CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE MODEL WEST GERMANY

Nr.2: Computerized Surveillance

Foreword

State repression in West Germany in the last six years has taken on a new dimension. Police attacks on demonstrators; increased armament for the police force; police raids on flats, houses, bookshops; observation of organizations and individuals by the secret police; employment problems for the left oriented; all these things are neither in West Germany new nor in other capitalist countries new. What is new is the use of technology, computers and a wide spread computerized network in order to destroy and prevent opposition from the left systematically and more effectively.

The introduction of such methods of political repression in West Germany have a model character. For this reason, those of us working in the Campaign against the model West Germany feel it is important to inform others about the form of repression in West Germany in order to support comrades in other countries in the early recognition of and in the fighting against such repressive measures. At the same time, we want to contribute, with the information in our articles, to a wide mobilization against these developments in West Germany.

CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE MODEL WEST GERMANY

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WEST GERMANY

Introduction of the Computer

Repressive politics aimed at isolating and thus weakening the"public enemy" must be based on access to information in order to prepare for effective use of a series of weapons varying in degree of severity against selected targets. The destruction of a protest movement is not usually a military problem but a political one; the citizens who have been "led astr   have to be separated from the radicals, the extremists, the terrorists. If you want to carry out a wave of arrests, you have to know who you want to arrest and where to find her or him etc. Secret service work was always a part of repressive politics.

In the past few years, we in West Germany have witnessed an enormous expansion of the state surveillance apparatus. This expansion is to serve two purposes: firstly, to close the information gaps in the records about the known "public enemies" thus providing a complete picture concerning these individuals (and complete in the minds of the police is complete); and secondly, to supply the surveillance apparatus with data about the entire population.

Such a development would have been impossible with the outdated methods of the past years. The old catalogue system requires much too much work and personnel; it is also much too complicated to provide quick, comprehensive answers. Besides that, it is practically impossible to combine several information systems in one such catalogue system. By introducing electronic systems for compiling data and establishing a centralized computer with a network of inquiry terminals, this technical gap was bridged. The establishment of this communication and information network, the so called INPOL, began in 1971/72. All data concerning robberies, kidnappings, black mail, fraud, offences involving explosives, personal data about wanted individuals, the licence numbers of stolen cars, the production numbers of stolen weapons, the registration numbers of stolen or lost passports and identity cards are fed into this computer system. Criminal offences and criminal offenders are filed automatically into a computerized catalogue. Reports about particular cases, analyses of old or new cases, behaviour typical of "criminals" in certain situations etc. can be produced on a moment's notice with the use of programmed code words.

While INPOL is used mainly for "usual" criminal investigation, the NADIS-system from the Federal Investigation Department (Verfassungsschutz) was developed exclusively to serve the purpose of political repression. However, much of the information stored in the NADIS-system appears again in the official computer register of the criminal police. There is a special computer programm for those of the radical left who are suspected of sympathizing with guerillas. These individuals are registered under the catagory "wanted" and thus appear in all data given out by the computer in answer to inquires under this code word.

Computerized Stacks of Information

The initiative for the establishment of computerized surveillance came from a special committee in the Home affairs Dept. in 1971, which had come to the conclusion that a comprehensive evaluation of the information about individual citizens was no longer possible. Distribution of the approx. 40 filing cards containing data about the individual citizen provided the citizen with a certain amount of protection. Centralization and evaluation

of this information is the aim of the new surveillance system. By introducing a registration number for every citizen, the extent of surveillance that is usual concerning the leftists, can be easily expanded to incorporate the whole population.

So the citizen becomes a bundel of data. Information about his illnesses, his reading habits, his travelling habits, his relatives, his friends, his education, his criminal offences, his traffic offences, his debts, his loans, his bank accounts, his income, his house, his land, his insurance, whether he receives welfare or unemployment or not, his military service, his political views, whether he votes or not, his psycological profile etc.

With every traffic control in Berlin, not only the driver of the car but also the passengers are registered. This was introduced a year ago. In order to register this information systematically, special forms were developed for this purpose. With this form, the names of all car occupants, their birthdates, their identity card registration numbers among other things are recorded. This data is evaluated by the computer of the criminal police in Berlin and is then passed on to the INPOL-computer for further evaluation. A similar form exists for use at the boarder and in airports. Even when the data in the Berlin computer is negated, this same information remains in the INPOL-system. A special branch in Wiesbaden stores the names of those who make inquires about other individuals, not only their names are stored, but also the names of those for whom the inquiry was about, the date of the inquiry and the reason for the inquiry are recorded. This is supposed to eliminate misuse of the computer system. All data once registered, is and remains open for inquires.

Control Area

Licence Number

Registration Nr.

Make:
- ☐ VW
- ☐ BMW
- ☐ D.B.
- ☐ Opel
- ☐ Ford
- ☐ Renault
- ☐ Fiat
- ☒ Other

Type:
- ☐ Truck
- ☐ Passenger
- ☐ Station Wagon
- ☐ Motorcycle

Colour:
- ☐ yellow
- ☐ red
- ☐ blue
- ☐ white
- ☐ green
- ☐ brown
- ☐ mauve
- ☐ grey
- ☐ black
- ☐ orange
- ☐ two tone
- ☒ other

Occupants: Name   Birthdate   Registration Nr.

△ X beside name of owner   • Note on reverse side!   b=provisionary identity ca
B=identity card
P=passport • country

Copies of documents from all investigations carried out by criminal departments all over West Germany are collected and fed into the computer system in Wiesbaden - on the average, 3000 entries per day. As of March, 1976 the Federal Criminal Department (BKA) had the following at its disposal: 2.1 million criminal files, 3.3 million filing cards, 3.5 million photographs, 2.8 million finger-prints and the names of 2.8 million persons.

Since 1971, Horst Herold (SPD) has been president of the BKA. Herold became known as the T.V. announcer for the wanted persons during the search for members of the Baader-Meinhof group in 1972. He is considered to be the brains behind the technical side, the computer side of the BKA. In the computer system in Wiesbaden, there are two computers (type 4004/150) from the Siemens company.

Estimations over the quantity of information stored in the computer system vary from source to source. In June, 1975 160,000 persons and 100,000 cars were estimated to be registered there. In September, 1975, it was approx. 200,000 persons and 100,000 cars. A newspaper article from September, 1975, calculated that 150 arrests were being made daily through the computer. In March, 1976, information about 240,000 offenders, 380,000 lost articles including 92,000 cars, could be had, with an additional reference list, from the computer. In October, 1976, 200,000 persons, 110,000 cars, 25,000 lost identity cards, 25,000 production numers from stolen weapons and 2.8 million finger-prints were registered.

The INPOL-computer, which has been in full operation since September 1975, replaces an older data bank from the year 1972. The success of the old data bank can be seen from the number of arrests made at the German boarders: 1973 - 11,750 arrests; 1974 - 14,000 arrests; 1975 - 19,000 arrests. With the INPOL-system, 52,000 arrests were made in 1975.

The INPOL-system is openly praised by goverment officials. Werner Maihofer, Minister for Home Affairs, states in a leaflet that came out during the last election campaign: "We have built up the Federal Criminal Department to a powerful center for fighting crime - with the most modern technology, almost three times the personnel today as in 1969 - the beginning of the social-liberal coalition - and with a budget six times as high." In the same leaflet, it is proudly reported: "42% more success in the search for wanted people at the boarders since the introduction of the computer system." The following official figures summarize the budget alloted to the various sections of the West German surveillance network:

	1969 (in million German marks)	1975	Increase
Federal Criminal Department (BKA)	22.4	136.8	510.8%
Federal Investigation Dept. (Verfassungsschutz)	29.9	76.9	157.2%
Boarder Control (Bundesgrenzschutz)	314.4	758.3	141.3%
Police forces in all states	18.0	33.6	86.7%

Note: $1 = 2.30 German marks

Over 900 million German marks - approx. 400 million dollars - for "inner security"!

The INPOL-computer system will become fully operational when
all states are connected up to the network of the central computer.
Most of the states were incorporated by the end of 1976. Officials
reckoned that the number of "conspicious" citizens registered by
1976 would increase to over 500,000. "Conspicious citizens"? - all
those who have come in contact with the police whether through
traffic controls, alcohol controls, fights in pubs, or at demonstra
tions.

The Computer Network

Optimal efficiency of the INPOL-system can be attained when
the system not only stores masses of information, but when a net-
work of numerous data terminals (for inquiries and for collecting
information) have also been established. Such terminals exist
presently in the police stations of all larger cities, at all
boarder crossings and at all airports. As of June, 1975, there
were 550 permenantly installed instruments for reading computer
information. As of March, 1976, 750 computer buses had been built -
transportable terminals. By 1980, a total of 9000 data terminals
are planned. Even some police cars are already equipped with small
computers. The Federal Research Department commissioned a research
project for developing a system for searching for wanted individuals
involving a transportable computer that every policeman can carry
in his pocket. This project is to be completed by the end of the
1970's. Consequently, every policeman will be able to ask his
computer for all the names, dates and correlations that he will.
Data terminals are also installed in helicopters, which have been
used more and more in the past few years against demonstrators
and in extensive search actions.

All reports that can be had over INPOL can be printed on a
small additional instrument that can be plugged into the miniature,
portable computer. The "normal" terminals already have these
monitors. This additional instrument probably works on the same
principle as telecommunications. A teletypewriter can be connected
to every telephone and will print all conversations. The teletype-
writer can print 6.8 letters per second. The customary teletype-
writer can print 20 lines in ree minutes; the newer types can
print 5 pages in the same time. Such a machine costs between 4 and
11,000 German marks. They have, however, two large disadvantages:
there is no internationally standardized model and there is no way
of controlling if information fed into the machine actually comes
out as printed matter at the other end.

And how will these computer cars and data terminals be used?
In police raids, search actions and for observation. The electronic
equipment for these cars costs about 12,000 German marks.

All this constly equipment is being purchased, this extensive
apparatus is being built up, to fight "terrorists", as it is called
in official circles. But what is really being established is an
uncontrollable instrument of surveillance. The computerized search
is directed against all individuals.

Computer Surveillance Indicates the Actual Level of Police War Tactics

The use of electronic systems for the surveillance and invest-
igation of the left, with a trend to expand this practice to include
the entire population, brings definite advantages for those who are
governing:
1. it is a fast and thorough system; for instance, inquiries
   about stolen cars can be answered within 7 seconds.
2. it is easy to keep up-to-date

3. it is possible to extend the system to other countries
by building up similar systems on the same technical basis
(Siemens computer)

4. diffusely distributed information is centralized and can
thus be evaluated.

5. it is an unnoticeable, inconspicuous method of repressive
politics.

This last aspect is worthnoting. The intelligence work of
the police, the collecting of information, the registering of our
personal data in the police computer indicate the actual level of
police war tactics and of their power against the poeple. It is a
silent, stealthy civil war tactic, that we first notice when it is
already too late. For instance, Dr. Klaus Traube first heard of
the investigations carried out about his personal activities through
a magazine, the Spiegel, which got hold of the secrete files concern-
ing this case. The measures against Traube, an atomic scientist,
began in July, 1975 with observation of his house, his friends etc.
and went as far as the installation of a "bug" behind his desk in
his private home. If the police force of the Weimar Republic had
had access to such a surveillance system, the communist and socialist
resistance against the take over by the fascists in the early 1930 s
would have been even harder and more effectively destroyed than it
was. More important is that this electronic, computerized system
has made a spy network superfluous to a large extent; the replacing
of persons with technical apparatus makes the resistance against
such a system very difficult.

Another interesting aspect concerning computerized personal
data: this information can be passed on to a third party (eg. private
firms, finance companies, welfare departments etc.). The way is
already paved for this step. The laws of Lower Saxony allow for the
passing on of such information "so long as this is necessary to
protect the free democratic basic order, the existence and the
security of the nation or one of its states" (paragraph 6). The
Traube case is proof that such is already the practice at a national
level, although the legislation necessary to legalize such actions
is lacking: in 1976, Traube was fired from the AEG Company where
he had been employed in atomic research since 1959, lastly as chief
administrator for the Fast Reactor project; as was uncovered by the
Spiegel, Traube was fired, because the Federal Investigation Depart-
ment had passed on information about him to the AEG Company manage-
ment.

That the state penetrates into the domain of industry, in this
case, atomic industry, and industry in turn penetrates into the
domain of the state in order to realize their common interests is
only one example of the incorporation of whole sectors of society
into the state apparatus; such measures are usually accompanied
by manipulated reports from the press and other mass media. For
example, there was only one critical article in the more liberal
newspaper, the Frankfurter Rundschau, concerning the implications
of handing over information from the Federal Investigation Depart-
ment to a third party as is allowed in the laws of Lower Saxony.