


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**The Enslavement  
of the Working Class in  
CHINA**

**by  
Dirk Wouters**



**from Social Revolution (London) 25p**



## CONTENTS

<b>Introduction</b>	<b>page 1</b>
<b>1. China since 1949: The Enslavement of the Working Class in the "People's Republic" of China by Dirk Wouters</b>	<b>page 2</b>
<b>2. Democracy in China? A glimpse at Chinese politics</b>	<b>page 10</b>
<b>Document One — Regulations of the Chinese Security Organs during the Cultural Revolution</b>	<b>page 13</b>
<b>Document Two — Psychiatry and Dissent in China: the case of Yen Wei-ping</b>	<b>page 14</b>



## SOCIAL REVOLUTION

We are a new group working for a free world community in which social equals co-operate to fulfil human needs. We see 'right' and 'left' alike as competing oppressive forces. We spread ideas and encourage the democratic self activity of working people in all spheres of life.



# Introduction

Many who want a better society still have illusions about life in China. The fantasy material imported and processed for us by Western Maoist propagandists offers us one variety of emotional escape from our own situation and problems — the only sound starting-point for changing the world. People are helped to hold back the realisation that oppression holds sway over the *whole* world, that we need to work out *our own* conceptions of socialism, without benefit of pre-packaged models.

SOCIAL REVOLUTION (London group) hope this pamphlet will cast some light on the real nature of Chinese society. Our friend Dirk Wouters first wrote and published "The Enslavement of the Working Class in China" in Flemish. (He and we acknowledge that he obtained much information from the book on China by Charles Reeve; details below.) Dirk had little success in getting left-wing bookshops in Belgium to take a pamphlet with such a position. Another friend translated the work into English, and Dirk asked us to publish the English version.

With it we reproduce an article on Chinese politics from our now defunct discussion journal "Libertarian Communism", and two original documents from the early period of the Cultural Revolution. So far as we know, these and other materials which have come into our hands have not been made available in English before. They are included because they convey interesting impressions of the atmosphere of everyday life in China. The text of the pamphlet is interspersed with quotations from the books by Elegant and Schram listed below.

Many aspects of Chinese society are unfamiliar to us who live in Britain, for example. Nor do we deny the important differences between Western "private" capitalism and Chinese State capitalism. But it is more important still to emphasise how much there is in common. Governments, armies, security police, hierarchies of command, indoctrination exist in *all* countries. In *all* countries working people have to sell their energies for wages to those who control the means of production in order to live, and have very little or no control over their lives.

The often taken for granted similarities between one country and another are not accidental. The nation-States of the world cannot independently choose fundamentally different ways of life, choose to be "capitalist" or "socialist". They are linked together in a *world* capitalist system, and the division of the world into competing States is a basic part of that system. The rulers of each State — private businessmen or State bureaucrats — must struggle to keep ahead in a ceaseless race for expansion against the rulers of other States. To do this, they must maintain their power over the working class, build up the means of production under their control (capital accumulation), promote their trade and prepare for wars. The logic of the contest imposes similar pressures and institutions in all

countries. The inhuman contrasts which arise — H-bombs and Concordes side with deprivation and forced labour — are all the sharper in relatively less developed States like China.

The death of Mao, whom *we* at least do not mourn, has been followed by the triumph of the old pre-Cultural Revolution bureaucrats and generals, under Hua, over the new "radical" bureaucrats, the "Gang of Four" and their supporters, who came to power during the Cultural Revolution. The "radicals" had been no less keen than their fellow rulers to build up their power and enjoy the opulent houses, cars and other perks of office. However, the purge against them is also being used to suppress working class resistance to stronger discipline. One of the charges reported against Chiang Ching, for example, was that she sabotaged production by insisting on the observance of safety regulations on the railways. The charge was made, of course, by the railway workers themselves, who demanded the right to risk injury and death to build a strong China.

**SOCIAL REVOLUTION (London group). November 1976.**

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1.

# china since 1949

THE ENSLAVEMENT OF THE WORKING CLASS  
IN THE "PEOPLES REPUBLIC" OF CHINA

*Quote from People's Daily, August 1968:*

Many people are saying: "Chairman Mao teaches that the masses must educate themselves. We are the masses, so what we do is nobody else's business!"

This, of course, is merely a pretext contrived by the extreme democratic faction. Chairman Mao's instructions are the exact opposite of Liu Shao-Chi's theory of the Backwardness of the Masses. The masses teaching themselves means: They must love Chairman Mao without limit; they must assume the correct responsibility for the revolution and production; and they must display a revolutionary, disciplined consciousness. They must use Mao Tse-Tung Thought to overcome all non-proletarian thought trends, while ceaselessly elevating their own political consciousness.

"Democracy is protection, while centralisation is dangerous!" A number of members of leadership circles speak in that way. In such thinking, fear is the dominant element, and fear encourages the tendency toward extreme democratisation.

When the proletariat makes revolution, there must be authority and high-level centralisation. Otherwise the proletariat will not be able to seize political power or hold political power.

From Elegant.

## Introduction

Until the 1950's the Soviet Union was regarded by many self-styled "Marxists" as the "workers' fatherland". This ceased to be the case after the 20th Party Congress of the CPSU at which the crimes of Stalin were made public. While many "leftists" became totally disillusioned and turned their backs on "communism", others found a new "fatherland" to glorify: the "peoples republic" of China.

The "Cultural Revolution" brought about a great "boom" in the Maoist movement, particularly amongst students and in left Christian circles. China became the mecca of leftist intellectuals and was represented as an ideal "socialist" state which allowed the way for the Third World.

Maoist propaganda has created many persistent myths: the "Great Cultural Revolution", the "decentralized economy", "direct democracy", etc. China is alleged to be run by the working class.

In this pamphlet I try to show that Chinese reality looks a

great deal different from what Maoist propaganda would have us believe. With the aid of reliable facts the reader will come to see that China is not a socialist country, but a state capitalist dictatorship, where the workers and peasants are indoctrinated to accept their own exploitation. But despite Maoist indoctrination the workers and peasants have put up strong resistance in the form of strike movements, factory occupations, rights, etc.

This pamphlet allows all well-meaning left militants to get an insight into the state capitalist regimes which today hold millions of workers and peasants in subjection.

## Mao: glorifier of Stalin

On the sixtieth birthday of Joseph Stalin (21 December 1939) Mao wrote: "To celebrate Stalin means to take sides with him, with his work, with the victory of socialism, with the way he has showed mankind..." (Mao Tse Tung, *Stalin, L'Ami du Peuple Chinois*, L'Union des Communistes Marxists-Leninists du Belgique). When Stalin died Mao praised him in the following terms:

*Joseph Stalin, the greatest genius of our time, the great leader of international communism, the comrade in arms of the immortal Lenin, has left us for ever. Stalin's contribution to our time, both in his theoretical work and in his practice, has been enormous.*

(Mao Tse Tung, *La Grande Amitie*, L'Union des Communistes M-L de Belgique.)

Stalin did indeed achieve a great deal. In fact, from the beginning of the 1930's until his death he had no less than about 15 million people physically liquidated, most of them convinced Bolsheviks. Together with Hitler he was the greatest mass murderer of our time.

That Mao has learned a lot from Stalin will become clear in the sections which follow.

## the "Revolution"

Who brought the so-called revolution of 1949 to a "good" end? In 1925-6 the Communist Party had played a major role in the strike wave in Shanghai, Hankow and Canton. The Comintern however forced the Chinese CP to accept a petty-bourgeois nationalist programme, as a result of which an alliance with Chiang Kai Shek's Kuomintang could become possible. In 1927-8 the Kuomintang took the opportunity to murder the whole working class basis of the CP. After 1928 in fact the CP lost all contact with the workers' movement. So it could hardly have been otherwise that in 1949 the Peoples Liberation Army was practically exclusively composed of peasants and professional soldiers.

So it is quite understandable that on the capture of

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Shanghai, Hankow and Canton the military command should issue the following order:

*We ask workers and employees of all professions to continue to work and that business is conducted as usual. Kuomintang officials and all other political and administrative bodies must remain at their posts and obey the orders of the Peoples Liberation Army and the peoples government.* (New China News Agency, 3 May 1949).

The "revolution" was over. The social forces which took power consisted essentially of the peasants, led by a bureaucracy originating from the old trade unions and bourgeois intelligentsia.

Through the fact that there existed in China what Marx called the Asiatic mode of production (production without capital accumulation) the not very important bourgeoisie was unable to fulfil its historic role in the development of capitalism. The development of the country could in fact only take place through a massive State intervention in the economic sector (as in many developing countries). The task of national reorganisation and of capital accumulation was carried out by a neo-bureaucracy from the intellectual layers of the population, which led the Chinese economy to State capitalism. Many intellectuals and "patriotic" capitalists joined the CP and installed themselves in leading posts in the new administration.

## State Capitalism

### THE BIRTH OF CHINESE STATE CAPITALISM

After their takeover of power the CP was faced with the difficult task of completely reorganising the economy. The civil war, the destruction of agricultural production and the disorganisation of the system of communication had given rise to an enormous inflation and a powerful urban revolt which did not die down till 1952. After 1952 this problem was solved by the reorganisation of the administration, the recommencement of agricultural production, by — what was still more important — the building up of the trade unions as a means of controlling the working class, and, finally, through complete military control of the whole country.

In order to be able to make a start with industrialisation the new government was forced to integrate China into the Russian state capitalist bloc.

The first five-year plan and the Korean war made China almost completely dependent on the Soviet Union. This dependence on Russian state capitalism soon brought into existence two camps within the ruling elite.

On one side was the Mao group in the army and Communist Party which said that an independent way to "socialism" was possible; on the other was the ruling group of technocrats who, together with the Russian power-holders, wanted a further integration of China into the international capitalist system, both in its state and in its market form. With the help of 10,000 Russian technicians the Chinese economy was completely tied to Soviet Russia.

As a result of the nationalisation of heavy industry an increase in agricultural production on the one hand became a necessity and on the other hand the control of the working class became a necessity for the running of the Chinese economy.

### PARTY AND TRADE UNIONS AGAINST THE WORKERS

In October 1949 a strike movement broke out in the most important industrial centres. Many sectors were completely

... More emphasis will now be put on light industry and agriculture. ... The outcome will be to bring greater and faster development to heavy industry, greater and faster development to the production of the means of production.

The development of heavy industry demands capital accumulation. Where will this accumulation come from? It can come from heavy industry itself. It can also come from light industry and agriculture. But light industry and agriculture can provide the greater and faster accumulation.

... This will result in more daily necessities, which in turn will mean more accumulation, and after a few years still more funds will be invested in heavy industry. ...

The result of ... one-sidedly developing heavy industry without paying attention to the people's livelihood, will be to make the people dissatisfied, so that even heavy industry cannot really be run well. In a long-term perspective, this methods will lead to somewhat slower and inferior development of heavy industry. When the overall account is added up a few decades hence, it won't be favourable. ...

"On the Ten Great Relationships". Speech by Mao 25.4.1956.

Quoted in "Mao Tse-Tung Unrehearsed" edited by Stuart Schram (Pelican).

paralyzed by strikes. The newly-formed trade unions remained completely aloof. The strike wave was a protest against the government's economic measures to increase production and exploitation in the factories, and also against the demagogic policy of the CP which carried through all changes in the name of the working class.

The government and the trade unions announced wage *decreases* and a limitation of social benefits in the nationalised industries. This was one of the first measures taken to increase surplus value.

The spontaneous strikes were so effective that in the spring of 1950 the Chinese economy stood on the edge of the abyss. Together with the "national and progressive employers" *the CP put strong pressure on the workers to resume work*. This showed once again how great was the rift between the CP and the working class. For the workers "socialist" consciousness was reduced to . . . acceptance of their own exploitation.

When the strikes had ended and when it was clear that the trade unions had little influence over the workers, the CP launched a propaganda campaign on behalf of the unions. The trade unions tried to make themselves attractive by making a self-criticism. Some wage and material claims which the unions had earlier opposed were now accepted. While workers in private industry got some support from the unions, the unions allowed no action at all in the nationalised industries.

The following from an interview by Edgar Snow with Li Chi-po, Vice Chairman of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, illustrates the role of the unions. Snow asked what the shoemakers' trade union would do if a shoemaker wanted to strike for higher wages. Li answered the question as follows:

*Strikes for higher wages cannot occur if workers have been properly educated to understand that wages are based on fair standards of values of production set by the state, which makes no profit for itself but merely acts for "the whole people" to reinvest national savings for the future enrichment of all.* (E.Snow, *The Other Side of the River, Red China Today*, New York, 1963)



From 1952 the proportion of workers in the CP remained the same. This was because of a slight improvement in living standards (more wages) which had been made possible through an increase in productivity. After the introduction of the first plan wages were calculated according to productivity. Increased productivity however is accompanied by increased exploitation.

The CP successfully dealt with the independent workers' struggle against the reduction of real wages and a lengthening of the working day.

During the first plan the authorities tried, whatever the cost, to safeguard the living standards of the workers. Wages were stabilised and material benefits maintained; the CP was afraid of a further alienation of the union from the workers.

As a result of putting emphasis on the development of heavy industry, agricultural production came under pressure. This led to a rapid "collectivisation" of agriculture, to such an extent that by the end of the first plan 96.3% of agricultural production was controlled by the State. The opposition of the peasants nevertheless forced the State to modify certain projects.

With the completion of collectivisation the commune-system was introduced. This system brought a double reduction with it: first, a direct decrease in consumption and, second, a fall in the value of consumer goods. Through the nationalisation of consumer industries and trade the State acquired direct control over the supply and price of the goods produced by the communes.

Economic growth in this period amounted to about 14% a year, but this was above all due to massive capital investments by the Soviet Union. Agricultural production however stagnated. Despite the population explosion the CP opposed birth control. Setting everyone to work was the most important problem this caused.

#### THE "GREAT LEAP FORWARD"

The stagnation in agriculture made a new economic policy necessary. So was born the "Great Leap Forward".

In accordance with Maoist custom this was preceded by an intensive ideological campaign. The Chinese people had to make themselves ready for new sacrifices: the increased exploitation was expressed in an attractive ideology. This extreme idealism in Maoist ideology resulted in part from Leninist voluntarism, but above all also from sordid material reasons.

The Commune now became the centre of agricultural production; 30 to 40% of production was re-invested (*Peoples Daily*, 31 October 1958). It is important to know this, since Maoist ideology still represents the Commune as "the transition to socialism" and "the basic unit of communist society" (*Peoples Communes in China*, Peking, 1958). The whole project aimed at increasing the agricultural surplus by strengthened Party control over production. Production was supposedly decentralised, but in reality was fully centralised in the hands of the Party. A considerably part of the urban population was transferred to the communes. In 1958 not less than 100 million people were mobilised for irrigation works, with the aim of increasing labour productivity. The surplus value which resulted from all this went to the State. The task of the small "decentralised" enterprises was to supply the necessary investment for the centralisation of Chinese state capitalism and for the creation of a heavy industry (Jean Deleyne, *L'Economie Chinoise*, Seuil, Paris, 1971).

During the first year of the Great Leap Forward in 1958 agricultural production reached a good level, but soon problems piled up. The peasants, who had been deprived of their private plots and who now had to work intensively on the land, together with those who worked in small industries, began to oppose their increased exploitation, despite the fact that the Party had put politics in command (sic).

In the autumn of 1960 the situation at national level became catastrophic. In the agricultural districts the peasants refused to work as slaves, and in addition climatic conditions were bad. The setting up of small "decentralised" industries

was also a failure. The supplying of means of subsistence to the industrial centres became more and more difficult. Industrial production slowed down, partly through lack of private necessities and partly through the failure of the bonus system ("ideological" bonus).

This attempt to decrease the consumption of the workers brought about a resistance from the working class (*Labour Developments Abroad*, US Department of Labor, October 1970, Vol 15, No.10). Wages had been frozen since the end of the first plan.

In January 1961 the central committee of the CP abandoned the reforms of 1958-9: the communes were disbanded and replaced by small agricultural units. In 1963 the central committee was even forced to accept the creation of a market for private agricultural products in a bid to push up agricultural production again. This represented a break with the most important objectives of the Great Leap Forward.

The failure of the economic policy led to a break with Russian state capitalism. From 1960 the Chinese ruling class was forced to find its products and machines in the West.



#### THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY

In July 1959 the Mao party fraction got the upperhand over that of P'eng Te-huai, the Minister of Defence. Mao proposed an equal development of agriculture and industry. But he soon came to the conclusion that this policy was not viable and accepted once again agriculture as the basis of development.

As a result of the failure of the Great Leap Forward on the economic level the Mao group lost control of the Party. This was however just the beginning of the discussion about economic policy.

Mao's economic policy was completely centred on labour productivity. According to him an increase in productivity could only be brought about by a system of very equal wages (with or without some minor material incentives), thanks to strong Party control over labour power (by means of ideological "education").

He admitted the failure of the Great Leap Forward, but he still held fast to the commune as a unit of production.

At the beginning of the Third Five Year Plan (1962-66) the most important aim was to push up productivity in the agricultural sector and, with the profits thus obtained, to



stimulate the development of industry. The commune became an indispensable link between the agricultural community and the administration (M.W.Wertheim, "La Situation Economique et Sociale en Chine, *Population*, May-June 1965, Paris).

Together with the re-introduction of private property the system of productivity bonuses was again applied. The "ideological incentives" were abolished. Despite the re-introduction of private property and the bonus system, productivity in the communes hardly improved. It appeared again after the Third Plan that the agricultural surplus was insufficient to stimulate industrial development.

The lack of a reasonable growth in the industrial sector forced the State to control migration from the countryside to the towns. The surplus of labour power caused over-manning in the industrial sector and at the same time an enormous development of the public service and of the university sector. Only a third of the urban population belonged to the industrial proletariat. Another third to the administration and the remaining third to students, small traders and artisans. The material situation of the proletariat improved a little. Wages went up by 10 per cent and productivity bonuses were increased. This was no "gift" from the State, but a necessity in order to keep control of the working class. The decrease in real wages in the previous period had resulted in great working class discontent. During the Third Plan the trade unions in fact got more control over the workers. The industrial situation hardly improved. Only the high-priority industries were able to raise their productivity a little.

## Cultural Revolution

The Central Committee laid down the start of the so-called cultural revolution with a decree of 16 May 1966. Another decree two years later brought it to an end. Never in world history had a revolution been so institutionalised as this.

Practically no part was played in this revolution by . . . . . the workers.

At the beginning of 1966 the situation in China was characterised by economic stagnation, particularly in the industrial sector, due mainly to the resistance of the workers to their exploitation: China urgently needed a change in its economic policy and the organisation of production.

About 1966 the dominant party fraction round Liu Shao-shi campaigned for a new economic policy, extending the market for agricultural products with the aim of developing productivity and investing in heavy industry. The only way to do this was to integrate China into the Russian state capitalist bloc and, linked to this, to introduce the profit motive for industrial enterprises. In other words Liu wanted to again tie the Chinese economy to Soviet Russia.

The Maoist group and the Army leaders came out against this line. Liu enjoyed the support of top economic management and of the trade union bureaucrats. Mao on the other hand had the support of the army and a part of the student masses. Mao profited from the discontent of the students who, as in the West, had not been prepared for a place in the production system.

Two clearly different phases of the Cultural Revolution — officially started on 15 August 1966 with a mass meeting in Peking — can be discerned. In the first phase, which lasted till January 1967, the Maoist fraction led a clear political struggle against the Party bureaucracy. In the second phase from the beginning of 1967 to the middle of 1968, production was affected.

The Red Guards had to "build up a strongly disciplined and militant army, with a high class consciousness, which can serve as a reserve force for the liberation army" (Chou En-Lai, address to a meeting, 18 August 1966). The elements in the Party who followed the "capitalist" way had to be opposed.

The first period was particularly characterised by the close co-operation between the Red Guards and the army. After the end of 1966 the "revisionist" group of Liu became an easy target for the Red Guards. The role of the Red Guards is particularly important because of their great political and social significance, the changes which were applied in methods of production and the way in which the workers reacted to these changes.

At the beginning of 1967 not only was an effect on production noted but the first steps were also taken to re-organise the productive forces, which was the ultimate aim of the Maoist fraction. This process led to an extraordinary social unrest. The working class developed for the first time an independent struggle. This struggle, however, was not carried on to support the Maoist fraction, *but on the contrary was a reaction against the slogans of the Maoist leadership.*

### *Article in Honan provincial press:*

The class enemies in the Honan Mining Bureau, not reconciled to their defeat, spread anarchism and other "ultra-democratic ideas". They said the eight-hour work system was only a framework, while obeying the leadership was "manifesting slave-mentality".

From *Elegant*.

In December 1966 the Maoist fraction was strong enough to carry through the first reforms. On 27 December the Trade Union Federation was dissolved and the decision made to take the "revolution" to the factories and countryside. It was clearly stated that "the revolution must be carried through and productivity heightened". Despite all the ideological jargon it is clear that the Maoists wished to use the workers in the struggle against the other Party fraction. Their aim wasn't at all to better the social position of the workers.

What did the announced change mean for the working class? Due to the fact that workers had no basic interest in making a choice between the two fractions, decisions were taken at the highest level. The Party established groups of "revolutionary rebels", which together with the Red Guards attacked the factory managers, trade union bureaucrats and "bourgeois" workers. Since the "revolutionary rebels" had no influence on the workers, they had to rely completely on the Red Guards and the army. Result: a total disorganisation of production.

The Cultural Revolution — which had nothing in common with a spontaneous movement of the working class — only offered an alternative way of accumulating capital. The social unrest which was its consequence was never more than a simple reaction against the measures of the authorities.

At the beginning of 1967 the government took the first measures in the context of the new economic policy which the Cultural Revolution heralded. In the industrial sector not only were the social benefits of the workers reduced (through the dissolution of the trade unions), but real wages were also lessened through the elimination of material incentives and the bonus system (*Labour Developments Abroad*). In this way the share of wages in the total social product was reduced and exploitation increased. The action of the Red Guards in the factories with the aim of "educating" the workers provoked a massive strike movement which went on till 1969. This massive activity of the workers naturally could not have been switched in accordance with a "revolutionary" plan. This was the beginning of the most confused period which lasted till the end of 1967. Then the army intervened with the aim of restoring (capitalist) order and getting the production (of surplus value) going again.

The strike movement began in Shanghai on 9 January 1967 with a strike of dockers. The strike soon spread to the industrial zones of the town. The workers' unrest was above all an answer to the lowering wages and to the introduction



of "ideological incentives". It was directed against the factory which based itself on loyalty to the Party and to thoughts of Mao.

Already during the summer of 1966 the Red Guards had met resistance to their campaign against "bourgeois" living styles. This consisted in seizing all old records and books which were in the possession of workers.

It is during this period that the Maoists began to "educate" management.

The strikes of 1967 spread quickly to other industrial districts and for the first time since 1926-7 the working class came into action to defend its own immediate class interest against increased exploitation through wage decreases. The Maoists naturally have their own explanations: it was a sign "bourgeois ideology", a survival from the "old society". In reality the strikes were a reaction to the new social situation of the working class. The Maoists even claim that "powerful capitalists" incited the workers to revolt (*Peoples Daily*, Address to the People of Shanghai," January 1967. See also *Problemes Chinois* No.1).

Soon the strike movement spread to:

1. Manchuria, where production in the most important industrial centre (Sheng Ang) was completely paralysed;
2. The province of Fuyan where the factories were occupied and the State profits shared out; Canton, Nanking, Beijing, Chanjing, Yan'an, Xi'ha, Huangshu, and also the industrial parts of Shansi province where numerous appeals to resume work were addressed to the workers.

Of all these strike movements that in Shanghai was the most important. On 13 January Beijing radio announced that violent fighting was going on for the possession of the office of the railways and for the Yang Shu Bu power station which had been occupied by "bourgeois workers" (Radio Peking, 13 January 1967. See also *Problemes Chinois* No.1, article "Ouvriers en Greve"). The army was sent in to put an end to the occupation.

The army came to the foreground more and more not only to nip the workers' revolt in the bud, but also to limit the excesses of the Red Guards. Only the army had any control over the increasing social unrest. This control was institutionalised with the setting up of "revolutionary committees".

In February 1967 the *Peoples Daily* called for the formation of these "revolutionary committees", based on the unity of three elements: the army, "revolutionary" management and the producers. Some days later the first congress of the Red Guards announced the uniting of these committees. Lost production now had to be recovered and total production increased. To do this a new method of Party control over the workers was needed. This was in fact the task of the newly-formed "revolutionary committees".

Quote from "The Southern Daily", organ of Kwangtung Provincial Revolutionary Committee, 19.7.1968:

The way to deal with the class enemy is simple: Suppression! To crush them eternally is the only possible way of fundamentally protecting the masses. If the masses violate the law, they too must be punished by being sent to jail or, even, by execution ... There must be freedom within the ranks of the masses, but there must also be discipline. There must be democracy in the ranks of the masses, but there must also be obedience to central authority.

Elegant

It is important to understand that the Cultural Revolution did have genuine anti-bureaucratic aims. The old bureaucracy had in fact prevented a great deal of capital accumulation and had hampered the creation of surplus value.

Following the reorganisation and the limiting of the bureaucracy, the Party cadres and technicians were "re-educated" in order to allow their re-integration into the productive system.

In the end the Red Guards were institutionalised, for despite the fact that they were controlled by the army, some Red Guard groups escaped from army control and radicalised their activities. The opposition of the workers to their exploitation made some Red Guard groups take up a position to the left of the Party line. This radicalness, however, was limited to delivering a timid criticism of the exploitation methods of the ruling class. The planners of the "Cultural Revolution" warned the Red Guards against the ideas of "anarchism, ultra-democracy, complete equality and a bandit mentality".



It is important to underline that the attempt to set up commune organisations — which was frustrated because of the "federalist danger" (i.e., the danger of being outside Party control) — precisely took place in the industrial districts where the class struggle had been the strongest: Shanghai and Shansi. This "leftism" was in fact regarded as an "abnormality of the revolution"

In July 1967 the universities were re-opened and the students returned to their books. The most recalcitrant students were forced to work in the countryside; others were physically liquidated. At the end of 1967 and beginning of 1968 a start was made to a thorough reorganisation of the Party, which was completed with the 9th Congress in April 1969. In the countryside the Cultural Revolution did not bring much change: only a few new infrastructures were established. It was also during this same Party Congress that the Cultural Revolution was officially declared ended.



# Law and Order

## THE RETURN TO LAW AND ORDER

After the "Great Cultural Revolution" the new apparatniks kept themselves very busy with criticism of the "capitalist-revisionist line of Liu". The winning Maoist fraction was of the opinion that "the whole struggle which we have carried on in the past in the countryside, in the factories, on the cultural level, has failed because we found no method of awakening the enthusiasm of the great mass. Now we have found this method: it is the Cultural Revolution" (Lin Piao, address to the 9th Party Congress, 1969). They put "politics in command" at all professional levels. The "policy" of consciousness" was introduced. The new line tried to overcome the inequality between agriculture and industry, through investment in sectors which would lead to a direct increase in agricultural production.

Since the beginning of the Cultural Revolution there had been no talk of the need for planning. It was only in 1970 that centralised planning again came to the fore: "Our socialist economy is a planned economy, and the aim of a socialist economy is not only to make profits but also to increase production" (*Peoples Daily*, "The Organisation of Chinese Socialist Trade"[sic], 19 October 1970). Here it must be pointed out that the Cultural Revolution had to involve a strengthening of centralised planning and *not* a decentralisation to enterprise. This is important because pro-Maoist ideologies always refer to the democratisation of the the revolution in China since the Cultural Revolution. But all their idyllic descriptions of "workers power" in China are crippled by the existence of the State plan: "The State determines the levels of production to be achieved in the national plan and enterprises are asked to exceed these levels" (*Far Eastern Economic Review*, October 1970). The Central Plan is thus the centre of development even (and *particularly*) after the Cultural Revolution. For in order to make this central planning work the organs of State control of production had also to be reorganised. The "revolutionary committees" were best suited for this aim.

Certain theories in the West about the Cultural Revolution base themselves on the so-called decentralisation of power and "direct democracy", of which the "revolutionary committees" were an expression. In reality these committees remained completely dependent on the highest Party authorities. There were indeed some committees which stood for a practically autonomous policy, but these were quickly called to order by the Party: "The construction of the Party must be led by the Party itself and not be factions" (Alain Bouc, 'La Lente Renaissance du PCC', *Le Monde*, 25 March 1970)

The Party even declared:

*Some people, badly influenced by anarchism and bourgeois factionalism deny the leadership of the Party... The Party must have the leadership in everything... Some other comrades have exaggerated in a hopeless way the role of the mass organisations and see inaccurately the relationship between the mass organisations and the Party; they have placed the mass organisations above the Party and contested the leadership of the Party. This is the expression of a reactionary anarchism and syndicalism (Peking Review, No.12, 1970).*

What remains, then, of the "autonomy" and direct democracy" of the working classes? Even "local initiative must be situated under united leadership and be centralised through the central government" (*Peoples Daily*, 8 May 1970).

The Cultural Revolution made the "revolutionary committees" an organ both for controlling production and for representing the workers. The essential aim was to bring to a halt the loss in surplus value and at the same time to exercise a better control over labour power through carrying out the orders of the central Party organs.

Wages were supposedly levelled, but this happened at the expense of skilled workers who saw their wages reduced. And there still remained eight wages categories in existence, which made wage equality a fiction.

The stagnation in the production of consumer goods did not lead to inflationary pressure as in other "socialist" countries because of the strong State control over the working class which allowed wages to be frozen and "bourgeois" incentives to be reduced.

The "revolutionary criterion" that the wage of a worker should in fact be determined only as a means to increase the income of those who were loyal to the Party only worked to divide the working class. At the "struggle meetings" where these "revolutionary criteria" were fixed, only the proposal of the Party on this matter was discussed, and once again it is self-evident that the criteria of the highest Party cadres were *not* determined through any kind of "workers democracy".

*Quotes from article in Red Flag by Yao Wen-Yuan, August 1968*

There are still comrades in our ranks who have idiotic ideas. They say: "We wrought the victory of the revolution. We took power without the leadership of the Party, and everything went well! ..." That manner of talking is utterly wrong. We must study the new Party Constitution and reject the ultra-leftist bourgeois reactionary trend. We must maintain vigilance against the class enemy, who uses factionalism to undermine the reconstruction of the Party. The revolutionary mass organisations at all levels must accept the leadership of the Party organisation. The proper relation between the Party and mass organisations is that between rulers and subjects.

... Some muddle-headed people cannot cope with proletarian freedom and discipline as two sides of the same coin. ... They do not understand that observing revolutionary discipline on their own initiative consolidates the dictatorship of the proletariat. They say "To hell with discipline. I have my own freedom. ... We are now living in an entirely new Socialist system under the dictatorship of the proletariat. Everyone enjoys extensive democracy and freedom. ..." Those who have no sense of responsibility and just talk about freedom, but neglect revolutionary discipline and entertain ultra-leftist, extreme-democratic ideas are preaching petty-bourgeois freedom.

From Elegant.

As far as the organisation of production was concerned the "revolutionary committees" were continually reminded that "the negation of the centralised State plan is an expression of anarchism".

The impact of the Cultural Revolution was a total failure: strikes, work interruptions, absenteeism and other types of work refusal were the order of the day. "Discipline is necessary. At present there is none in the factories" (Hsich Fu-Chih, Minister of Public Security, Quarterly Review of China, Korea and Hong Kong, No.1, 1968). Despite the quick intervention of the army and the formation of revolutionary committees" production went up again, and in 1968 the 1967 level of production was again reached.

Only the oil and electronics sectors were able to maintain their production level during the Cultural Revolution. This was because the Red Guards had not intervened in these sectors on account of their military importance. With the aim of increasing production and the better use of capital, the workers were "educated" to work and the education system was completely geared to production.



The surplus of labour power in the industrial and tertiary sectors was reduced to a minimum through the enforced emigration of many workers to the countryside. Through following this policy a new agricultural infrastructure was successfully built up in a minimum of time. From 1966 to 1970 in fact a rapid rise in production was observed in this sector. In 1970 difficulties began again because the peasants preferred to use the proceeds for themselves rather than to give them to the State. Agricultural products still represent a large part of Chinese exports.

The private plot remains the basic factor in agricultural production. During the first months of the Cultural Revolution the ownership of private plots was forbidden. The opposition of the peasants was however so strong that private ownership was again allowed. In the new wages system, as in the industrial sector, the stress was laid on political criteria (loyalty to the Party line). The disagreement with the peasant population was thus taken in hand, which again was to the benefit of the Party bureaucracy.

Since the Cultural Revolution agricultural production has increased by 3% per year and the GNP by 4.5%, which is only a third of the growth during the first plan. Industrial production has practically stagnated. An increase in productivity in heavy industry can only follow from new investment.

The problem still remains: to increase investment, both in the agricultural and the industrial sectors. There are only two solutions: either close cooperation with the USSR and USA or an increase in capital through an increased exploitation of the peasantry. At the moment the latter solution is pursued insofar as, however, it does not provoke too much peasant resistance.

#### VICTORIAN SEXUAL MORALITY

The Chinese carry on a very intensive campaign for sexual abstinence, for the transformation of love for the opposite sex into twelve hours work per day, for late marriage and other similar themes which were characteristic of the puritan culture of 19th century capitalism:

*If people marry later their spirit has more hold over their body, which allows them to solve their problems in intelligent ways and to restrain their sexual desires so as not to endanger their health through excesses ... By marrying late young people can devote more energy to state affairs and group life, to the study of political theory and to the political struggle ... So late marriage is objectively an advantageous condition for political progress (Yang Msiu, "Pour le Mariage Tardif", Jeunesse de Chine, 1962).*

In an article "Don't Make Love Too Early" a certain Ke Tchang Tuch insinuates that masturbation is a symptom of illness (in *L'Eleve du Secondaire*, 1956, No.4).

It is obvious that this morality can only be understood if it is placed in the context of China's socio-economic system.

#### THE CONCENTRATION CAMPS

Many Western intellectuals are still of the opinion that there are no labour camps in China. The Chinese authorities are naturally silent about this, but even official publications confirm the existence of these camps. Thus there is the decision of the Council of Ministers about "education through work" (approved on 1 August 1957 during the 78th session of the Permanent Committee of the National Peoples Assembly).

Who ends up in the camps? In the first place those who are labelled "counter-revolutionary" and "reactionary" by the government. Others make themselves guilty by "vagabondism", refusal to work and disturbance of the public order. People who resist work discipline also end up there.

Just how many detainees there are is not known since naturally no official statistics exist. Most ex-prisoners (those who survive this punishment system) estimate the number between 15 and 20 million. One of the few to survive is Bao Ruo-Wang who has supplied a unique testimony about living conditions in the camps, a testimony which has been accepted as trustworthy by prominent sinologists. In contrast to the Russian concentration camps physical torture in the Chinese camps is condemned. The Chinese go to work very

efficiently: they use mental torture which no one can resist. The most important method consists in letting the prisoners suffer hunger for a long period. For months they only get a watery soup to drink. The "re-education" consists for the most part in the indoctrination of Maoist "truths". Work and re-education take turns; the prisoners are there not only to work "but also to get rid of your bad thoughts. Bad thoughts about the government, the leaders, government policy, the allies of the government and the Communist Party. In order to get rid of these bad thoughts you must express them so that the government can educate you. You must not be afraid to express these bad thoughts; we want to know that you have them — otherwise in fact you would not be here".

Bao Ruo-Wang was not afraid to express his "bad" thoughts. He did ... and was put in chains in an isolation cell (B.Ruo-Wang and R.Chelminski, *Prisoner of Mao*, New York, 1973).

Sexual problems do not seem to exist in the camps; after all, the prisoners are too hungry and tired to think about sexual problems. But those who are caught engaging in homosexual behaviour are immediately executed.

Near to the concentration camps are "model prisons" where the prisoners do indeed have a princely life. It is these prisons which are shown to tourists and other visitors. However, the prisoners stay there only for a very short while and are then taken to a concentration camp.

*Quote from worker in unofficial "underground" factory:*

The Communists figure there are so many "underground" workmen, they don't bother giving them real sentences. Lots of times, the authorities actually helped us.

All you need is a few good workmen. They're easy to get because the "underground" wages are so much higher — or because they can't work in legal factories because they are released "criminals" from forced labour, and therefore "enemies of the State".

Then you need some capital. Particularly in Canton, a lot of people get money from relations living abroad — or a few men will get together and pool their money.

Elegant

## Reactionary Foreign Policy

What is the truth about the so-called "proletarian internationalism" which China pays tribute to? Logically China's foreign policy goes very much together with its economic policy. After the takeover of power in 1949 China, in its rivalry with American imperialism, took part in the Korean War. The break with Russia and the economic consequences of this greatly hindered intervention abroad. The government was forced to limit such interventions. All military aid went to North Vietnam which had suffered so much from the American military escalation. When hundreds of thousands of militants of the pro-Chinese Indonesian CP were killed in 1965 by Suharto's hordes, the Chinese government waited till two months after it had happened to "make charges"



about this massacre. Some orthodox Maoists found this a betrayal of "internationalism".

The Maoists always boast about China's support for oppressed peoples. But China supports only those who fit into the framework of its economic policy. Just like any other capitalist country China needs markets for its products. It is in this light that its support for self-appointed liberation movements must be seen.

Further, the Chinese government has friendly contacts with various ultra-rightist regimes: Franco's Spain, the Colonel's Greece (before the Cyprus question), Chile of the Junta, Burundi of the genociders, etc.



In the framework of its anti-Russian policy China supports the building of a strong Europe, the EEC, the presence of NATO troops in Europe, the Japanese-American Security Treaty, etc. China was also one of the first to nip the uprising of the Ceylonese revolutionaries in the bud. In a letter to Prime Minister Bandaranaike of Ceylon, Chou En-Lai wrote, among other things, the following:

*We are content that, thanks to the exertions of your Excellency and of the Ceylonese government the chaotic situation which had been caused by a handful of individuals calling themselves "guevaraists", and into whose ranks foreign spies had infiltrated, has now been brought under control (Ceylon Evening News, 27 May 1971).*

In the same letter Chou En-lai offered 150 million rupees in the form of foreign currencies to the Ceylonese government so that it could stifle the seed of the peoples uprising.

Among the greetings telegrams which Mao received on his 80th birthday was one from Augusto Pinochet, the strong man of the Chilean military junta. After all, shortly after the coup d'état took place the Chinese embassy in Santiago refused to accept Chilean refugees! In official declarations the death of Allende was deplored, but it has never come to a condemnation of the junta's coup d'état. Instead of breaking off relations with Chile, trade relations were even extended. As if that was not enough, in 1974 China declared itself an advocate of a "strong" Israel.

China's foreign policy has thus nothing whatsoever to do with proletarian internationalism.

## After the 10th Congress

The 10th Party Congress was held from 24 to 28 August 1973 in the greatest secrecy. Only on 29 August did the Chinese know that a Party Congress had taken place. The masses had no opportunity to take part in the debates: not a single document was published before the congress that had any reference to it. The preparation and conduct of the Congress was on super-perfect Stalinist lines.

The Congress was one of yes-men. The New China News Agency could thus easily describe it as a "unity congress". Most of the Congress was devoted to the "crimes" of Lin Piao who was called a "bourgeois careerist, a conspirator, a two-faced counter-revolutionary, a renegade, a traitor, a Kuomintang anti-communist, a trotskyist, a foreign agent and a revisionist". Of Lin Piao's real socio-economic point of view, essentially not a word. Obviously the "class struggle" was going to be the main point in the criticism of Lin Piao. About the real class struggle, that of the workers and peasants against the Maoist dictatorship, the power-holders were naturally as silent as death.

The Cultural Revolution was in part an answer to the Party and Trade Union bureaucracy of the Liu clique, but was at the same time also the beginning of the formation of a new (Maoist-minded) bureaucratic elite. The anti-Lin campaign has now been supplemented by an anti-Confucius campaign, which has as its aim to completely eliminate the opposition. The bourgeois character of the anti-Confucius campaign appears clearly from the fact that the Party now praises the Emperor Ch'in Shih Huang, founder of the Ch'in dynasty. The deeds of the Emperor Ch'in do in fact show a likeness with those of Mao. He succeeded in mercilessly rooting out all opposition to his government.

The latest information which is coming to us out of China shows new strike movements in the important industrial centres. Violent fights have taken place between workers and soldiers. This is quite logical because one of the points in the programme of the 10th Party Congress was accelerated industrialisation. And an accelerated industrialisation means for the workers a strict labour discipline ... and less wages. The future will show if we will get a repetition of the massive strike wave of 1966-7.







After the take-over of power in 1949 the CP has always sought the best method to develop the productive forces in China. The processes thus set in motion have always met with the opposition of the workers and peasants. The historic class struggle in Mao's China has been carried on against a ruling class which strives after capital accumulation at the expense of the working class. In contrast to Maoist ideology, which reduces the social struggle to a fight between two Party fractions where one represents the true proletarian tendency, the workers struggle is completely alien to these intra-

bureaucratic disagreements. It is the working class who carry on the real class struggle: that of wage slaves against capital-holders.

As has been shown in the previous sections, China is today a thoroughly bourgeois society, which is motivated by a bourgeois ideology, "Marxism-Leninism". This "Marxism-Leninism", which hides its bourgeois content behind the facade of a semi-marxist terminology, leads only to state capitalism.

Neo-capitalism or state capitalism: for the workers it does not make much difference. Only when the workers have come to understand that they need no "vanguard" to bring about Socialism and to believe in their own capacities will we get any nearer to Socialism. Only the independent struggle of the workers can lead to Socialism. As Marx put it: the emancipation of the working class can only be the work of the working class itself.

2.

# democracy in china ?

A GLIMPSE AT CHINESE POLITICS

One of the shortcomings of many well-meaning people who have vague hopes for a new society is that they cannot bear the thought that there nowhere yet exists a society in which all men and women control their own lives. They need to believe in some paradise which has already fulfilled their dreams and which they can adore blindly without having to work out for themselves the real problems of human liberation. Stalin's Russia used to serve the function of a "workers' fatherland", but has become much less popular since Khrushchev revealed a little bit of the truth about the Stalin dictatorship, the purges and labour camps. Now another Stalin dictatorship, more distant and even less accessible, benefits from the longings of left-wingers abroad — Mao's China.

Like a previous generation of travellers returning from Russia, select visitors return from China with glowing accounts of the new life of hard-working, self-sacrificing but happy workers and peasants, all taking part in the running of their factories and communes under the kindly gaze of the great leader. After two weeks of being shepherded along the prepared tourist trail, any remaining temptation to criticise is overcome by the racist thought that, after all, these Chinese aren't really like us: that we wouldn't like for example, long sessions studying Mao Tse-Tung thought after a hard day's work doesn't mean *they* would want to object.

Socialists reject the official myth of the State Capitalist regimes that power in them is held by the mass of working people, that they are "socialist" or "dictatorships of the proletariat" or whatever. Countries like Russia and China are ruled by tiny elites of ruthless Communist Party bureaucrats. However, it is often difficult to show this clearly from

statements issued by the regimes themselves for foreign consumption — the only statements that their supporters cannot dismiss as "capitalist propaganda". During the worst period of the Stalinist purges, the Russian press was full of news about the new constitution being discussed throughout the country — a marvellous scrap of waste paper guaranteeing citizens all the democratic freedoms they could ask for.

A few months ago I picked up in a left-wing bookshop a beautifully printed booklet (10p) entitled "The Tenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China (Documents)". On the first page, a multi-coloured portrait of the great helmsman smiles out at us, the face of the haggard chain-smoking old dictator made smooth and rosy. After the photos of twenty more leading "comrades" (not yet exposed as double-dealing renegades) we come to such treats as "Report to the Tenth National Congress of the CPC", delivered by Chou En-lai, the report on the new Constitution, delivered by up-and-coming Wang Hung-wen, the Constitution, and a couple of press communiques. You will be relieved to know that both reports were adopted unanimously by the Congress.

Once you get the hang of it, it's quite easy to extract some sort of meaning from the jargon and endlessly repeated formulas in this stuff. Surprisingly enough, that meaning is a fairly frank explanation of the workings of a remorselessly dictatorial system. We still don't know how accurately these documents reflect the real social and political life of Maoist China, but they surely have some significance. So let's take a quick guided tour through the constitution. If you don't trust me, you can check up by getting your own copy straight from the Foreign Languages Publishing House in Peking.



First of all, Article 7 says that all other Chinese organisations — State organs, the Army and militia, so-called labour unions, peasant associations, women's federations, the Youth League, the Red Guards and the Little Red Guards (how sweet), and "mass organisations" — must accept the centralised leadership of the Communist Party. Again, Wang emphasises that "of the seven sectors — industry, agriculture, commerce, culture and education, the Army, the Government and the Party — it is the Party that exercises overall leadership." He goes on to say that a Party committee's leadership must not be replaced by a joint conference of several sectors, which presumably had been known to happen. It is clear from the context that "leadership" means not merely a gentle guidance, as Maoist sympathisers might like to imagine, but the power to impose directives, by force if need be. In a genuinely Socialist society, of course, we would do without leaders, commerce, Governments and Parties.



Next, we ask how the Party is organised. "The organisational principle of the Party is democratic centralism." Well, there's no difficulty in locating the centralism. So let's forget the democracy for the time being, and set out the centralist features of the Constitution:—

1. Article 5 — The individual is subordinate to the organisation, the minority is subordinate to the majority, the lower level is subordinate to the higher level, and the entire Party is subordinate to the Central Committee.
2. Article 6 — Leading bodies convene Congresses (National Party Congresses only every five years, local Congresses every three years), but they can convene them before the due date or postpone them if they wish. Further, the convening of Congresses at one level is subject to approval by higher organs.
3. Primary organisations are set up in factories, mines and other enterprises, communes, offices, schools, shops, neighbourhoods, Army companies and other primary units. These must include the vast majority of the 28 million Party members. These units hold elections every two years, and the elections can be brought forward or delayed. The main tasks of the primary units are indoctrination, and "to fulfill every task assigned by the Party and the State". No mention is made of any decision-making powers at this level — Articles 11 and 12.
4. In elections there is no choice among representatives (let alone delegates) or programmes. There is a process called "democratic consultation" — some kind of behind the scenes negotiations.
5. The plenary session of the Central Committee is convened by and "elects" the Political Bureau of the Central Committee (20 men and one woman, Mao's wife), which exercises the functions and powers of the Central Committee between the not very frequent plenary sessions.

Right at the centre, the Politburo contains a Standing Committee (nine men), under whose leadership "a number of necessary organs, which are compact and efficient, shall be set up to attend to the day-to-day work of the Party, the Government and the Army in a centralised way" — Article 9.

The exact relationship of the Standing Committee to the Politburo is left unclear, but it is clear that these nine men have a firm double hold over Chinese society. First, they directly control the "necessary organs". Second, they "lead" the Politburo, which "leads" the Central Committee, which "leads" the whole Party, which "leads" China. Over this hierarchy their control is perhaps a little less direct, with some decision-making power held by other high-ranking officials.

So much for centralism — now what about democracy? As Article 5 says, "it is essential to create a political situation in which there are both centralism and democracy". Well, primary units (Article 12) are instructed to "maintain close ties with the masses, constantly listen to their opinions and demands", but this confers on the "masses" no specific rights at all. It is what all sensible rulers do who want to keep a watch on what their subjects are thinking. Then there is all the "consultation" and "deliberation", which again guarantees nothing.

The most remarked on "democratic" provision of the Constitution, made much of in Western news reports, is this section of Article 5:—

*"Party members have the right to criticise organisations and leading members of the Party at all levels and make proposals to them. If a Party member holds different views with regard to the decisions or directives of the Party organisations, he is allowed to reserve his views and has the right to by-pass the immediate leadership and report directly to higher levels, up to and including the Central Committee and the Chairman of the Central Committee. It is absolutely impermissible to suppress criticism and to retaliate."*

But this rule gives no independent power to the ordinary Party member. She or he cannot organise a movement to implement alternative policies, or even publicise her or his views, but only appeal to big bureaucrats over the head of little bureaucrats. If the higher level agrees with the comrade they countermand the dictates of the lower level; if not, our comrade is in even deeper water. The real aim of this procedure is to tighten up central control by keeping higher levels well informed about what goes on at lower levels.

Some people's idea of democracy might be Wang's report that:

*"... the Party committees of the provinces, municipalities and the autonomous regions, the Party committees of the greater military commands and the Party organisations directly under the Central Committee all set up groups for the revision of the Party Constitution, extensively consulted the masses inside and outside the Party, and formally submitted 41 drafts to the Central Committee. At the same time, the masses inside and outside the Party in various places directly mailed in many suggestions for revision. The draft of the revised Constitution now submitted to the Congress for discussion was drawn up according to Chairman Mao's specific proposals for the revision and on the basis of serious study of all the drafts and suggestions sent in."*

We wonder whether anyone sent in suggestions like — direct election of delegates who can be mandated and recalled at any time to councils at all levels, independent working class organisation, freedom of speech, press and association, abolition of bureaucratic organs. And what happened to anyone who did send them in. During the Cultural Revolution when central control was temporarily weakened, some groups such as the Sheng Wu Lien in Hunan Province raised this type of demand, and were later suppressed as "ultra-leftists", many members being shot after appearing before mass kangaroo courts.



Is not Chen Tung-Ping sleeping right next to you? I have read all the various materials of his denounced by your Institute. You were sleeping together with a counter-revolutionary, and yet you did not know it!

Mao in a talk with his nephew Mao Yuan-Hsin 5.7.1964, published by Red Guards, quoted in "Mao Unrehearsed".

We should not imagine that members of the "great, glorious and correct" Communist Party of China have an easy life, passively obeying directions from above without having to think for themselves. For if their higher ups are unmasked as traitors by a rival faction, then they too will be exposed to attack for opposing the real Party line. The Party line is a straight and consistent path forward if you study hard enough to detect it. Chou says:—

*"In the last fifty years our Party has gone through ten major struggles between the two lines ... and such struggles will occur ten, twenty or thirty times."*

And it is an "irrefutable truth" that the correct line always wins out in the end:—

*"If one's line is incorrect, one's downfall is inevitable, even with the control of the central, local and Army leadership."*

Treason never prospers, for if it prosper, none dare call it treason.

The incredible charges which Chinese bureaucrats make against their defeated rivals are made necessary by the dogma that whoever is in control at present represents "the dictatorship of the proletariat". Any opponent must be an agent of the "class enemy". After unanimously expelling Lin Piao from the Party "once and for all" (he was at the time dead), the Congress then expelled "Chen Pota, ... anti-communist Kuomintang element, Trotskyist, renegade, enemy agent and revisionist". In this abuse, the only label which may mean something specific is "Trotskyist". Chen seemed to be encouraging democratisation during the Cultural Revolution; such people are inaccurately called Trotskyists by the Stalinists and Maoists.

So the Party member must often weigh up the risks of resisting the present leadership, in the expectation that the opposing faction will consolidate its power, against the risks of being later exposed as an accomplice of the enemy. The sort of risks involved are hinted at by Wang:—

*"When confronted with issues that concern the line and the overall situation, a true Communist must act without any selfish considerations and dare to go against the tide, fearing neither removal from his post, expulsion from the Party, imprisonment, divorce or guillotine."*

That's life in People's China! No wonder they worry about "combining unity of will with personal ease of mind and liveliness".

As for our fellow workers in China, we can know very little about their struggles, but we are sure they will keep up the fight against their rulers, the group which Sheng Wu Lien called "the red capitalist class". As part of the world working class, they will yet take part in building a genuine Socialist community.

STEPHEN STEFAN

**Note** — See also article entitled "A Socialist in China" (Socialist Standard, November 1974), and "Theses on the Chinese Revolution" by Cajo Brendel, Solidarity pamphlet 25p.

This National Congress seems to have been a very good one. In my opinion it has been a congress of unity and of victory. We use the method of issuing communiques. The foreigners can no longer fish for our news [laughter]. They say we hold secret meetings. In fact we are both open and secret. I think that the reporters in Peking are not much good. Perhaps we have cleared out most of the traitors and spies who had wormed their way among us. In the past whenever we held a meeting it was immediately leaked out and the Red Guard posters immediately published it. Since Wang, Kuan, Chi, Yang, Yu and Chuan fell, they no longer have any more news about the meetings of the Central Committee.

That's more or less that. The meeting is adjourned [long enthusiastic applause].

Talk at the First Plenum of the Ninth Central Committee of the CPC, 28.4.69, summing up after the Ninth Congress.

From Schram.

#### SOCIAL REVOLUTION GROUPS

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Various materials relating to the early period (1967-8) of the "Cultural Revolution" have recently come into our hands. We are reproducing these regulations because they undermine the myth of the Cultural Revolution as a spontaneous popular movement.

We use the following abbreviations of political formulas:

**Cultrev** — cultural revolution, great proletarian cultural revolution;

**Maothought** — the thought of Mao Tsetung;

**Dictprol** — the dictatorship of the proletariat (that is, the use of force by the regime);

**Revmasses** — revolutionary masses (that is, officially approved Red Guard groups).

## document one

# Security Regulations

### REGULATIONS OF THE CHINESE SECURITY ORGANS DURING THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION

**DIRECTIVES FROM THE HIGHEST BODIES**, issued by Popular Administrative and Judicial Commune of West District, 10.1.67.

Our present task is to reinforce the means at the disposal of the State and the people: mainly the people's army, the people's police and the people's tribunals, used for national defence and to protect the interests of the people.

Here are some projected regulations on the work to reinforce public security during the cultrev.

The cultrev is a movement directed by Maothought. It takes place under the dictprol. The cultrev is in an excellent situation. It is actively mobilising the great revmasses. Without the dictprol, a real great mass democracy cannot take root. The organs of public security are the instruments which the dictprol uses to guarantee great democracy, big character posters, exchanging experiences, great discussion and the order of the cultrev.

Thus the following regulations are specially promulgated:

1. Counter-revolutionary elements against whom there is formal proof that they are guilty of murder, incendiary acts, poisonings, looting, creating incidents on the lines of communication, harmful acts caused to others in an underhand way, spying for foreign countries, revealing State secrets, sabotage etc, are to be punished according to law.

2. All sending of anonymous anti-revolutionary letters, all open or secret distribution of anti-revolutionary tracts, all poster slanders and attacks on our great leader Chairman Mao or on Comrade Lin Piao, his closest comrade-in-arms, at present constitute counter-revolutionary acts, and are to be punished according to law.

3. The revmasses, the left or left tendencies, and the revmass organisations are to be protected. All armed struggle is rigorously forbidden. All attacks on revolutionary organisations, all punishments and bad treatment inflicted on revmasses, detention and isolation of persons belonging to the revmass, are declared illegal acts. In general, for faults of this kind, the party and administration cadres will reunite the masses, and organise sessions to criticise these acts and re-educate those guilty. The main criminals who have committed murders, and their henchmen who have committed serious faults, and the manipulators from behind the wings, are to be punished according to law.

4. It is formally forbidden to allow the following persons to leave their usual place of residence to take part in exchanging experiences:

elements belonging to the landowners, the rich, the reactionaries;

the bad elements, the rightists;

persons undergoing reeducation by labour, those who have purged their guilt and have continued working in the same place, those released after purging their guilt and whose political behaviour since has not been satisfactory;

base elements of reactionary parties and groups, including leaders of low and medium rank of reactionary sects and brotherhoods;

persons whose occupation is the organisation and propaganda of religious beliefs;

soldiers of the previous enemy army of rank above company commander;

administration personnel of rank above leader responsible for 100 families;

police personnel of rank above police sub-officer, gendarmes, the personnel of the special services;

opportunist and trouble-making elements;

members of families of counter-revolutionary elements executed, imprisoned, placed under surveillance or escaped abroad.

All these persons are formally forbidden to change their names, to make false declarations about their past, to infiltrate massrev organisations, to incite others to revolt while manipulating them from the wings. They are even more formally forbidden to form their own organisations. And if these elements resort to acts of sabotage, their cases must be dealt with rigorously and severely according to law.

5. As for those who seek to propagate reactionary and anti-revolutionary aims and views under the pretext of great democracy, or using other means and arguments, in general the masses will lead the struggle against such individuals. In the more serious cases, the organs of public security will assist the masses and conduct an enquiry in the field; and, where necessary, a decision will be taken having regard to the case under consideration and the prevailing circumstances.

6. Military, party, administration and public security personnel who change these regulations, distort and misrepresent the real facts, or commit acts of repression against the revmasses, will be punished according to law.

These regulations must be widely publicised to the great popular masses. The revmasses are called upon to supervise and check up on the organs of public security in the execution of their tasks, so that the masses can maintain and safeguard order in the revolution and guarantee the normal execution of security tasks.

(The 6 regulations were copied from records of declarations made on 9.1.67 by Prime Minister Chou Enlai and Security Minister Hsieh Fuchih on receiving in the Palace a group of revolutionary comrades from the administrative and judicial apparatus of the whole country.)



## document two

# the case of Yen Wei-ping

### PSYCHIATRY AND DISSENT IN CHINA

#### **"Striking Counter-Revolutionary Case — Preliminary Findings (excerpts) of Investigation into the Make-Believe Joint Consultations Planned by Chien Hsin-Chung, Huang Shu-Tse and Shih Shu-Han and Designed to Shield Counter-Revolutionary Yen Wei-Ping"**

This is an article from the Peking Medical Revolutionary Committee paper, *"Entirely Matchless"* No.9, 19.5.1969. The subsequent fate of Lin Piao adds a further irony to the story. Insertions by us are in square brackets preceded by i.e.

#### **Editor's Note:**

Proletarian revolutionary rebels have unearthed facts of 3—anti elements [i.e. anti-party, anti-socialism, anti-Mao thought] Chien Hsin-chung and Huang Shu-tse (Minister and Vice Minister of Health respectively) harboring the active counter-revolutionary Yen Wei-Ping (the stinking wife of Underworld Lord Lu Ting-i) who made attacks on our Deputy Commander Comrade Lin Piao. This is exhilarating good news and represents a great victory for the invincible thought of Mao Tse-tung.

We now publish extracts of the report of investigations, which, with massive facts adduced, furnish ample proof that the 3—anti element Chien Hsin-chung and anti-Communist veteran Huang Shu-tse belong to one and the same gang of Peng Chen, Lu Ting-i and An Tzu-wen. They provide undeniable proof of their elaborate planning of the counter-revolutionary feigned joint consultations designed to shield Yen Wei-ping, and their participation in the criminal activities of the Peng-Lu-Lo-Yang counter-revolutionary bloc.

Chairman Mao teaches us: "After the wiping out of the gun-toting enemies, the non-gun-toting enemies who still remain will engage us in a desperate struggle. We must not slight such enemies". Counter-revolutionary revisionists Chien Hsin-chung and Huang Shu-tse were active participants and prime-movers of this counter-revolutionary case. We must have a total reckoning of their criminal activities, knock them down and plant one foot on them so that they might never have a chance to stand up again.

"As the storm brought upheavals to Chung-shan (a hill in Nanking), our one-million-strong men forced a crossing of the river." The situation in the Health Ministry is now very encouraging. Let us persevere in our efforts by holding high the great red banner of Mao Tse-tung's thought, and smash the urban lordly influence and amputate the sinister hand of the Liu-Teng black command, in the Health Ministry.

From March 1960 to January 1966, active counter-revolutionary Yen Wei-ping, wife of counter-revolutionary revisionist bloc chief Lu Ting-i, wrote scores of unsigned counter-revolutionary letters, frantically attacking our most respected leader Chairman Mao's dear comrade-in-arms Deputy Commander-in-Chief Lin Piao and his family and frantically opposing Comrade Lin Piao. She is indeed an arch counter-revolutionary.

All the time, counter-revolutionary revisionists Peng Chen, Lu Ting-i [i.e. her husband], Chien Hsin-chung and Huang Shu-tse actively took part in and planned the covering up of this counter-revolutionary case. To shelter her counter-revolutionary activities, they deliberately "diagnosed" counter-revolutionary Yen Wei-ping to be suffering from a "mental disease", for the attainment of their secret political objectives.

#### **FAKE JOINT CONSULTATIONS IN CANTON, COVER FOR COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY**

Counter-revolutionary Yen Wei-ping began writing unsigned counter-revolutionary letters, frantically attacking our most respected leader Chairman Mao's close comrade-in-arms Comrade Lin Piao, in March 1960.

These counter-revolutionary anonymous letters attracted the attention of the Public Security authorities.

Toward the end of 1960, fearing exposure, Lu Ting-i took Yen Wei-ping to Canton. She feigned some "mental disease", through the arrangements of Hsueh Pang-chi, former head of Shanghai East China Hospital and counter-revolutionary suspected of having connections abroad. All this was to render cover to her counter-revolutionary activities.

In February 1962, Lu Ting-i visited Canton and called on Hsueh Pang-chi who happened to be on a field assignment to Canton. Lu wanted Hsueh to see Yen Wei-ping.

Hsueh did as he was told, and mentioned her condition to Su Tsung-hua, director of Shanghai Mental Diseases Prevention and Treatment Institute and a bourgeois academic authority, who travelled to Canton with him. Hsueh asked Su to pay Yen a visit.



When Su called, Lu Ting-i bade Yen Wei-ping to feign impatience by walking about ceaselessly upstairs. Lu himself did not show up to describe her "symptoms", nor did he allow Yen to be seen and spoken to. The "patient's history" was conveyed to Su by Hsueh, who averred that Yen shouted violently, was very suspicious and greatly annoyed Lu with her screams.

Basing his observation on this false "symptom" alone, Su discussed the matter with Hsueh and then "diagnosed" Yen to be suffering from "psychic ailment during menopause".

Having achieved his end, Lu Ting-i lost no time to instruct Hsueh Pang-chi that he should submit a report of Yen Wei-ping's condition to the Health Ministry's Medical Service Bureau. Yen was merely a common cadre and did not fall within the scope of the Medical Insurance Scheme. For a cadre's dependent to secure medical attention, there was absolutely no need for a report of her "condition" to the Medical Service Bureau, much less direct to the Bureau Chief.

Hsueh Pang-chi acted in accordance with Lu Ting-i's wishes and wrote personally a report to Huang Shu-tse, deputy director of the Health Ministry's Medical Service Bureau about the "mental disease" of counter-revolutionary Yen Wei-ping, on March 2, 1961.

Hsueh wrote: "Yen Wei-ping is lately in Canton. Her health is poor. After consultation with Professor Su Tsung-hua, we suspect her to have some psychic ailment attendant on her menopause ... Department Chief Lu has asked me to communicate to you her condition and our suggested medical treatment."

Upon receipt of the report, Huang Shu-tse was extremely co-operative and immediately wrote a letter to Dr Hsu X-x of Peking Hospital.

Huang said in his letter: "Hospital head Hsueh Pang-chi wrote to us with recommendations about treatment of Yen Wei-ping. Please read and keep these recommendations in the patient's history file of Yen. I have ascertained from him that these recommendations were the result of a joint consultation by him and Institution Director Su and that there is no other record about the case. There is no need for you to press for more information from Canton."

Huang also added: "We recommend that Dr Shen Yu-tsun (wife of Chien Hsin-chung) of the Neurology Department of Peking Hospital be asked to examine Yen. Before she sees her, you may mention the patient's symptoms to her. I should like to be present when she sees her."

Thus, under Lu Ting-i's intimation and through the efforts of Huang Shu-tse as well as the visit of Chien Hsin-chung's wife Shen Yu-tsun, counter-revolutionary Yen Wei-ping was said to be suffering from "hysteria" which provided a cover for her counter-revolutionary crimes.

After this, Yen Wei-ping madly proceeded with her counter-revolutionary activities under the cover of her feigned mental disease.

#### FAKE JOINT CONSULTATION IN SHANGHAI, EVASION OF LEGAL ACTION

In 1962, the Public Security Authorities secured clues to counter-revolutionary Yen Wei-ping's crime of writing unsigned letters maliciously attacking Deputy Commander-in-Chief Lin. They sent men to contact Chao Chun, deputy secretary of the Party Committee of organs under the former Central Propaganda Department and Party Committee member Liu Min for a check on Yen Wei-ping's handwriting. Getting more alarmed, Lu Ting-i hastily took Yen to Shanghai in November 1963 on a feigned mental disease, to run away from the law.

On arriving in Shanghai, he called again on Hsueh Pang-chi, head of East China Hospital, and wanted him to "think of a way out". He confided to Hsueh Yen's attack on Comrade Yeh Chun. Hsueh, well aware of Yen's counter-revolutionary crime, still conspired with the Shanghai Municipal Health Bureau's Party secretary Ho Chiu-teng (who is now identified as a power-holder within the Party taking the capitalist road) to plan "joint consultation" and "medical treatment" for her.

The "joint consultation" was held by Hsueh Pang-chi and Su Tsung-hua. Both the "joint consultation" and "medical treatment" prescription were done at the guest house where Lu Ting-i lived. Coming along with Lu to Shanghai was Dr Keng X-x of the Medical Service who was responsible for reporting to the Health Ministry's Medical Service Bureau about the "medical treatment" prescribed for Yen Wei-ping. Under Huang Shu-tse's and others' harboring, a counter-revolutionary was safely kept from harm as a psychic patient.

During Lu Ting-i's stay in Shanghai in connection with Yen Wei-ping's "treatment", Hsu Yun-pei, ex-Party Secretary of the Health Ministry, was also there and often visited Lu Ting-i, to discuss clandestine dealings.

In the course of the "medical treatment", one nurse was anxious to learn more about Yen Wei-ping's "pathological manifestations" by getting closer contacts with her. But, counter-revolutionary Yen, sly as she was, would never allow any older nurse to be near her for fear of betraying herself. She chose a young nurse to give her injections but not to be anywhere near her otherwise.

## darkness

In any case, she could not hide everything. On several occasions, after an insulin injection, and just before she had fully regained consciousness from the induced sleep, she gave leakage to her secret fear from the innermost of her heart, and muttered again and again: "There is darkness everywhere before me. So dark ... and dark." She would not say any more about it when she woke up.

Why was there darkness before her? Her counter-revolutionary crime had become known, and there was no escape from the law. For a counter-revolutionary and an enemy of the people, the future could not but be dark and bleak indeed.

After this "joint consultation" in Shanghai, before the spring festival in 1963, Lu Ting-i brought Yen Wei-ping back to Peking, allegedly to seek "treatment" on one hand and to continue with her counter-revolutionary activities on the other.

Toward the end of 1964, Lu Ting-i took Yen Wei-ping to the house of Chien Hsin-chung, to be "seen" specially by Chien's wife Shen Yu-tsun. There were many other doctors in Peking with greater expert knowledge on neurology than Shen who was merely a general practitioner. Lu called on Shen at Chien's house instead of the experts, ostensibly to seek "consultation" but actually to devise "covering up" of Yen's counter-revolutionary crimes. In 1965, he telephoned to Chien Hsin-chung repeatedly to seek Shen's advice. One may witness how closely they co-operated with one another.

### WORDS AND DEEDS ARE NOT CONSISTENT!

He who recalls the past remembers that she came when called and was a docile servant.

He who contemplates the present sees that she rejects a hundred summonses.

Satirical couplet about Chiang Ching, quoted on p.395 of "Mao's Great Revolution" by Robert Elegant. (The World Publishing Co., 1971).

Note: "he" and "she" are the same word in Chinese.

From Elegant



## FOSTERING FAVORABLE PUBLIC OPINION TOWARD HARBORING COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY

Counter-revolutionary revisionists Chien Hsin-chung, Huang Shu-tse and others also attempted to provide further cover to counter-revolutionary Yen Wei-ping by publishing articles concerning general knowledge on mental diseases in the Health News under their control. As early as 1965, Huang Shu-tse, through the influence of the Medical Service Bureau, arranged that three articles concerning general knowledge on mental diseases should be published in Health News, one of the articles being written by Su Tsung-hua, Director of Shanghai Mental Diseases Prevention and Treatment Institute and reactionary academic expert who had attended to Yen Wei-ping. Huang, who had hitherto cared little about newspapers, secured the three articles and sent them over to Health News. Meanwhile, head of the Medical Treatment Section of the Medical Service Bureau, Cheng Hsueh-wen, telephoned the editorial office of Health News to convey Huang's message like this: "Certain Central Government leaders are afflicted with such diseases. This will furnish them with some knowledge." The paper was also asked to send a few copies containing the articles to the central leaders. This was stark revelation of Chien Hsin-chung's and Huang Shu-tse's intentions to create public opinion in favour of Yen's feigned mental disease.

### PENG, LU, CHANG, CHIEN AND HUANG'S CONSPIRACY

In February 1966, just as Yen Wei-ping's counter-revolutionary case was about to be brought to light, Peng Chen and Lu Ting-i, intensely alarmed, instigated ex-deputy of the Central Propaganda Department Chang Tzu-i, Health Minister Chien Hsin-chung, and Health Vice Minister Huang Shu-tse to plan two more larger-scale counter-revolutionary sham joint consultations to re-establish Yen's case as a mental disease, in an attempt to fool the central authorities and cover up their counter-crimes. They perpetrated a series of counter-revolutionary activities before such a joint diagnosis.

On February 6, 1966, counter-revolutionary revisionist chief Peng Chen telephoned Chien Hsin-chung, asking him to arrange for Lu Ting-i's admission to Peking Hospital.

Peng: Do you know there's something wrong in his house?

Chien: Yes, a little . . .

Peng: You'd better let Lu Ting-i live in the hospital. Yen Wei-ping's raving bores him so.

Chien Hsin-chung at once notified the Medical Service Bureau. Before long, the Bureau informed Lu Ting-i: "You are required by Comrades Peng Chen and Chien Hsin-chung to enter hospital for a medical check-up." Thus, Lu entered the Peking Hospital on February 6, on the pretext of being pestered by his wife's noisy outbursts. There, he was actively engaged in intriguing activities and he planned sham joint consultations.

On February 7, Lu summoned Keng X-x to his bedroom and told him: "Yen Wei-ping wrote several letters to attack other people. Other people, misinterpreting her intentions, might suspect a political problem in her. Is it possible that she is capable of such misbehaviour at the last stage of her ailment? Please do something for her by way of medical treatment." Keng X-x quickly made a report of Lu's words to the authorities concerned in the Health Ministry.

On February 8, Lu Ting-i left the hospital and went to Wuhan to work with Peng Chen on the counter-revolutionary February Outline Report. On February 13, he returned to Peking and re-entered the Peking Hospital to continue with his intriguing activities.

The same day, Lu telephoned to the ex-deputy of the Central Propaganda Department Chang Tzu-i, summoning him to the hospital. He told Chang that Yen Wei-ping had written unsigned letters abusing Lin Piao and his family and that this case was being taken up. He requested Chang to lend a helping hand. He said: "According to the doctor, Yen Wei-ping is suffering from an obsession and needs medical

## THIS CHINA

On January 21 the House of Lords debated juvenile crime. Said the Viscount Massereene and Ferrard:—

May I tell your Lordships something a friend of mine told me? He is somebody called Waddington who has just come back from China. . . . He went round some schools in China and was very impressed by the good discipline of the children. He said to one of the teachers

— "What happens if you happen to have a very unruly child?"

— "We send them back to their parents."

— "When they come back to the school and they are still unruly, what do you do?"

— "We then banish the parents to forced labour. We punish them."

Well, of course, I am not proposing that we should do that here.

But why not? Not only Maoists and Conservatives, but all concerned with good discipline, have something to learn here.

attention. Will you see what can be done?" He wanted Chang to have a talk with Yen, and suggested: "Perhaps, let her go somewhere for medical treatment; perhaps, to the rural village to take part in the 4-clean-up movement; or, perhaps, to her elder sister in Nanking."

Subsequently, Lu asked Chen X-x, head of the Neurology Department of Peking Hospital: "Is too much suspicion a psychic ailment? ... What kinds of mental disease may come from too much suspicion?" Chen told him something general about the question, which was made use of secretly by Lu to fabricate a patient's history.

### TWO MORE SHAM JOINT CONSULTATIONS, CONTINUED SHIELDING

Everything ready, Peng Chen personally telephoned Chien Hsin-chung, urging him to organise a "joint consultation" for Yen Wei-ping.

During Lu Ting-i's stay in Peking Hospital, Chien Hsin-chung regularly called to have secret talks with Lu. Chang Tzu-i was very active to co-ordinate in the planned sham joint consultation.

On February 18, Chien made his wife Shen Yu-tsun take part in the first counter-revolutionary joint consultation. Hiding behind the scenes, Chien asked Shih Shu-han to sponsor the show which was held at the Office of the Medical Treatment Section of the Health Ministry, instead of in a hospital. The "patient" was not present. The "symptoms" were described by Shen Yu-tsun and Keng X-x and were discussed among these six people present: Vice Minister of Health Shih Shu-han, Chien Hsin-chung's wife Shen Yu-tsun, Head of Health Ministry's Medical Treatment Section Cheng Hsueh-wen, Head of Doctors' Roster Office of Peking Hospital Li Po-wei, Dr Keng X-x who originally attended to Lu Ting-i, and Chen X-x, in charge of the Neurology Department of Peking Hospital.

Shih Shu-han announced at the start: "This joint consultation is to make an analytical survey on the basis of the symptoms without examining the patient any more. ... Let us determine the nature of her case according to her symptoms and decide what course of treatment should be given her." Shih was acting in compliance with the wishes of



the leading authorities of the Health Ministry. Was it not farcical to make such an analytical survey without examining the patient? That was no joint consultation at all, but a counter-revolutionary political intrigue.

Next, Keng X-x reported the fake symptoms as related by Lu Ting-i: "Yen Wei-ping is very suspicious, and often shows her temper at her servants at home ..." This account of the so-called "symptoms" was supplemented by Cheng Hsueh-wen and Li Po-wei too.

Deliberations followed the recounting of the so-called "symptoms", and centered around whether her suspiciousness was normal or "pathological". Then, Keng X-x revealed that she wrote counter-revolutionary unsigned letters, and raised the question: "Can Yen in a fit of her mental ailment write letters to abuse people?" Some doctors averred: "Such letters written in an emotional outburst would show no change in handwriting but certain sentences would be quite disorderly. The letters must be seen before any conclusion may be drawn about the writer's mentality being normal or pathological." For fear of betraying themselves, our lords in the Health Ministry dared not produce any of Yen's letters. When someone opined that there were insufficient materials to form any conclusion, Shih Shu-han offered this excuse: "Many parts of the patient's history are also inexplicable to us, but these are all the materials we have." He urged everybody to think of a solution. So, the diagnosis was "obsession". Was this not a mere consultation in name but a counter-revolutionary cover in fact?

As soon as this was over, Shih Shu-han and Li Po-wei made a joint report to Lu Ting-i. The next day, Chang Tzu-i called on Shih Shu-han and asked: "What hospital should she go to?" Shih said: "Let her go to the Hsiang-shan Sanatorium." Then Lu Ting-i telephoned to Shih from Peking Hospital and wanted Shih and Chang Tzu-i to call on him. When Shih arrived, Lu heard his report and said: "I gather from an expert in Shanghai that there is a new therapy with the use of an insulin injection to cause a shock and then loss of memory about the past." Shih said: "We'll see about that."

On February 20, Lu Ting-i wanted Shih Shu-han to accompany him in a visit to Peng Chen, to make a report. Subsequently, bowing with clasped hands, Lu Ting-i said to Peng Chen: "You and your wife are now the only ones I can look to for help in Yen Wei-ping's case." What sort of a case could this mean? Of course, the counter-revolutionary crime! Peng had long since been aware of it all, having in his possession photocopies of Yen Wei-ping's unsigned counter-revolutionary letters. And, what sort of help? To harbor her, of course, and to cover up their own counter-revolutionary crimes. Afterwards, Peng Chen took Lu to another room where they had a secret talk together for over 10 minutes.

After their secret arrangement, Chien Hsin-chung also specially saw that the Medical Treatment Section invited Shanghai Mental Diseases Prevention and Treatment Institute Director and reactionary academic expert Su Tsung-hua to come to Peking by air for another "joint consultation" about Yen's case. One cadre in the Medical Treatment Section thought the invitation was not in conformity with procedural practice and such air passage could hardly be debited to a proper account. Shih Shu-han said: "We have been asked to handle this joint consultation by Peng Chen, Lu Ting-i, Chang Tzu-i and Chien Hsin-chung. They are such VIPs that we cannot but try to accommodate them." In the end, the Medical Treatment Section notified the Shanghai East China Hospital that they should book air passage for Su Tsung-hua and let him rush to Peking.

On February 22 and 23, after Su Tsung-hua came, another counter-revolutionary joint consultation was held. Su became the new-comer in addition to the original six in the first joint consultation. After the meeting had begun for half an hour, Huang Shu-tse also joined in after having just got off from a plane. The "patient" was still absent from the "joint consultation". The discussion centered around diagnosis, treatment and feasibility of letting Yen Wei-ping take part in the 4-clean-up drive.

Su Tsung-hua gave an account of his "treatment" of Yen in Shanghai in 1963. Immediately, Shen Yu-tsun asked: "Would it be advisable for her to take part in the 4-clean

up drive in the rural area?" How could anyone suffering from any real mental disease be allowed to take part in the 4-clean up campaign? Did the proposition itself not bespeak their blatancy in harboring counter-revolution? Huang Shu-tse asked "What should be done if she would not go?" Shih Shu-han suggested: "If she would not go to the 4-clean-up drive, how about letting her convalesce in a sanatorium?" Huang Shu-tse raised the query: "What is to be done if she would not go to a sanatorium?" Su Tsung-hua opined: "Some pressure might be applied, if necessary." With this, Shen Yu-tsun concurred immediately.

From Li Po-wei's "Record of the Joint Consultation", there was actually someone touching on the question of post-recovery habilitation this way: "If the patient is not well rehabilitated, it might not only hinder full recovery but also induce far worse developments in the way of more frequent relapses, greater vindictiveness, vengeful eagerness to make others die with her or to commit suicide. ..." How these people had found "legitimate" medical grounds to justify their harboring of counter-revolutionary element Yen Wei-ping.

See what a criminal "joint consultation" farce has been staged before our eyes under the skilful direction of these lordly gentlemen Chien Hsin-chung, Huang Shu-tse and Shih Shu-han! All the ideas of Lu Ting-i were realised through the planning of Chien Hsin-chung, Huang Shu-tse and Shih Shu-han, with the active assistance of Shen Yu-tsun.



#### INSANITY SCHEME FRUSTRATED, COUNTER-REVOLUTION EXPOSED

After two counter-revolutionary joint consultations with diagnosis and prescribed treatment, they embarked on another series of criminal activities. However, the presence of insanity of counter-revolutionary Yen Wei-ping was eventually unveiled and the crimes of Peng, Lu, Chien and Huang in harboring a counter-revolutionary were brought to light.

After the two counter-revolutionary joint consultations, Shih Shu-han made a report to Chien Hsin-chung who expressed approval of the treatment plan. Chien also agreed to Shih's idea of reporting to Chang Tzu-i.

On February 23, Shih Shu-han took Cheng Hsueh-wen and Li Po-wei along to report to Chang Tzu-i.

Soon afterwards, Chang Tzu-i called on Shih Shu-han to discuss the problem of Yen Wei-ping going to the Hsiang-shan Sanatorium.



Next, Shih Shu-han, Chi Su-hua and Shen Yu-tsun drove to the Peking Hospital's Attached Mental Hospital together to arrange a place for Yen's "compulsory medical treatment".

Everything ready, counter-revolutionary revisionist Lu Ting-i sent for Chang Tzu-i to the Peking Hospital on March 4, and told him: "To get away from my wife's noisy outbursts, I am leaving Peking." He had made Chang Tzu-i and Chien Hsin-chung meddle with the sham joint consultations and decide on her joining the 4-clean-up drive or entering a sanatorium, so as to evade his legal responsibility. Now, he ran away from it all. On March 7, Chang Tzu-i visited Yen Wei-ping and offered her the two choices, both of which were rejected by Yen.

On the evening of March 11, Peng Chen telephoned Chang Tzu-i and asked him to call with Hsu Li-chun. At his house, Peng Chen showed them photostats of Yen Wei-ping's unsigned counter-revolutionary letters, saying "Just to let you have a look." This fact shows that Peng had long since been aware of the matter and had systematically conspired with Chang Tzu-i, Chien Hsin-chung and Huang Shu-tse to cover up a counter-revolutionary's criminal activities. As a matter of fact, Yen's counter-revolutionary case formed a component part of the criminal activity of Peng, Lu, Lo and Yang's counter-revolutionary bloc. Why should Peng Chen personally direct Chien Hsin-chung and Huang Shu-tse to organise the counter-revolutionary joint consultations? The display of the photostats should provide an apt explanation of their long premeditation.

In early April, while Lu Ting-i was in Nanchang, counter-revolutionary Yen Wei-ping, who had secretly opened a top-secret document of the Central [i.e. the Central Committee], learnt of the cropping up of Peng Chen's problem. She lost no time in ringing to Lu Ting-i over the long-distance telephone for more than 10 times in the evening. Lu Ting-i deliberately refused to answer the phone, until after he had had a telephone communication with Peng Chen. If Yen had suffered from any mental disease, it must have been a counter-revolutionary one indeed. She was in her perfect senses and had managed to steal a look at a secret document of the Central Committee. Her burning anxiety after learning of the exposure of Peng Chen could not but display her strong counter-revolutionary vigilance.

On April 28, it was decided by the Central Committee to have counter-revolutionary Yen Wei-ping arrested. On April 29, in accordance with Comrade Hsieh Fu-chih's directive [i.e. Minister of Public Security], Vice Minister of Public Security Yang Chi-ching notified Lu Ting-i to this effect: "Yen Wei-ping is an anti-Party counter-revolutionary and it has been decided by the Central to have her arrested." Lu Ting-i became panic-stricken, saying protestingly: "How would it be?" On May 8, at the Central Working Conference, the problem of counter-revolutionary revisionist Lu Ting-i was brought to light.

#### FABRICATING REPORT, ALTERING RECORD, DESTROYING EVIDENCE

After Yen Wei-ping's arrest, counter-revolutionary revisionist and arch-renegade An Tzu-wen sent for Huang Shu-tse and Cheng X-x to his house. He told Huang of Yen's arrest due to unveiling of her counter-revolutionary crime, and wanted Huang to submit a fabricated report to the Central for continued shielding of Yen.

On May 15, in compliance with An Tzu-wen's black directive, Chien Hsin-chung, Huang Shu-tse and Shih Shu-han made a fabricated report to the Central Committee, asserting: "The diagnosis of the joint consultation was obsession which had stemmed from the patient's hysterical character and had verged on mental disease." That was aimed at continued deception of the Party centre and at exoneration of Yen.

Before submitting this fabricated report, Huang Shu-tse called for the handing over of records concerning the joint consultations by Peking Hospital Doctors Roster Office chief Li Po-wei to the Health Ministry. Li had these turned over to Fan Kun-hsien (Shih Shu-han's wife who happened to work in Peking Hospital also) through the matron of the Office. When Shih Shu-han got these from Fan, he immediately forwarded them to Chien Hsin-chung and

Huang Shu-tse. We can thus see the close connivances of Chien, Huang and Shih in trying to cover up Yen's counter-revolutionary case.

After Yen's arrest, Lu Ting-i sent someone to the Peking Hospital on May 14 to ask for a certifying document from the hospital, for continued deception of the Party centre. At this time, Huang Shu-tse and Shih Shu-han, who had become aware of their precarious situation, dared not formally establish Yen Wei-ping's case as "mental disease" any more, but employed the new term, "Disease of Neurobiological Functions" (a kind of mental ailment). The document read *Diagnosed after several check-ups as impairing of neurological functions (rather serious). Inflammation around left shoulder joint, slightly swollen before menses in the past. Constipation from time to time.*

To cover up the crime of harboring counter-revolution, under the instigation of the Health Ministry's lords, the Peking Hospital Doctors Roster Office personnel concerned with the joint consultations dared to alter the patient's history and the joint consultations records. The former has been rewritten, without bearing any reference to any of the counter-revolutionary joint consultations. As to the latter, records of the two counter-revolutionary joint consultations dated February 18 and February 22 and 23 were also rewritten and show no more traces of Shih Shu-han and Huang Shu-tse's utterances and other important details, with intent to obliterate all incriminating evidences.

Last July, the Premier criticised the Health Ministry and called for the submission of a Ministerial report to the Party centre. Chien Hsin-chung, Huang Shu-tse and Shih Shu-han became panic-stricken. The report was eventually written by Shih Shu-han and Cheng Hsueh-wen and forwarded to the Premier.

One day in late August, Shih Shu-han called at Peking Hospital and enquired from Dr Chen X-x what obsession was, looking very tense and sad. On August 25, around noon, he took some sleeping pills. Less than a half hour later, Huang Shu-tse called and found him asleep (Shih's wife was not at home then). Some time after 1pm, Huang called again and learnt that Shih had taken sleeping pills. Instead of sending Shih to hospital, he telephoned to the Peking Hospital for some medical personnel to come over to administer "emergency treatment". When Mrs Shih returned home after 3pm, Huang had not yet sent Shih to the hospital. After the emergency treatment had failed and there had been a delay of 23 hours, Huang ordered that Shih be sent to the Peking Hospital on the afternoon of the 26th. Shih passed away on the morning of the 27th after more than 10 hours of efforts to save his life in hospital. Afterwards, Huang Shu-tse declared: "It was Shih Shu-han that handled the joint consultation about Yen Wei-ping's case, and we are not very clear what they were about." He was trying to shift the entire burden of the crime to a dead man and free the rest from blame.

Abundant materials have pointed to one thing. In the counter-revolutionary sham joint consultations to shelter counter-revolutionary Yen Wei-ping, Chien Hsin-chung, Huang Shu-tse and Shih Shu-han and acted in close coordination and collaboration in strict accordance with the shady directives of their masters Peng and Lu Ting-i. Their monstrous crimes against the people must be thoroughly accounted for.

*By the Red Commune, China Medical College, Red Guards Congress*

*Yenan Commune, Health News*

*Red Rebel Corps, Health Ministry's Organisations*

*Yenan Fighting Brigade, Health Ministry's Organisations*

May 8, 1967.



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
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We hope that the publication in Britain of *The Enslavement of the Working Class in China* will weaken illusions about the Mao regime held by people working for a better society. This is important for at least three reasons.

First, it is the only help we can at present offer our fellow workers in China in their difficult struggle against ruthless bureaucratic power.

Second, people need to forget escapist dreams about non-existent paradises in far-off countries. The only sound starting-point of revolution is our own situations and problems.

Third, we want to make clear what we mean by 'socialism' and what we don't mean. We don't mean atom bombs and Concordes while prisoners still hack roads through the mountains by hand. We don't mean Party thought control and indoctrination. Chairman Mao is not a red red sun in *our* hearts.