable ideal and practical alternative to marxist, liberal and conservative authoritarianism. It will provide the most comprehensive and lively account of anarchist thought and criticism to appear under one title. Both scholarly and entertaining it will provide fresh insights into the theory and practice of anarchism, and also the important part played by anarchists in developing theories of art, education, ecology, sport, music, critiques of industrialisation, marxism and adversary democracy, etc., and an up to date and fresh look at the importance and relevance of anarchism in contemporary society.

The Anarchist Encyclopaedia (ISSN 0267-6141)

Monograph 1:

Civil War & Civil Peace: Libertarian Aragon 1936-37, Graham Kelsey.

Cambridge, November 1985, 80pp. (Individual copy £2.00, inc. p+p)

(General Editor: Stuart Christie)

The Anarchist Encyclopaedia

Cambridge Free Press

Unit 6, 25 Gwydir Street

Cambridge CB1 2LG.

As well as defining anarchism as a concrete political theory in its own right, as developed from the time of Bakunin and Kropotkin until the present day, it will become a focal point for accessible, in-depth discussion on all aspects of philosophy, geography, history, the social sciences, and critiques of statist and authoritarian ideologies from an anarchist point of view.

Each bi-monthly folio of The Anarchist Encyclopaedia is devoted to a particular theme, social issue or problem which will be explored in depth. Contributors will be invited to provide analytical and review essays on the topic addressed, the aim of which is to cast a hard light on other ideologies, seek fresh viewpoints, to clarify an issue and achieve a better understanding of its implications

The Anarchist Encyclopaedia is designed as an interesting, useful, easily updateable and cross referenced source on current research and thinking in the field of anarchist theory, practice and social criticism. It will contain:

* Definitive and highly readable feature essays on historical, political and methodological topics.

* Reports on all the latest research and debates, with interpretative comments by the editorial staff and contributors.

* Book Service, with reviews and news of books of interest and importance as viewed from a libertarian perspective.

* Updated check lists for every section.

* New easy reference indices for the check lists, file services and features.

* Chronological lists, bibliographies and biographical notes.

The Anarchist Encyclopaedia will consist of: * A simple master index with alphabetical coding for all sections. The letters are repeated through the file so you can flick immediately to the right section and the information you require.

* Outline Indices: Entries outlining the main topics covered in Encyclopaedia articles will be listed alphabetically under Main Headings (used for countries, organisations, ideologies, etc) * Analytical Indices: These indices summarise in greater detail the articles previously covered by outline indices. A cumulative list of general subject headings is given on the first page of each analytical index. The detailed subject areas covered by each Main Heading are indicated by subheadings under which will appear the individual entries giving page and article references in the Encyclopaedia.

The Anarchist Encyclopaedia will present in an accessible form the knowledge necessary to fill a marked gap in libertarian scholarship, and effectively present new information and fresh perspectives to the reader. It will not only be an invaluable quick introductory work which will be detailed enough without the need of further reference, it will, in most cases, constitute the standard reference work on subjects discussed. The first folio of The Anarchist Encyclopaedia on Libertarian Aragon 1936-37 is now available.

Monographs scheduled for Volume I (print run 1500) :

* History China: Anarchists and the May 4 Movement in China.

Spain: Civil War and Libertarian Aragon

* Political theory: Critiques of: Robert Nozick, Karl Popper, Joseph Schumpeter, Robert Michels, and John Rawls' 'A Theory of Justice'; anarcho syndicalism; social ecology; theories of state and revolution; anarchism in the 21st century; the class basis of fascism

* Practice: Self-management; education; feminism, psychoanalysis

* Arts: Anarchism in film and literature; mass media and libertarian communication; art and anarchy.

* Current Affairs NATO; the New Right

Subscription Rates:
1 Year (Institutional),
£25.00 \$50.00.
2 Years, £45.00/\$90.00.
1 Year (Individual) £16.00/\$32.00
2 Years, £30./\$60.00.

Order Form METHODS OF PAYMENT

You may order The Anarchist Encyclopaedia from us by paying in any of the following ways. The price of a journal subscription includes the cost of postage.

1) By cheque in £ sterling. Cheque payments in \$US or DM are also acceptable. Please also add the equivalent of £1.00 sterling to cover bank charges.

2) By Bankers' Standing Order (Please ask for a form).

* I enclose a cheque for:

* I have today paid by International Giro:

(Delete as appropriate)

Amount:

Date:

(Cheques payable to: 'The Anarchist Encyclopaedia')

Please enter my/our subscription to The Anarchist Encyclopaedia for
1 year 2 years

Name:

Address:

.

.

. Area Code

.

.

Anthropology

Harold Barclay

Introduction

Anthropology is the study of the human being both as a biological entity and as a cultural animal. It has been referred to as the study of people in all places and in all times. While there are obviously other academic disciplines which make humans their chief object of examination, anthropological investigations have laid claim to some degree of uniqueness because of the manner in which their subjects are perceived and studied. Thus, for one thing, anthropologists at least pay lip service to a 'wholistic' view of humankind. In a human society, it is argued, economic relations for example cannot be comprehended or fully understood if they are drawn out of the total cultural milieu and treated as isolated phenomena ignoring the ties of kinship, social stratification, political structures, religion, etc. Nor can they be treated ahistorically or in ignorance of the physical environment.

There are also certain human issues which not only necessitate consideration of the cultural whole but also the biological nature of the species itself. One example is the problem of the origin of culture. The wholistic approach is clearly evident in the majority of those anthropological reports called ethnographies, which describe the ways of life of people around the globe, and in archeological descriptions of sites and now defunct cultures.

A second way in which the anthropological approach to humankind may be unique is the specific techniques of investigation. Anthropologists are natural historians in that they observe their object of study in its natural setting and seek in their investigation to blend themselves into the environment and become as much a part of it as they can. Additionally, anthropological research is hardly a hit and run affair: being in the 'field' may last from six months to six years.

Ethnographers employ what is known as the participant-observer technique wherein they live amongst the people they are studying participating where feasible in the daily round of activity and observing behaviour as they do so. No anthropologist can expect to become fully assimilated with his group, that is, completely 'one' with it, yet it is important to build as much as possible a condition of rapport such that in the presence of the anthropologist people will be able to act naturally and in an uninhibited fashion. In this way one minimises the extent to which behaviour is staged and biased by the presence of an outsider.

Clearly such methods are open to criticism not the least of which is that they encourage emotional involvement with the subjects rather than the detachment which is supposed to characterise scientifically rigorous study. In addition they provide case study material and not the wide range

of data which can then be subjected to statistical analysis. Even the causal kind of open ended questioning which is characteristic of the anthropological technique operates against statistical manipulation of data. On the other hand, these procedures are well suited to in-depth analysis of small groups. And it is in part because of this that anthropology has been associated especially in the lay mind with the study of so-called primitive people who live out their lives in small groups.

The latter point does suggest another unique characteristic of anthropology which concerns the historical development of the discipline. In nineteenth century Europe and America the study of social relations, for example, of Euro-American society was taken over and claimed by sociology. Classical archeology claimed the ancient circum Mediterranean civilisations along with Mesopotamia and Iran. There were various human phenomena which were not the subject of study by an established discipline such as the ways of life of Sub-Saharan African peoples or American Indians, the 'classical' civilisations of America let alone the whole realm of human history before civilisation. The developing discipline of anthropology with its intent to study humans the world around was well suited to absorb these areas of investigation. There is a place for a 'cut and paste' theory of the development of most academic disciplines.

It should be stressed that despite what may be suggested above contemporary anthropology clearly is not confined to the study of the 'primitive'. Probably a majority of present day anthropologists are students of peasant societies and modern

industrialised communities. There is, therefore, considerable overlap with such fields as sociology and history as well as other social 'sciences'. It sometimes becomes difficult to discern whether one is reading an anthropological or a sociological work. But trying to draw sharp lines between academic disciplines is a rather empty exercise.

As one moves from one country to another the usage of the term anthropology can be confusing. In the United States and Canada anthropology, following through with the wholistic approach to human studies has traditionally had a fourfold base: physical anthropology, social anthropology/ethnology, archeology, and linguistics. The first addresses the problems of the human species: its origin and evolution and contemporary bio-genetic variation. It also may be seen as human biology or a branch of zoology. The remaining three specialities are branches of cultural anthropology which is concerned with humanity's most unique feature: culture. That is, practically all human behaviour is acquired. It is learned in a social context and tends to be shared by individuals, often being transmitted by deliberate inculcation. Learned ideas, accumulated knowledge, traditional plans for action all constitute culture. We say that humans are cultural animals, since they are distinguished from all others by their dependence upon these acquired phenomena. Social anthropology/ethnology is that branch of cultural anthropology which deals with the description of living human groups. If you identify yourself as a social anthropologist you stress the sociology or social relations of individuals. If you consider

yourself more an ethnologist this may mean you are interested in the historical relationships between peoples and in the description of customs. To some, mostly social anthropologists, social anthropology is primarily concerned with the making of theoretical generalisations while ethnology is seen as more atheoretical. Archeology essentially is a set of techniques developed to reconstruct the history and culture of now extinct groups who have left no written record or it may seek to provide data to supplement written records. The third branch of cultural anthropology is linguistics which investigates the most fundamental aspect of culture, language.

Practically everywhere in the United States and Canada these four areas are taught in a single department of a university and one pursuing a degree in anthropology would be expected to have some knowledge of all of them all. Such is not the case in Europe, Australia, and those other areas influenced by European education. In the United Kingdom physical anthropology hardly exists as a separate entity and surely not in conjunction with social anthropology or archeology. Archeology is recognised as a distinct subject and is quite divorced from social anthropology. In France the term anthropology means physical anthropology. American or British equivalent social anthropology in France is ethnology or sociology. The same has tended to be true of other European countries as well. With increasing international organisation and communication between anthropologists it is, however, generally tacitly agreed that all these subdisciplines or disciplines, whether physical anthropology, social

anthropology, archeology or linguistics, come under the general umbrella category of anthropology and that anthropology is a natural historical study of the human species in all times and all places.

On the relevance of anthropology to anarchism

I now propose to review those areas of anthropological practice and theory which may be seen as having significance to anarchist thought. First we may consider some largely ethical issues relating to what anthropologists do, particularly by way of collecting information and the motivations for it. This will be followed by a review of the more significant findings of anthropology as they pertain to such anarchistically pertinent issues as the unity of the human species, the significance of co-operation, reciprocity and mutual aid, sex roles, political and authority systems, and the origins of the state.

On anthropological practice: some ethical issues.

Anthropology, like other sciences is a child of the times and of the cultural milieu in which it developed. There is a certain truth to the claim that a people who are at peace with themselves, living in a highly integrated culture, are not much motivated to study themselves and analyse their way of life. But when a cultural system commences to disintegrate, when, for one reason or another, the great mass of people come to suffer from anxiety and other forms of socially induced distress, then there may arise disciplines concerned with self-analysis. This would be especially so in a cultural milieu which has

already embarked on a trend to scepticism and towards questioning the world, which is, of course, characteristic of the Western European world since the sixteenth century.

As we learn from the sociology of knowledge, all knowledge reflects a socio-cultural context. This is as true of anthropology as it is of other academic disciplines. One consequence of this is that we have become increasingly critical of any science which holds that a pure, value free objectivity is attainable. Even in physics it is noted that the observer somehow affects the behaviour of the observed. And as the famous physicist, Werner Heisenberg, has observed, we do not have a science of nature, but a science of human knowledge about nature. Even more is this true of the human sciences, so that we may say that anthropology like the other social 'sciences' indulges in the interpretation of observed data, recognising therefore the inherent difficulties of objective value free science.

An important question which arises out of this topic is to what extent have anthropologists in their researches knowingly or unknowingly been manipulators or exploiters of the innocent. There are three areas to which this question might be particularly addressed. The first concerns the role of governments and large corporations in anthropological research. The second and third concern ethical aspects of the way in which anthropologists deal directly with a people. Let us look briefly at each of these issues in turn.

1. The original motivation for anthropological data collecting was presumably to find out how the 'natives' think and act. Part of the financing of research enterprises came from

museums and universities, but much came and continues to come from governments or corporations either directly or indirectly through universities. Now I do not believe one makes a radical or incredible observation by noting that that these governments and corporations do not provide these funds out of altruism or love of knowledge. They do so because they desire information about certain peoples so that it may be used to facilitate the direction and regulation of such peoples. Any Colonial regime is particularly interested in instilling peace and quiet among its subjects. In the United States and Canada much of the impetus for anthropological investigation of the indigenous populations of Indians and Inuits arose out of the governments' desire to manage these aboriginals with a minimum of fuss. Later, as American interests expanded American anthropologists 'invaded' the Pacific islands, particularly Micronesia, Polynesia and the Philippines. At the same time they entered Latin America, which since the declaration of the Monroe Doctrine has been part of the American neo-colonial empire.

Once the French occupied Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco the victorious government encouraged extensive ethnological research which could be used by the colonial forces in drawing up administrative policy suitable to French interests. British colonial policy was likewise influenced by the numerous anthropological reports on peoples within its colonies. Would the famous study of the Nuer by E.E. Evans-Pritchard ever have been carried out had not the Nuer posed a vexing problem to the British administrators of the Sudan? Among all the colonial powers which survived to modern times only Portugal never developed

any significant anthropological study.

Much of what is today known as applied anthropology entails studies explicitly directed towards attempting to find ways in which people can best be adjusted to and assimilated into the contemporary status quo world.

Needless to say there are countless anthropologists who dissociate themselves from these conservative motivations. Anthropologists, amongst academics, remain probably the most outspoken defenders of disadvantaged peoples. One of the near universal results of the field work experience seems to be that the anthropologist returns home as a defender, if not an advocate, of the people he has studied. Finally, regardless of motivations and financial sources for research, whatever anyone publishes may be read and used by anyone else, governments and corporations included. This, however, does not excuse the fact that anthropology has been too closely wed to imperialism and the other great power forces in the world.

2. In the process of undertaking field research there would seem to be an enormous personal gain in favour of the anthropologist and at the expense of some local population. A cynic might suggest that what the anthropologist does is ingratiate himself amongst a group of people, prying information out of them so that he can return home, use the acquired data to obtain a Ph. D. and a well-paying prestigious position, and publish books to enhance his notoriety and fatten his wallet (Even if he receives no royalties he can count on merit increases and promotions from his employer).

I suspect that a great number of anthropologists might recognise a ring of truth in

this kind of scenario, especially as they may feel their debt to 'their' people can never be fully repaid. This, too, is probably one reason so many become advocates for their peoples. At the same time, it must be recognised that anthropologists do seek in their field work to be reciprocative. Part of that work is to learn how one might serve the community. And, indeed, if anthropologists may be seen as manipulators and exploiters it needs to be noted that many a 'native' has sought to exploit the anthropologist. Further, it is quite common to find that the people one is investigating themselves acquire an interest in the project, learning from it and gaining considerable self-satisfaction and prestige by their participation in it. In sum, the anthropologist is always engaged in an asymmetrical form of reciprocity. Once can hardly have a balanced exchange and equal gain for both sides when the relationship is unequal to begin with and the dominant party is a transient as well.

3. A second ethical issue relating to the anthropologist's rapport with a people is the extent to which deceit is employed as a device to facilitate acceptance in the community and to obtain information. Most every anthropologist faces a major problem in trying to explain to his informants why he is among them. In perhaps a majority of cultural contexts the whole idea of anthropology and anything related to it is utterly foreign. Thus, some anthropologists have resorted to mild deceit by saying they wish to learn the language (which is true but only partly so) or they want to study the history of the people. Deceit may find its way into other research activities as well. A suspicious shaman or medicine

man might be told that information is desired from him which can be used in curing illness in other parts of the world. For public relations purposes certain anthropologists have joined in the performance of religious rituals when in fact they have totally different beliefs regarding religion, but wish to make it appear they were believers. In recent years anthropological organisations have become very sensitive to the problems of deceit and also of protecting the anonymity of informants and there has been a much greater concerted effort to discourage misleading behaviour and statements by anthropological researchers.

Anthropological theory and data and their implications for anarchism

In general one may say that for every principle about humans and human nature that have been made by anarchists one can find in the anthropological literature both substantiation and disproof. There is, however, a growing consensus among anthropologists about certain ideas pertaining to humanity that would please any anarchist. First, let us consider what might be called the principle of the biological unity of the human species.

For some time antedating the rise of anthropology as a distinct discipline and extending down to recent times as part of the history of anthropology itself, there has been a struggle between monogenetic and polygenetic theories of the origin of Homo sapiens. Polygenetic theory argued for the divergent origins of the so-called races of humans. Emphases upon differences in appearance and differences of origin of human groups have been employed to buttress arguments about the

superiority or inferiority of such groups. If one claims that Blacks are mentally inferior to 'whites' then it is of considerable help to usher in evidence which presumably demonstrates that the foundation stocks of the two populations are totally unrelated. Monogenetic theory, by contrast, argued that all humans are one species sharing a common ancestral line. Today, this is a prevailing view in anthropology. It is held that Homo sapiens evolved out of an earlier species, Homo erectus, and that our genus, Homo, derives from older forms, the Australopithecines. Variations among present human populations are seen as a consequence of the biological process of adaptation but any such variation amongst humans is of very minor significance and involves at best only a handful of genes which relate to such factors as hair form, the amount of bodily hair, presence or absence of an epicanthic fold on the eye, skin pigmentation, overall bodily form (whether lanky or squat) and height, head form and various facial features.

Forty years ago practically every anthropologist agreed that the human species was divisible into races, although there was little agreement as to how many races there were. Today this view is no longer so widely held and an increasing number of anthropologists hold that Homo sapiens is a unitary species which may have local variation but such variation does not justify classification into separate races (subspecies). Briefly, the argument for this point of view is as follows: a) Certain allegedly racial characteristics such as head shape and bodily height are too affected by environmental factors to serve as the indicators of race they once

were used for. b) There is an incredible amount of overlap and mixing between populations. Races are at best 'ideal types'. They are a summary of certain presumed genetic traits which tend to be prevalent in some population. Yet any given individual within that population may not have all these traits or even a few of them. Thus, a broad flat nose is presumably a characteristic of West Africans, but there are some West Africans with narrower noses than some Norwegians. c) It has already been noted that so far as we know none of the so-called racial features is of much significance, especially in the contemporary world as far as adaptation and survival are concerned. Perhaps under aboriginal conditions a squat, blocky frame with lots of subcutaneous fat adapted the Inuit or Chuckchi better to extremely cold climate. But clearly as cultures have changed and become increasingly the mechanism by which humans adapt to the physical environment this biological feature loses importance. Scandinavians, for example, lack these qualities and have lived in the northern extremes of Europe for 2000 years with great success. It probably should be stressed that intelligence is not a factor which can be associated with any alleged races. It cannot be said for an absolute certainty that there are no variations amongst 'races' in intelligence because so far no one has devised a proper culture free test which could examine native or inborn intelligence nor has anyone offered an adequate operational definition of race which could be used in such testing. d) The term race has been so politicised and transformed into an ideological term that it has muddled its use for biological purposes. Race today has far more serious

implications for humankind as a political and ideological tool than it probably ever had as a biological reality. For these reasons many would abandon the use of the term race in relation to humans while, of course, continuing to investigate the bio-genetic variations that does occur within the species.

To sum up, anthropological data seem to show that humans are a single species with common ancestry. If it is possible to say the species is divisible into some kind of races, any differences are of very minor minor importance. Whether one travels to the middle of the Amazon Basin, or amongst Australian Aborigines or citizens of Moscow one will find in each of these populations a normal range in intelligence: a few dimwits and a few geniuses with a goodly majority just average sorts.

A second anthropological generalisation relates to principles of reciprocity and cooperation. Social Darwinists applied the doctrine of survival of the fittest and the struggle for existence to the human social world and argued for the paramount importance of struggle and competition between individuals. Those who are successful in such competition are seen as the best. This was, of course, quite amenable to a burgeoning capitalist economy offering as it did a justification for the superiority of the rich and powerful and for the inferiority of the poor and disadvantaged. The notion that competition is a necessary and universally dominant feature of the human condition therefore has become a common part of the middle class creed. The data of anthropology do not dispute that competition is an element in human relations, but there is an enormous variation

amongst different cultures in the expression of this phenomenon. The well known Pueblo Indians, especially the Hopi and Zuni, of the American Southwest are an example of people who inhibit competitive expression. It is even difficult to teach Hopi and Zuni children Euro-American competitive games and sports. Yet there is no reason to doubt that Pueblo culture has not been in its time a very successful adaptation.

Not only is there great variation from culture to culture in the expression of competition but within a given culture there are some areas in which competition may be encouraged and others where it is definitely discouraged. The contemporary cultures of Western Europe and North America are a case in point. American children, for example, may be taught to compete vigorously in games and sports and in school grades. Later they will be expected to continue this competition in the business world. On the other hand, it is expected that one should cooperate in the home and also in neighbourhood and parent organisations. Similarly, while the Northwest Coast Indians were notorious for their encouragement of intensely competitive feast and gift giving ceremonies (potlatches), it is often not adequately stressed that the sponsorship of a potlatch depended first upon the cooperative effort of a large group of kinsmen.

Peter Kropotkin was one of the earliest to attempt to counter the Social Darwinist emphasis on tooth and claw struggle when he wrote Mutual Aid: A Factor in Evolution. In it he catalogues countless cases of cooperation both in the natural world and in human societies. Marcel Mauss and Claude Levi-Strauss stressed the idea of reciprocity as a

fundamental and universally important feature of human societies. Reciprocity is a system of exchange found in some fashion in every known human group. Items (gifts) are passed from one person or group to another with the implicit assumption that in the future items (gifts) will be offered to the donors by the recipients. Reciprocity takes different forms, but the fundamental type is a balanced reciprocity in which there is an exchange of goods of approximately equal value between participants who at least in the context of the exchange situation are of equal standing. Reciprocity then entails cooperation and mutual aid and is the essence of Proudhon's notions of mutualism and contract.

Both archeological and ethnographical research support the hypothesis of the cardinal importance of cooperation in human groups. Some form of human family has proven to be the most enduring of all institutions, having survived for thousands of millenia. Whatever the type of family none operates on a principle of survival of the fittest. On the contrary, at least with the relation between parents and dependent children a sort of communist arrangement exists in which one receives according to need and gives according to ability. Families and indeed all kinship groupings are in some way mutual aid associations. They could not be otherwise.

Reciprocity is an explanation for one theory for the origin of the family. It holds that in the period of roughly one to three million years ago our ancestors increasingly acquired a taste for meat. Females would have been restricted in any hunting and scavenging activity by the presence of immature dependent offspring. Males, on the other hand, were free to indulge in

far flung hunting and scavenging. A relatively permanent bond between adult males and females provided meat and protection and females reared the young and foraged for vegetable food and small animals. This is also an explanation for the origins of the sexual division of labour.

Hunting and gathering was the only way of life for humans until the advent of plant and animal domestication about 12,000 years ago. Ancient hunter-gatherers as well as those who survived to modern times necessarily engaged in extensive cooperation amongst members of the group. Hunting, for example, invariably entails elaborate coordination of the activity of several participants. The more simple the weapons one has the more dependent one is on collective hunting. The isolated independent hunter is more a product of the rifle and the steel trap.

The origins and the possibilities for culture are dependent upon the evolution of cooperative and reciprocity institutions, since such institutions provide for some permanency of positive relationships which in turn provide for the exchange of ideas and the transmission of tradition, which is the heart of all culture.

Anthropological materials suggest several principles concerning sex roles. In every human society differences between female and male are recognised by expectations of differing behaviour and the assignment of different tasks to each sex. Invariably this involves according some prior status to males. There have been and are cultures which give more equality between the sexes as there are those which make male supremacy an important article of faith and practice, yet even in the latter there are usually

segments of life in which equality does occur or in which the female prevails over the male. Often in male dominant societies it is the public face of social life in which such dominance is held to be imperative, whereas in the privacy of the home the situation may be quite different. Such is certainly the case amongst Egyptian peasantry where men have priority except in the haram (the section of the house restricted to family members). Here there is considerably more give and take so that opinions of women, especially older women, can sometimes prevail.

A common myth holds that matrilineal societies are matriarchal or at least afford sexual equality. It is true that in many matrilineal societies, especially those which also practice matrilineal residence or residence on marriage with the bride's mother, women have a better social position. Yet it is still males who command the public life and tend to have an upper hand elsewhere. In matrilineal systems it is not one's father who has the authority, but one's mother's brother. In inheritance, likewise, legacies do not pass from father to son, but some items may go from mother to daughter, while others, particularly political and ceremonial roles, pass from mother's brother to sister's son. Because of the female place in the system of inheritance women can assert themselves more. Yet we find that matrilineal systems are rather unstable arrangements usually as vested interests in property become greater. Fathers increasingly demand a right to allow their sons to inherit from them. Further, a substantial number of matrilineal societies practice avuncular residence in which a youth, often at marriage,

establishes his home with or near to his mother's brother. Consequently, properties held by the matrilineal kin group are readily controlled by the males of that group.

There are no known cases of matriarchy, that is, societies in which females are dominant over males or, more directly, societies ruled by matriarchs. In addition it seems likely that matriliney is, in terms of the whole sweep of human history, a relatively recent innovation, probably given its major impetus when gardening arose ten or more thousand years ago. That is, the hypothesis is that women as gatherers of vegetable materials in pre-agricultural times would take on horticultural activity with the advent of domesticated plants and that gardens would then be passed from a mother to her daughters. When, as is so often the case, an activity, in this instance cultivation, becomes of central importance to the society men tend to take over and patriliney or non-lineal descent arises. (Another aspect of this, however, is that simple gardening becomes transformed into agriculture or extensive cultivation most commonly with the acquisition of large draft animals. The teamsters of this world have with few exception been men, so that this too puts the men more into the centre of cultivating concerns.)

If anything, earliest human societies were probably of a non-lineal or bilateral character: they were neither patrilineal or matrilineal. Males managed external relations of the group, hunting activity and probably shamanic or religious affairs, but there was some degree of egalitarianism between the sexes. Indeed, it is among non-lineal societies - those of the hunter-gatherers such as the Mbuti Pygmy or the Inuit,

on the one hand, and modern industrialised Euro-American societies, on the other, that we find the most extensive practice of sexual equality. One reason for this is, of course, a built-in egalitarianism in such arrangements. That is, neither mother's nor father's kin are held to be paramount and inheritance may pass in any number of ways.

The anthropological literature has long recognised the arbitrary nature of the sexual division of labour in different societies, the point being that there are actually only two jobs which are determined by one's sex: child bearing and breast feeding. Other activities are determined by local cultural tradition. Yet, hunting, feuding and warfare seem to be almost exclusively male domains. There seems to be some recent evidence to suggest that prolonged, vigorous physical activity in women inhibits fertility and thus, it is argued, those societies which curtailed such activity in women would produce more offspring and have a higher likelihood of survival (See, e.g., Susan B. Graham). Depending upon the cultural milieu, men in one society may be seen as the only individuals to make pots, while in another this is a job appropriate only for women. The same is true for basket-making or house building or other crafts. It is no more 'natural' for women to be nurses or office secretaries than it is for men to be dentists or carpenters.

In recent years anthropological investigations have given greater recognition to the contribution of women in various societies. This is in part because more women have become involved in research so that one is given a different perspective than the traditional male's eye view. It

was once thought that man the hunter provided the great bulk of the food for hunting gathering communities. Now it is recognised that the hunting activity outside the Arctic regions provides less than half of the food requirements and women's foraging the bulk of it. Studies show as well that among horticultural and agricultural people women often contribute more than their share of the physical labour. One of the effects of the adoption of draft animals seems to be a lessening of women's labour. Such was clearly the case with the adoption of the horse by the Plains Indians. In pre-horse days women carried most of the belongings on a change of campsite and, of course, everyone walked. The horse was a force for women's liberation when it was given the burdens to carry and provided both men and women with a ride. Rather ironically, restrictions on women's movement and requirements of dress in some Muslim countries also act to remove women from labour in the fields. Veiling, for example, inhibits manual labour and veiling, like excessively long finger nails, originated as a symbol of the well-to-do lady who did not have to work.

While I have stressed here heightened awareness of the role of women in the economic sphere on the part of anthropologists, it is also apparent that the importance of females in other activities is being increasingly appreciated. In addition, in the past often implicit in much anthropological research was the notion that what men do is somehow more important than what women do: men wheel and deal in the realm of community politics while women only sit at home and baby-sit. Hopefully, this attitude as well is disappearing.

Finally, we may note one

other area in this subject of sex roles to which anthropological investigations have made a contribution. A common Western notion is that men are by their inherent nature dominant and aggressive as well as rational, while women are retiring, passive and emotional. Comparative ethnography demonstrates that these qualities are heavily influenced by differing cultural values. No doubt in a majority of cultures men are considered properly more dominant and aggressive. Yet there are people in Sub-Saharan Africa and New Guinea, for instance, amongst whom women are quite aggressive. There are others such as the Hutterites, Amish or some Pueblo Indians, who strongly discourage aggressive behaviour in both sexes. In Iran it is the men who are expected to be emotional and to weep in public; women should be more stoic and self-controlled. I do not suggest that all these qualities are entirely culturally determined - that is, learned. Men and women are biologically different and the behaviour of males amongst mammalian species does differ from that of females. The peculiarity of the human species is, however, that what is biologically given is so often of less importance than the ability of humans to mould and alter behaviour through the cultural process.

Of major importance to anarchists is what anthropologists have to say about political systems, government and the state and principles of authority. It has already been noted that human societies have tended to emphasise the priority of the male. Similarly, it seems that there is an emphasis on the preeminence of elders. I think it is quite understandable how this could arise. An older person, but not a senile one,

would have countless experiences to share with others in addition to being a major storehouse of tradition. By his acquired expertise he acquires preeminence. This is also the rationale behind the seniority of parents over children. The older a person is the more one demonstrates an ability to survive and that itself deserves being listened to. As with anything else there is considerable cultural variation in the power vested in elders and parents. Inuit are often presented as a case of notable parental leniency and a more egalitarian relationship with children. The situation among some Arab groups entails a condition in which there is considerable leniency with infants but once children become six or seven years old they are literally forced to live like adults. They are now supposed to have acquired the faculty of reason.

Elders are invariably among the leaders of a community, but leadership may also be vested in other prestigious persons as well. Leadership of some kind is another apparently universal feature of human societies. We call leaders those individuals who are looked to for guidance and are more successful than others in having their express desires followed. These qualities often derive from the ownership and control of any scarce resource or from holding some kind of political or religious position. But they may also derive from more personal attributes such as oratorical skill, the capacity to persuade or that ambiguous quality known as charisma. In some societies all the leaders might well be considered as 'men of influence'.

In the early days of anthropology the fact that a society had recognised leaders of some kind, meetings or councils in which issues were

discussed and decisions made, and rules of behaviour which were somehow enforced meant that it had a form of government. Clark Wissler apparently following this kind of vague and ambiguous conceptualisation made government one of the universal institutions of culture. Often the politics of hunter-gatherers, particularly, was referred to by such descriptive terms as 'simple democratic community' (Radin, 30). Julius Lips in Franz Boas' General Anthropology, recognising there was something wrong with the blanket usage of the term government, preferred to write of 'government-like' or 'pre-government', adopting the latter from K.N. Llewellyn (Boas, 490). If each society had a government it was held that each possessed rules of behaviour which could therefore be called laws. It must be said for this kind of interpretation that many anthropologists sought to find government and law in all societies, especially those so called primitive ones, at least in part in order to stress the similarities between the contemporary 'civilised' world and the rest of humanity. To assert that Australian Aborigines had law and government was to assert that they too were human; they were not 'lawless' savages.

In contemporary anthropology one still finds those who incorporate everything political under a heading of law and government. More commonly there is a tacit recognition that some societies have governmental political systems while others are anarchic. A major clarification of this distinction was made by A.R. Radcliffe-Brown, who in his early life had an interest in Kropotkin and anarchism. Radcliffe-Brown proposed the term sanctions to apply to the manner in which a social group

reacts to the behaviour of any one of its members. There are positive sanctions which demonstrate approval, but more importantly in a society are the negative sanctions which express disapproval of some behaviour. One class of sanctions is diffuse sanctions which are spontaneously applied by any one or more members of a community. Their application is not restricted to the holder of any specific social role. Responsibility for and the right to impose the sanction is spread over the community at large. Further, when and if sanctions are applied is variable, as is the intensity of the sanctions imposed.

Diffuse sanctions include gossip, name calling, arguing, fist fighting, killing and ostracism. Dueling and formal wrestling matches are less widespread forms. And Inuit at least have ritualised song competitions in which two opponents try to outdo one another in insults before an audience which acts as judge. Diffuse sanctions may be resorted to by an individual or a group. And their effectiveness is enhanced as the entire community joins in participation in the sanctions. Vigilante style action and feuds are common forms of diffuse sanctions which depend upon collective action.

In many societies fines and other punishments are meted out by an assembly. In such instances assembly members act as mediators rather than judges and are successful to the extent that they can convince two disputing parties to come to some compromise. That is, such assemblies lack the legitimate claim to a monopoly on the use of force which is characteristic of governmental structures. Sanctions of this type Radcliffe-Brown called organised sanctions.

Religious sanctions entail the threat of

supernatural punishment. There is an important differentiating feature among religious sanctions which Radcliffe-Brown did not mention. That is, some religious sanctions require a human executor and others are believed to be automatic. In the first, power is vested in the hands of a few specialists. Examples of this are priests as necessary intermediaries or witches who control 'black magic'. On the other hand, the belief that breaking one of the ten commandments automatically commits one to hell represents a kind of religious sanction of the latter type. Religious and diffuse sanctions are universal features of human societies. Organised sanctions which Radcliffe-Brown calls legal sanctions are only imposed by 'constituted authority'. That is, these are laws, duly enforced by delegated individuals who alone have the authority to resort to violence in order to enforce the rules. Thus, legal sanctions are restricted to those societies which possess a government with defined specialist roles recognisable as policemen, court justices and lawmakers.

In sum, we may recognise in this classification differing kinds of political systems. Some are clearly governmental in which legal sanctions are prevalent while others lacking this type of sanction depend upon diffuse and religious sanctions and are anarchic polities.

In contrast to government, the recognition of the fact that some societies have states and others do not occurs very early in anthropology. Lewis Henry Morgan distinguished between primitive societies and states by attributing membership in the latter to territory and of primitive societies to kinship. But such a dichotomy has only limited utility since in several societies a kin group

is coterminous with a specific territory. Morgan's view was not dissimilar from that of Henry Maine who conceived of status and contractual societies. Membership in the first is determined by kinship affiliation. Leaders in such systems are not rulers, but fathers and grandfathers. In the contractual society territory or 'local contiguity' replaces kinship as the basis for community membership and a state is created. That is, in a contractual society leadership cannot be vested in senior kinsmen since such a system is composed of a heterogenous population and is not a uniform group of kin. Thus, other patterns of leadership arise: the state and government. Similar dichotomous typologies were also quite independently developed by Ferdinand To'nnies (Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft) and by Emile Durkheim (mechanical and organic solidarity).

In 1940 Meyer Fortes and E.E. Evans-Pritchard, as editors of African Political Systems, introduced the distinction between state and stateless societies explicitly recognising that the latter had no government. They saw three types of stateless politics:

'Firstly, there are those very small societies... in which even the largest political unit embraces a group of people all of whom are united to one another by ties of kinship... political structure and kinship organisation are completely fused.' (6-7).

'Secondly, there are societies in which a lineage structure is the framework of the political system.' (7).

'Thirdly, there are societies in which an administrative organisation is the framework of the political structure.' (7).

These authors differentiated kinship from lineage, but in actuality, both types one

and two above are sub-types of any kind of system in which kinship is coterminous with political relations. The difference lies in the presence of a prevailing and elaborate lineage structure in the second.

In a recent work, Bernardo Bernardini argues for the addition of two other kinds of stateless systems. In one 'the political structure is based on villages of cognatic kin with the villages related to chiefs and headmen who are vested with political authority'. The other type exists 'where the political system is based on the framework of age class systems' (Bernardi, 25).

In my judgment this age class type is not a bona fide stateless system. Where age classes are the prevailing political expression in a society we find the age class occupying a senior grade invariably is entrusted with judicial, executive, and legislative powers while the occupants of a junior grade act as police and warriors. It is true, as Bernardini emphasises, that this is all temporary power which will have to be ceded within a few years to an immediately junior class. It is also true as Bernardini points out that there is a distinct diffuseness to the system. I would suggest that rather than a stateless society we have in these cases a peculiar form of state organisation. In each there is a territorial sovereignty coupled with a delimitation of the exercise of political power into the hands of specified classes holding specified statuses (grades). Those in one senior grade have a monopoly on the power to judge and to enforce their rulings by calling on the junior policemen grade. Further, not all those in the ruling grade have equal authority, for formalised

leadership appears in many of these systems, such as the Abba Gada of the Boran of Ethiopia and the Laibon of the Massai in Kenya and Tanzania. This is not as centralised arrangement as one finds in the 'normal' state nor is there as prolonged rule by a single class. Furthermore each man may expect to assume some executive authority during his life. Therefore, not only is this a diffuse government it is an example of a decentralised democratic state which happens to be based on the continuity of state power through a succession and circulation of age classes rather than a succession and circulation of parties and elites.

We may therefore dispense with the age class type and proceed to consider in somewhat more detail the other four kinds of alleged stateless societies.

Societies in which political and kinship structures are one, but in which lineage organisation is rudimentary or absent

In the kind of polity of Fortes and Evans-Pritchard's first type we may locate most hunting and gathering societies. It may well be that before eight or ten thousand years ago this kind of arrangement was the universal political system of humankind. In it the largest grouping is what anthropologists have called a band. This consists of only a small number of individuals, usually a few dozen at the most, who exploit a given territory together and are identified with that territory. Band members are almost always somehow related to one another. They may be kin through relationship to one's father or to one's mother or by marriage. Invariably there is a patrilocal orientation, in that

the paramount figures in the group tend to be agnatically related males. Their fathers and paternal grandfathers were in the band before them. Australian Aborigines seem to be more gerontocratic than other hunter-gatherers, but in any case a man may achieve prestige through proving his expertise in some important activity. A successful hunter will be recognised as an authority in that realm and this will have a certain halo effect in other areas of community decision making. To demonstrate a close and influential connection with the supernatural world or capability as a curer of disease lend preeminence to a person. Emphasis is more on what has been called 'natural' authority. That is, a person becomes a 'man of influence' because he has achieved expertise in a crucial activity. In such societies there is also a greater equality between the sexes. Communal decisions are made through group discussions and consensus is ordinarily sought before action is taken although in cases of serious disagreement the band may split as one group of dissidents goes off on its own or joins another band. Neither judicial or police power is vested in any single individual or group. Even band leaders can only suggest or cajole, but they are leaders in part because of their ability to convince others. This does not mean that force is not applied in these societies. It is, but it is in the form of diffuse or religious sanctions, not legal ones. Sometimes a single individual may be able to terrorise and lord it over a whole band. Thus, an Inuit shaman may employ his powers to scare others into submitting to his will. But in due course that same shaman may find his life suddenly cut off as he is

'executed' by one or more others in the group - an extreme form of diffuse sanctions.

Societies with elaborate lineage structures

By lineage structure is also meant the segmentary lineage system. What we may call the 'ideal type' of this system incorporates the following components:

1. Membership in the significant groupings within the system - the lineages - is based upon putative patrilineal descent and relationship to others in the group.

2. The maximally integrative unit, the 'tribe', is segmented into major branches which are often referred to as clans. These in turn are subdivided into further groupings which are still further subdivided. The number of levels of segmentation varies from one culture to another. In some cases each clan is divided into 'maximal' lineages which are composed of 'major' lineages while these are divided into 'minor' lineages and minor lineages subdivide into 'minimal' lineages which are the equivalent of a group of families descended from a common paternal grandfather or great grandfather. Each individual member of the tribe then belongs to a group within each of the levels of segregation. In analogous fashion each person in a modern state belongs at one and the same time to territorial segments: household, municipality or county, province and nation.

3. Aside from the fact that segmentary lineage systems are not based on territory but presumed kinship another way in which they differ from the subdivisions of the modern state is that a person ordinarily becomes fully aware of his membership in any

segment only when a given segment is threatened from outside by another segment. This is known as 'complementary opposition'. That is, my minimal lineage may be in conflict with a minimal lineage within my minor lineage in which case it would be expected that all members of the minimal lineage will unite against the members of the other minimal lineage. If, however, a member of my minimal lineage is insulted or assaulted by a person from another minor lineage then the conflict between my minimal lineage and that other within my minor lineage should be set aside as we unite as a minor lineage opposed to the other minor lineage. Should someone from another clan assault a member of my clan then again we must temporarily at least forget our internal quarrels within the clan and unite against the opposing clan. Complementary opposition means minimal lineage against minimal lineage, clan against clan and tribe against tribe. Conflict never entails, for example, an entire clan against a specific minimal lineage. Complementary opposition means that one is largely aware of his group affiliation when his specific group is in opposition to another segment of the same level of organisation. It further suggests the corporate character of the groups involved. The unit is conceived as a single person; an injury to one is an injury to all just as guilt of a member extends to include the whole body. Finally, complementary opposition suggests the equality of units in terms of size and power. That is, for example, all clans should be approximately the same size and have the same strength.

4. Leaders of tribes and their segments are elders who have achieved status as influential men. Any power they have does

not rely on a police force, rather it must be earned and continually validated. The successful leader has a canny ability to assess and then verbalise popular opinion on an issue, to sway others by convincing argument and elegant speech, to demonstrate wisdom and justice, display generosity and skilfully employ his connections with other men of influence. He is first among equals although often a little more equal than others. He is also a mediator in disputes rather than an arbitrator. He is not a ruler.

5. To avoid leaving the impression that under such an arrangement all life is a continual violent struggle, three points should be made. One is that it is very likely that death from violence is lower in a segmentary lineage system than in the modern warfare state. The second is that in nearly all segmentary lineage systems there are mechanisms for quickly putting a stop to violence and revenge. Non-involved yet interested other parties may intervene to try to calm the situation and offer their services as mediators. Various kinds of pressures may be applied by those not directly involved not only to accept mediation but the decision of the mediators as well. Thirdly, lineages are mutual aid associations. Mutual defence is only one facet of a network of obligations. Lineage mates aid one another in sponsoring rites of passage such as marriages and funerals, in numerous economic activities, and often lineages, rather than individuals, are the land owning and controlling unit.

Segmentary lineage theory has been criticised to the extent that it purports to provide an adequate explanation of the political relations in those societies which depend upon such structures. In other

words, it has been claimed that the segmentary lineage system is the only mesh in the network of political relations. However, within the past three decades further analysis has suggested that in those societies where this form of organisation prevails that system alone is inadequate to explain the various ramifications of political life and, further, that system does not operate precisely according to the model. Important discrepancies exist.

In addition to lineage obligations an individual builds personal friendships outside of kinship: one acquires ties to unrelated neighbours. One gains working and trading partners who are not kin. From birth one has ties to kinsmen related through the mother and through the father's mother, and marriage leads to the acquisition of affinal kin. Especially amongst those people who are Muslim, an individual often builds close ties to religious figures and organisations. And where age class systems exist these may operate as counteracting forces to segmentary lineages. Any of these ties may assume considerable importance and some can in specific circumstances override those obligations to lineage mates. For instance, if my lineage becomes embroiled in a conflict with a lineage to which my mother belongs, I may very well chose to sit on the sidelines and avoid involvement lest I do harm to my maternal kinsmen. I may even seek to assume a conciliatory role in the affair.

Segmentary lineage systems are widespread in Sub Saharan Africa. They are also found among Berbers, Arabs and Afghans, but among them mainly in precarious association with the state.

There are a number of

modified forms of this system. One which is a sub-type lacks the strong segmental character and corporate nature of the lineage groups. While these unilineal kin groups are of central importance other important organisational forms operate to enmesh the individual in a network of obligations and relationships which make government a redundancy. A case in point is the Tonga of southern Zambia. They are a matrilineal people numbering about 150,000, engaging in cattle herding and cultivation of corn, millet and sorghum. Tonga have no chiefs or rulers, although they have influential persons who act as advisors, mediators and coordinators. These have no authority to force others to obey them. A central mechanism of social control is the membership of each individual in a number of different groups, which in turn are part of a network of further obligations so that any negative action against an individual or group resulting from one set of ties has its counter restraining effect resulting from affiliation with other groups and individuals. Everyone has a close connection with his own matrilineage, his matrimonial clan and that of his father. Clan ties are further extended through marriage alliances with other clans. Further, each clan has a set of other clans with which it maintains 'joking relations'. In these one should never become annoyed at the behaviour of his clan joking partner. So, in this way, bonds aimed at avoiding hostility are extended to a large segment of the Tonga population.

One also belongs to a neighbourhood which draws additional people who are not otherwise part of one's social network. Additionally, one establishes links through special brotherhood pacts and a

system of loaning cattle to non-kinsmen. (By spreading one's cattle around one avoids a concentration of animals which in case of epidemic, raid or other catastrophe could destroy much of a person's capital investment.) By one connection or another a person ordinarily finds that effective restraining measures are built up to cover the important social relations one might have.

Administrative polities

The third type of stateless society in Evans-Pritchard and Fortes' classification is one in which an administrative apparatus constitutes the political framework. I believe that closer examination of examples of this type will show that many if not most exhibit certain rudimentary governmental and state qualities. Consider the Ibo, the second largest ethnic community in southern Nigeria. They presently number some seven million and have traditionally been town dwellers and marketing and trading are major activities of these people noted for their aggressive business-like activities and their individualism. Throughout Iboland there are at least two different kinds of polity. Thus, some Ibo towns have 'kings' and a governmental structure which is intrusive and not typically Ibo. Over most of Iboland the traditional highly decentralised and acephalous political system has prevailed.

Much of Ibo social life is dependent upon participation within a patrilineage structure, the fundamental unit of which is the compound under the supervision of its senior male. Related and neighbouring lineage segments and compounds comprise a village which is ordinarily the maximal unit of

social integration and control. Within the village complaints and legal proceedings are undertaken by compound heads or by groups of mediating third parties each of whom may be called upon to settle a dispute. But such mediators have no power to impose their decisions. Thus, if one is not satisfied by this procedure he appeals to other institutions. the elders within each village who form a specific age grade, comprise a deliberative, legislative, judicial and executive body to whom an injured party may appeal. The elders do not act unless they are called upon to do so. They function as a court, deciding guilt or innocence and assessing fines and punishments. Punishments are meted out by the young members of the age grade association. That is, the Ibo has age grades with responsibilities associated with each grade. The members of the younger grades are, among other things, responsible for bringing witnesses and culprits to the village court and for executing punishments decided by the court. One found guilty of stealing, for example, may be tied up for days on end without food or if he is caught red handed he is carried around the village along with what he has stolen and those on the street curse him, spit on him and ridicule him. There is no power of capital punishment, but a murderer is expected to hang himself if caught.

Aside from this governmental technique, Ibo society has other methods for imposing sanctions. There are associations of titled men which exert considerable influence. Such organisations offer various titles which a man may purchase and so acquire prestige. Religious sanctions are imposed by dibia associations which are for religious specialists. There

are associations for herbalists, for diviners or medicine men; each requires a considerable initiation fee and leads to a member's ordination as a priest within the association. Most important among such individuals are the oracles through whom the gods speak, making predictions, answering questions and, thus, operating as a major force directing people's behaviour.

Ibo society, to use Bohannan's term, has a multicentric power system (Bohannan, 301 ff.). Clearly it has a government, but this government is minimal and is sovereign only over a small population. In addition there are several distinct loci of power. While in the usual state a monopoly on the use of violence to impose rules derives from a single source, among Ibo there are several legitimate centres of power so that no body can claim such a monopoly. Ibo are best seen as having a marginal or rudimentary form of government and one may wonder to what extent this may also be true of other societies of this 'administrative' type.

Independent village chieftancy

The final type of stateless society is the one suggested by Bernardini in which there are autonomous villages composed of cognatic kinsmen who are related to 'chiefs' or headmen who are vested with political authority. However, it needs to be stressed that this phraseology is misleading. the political authority of chiefs is highly circumscribed and in many of this type it may be said not to exist at all. Once again, then we must note that these leaders are not rulers; they do not have access to a police force. At the same time some of these kinds of societies border on formal government. Thus, among certain

New Guinean peoples it is considered legitimate for the headman to use his own physical force to enforce his will and he is often the strongest and biggest man in the village.

New Guinean societies particularly are characterised by the 'Big Man' phenomenon. Each village has a 'Big Man' who is the man of influence in the community. He must achieve his status and does so through a variety of means. He must be physically strong and have correct male characteristics of aggressiveness and boastfulness. He must be a successful warrior, have appropriate influence with the supernatural and be a capable orator and mediator of disputes. Probably of most importance is his success in the economic sphere.

The New Guinean economy is based on the gardening of yams particularly and the keeping of swine. Any Big Man is one who is a successful gardener and pig breeder. Since much of the gardening and pig care is done by women this means the size of one's garden depends on the number of wives one has. A proper Big Man has a large garden and is a polygynist. In addition his household rears many pigs, some of which may be loaned out to others. With an adequate economic base a man can then build up a personal following by making loans and holding pig feasts so that others will become indebted to him, so enhancing his wealth and influence. At the same time with his feast giving he builds a reputation as a generous man. perhaps the Big Man is not far removed from Max Stirner's ideal, or the hero in an Ayn Rand novel.

In the Philippines also there are a number of cultures in which the political system is characterised by influential men similar to Big Men. yet in most New Guinean societies

there is a lineage structure which acts as a supplement to the Big Man oriented political system. In contrast, a Philippines people like the Ifugao are bilateral and therefore much more atomistic.

The work of Pierre Clastres, and consequently his observations on Amazonian Indian politics have become well known amongst anarchists. These Indian groups have a village level organisation each with a headman, but the headman has little or no authority. Pierre Clastres asks why there should be headmen who have no power. He recognises the chief's importance as a peacemaker and mediator but argues that these functions should not be confused with the nature of chieftainship. To explain this nature we must turn to the relationship of the chiefly role to reciprocity. The chief is involved in an exchange entailing women, words, and wealth. Most of these Indians practice polygyny. The chief is always the man with the most wives; often the only polygynist in the village. At the same time the chief is expected to enthrall the group with his oratory - no speech, no chief. He must sponsor feasts, support the community in hard times, and always demonstrate his magnanimity and generosity. Through these mechanisms the chief continually strives to validate and revalidate his position. But such demonstrations are not, as one might think, proper reciprocations to the community for the excess of wives or for the position the chief has. Women are of such 'consummate' value that all the words and all the gifts provided by the chief are insufficient to qualify the situation as reciprocal, that is, equal exchange. As such the chief in his position defies reciprocity, that basic law of

social relations. Such an asymmetrical relationship is identified with power and that with nature. In opposition to them stand reciprocity, society and culture. People in archaic societies realising this conflict and the contradictions of the fundamental social law see power as enjoying a privileged position; in fact 'power' should be made 'impotent'. The final synthesis in this dialectic is paradoxical. The chief's most unreciprocal acquisition of multiple wives puts him in a condition of perpetual indebtedness to his people so that he must become their servant.

While Clastres' argument has merit he provides little empirical data to substantiate it. Especially absent is any idea of what the individuals involved actually think about power and chiefs. Both Clastres and his mentor Claude Levi-Strauss have investigated the chiefly role in the Amazon according to structuralist principles, but they have apparently reached different conclusions about it. In contrast to Clastres, Levi-Strauss offers the usual conservative explanation that a true reciprocal relationship is involved (Levi-Strauss, '309). Colson has suggested than an emphasis on reciprocity perhaps overemphasises the altruism involved, neglecting the fact that many people do not give in the 'spirit' of reciprocity so much as out of fear of reprisal if they do not give (Colson, 1974, 48).

Gertrude Dole has developed another explanation for the powerless chief in South America. She maintains that many of the known anarchic tribes on that continent were once much less so. Disease particularly reduced the population of many groups to the point where they can no longer function as

self-sufficient and separate entities. Consequently various remnant groups consolidate. Headmanship was normally a kind of hereditary office through the male line, but a man often dies before his eldest son matures so that one from another family is appointed successor. This man himself may be from a family which has provided headmen in another tribe. Thus leadership is distributed among various families producing claims to succession in several patrilineal lines so that the chiefly position becomes weakened. Dole argues that the strength of headmanship is tied to lineality because it provides a standardised and exclusive channel for the exercise and transmission of authority. Where this disappears the authority of the chief is undermined.

In sum, this typology of four kinds of stateless societies demonstrates that their anarchic qualities may vary considerably. Yet, it also shows that a large number of people in the world have and do live in enduring governmentless, stateless political systems and there have been a variety of ways in which this has been achieved.

A note on freedom

A survey of ethnographic studies will show that anthropologists have not devoted a great deal of space to explicating conceptions of freedom in different cultures. Perhaps it is a difficult term to get at since many people throughout the world seem to lack a conscious or verbalised conceptualisation of it. Freedom seems to be a term which has been most discussed in European circles since the eighteenth century. However, two pertinent generalisations regarding the relation of culture to freedom have

frequently been expressed by anthropologists as well as others.

One is that culture is both a liberating and a constrictive force. The rules and regulations of all societies channel every individual along certain lines and not along others. It is easy to see culture as an inhibiting force curtailing individualistic or deviant behaviour. However, in providing rules culture permits us to better predict the behaviour of others and thus frees the individual from the constant worry of what to expect in others. In cultures such as modern western ones where there is little consensus about the rules and where many seem to be at a loss as to what the rules are there is an increase in anxiety and other related problems.

The case of language is an appropriate example. This most important of all aspects of culture includes all sorts of rules regarding grammar and pronunciation. Communication would be impossible otherwise. We do not have freedom to speak in any fashion we please. By having rules of our language so well embedded in our minds from an early age we are freed from continually struggling with having our most simple thoughts understood by others. We can tend to more important matters.

Obviously some cultures are more liberating than others. Thus certain societies have been called 'loosely structured' because there is consensus on a set of rules, but a considerable amount of leeway is tolerated in their interpretation and implementation. In 'rigidly structured' societies there is a most minute specification of rules, so that a margin of tolerance hardly exists. The Thai are perhaps an example of a loosely structured people. orthodox Jews or Arabs may be

rigidly structured.

Another generalisation points to weaknesses in the stateless societies concerning the protection of individual freedoms. It was briefly indicated above how under certain conditions such as among New Guineans an anarchic polity can degenerate into the tyranny of one man.

A reliance upon diffuse sanctions can readily become oppressive. The taunt, gossip, ostracism and violence which often comprise such sanctions can become unyielding and unforgiving. And we know from our small town life there is little place for refuge from such sanctions so long as one desires to remain within the community. Not only can diffuse sanctions readily get out of hand, but they can be a force for conservatism, stupidity and intolerance. But this may not so much reflect the nature of diffuse sanctions as it reflects the temperament of the people. A more tolerant and loosely structured people would not employ sanctions with the severity of the narrow minded or those who seemed obsessed with revenge. We might like to think that a better educated people might also be less severe. Perhaps it is more true to say that those possessing wisdom would not employ sanctions oppressively. Further, it is interesting to note how often in polities in which diffuse sanctions prevail there is a great emphasis on personal self-restraint and avoidance of violent situations. Such people recognise the significance of individual responsibility.

It is, of course, said that the state maintains order and so would prevent the excesses of diffuse sanctions which might be uncontrolled in an anarchic system. Perhaps this is true, but states have a way of imposing even more virulent forms of oppression

and violence. History shows that the overwhelming trend for all the hundreds of states which exist and have existed is towards oppression and domination. Even granting for the sake of argument that the liberal democracies are more tolerable, and 'liberality' is limited to the homeland while they are oppressors abroad. Lee has suggested that the state may be more effective in reducing certain kinds of violence such as individual fights, but it creates more forms such as war (Lee, 398-9).

On the origins of the state

How the state originated has been a question of importance to anarchists and it is one that has interested some anthropologists as well. It is fair to say, however, that anthropologists' contributions in this area have been as much in criticism of various theories as they have been in offering original theory. In this section all of the theories of state origin which have been advocated will not be reviewed. Rather, those which have had some importance within anthropology will be briefly summarised.

First, we may consider those theories which have been developed by anthropologists themselves. One of the first was that of Heinrich Schurtz who argued that state organisation arose out of men's sodalities such as secret societies, age classes and clubs. In these sodalities, as in the state as well, membership is not based upon kinship. Member's may be recruited on the basis of age, sex, and territory. Invariably these organisations are involved in the regulation of behaviour in the community. The brief discussion above of age class systems is sufficient to demonstrate the political role of these organisations and the

extent to which they assume governmental functions.

A.M. Hocart argued that the earliest government-like functions were assumed by ritual specialists some of whom in the course of time became full fledged rulers of states as part of a general process of increasing specialisation in the division of labour. A considerable body of evidence can be garnered to support this view. Religious specialists control what is considered important knowledge and such control can readily be used to manipulate others and accrue wealth and more power. Religious specialists often act as mediators in disputes and in time such a role is evolved into that of arbitrator, that is, a judge with enforcement powers.

Robert Carneiro urges a demographic theory of state origin. He holds that where you have population growth coupled with delimited agricultural resources there will be pressures to expand the territory. This provokes increased warfare, which requires a military organisation and that is correlated with increased centralisation of political power. Thus, states are created. Carneiro offers then another version of the conquest theory of the state only he tries to provide an explanation for the drive to conquer through a kind of demographic determinism.

These several theories contribute to our understanding of the origin of the state by emphasising specific crucial factors in potential state evolution. At the same time no single one can be taken as the exclusive explanation particularly because they ignore other crucial factors. For one, none addresses the roles of property and hierarchy. Such a gap is filled by Engels, who, drawing on and explicating the

earlier views of Lewis Henry Morgan, tied these to marxist theory. With Engels and Marx the growth of private property generates social class differentiation and this in turn provokes domination by the propertied class over the propertyless. The state appears as the political arm of the dominant class in order to reinforce its power and control. In recent years the marxist explanation has attracted considerable support in anthropological circles. certainly no one would deny the fundamental significance of property and social hierarchy to the state's evolution. Yet the Engels-Marx thesis may be criticised for its narrow emphasis on economic factors. It completely underestimates the importance of power through knowledge whether this be in the form of purveyors of priestcraft as in earlier times or of technocrats and bureaucratic managers of modern times. Pierre Clastres has turned Engels and Marx on their heads arguing that '... (P)erhaps one must acknowledge that the infrastructure is the political, and the superstructure is the economic' (171). He is referring specifically to the rise of the American Indian states which were dependent upon an agricultural system of the same technological level as the anarchic 'savages' of the forest. The real revolution, he sees, was the rise of the state with its administrative networks and hierarchical authority, not economic transformation.

The theory of state origin was shared in some fashion or another by Henry Maine and Emile Durkheim although it is more often implicit in their writings than explicit. Here the theory commences with the argument that there have been two basically different kinds of

human society, which have been noted earlier in this essay. On the one hand there is the small, 'folk' community based on kinship. On the other there is the complex society based upon contract and territory. In the first, Durkheim stressed a mechanical solidarity or simple division of labour based on sex and age. In the second there was a complex specialisation of task constituting an organic solidarity. Both Maine and Durkheim held that in the transition from the simple type to the more complex type there would occur a change in the kind of legal structure. Thus, for example, Durkheim writes of the prevalence of 'repressive' law in the simpler society by which he essentially meant a system of collective revenge. With the differentiation of the social order through the shift in the division of labour towards specialisation there is also a shift in the legal system. The society characterised by organic solidarity cannot function with repressive sanctions alone. What is necessary is a restitutive or cooperative law which aims to reestablish an equilibrium and compensate injured parties. Durkheim says nothing about the state per se, but we may surmise as we surmise from Maine's thesis as well, that the state arises as a regulatory device in a complex highly differentiated and thus heterogeneous society. For both Maine and Durkheim there is a minimal differentiation of individuals in the simpler society. In Maine's view one's status is his kinship status. This being so polity and kinship are fused. However, once society is no longer based upon kinship alone, once we commence treating people as individuals with separate contractual relationships, or in the Durkheimian perspective, once we introduce a complex and

specialised division of labour in which individual specialists become mutually dependent upon one another we require something different than a kinship basis for social order. Since everyone is no longer someone else's kinsman, since we no longer have a homogeneous society, how can social order be maintained? The most common solution seems to be the introduction of the state and government. At least this seems to be the case with those societies which have developed an urban, literate culture. The argument that the state is found in all complex societies and consequently must be a necessity for them is one which is not without fault. First, it tends to be circular in that social complexity is in part defined by the presence of social ranks, classes and distinctions, states, governments and bureaucracies. Secondly, it confuses the need for co-ordination of complex structures with the need for a state. It seems likely that since the state is so common among complex societies that it has perhaps been perceived as the easiest way to handle the problem of integration of disparate parts. At the same time there are other techniques as alternatives to state organisation. I refer particularly to what may be called acephalous segmented network systems examples of which include the organisation of several major social movements (see Hine), the coordination of international postal services and of railway service (Barclay, 1986). Thirdly, the argument becomes a functionalist one explaining the state as a grand organiser and keeper of the peace, totally ignoring Engels and others view of the state as an instrument of class domination. It also ignores the state as a creator of violence and discord, perhaps as much or

more than would occur in its absence.

Karl Wittfogel developed a technological determinist thesis concerning the origins of the state. He observed that the ancient civilisations of Egypt and Asia arose on the banks of great rivers. These 'hydraulic civilisations' all had water problems; the rivers became the source for elaborate irrigation works. These in turn depended on the organisation of central mechanisms for control and hence engendered the development of the state. Paul Wheatley reviews the evidence for Whittfogel's claim and finds it wanting (292 ff.). In China the large scale hydraulic works were intended mainly for transportation rather than agriculture. Furthermore, they were not products of a centralised government except where they were specific military ventures. Rather, they were made and maintained by local or regional groups. For Mesopotamia Robert Adams has written that '... there is nothing to suggest that the rise of dynastic authority in northern Mesopotamia was linked to the administrative requirements of a major canal system.' (Kraeling and Adams, 281). The Mesopotamian walled city-state complex arose a considerable time before any large scale irrigation and must have therefore other causes. In the Andean region as well urban development occurred first and only sometime later did major irrigation canals appear. Canals associated with the Nile were primarily built for transportation of stone for pyramid building and other public works or for draining swamps. Egyptian sources give no indication whatsoever of a role for irrigation canals in administration. If such technology were actually crucial for the creation of the Egyptian state one would expect otherwise.

In more recent times we may note from the anthropological record several people living on the island of Luzon in the Philippines who had a highly decentralised, anarchic polity as well as a complex system of rice irrigation. Therefore, it is not that complex irrigation systems require state management but they require some kind of coordinated management - a management which apparently can also be achieved by decentralised, egalitarian means.

Ronald Cohen has written '... (T)here is no clear cut or simple set of causal statements that explains the phenomenon of state formation... The formation of states is a funnel-like progression of interactions in which a variety of pre-state systems responding to different determinants of change are forced by otherwise unresolvable conflicts to choose additional and more complex levels of political hierarchy.' Once this is achieved there occurs convergence of forms towards the early state (142). Perhaps many anthropologists would concur with this statement. At least they recognise the immense complexity of the problem of state origin and would fall back upon some 'synthetic' theory which tries to integrate all the relevant elements discussed in the other more specific theories.

Conclusion

In its history anthropology has too frequently been dependent upon and manipulated by governments and other powerful institutions. Yet as a discipline it has retained a distinctly humanistic orientation. It is a liberal art in the best sense of that term: open minded and free from orthodox conventions. It has stressed the malleability and

variability of humans and devoted a great deal of scholarship to the phenomenon of cultural change. Consequently it has pleaded for a more realistic view of human behaviour. At least, there has long been the emphasis upon an attempt to understand other people's points of view no matter how divergent they might be from our own. Anthropology has always been critical of ethnocentrism and has implicitly held that somehow if we understand others we will get along better.

I believe it is fair to say that anthropologists have demonstrated that humanity is one species and that physical variation between populations of humans is of minimal significance. The myth of racial determinism has been exploded. The data of anthropology tend also to discredit notions of social Darwinism. The practice of sharing, cooperation, mutual aid and reciprocity are all essential to the survival and prosperity of the human species.

Various generalisations can be made concerning the subject of power and authority. Some kind of legitimated power - that is, authority, is found in all societies as are rules for behaviour which are reinforced by sanctions. These features are, however, expressed in differing ways. The governmental-state structure is only one type of behavioural management. The viability of anarchy, or the absence of government, is demonstrated by its widespread occurrence among a variety of cultures, although it is most characteristic of those with small, rural populations and limited technology.

In every society each individual is given a social status. One has a position ranked in relationship to others in the group according

to traditional criteria characteristic of the specific culture. True equality of all individuals has not been achieved in any society nor has it been a desired value for most. However, hierarchical structures wherein groups are stratified according to their access to scarce resources - whether wealth or power - are found in only a few societies.

For those who believe that we inhabit a progressing world and that progress is inevitable with Western Civilisation representing the pinnacle of that progress, it would be well to ponder the following:

'Civilisation' clearly correlates with true warfare, slavery, social classes and castes, human sacrifice, state and government, bureaucracy. The type of people once referred to as savages and primitives are invariably free from those incumbrances.

I would stress one final point. Namely, merely because human cultures have certain characteristics does not necessarily mean that it is the way things must be done or the way they ought to be done. All too often we find anthropologists among others making the argument that complex cultural situations make the state a necessity, when in fact it should be said that some form of coordinative system is essential. Along similar lines we are told of the necessity for authority and leadership in order to have a functioning human society, but there are different kinds of authority and leadership, ranging from the autocratic to the 'natural'. In the latter one is accepted as an authority in some particular endeavour because he possesses acknowledged expertise in that endeavour. One does not seek to dominate others through his or her authority. He seeks to share his knowledge so that

others might be raised to the same level of ability.

As we learn in introductory philosophy it is an error to attempt to derive the 'ought' from the 'is'. Merely because societies are structured in a certain way does not mean they ought to be that way. For one thing cultures are so variable one would be hard pressed to find a

Bibliographic Note

General surveys of the field of anthropology are primarily confined to works prepared as university textbooks. Two of the better of these are Roger M. Keesing, Cultural Anthropology: A Contemporary Perspective (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1981, 2nd edition) and Robert F. Murphy, Cultural and Social Anthropology: An Overture (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1986, 2nd edition). Other appropriate texts include Mary Ellen Goodman, The Individual and Culture (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1959) and Harold B. Barclay, Culture: the Human Way.

On anthropological field work and methodology in general both Keesing and Murphy above have sections on these topics as does Barclay. Also, the following are recommended: Gerald D. Berreman, Behind Many Masks: Ethnography and Impression Management in a Himalayan Village (Society for Applied Anthropology, Monograph 4, Ithaca, New York, 1962), Jacob Pandian, Anthropology and the Western Tradition (Waveland Press, Prospect Heights, Illinois, 1985) and G.D. Spindler (ed.),

blueprint. And any generalisations about all societies, as we have been making in this conclusion, are of such a general nature as to be near useless for such purposes. What can be gained from these anthropological musings is a delineation of the limits of human behaviour, its immense variability, and its universalistic traits. Further,

Being an Anthropologist: Field Work in Eleven Cultures (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1970), R. Edgerton and L.L. Langness, Methods and Styles in the Study of Culture (Chandler and Sharp, San Francisco, 1974).

On the topics of human evolution Nancy Makepeace Tanner's On Becoming Human (Cambridge University, 1981) has relevance as well for the issues of cooperative activity and sex roles. On racial matters Alexander Alland Jr., Human Diversity (Columbia University, 1971) and also his The Human Imperative (Columbia University, 1972) are worthy of note. Two physical anthropology texts are Alex J. Kelso, Physical Anthropology: An Introduction (Lippincott, Philadelphia, 1974) and Harry Nelson and Robert Jurmain, Introduction to Physical Anthropology (West Publishing, St. Paul, Minnesota, 1982).

Group cooperation and reciprocity are discussed in most ethnographies. Peter Kropotkin's Mutual Aid: A Factor in Evolution (Heinemann, London, 1902) may be dated but still makes interesting reading. Marcel Maus, The Gift (Free Press, New York, 1954) is another old

classic translated and reissued in this edition. Finally, mention can be made of Marshall Sahlins, Stone Age Economics (Aldine, Chicago, 1972). Sex roles and male-female relationships are another topic one finds discussed in most ethnographies. Two works specifically dealing with the status of women are M.K. Martin and B. Voorhies, Female of the Species (Columbia University, 1975) and M.Z. Rosaldo and L. Lamphere (eds.) Women, Culture, and Society (Stanford University, Stanford, California, 1974).

I list below selected ethnographies which describe stateless or anarchic societies. They are categorised according to the fourfold typology presented in the text:

1. Societies in which political and kinship structures are one, but in which lineage organisation is rudimentary or absent:

Bicchieri, M.G. (ed.) Hunters and Gatherers Today (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1972)
Birkett-Smith, Kaj. The Eskimos (Methuen, London, 1959)
Elkin, A.P., The Australian Aborigines (Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1961)
Holmberg, Alan, Nomads of

- the Longbow (Smithsonian Institution, Washington D.C. 1950).
- Lee, Richard B., The Kung San: Men, Women, and Work, a Foraging Society (Cambridge University, 1979)
- Spencer, Robert F., The North Alaskan Eskimos: A Study in Ecology and Society (Bureau of American Ethnology, Washington, D.C., 1959)
- Turnbull, Colin, The Forest People (Doubleday, New York, 1962)
- Turnbull, Colin, 'The Mbuti Pygmies of the Congo in Gibbs, James (ed.), Peoples of Africa (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1965)
- Warner, W. Lloyd, A Black Civilisation (Harper, New York, 1958)
2. Societies with elaborate lineage structures
- Bohannan, Paul, 'The Tiv of Nigeria' in Gibbs, James, Peoples of Africa (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1965)
- Evans-Pritchard, E.E., The Nuer (Oxford, 1940)
- Middleton, John, The Lugbara of Uganda (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York 1965)
- Middleton, John and David Tait, Tribes without Rulers (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1958)
- Schneider, Harold K., Livestock and Equality in East Africa (Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana, 1979)
- Tait, David, 'the Political System of the Konkomba' in Ottenberg, Simon and Phoebe (eds.), Cultures and Societies of Africa (Random House, New York, 1960)
- 2a. Societies where lineage structure is central but of less importance.
- Colson, Elizabeth, The Plateau Tonga of Northern Rhodesia: Social and Religious Studies (Manchester University, 1962)
3. Administrative polities
- Green, M.M., Ioo Village

- Affairs (Praeger, New York, 1964)
- Uchendu, Victor, The Igbo of Southeast Nigeria (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1965)
4. The independent village chieftancy.
- Barton, Ralph, Ifugao Law (University of California Publications in American Archeology and Ethnology, XV, 1919)
- Berndt, Ronald and P. Lawrence (eds.), Politics in New Guinea (University of Western Australia, Perth, 1971)
- Clastres, Pierre, Society Against the State (Urizen, New York, 1977)
- Hogbin, Ian, The Leaders and the Led: Social Control in Wogeo, New Guinea (Melbourne University, 1979)
- Langness, L.L., 'Traditional Political Organisation' in Hogbin, Ian (ed.) Anthropology of New Guinea (Melbourne University, 1973)
- Finally, two titles concerning the concept of freedom are Dorothy Lee, mentioned in the first paragraph, and Paul Riesman, Freedom in Fulani Social Life: An Introspective Ethnography (University of Chicago, 1977)
- Bibliography
- (Including works cited and some additional relevant publications)
- Barclay, Harold B., People Without Government: An Anthropology of Anarchism (Cienfuegos Press, 1982)
- Barclay, Harold B., 'Segmental Acephalous Network Systems', Ms. in Italian as 'Le societa acephale', Volunta, XL, 1, 1986)
- Bernardi, Bernardo, Age Class Systems, (Cambridge University, 1985)
- Boas, Frank, (ed.), General Anthropology, (Heath, Boston, 1938)
- de la Boetie, Etienne, The

- Politics of Obedience (Free Life Editions, New York, 1975)
- Bohannan, Paul, Social Anthropology (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1963)
- Carneiro, Robert L., 'A Theory of the Origin of the State', Science, No. 169, 1970)
- Clastres, Pierre, Society Against the State (Urizen, New York, 1977)
- Cohen, Ronald, 'State Foundations: A Controlled Comparison' in Cohen and Service
- Cohen, Ronald and Elman Service (eds.), Origins of the State (Institute for the Study of Human Issues, Philadelphia, 1978)
- Colson, Elizabeth, The Plateau Tonga of Northern Rhodesia: Social and Religious Studies (Manchester University, 1962)
- Colson, Elizabeth, Tradition and Contract. The Problem of Order (Aldine, Chicago, 1974)
- Dahrendorf, Ralf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society (Stanford University, Stanford, California, 1959)
- Dole, Gertrude, 'Anarchy without Chaos: Alternatives to Political Authority among the Kirikuru' in Schwartz, Turner and Tuden.
- Durkheim, Emile, The Division of Labor in Society (Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, 1947)
- Engels, Frederick, The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State (Pathfinder, New York, 1972)
- Evans-Pritchard, E.E., The Nuer (Oxford, 1940)
- Fortes, Meyer and E.E. Evans-Pritchard (eds.), African Political Systems (Oxford, 1940)
- Fried, Morton, The Evolution of Political Society (Random House, New York, 1967)
- Graham, Susan B., 'Running and Menstrual Dysfunction: Recent Medical Discoveries Provide New Insights into the Human Division of Labor by Sex', American Anthropologist, LXXXVIII, 4, 1986
- Hine, Virginia, 'The Basic

- Paradigm of a Future Socio-Cultural System', World Issues, II, 2, 1977.
- Hocart, Arthur M., Kings and Councillors (University of Chicago, 1970)
- Kraeling, Carl H. and Robert McAdams (eds.), City Invincible (University of Chicago, 1960)
- Kropotkin, Peter, Mutual Aid: A Factor in Evolution (Heinemann, London, 1902)
- Lee, Richard B., The !Kung San Men, Women and Work in a Foraging Society (Cambridge University, 1979)
- Levi-Strauss, Claude, Tristes Tropiques (Atheneum, New York, 1964)
- Lowie, Robert H., Social Organisation (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1960)
- Maine, Henry, Ancient Law, (Murray, London, 1861)

- Morgan, Lewis Henry, Ancient Society (World Publishing, New York, 1877)
- Oppenheimer, Franz, The State (Vanguard, New York, 1928)
- Peters, Emrys, 'The Proliferation of Segments in the Lineages of the Bedouin of Cyrenaica', Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute XC, 1, 1960
- Radcliffe-Brown, A.R., Structure and Function in Primitive Society (Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, 1952)
- Radin, Paul, Social Anthropology (McGraw-Hill, New York, 1932)
- Schurtz, Heinrich, Alterklassen und Mannerbunde (Reimer, Berlin, 1902)
- Service, Elman, Primitive Social Organisation (Random House, New York, 1962)
- Service, Elman, Origins of the State and Civilisation

- (W.W. Norton, New York, 1975)
- Smith, M.G., 'Segmentary Lineage Systems', Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, LXXXVI, 1956
- Schwartz, Marx, Victor Turner and Arthur Tuden (eds.), Political Anthropology (Aldine, Chicago, 1966)
- Tonnies, Ferdinand, Community and Society (Michigan State University Press, East Lansing, Michigan, 1957)
- Weber, Max, Economy and Society, 2 volumes (University of California, Berkeley, 1978)
- Wheatley, Paul, The Pivot of the Four Quarters (Edinburgh University, 1971)
- Wissler, Clerk, Man and Culture (Crowell, New York, 1923)
- Wittfogel, Karl A., Oriental Despotism (Yale, New Haven, Connecticut, 1963)

ISSN 0267-6141

The Anarchist Encyclopaedia
c/o Cambridge Free Press
Unit 6
25 Gwydir Street
Cambridge CB1 2LG

