

RESISTER and COSAWR (U.K.)

RESISTER is written and produced by the COMMITTEE ON SOUTH AFRICAN WAR RESISTANCE (COSAWR) in the UK, and contributions are received from COSAWR in the Netherlands. It is aimed primarily at those South Africans who are in exile as a result of their resistance to the South African military. It is also produced for the many people and organisations in Britain and throughout the world who are participating in the international campaign against apartheid.

COSAWR-UK was formed in December 1978, and consists of South African war resisters who have been active in many spheres of anti-apartheid solidarity work. It has the following aims and functions:

... Providing assistance to military refugees from South Africa in the form of advice regarding residence in Britain, employment, housing, education, etc.

... Involving SA war resisters in discussion groups, seminars and public meetings on the South African situation, as well as in anti-apartheid work in Britain

... Raising the issue of the increasing militarism of the apartheid state and the resultant resistance to it, as well as campaigning for the implementation of the United Nations General Assembly resolution calling on member states to grant asylum and assistance to refugees from the South African military

... Research into South African militarism and war resistance

... Producing publications, like this bulletin, information booklets, campaign documents etc.

... Liaison with other organisations and groups in Britain and abroad on the issue of war resistance in South Africa.

COSAWR-Netherlands does similar work.

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
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RESISTER

Bulletin of the Committee on South African War Resistance

LONDON - Sept/Oct 1980 - No. 10 20p



Namibia:
S.A. UNDER PRESSURE

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MOLL: ARMY BACKS DOWN

After eight months in military prison, 125 days of which were spent in solitary confinement, Peter Moll has been recognised as a conscientious objector. Another jailed war resister, Richard Steele, was also granted the same status.

The decision to grant Moll and Steele such status was announced by the South African military in mid-August. It is the first time somebody other than a member of a church which specifically forbids any kind of military service has been accepted by the regime as a conscientious objector.

Previously, only members of small churches such as Jehovah's Witnesses and Seventh Day Adventists have been given conscientious objector status.

Adherents of these small sects who refuse to do military service are sentenced to detention barracks (usually for three years) but are treated very differently from other inmates. They wear blue overalls instead of military uniform and are exempted from any military-type duties such as drilling.


Furthermore, once their sentences have been served they are not called-up again to face more imprisonment for continual refusal.

In contrast to these, Peter Moll is a Baptist whose refusal to fight for apartheid stemmed from Christian opposition to the present South African political situation.

Thus he told the court which sentenced him last December that

he would not fight against SWAPO and the ANC to defend a fundamentally unjust system. As a result he was found to have 'gravely undermined the defence of South Africa and discipline in the Defence Force!.

In Voortrekkerhoogte Detention Barracks he was repeatedly sentenced to periods of solitary confinement for refusing to wear military overalls, a stand he took on the grounds of refusing to be identified in any way with the apartheid military.



Inside South Africa, many prominent churchpeople supported Moll's demand that he be treated as a conscientious objector like members of the smaller religious sects. Fasts and vigils were organised in several centres in solidarity with him and Richard Steele, who had taken a similar stand in detention barracks.

COVER: Part of the damage caused by another SWAPO attack on a SA base in Namibia

In Britain COSAWR launched a campaign in support of all South African war resisters and drew attention to Moll and Steele in particular. Leading figures, such as Labour MPs Tony Benn and Frank Allaun appealed to the South African authorities to release resisters, and wrote personal letters of support to Moll in prison.

and after a few days in solitary confinement get official recognition', a military spokesperson said.

Furthermore, anybody who refused military service on straightforward moral or political grounds (ie. not from a christian viewpoint) would be severely dealt with. The spokesperson

The SADF has recognised Peter Moll and Richard Steele as 'official conscientious objectors'.

The legal implications are:

- * They will be treated in the same way as Jehovah's Witnesses (and members of other peace sects) in Detention Barracks - i.e. they will no longer be required to wear military uniform or do drill.
- * They are still unlawful conscientious objectors and will have to finish their sentences.
- * No indication has been given that they will not again be charged should they refuse further military service.

* This does not mean that other objectors who are not members of the 'peace sects' will be accorded the same status. It may, however, set a precedent for the treatment of Baptist conscientious objectors.

* Other war resisters will still face recurrent imprisonment for refusing military service, and once imprisoned they will face repeated solitary confinement if they refuse to wear army clothes or do military drill.

The SADF backdown is thus limited to the specific cases of Moll and Steele (and possibly to those of future Baptist objectors). For the vast majority of South African war resisters the situation remains the same.

After months of persecuting the two war resisters, the South African authorities finally backed down. Moll and Steele's own principled refusal to identify in any way with the army, the public support they received inside the country, and international pressure, forced the government to defuse the whole issue by granting them conscientious objector status.

For the majority of war resisters, nothing has changed (see box). The military authorities were quick to explain that there had been no basic changes in the conscription system. Nobody can 'pose as a conscientious objector

described it in these terms: 'There is no such thing as political objection-- not in a democratic country such as ours is.'

The decision to grant Moll and Steele conscientious objector status and to stop sentencing them to solitary confinement was reported on the front page of the London Times. COSAWR(UK) issued a statement welcoming the development and calling on the international community to continue its support for all South African war resisters, and to demand the unconditional release of all those imprisoned for refusing to serve in the apartheid armed forces.

Malan gets his cabinet call-up

When Prime Minister PW Botha recently announced changes to his cabinet, the most significant being the appointment of Defence Force chief, General Magnus Malan, to the job of Minister of Defence, the moves were enthusiastically acclaimed by most of the media. Botha was at last gathering all his 'Verligte' supporters around him for the assault on Andries Treurnicht and his reactionary die-hards, so it was claimed.

If only Botha could get his way, the argument goes, South Africa would enter a new era of peaceful change with racial oppression a thing of the past. Certainly, the moves consolidate the position of Botha and the military at the centre of political power. Botha himself gave up the Defence portfolio, which he had held since becoming Prime Minister, to Gen. Malan, while Deputy Minister of Defence, Coetzee, became Minister of Justice and Prisons. Besides Malan, another non-elected person to move into government was Gerrit Viljoen, Chairman of the Afrikaner Broederbond and Administrator General of Namibia at the time: another Botha man and so-called 'liberal'.

The steady gains made by the Botha/military faction have taken place over a number of years, evidenced for example by the change in the nature and function of the State Security Council, set up in 1972 to advise the Cabinet. Dominated by the military, it is now the primary policy making organ of government. The election of PW Botha after the demise of Vorster, van den Bergh (of BOSS) and other


Afrikaner ideologues was a logical consequence of this power shift.

Another example of this trend is the appointment of General Webster to the President's Council, a recent constitutional gimmick. No area of any significance is to be left without the guiding hand of the military.

To interpret this as the triumph of 'enlightened liberalism' is ignorant day-dreaming. The kind of changes envisaged by the Botha-Malan regime are aimed at improving, not relaxing, political and economic control over the exploited majority. If concessions have to be made to do this, then they will be made, but the increasing militarisation of the country and the intransigent attitude of the regime over Namibia, leaves little doubt as to the overall strategy.

The consolidation of South Africa as a military state inevitably raises the possibility of the removal of what few 'democratic' structures still exist. An insight into the thinking of the generals was spelt out by General Dutton in 1978: '...the requirements for the application of total strategy would appear to favour a system of unified command, joint central planning... Conventional organisations in democratic systems do not as a rule lend themselves to these procedures. Therefore organisational changes would appear to be necessary.' The language of an enlightened, liberal proponent of change?

Profile of a career killer



Malan, Botha, and new SADF head C.L. Viljoen

Magnus Andre de Merindol Malan was born in 1930, the son of Prof. Avril Malan, an Afrikaner Nationalist MP and Speaker of the House of Assembly and chairman of the Afrikaner bank, Volkskas. To add to his family's claim to the true spirit of Afrikanerdom, his brother, also Avril, captained the Springbok rugby team.

Malan joined the South African Defence Force (SADF) as a cadet when 20 and graduated with a BSc (Military) from Pretoria University. As a captain, in 1960, he was in command of the unit defending the Houses of Parliament during the state of emergency following the Sharpeville massacre. Soon after this he was seconded to the French Army and sent to Algeria to experience the reality of guerrilla warfare for the first time. He learnt the trade of a colonial military force, and, at first hand, experienced its defeat at the hands of the FLN, the popular Algerian liberation forces.

In 1963 Malan was again posted overseas, this time to the Uni-

ted States where he spent a year studying at Fort Leavenworth in Kansas, the US Army Command and General Staff College. 1963 was the second year of active (although still limited) US military operations in Vietnam.

According to local observers, Malan is a keen student of the politico-military strategies of Israel and Taiwan, in particular, and other right-wing regimes. It is clear that in his role, not only as a soldier, but also as an ideologue he has been instrumental in the development of the so-called 'total strategy' concept - an SADF-coined euphemism for the fast increasing influence of the military within the South African state.

Malan's rise to power has been dramatic; Brigadier at 37, Major-General at 42, Lieutenant General and Chief of the Army at 43, then General and Chief of the SADF at 46, and Minister of Defence at 50. There is one rung left on the ladder, Prime Minister, or will this post be transformed into President of a Junta?

5,200 TO STAY AWAY

The South African Directorate of Military Intelligence has predicted that 5,200 conscripts will evade military service in 1980. This has been revealed by a 'defector' from the National Intelligence Service (formerly BOSS), who left South Africa during June, Ivan Himmelhoch.

Himmelhoch, who claims he agreed to act as an informer for BOSS in order to avoid his

military service, also revealed that a detailed study prepared by the NIS during April this year predicted that in a democratic election in Namibia, SWAPO would probably win 'as much as 83% of the vote'.

A figure of 5,200 conscription evaders reflects an over 60% increase in war resistance since 1978.


S.A. Resisters Campaign in Netherlands

In Holland COSAWR-N, the Dutch wing of the South African war resisters movement continues to campaign for a consistent and unambiguous treatment of war resisters seeking asylum in that country.

The Dutch government publicly committed itself to abide by the United Nations' resolution which urges all member states to grant asylum to SA war resisters - a commitment which carried extra weight because they had sponsored the resolution.

In practice, however, the Dutch government has acted contradictorily to its own resolution. Not one war resister has yet received full refugee status; several have waited months - in some cases more than a year - for replies to their asylum applications.

Matters came to a head at the be-



Mark Wolffe

ginning of the year when resister Mark Wolffe had his application refused and was faced with possible deportation.

The Minister of Justice ruled that Mark was not a genuine refugee and that he should be refused asylum on the grounds that he did not come directly to Holland but fled South Africa for Botswana.

Mark's case was very clear: when in South Africa he had taken a clear stand against service in the apartheid army. He pointed out in a letter to the military authorities that "In this country defence is not primarily against foreign invaders but against fellow countrymen who seek to change the political order....The battle (in SA) is essentially a civil war."


In April 1978 military police caught up with Mark and issued him with call-up papers and he was forced to flee South Africa.

While in South Africa his passport had been restricted by the authorities, and this left him no choice but to flee, not to Holland, his intended destination, but to Botswana. After being guaranteed a scholarship at Delft University, Mark was issued travel documents by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Gaborone to come to Holland. On arrival in Holland he made an application for asylum.

The Dutch government's threat to deport Mark would mean that the status of other war resisters-- indeed of all refugees in the

Netherlands-- would be threatened. COSAWR-N launched a campaign in support of his case, arguing that if he was deported to South Africa he would face all the penalties normally applicable to war resisters, as well as other penalties, as he has a long history as an anti-apartheid activist.

The campaigners circulated a pamphlet and an open letter of protest to the State Secretary of Justice, Mrs Haars, calling for a reversal of the decision - and for a policy consistent with the United Nations resolution. The letter was signed by over 150 organisations- among them Dutch church groupings, political parties, student and community organisations, Dutch soldiers' trade unions and so on.



The campaign attracted widespread support and culminated in a demonstration on the Dam in Amsterdam, near the monument commemorating the war dead of World War II. Attended by over 150 people, the meeting was addressed by a member of COSAWR, and Jan ter Laak, a prominent Catholic clergyman. The public responded well and there was good radio and newspaper publicity.

Despite the fact that some 600 letters were delivered to the State Secretary of Justice, there was no immediate response to COSAWR's demands.

Mark's study permit officially expired on 29 December. Although he has appealed against the decision of the Ministry to refuse him asylum, there is nothing in Dutch law to prevent

his immediate deportation. His position remains uncertain. The authorities are willing to extend his study permit, but this involves signing a document, stating that he will leave the country when his university course is completed. He has refused to do this. He thus has no legal footing in Holland.

While COSAWR's campaign has not resulted in a changed decision on Mark's case, it has had important effects. It has mobilised a large constituency around the issue of SA war resistance, as well as the larger question of the government's refugee policy. When finally confronted by a question from the Radical Party in the Dutch parliament on her policy towards SA war resisters the State Secretary for Justice, Mrs. Haars, replied that applications for asylum by war resisters were treated individually, and thoroughly tested against international regulations and yardsticks. She also admitted that few details of the punishment facing war resisters in SA were available to her, and she would attempt to make enquiries locally (i.e. in South Africa.)

COSAWR finds this a stunning admission. Five years after the first war resister requested asylum here, the ministry is only now bothering to find out whether war resisters face repression or not.

Meanwhile COSAWR-N has remained active on other fronts. COSAWR members continue to speak in schools, rallies and seminars. It has supported and provided background information for the national campaign here to impose a unilateral oil boycott against South Africa. COSAWR maintains good relations with anti-apartheid organisations and its most recent project has been the production of an exhibition on the Freedom Charter, as an aspect of the 25th anniversary of that historic document.

Namibia : S.Africa Prepares UDI Army

In August, the South African regime transferred all its Namibian-manned military units to the control of the newly-created South-West Africa Territory Force (SWATF). SWATF has been on the cards for a few years: When Geldenhuys (recently promoted to head of the SA Army) was sent to take over military operations in Namibia in 1977, one of his tasks was to set up a 'national multi-racial army' in preparation for South African controlled 'independence'. SWATF is clearly another manoeuvre by Pretoria to obstruct the implementation of free United Nations-controlled elections in Namibia, and to promote an 'internal government' under the tribalist Turnhalle Alliance (DTA).

The DTA 'Council of Ministers' supposedly controls SWATF. But the renaming of army units, setting up a SWATF command structure in Windhoek and the introduction of new uniforms cannot obscure the fact that Namibia is a country under the occupation of the South African Defence Force. In effect, the SWATF forces will continue to be militarily part of the SADF.

Control

The 'operational area' (which includes most of the North of Namibia) and Walvis Bay (one of the most militarily-intensive areas in Southern Africa) are still under the direct control of the SADF. The 'Officer Commanding SWA' - Maj. Gen. C J Lloyd, recently promoted from Natal Command where he was known to favour a 'control of hearts and minds' approach to guerrilla warfare- remains in overall command of SWATF and SADF forces in Namibia.

SWATF consists of six distinct components: a command structure in Windhoek; permanent force infantry units (which include the Bantustan 'tribal armies'); a part-time mainly white 'Citizen Force' mustered into a conventional motorised infantry brigade; a commando network with

26 localised units based around the country; a logistics and administrative component and a training wing. An 'air force' is apparently being developed out of an ex-SADF light air commando. Approximately 20,000 troops are involved, of which about half are black. (At least another 55,000 troops are in Namibia officially under SADF command.)

The formation of SWATF has gone hand-in-hand with much talk in Windhoek of introducing conscription for all Namibian males. This is desirable from Pretoria's point of view partly for political reasons and partly because of manpower shortages. It has its precedent in Smith's attempt to draft sections of the African population of Zimbabwe in the last months of his regime. The massive failure of that attempt, however, must weigh heavily on the minds of the DTA 'Council of Ministers' and it is unlikely that a full-scale draft will be imposed. After all, when the vast majority of the Namibian people support SWAPO, it hardly makes sense for the DTA to try and conscript them.

Pressure

It is quite likely, however, that the regime will attempt to increase black 'recruitment' along

traditional SADF lines: intimidation, pressure on the unemployed and slick advertising and rewards. Amongst the 'Coloured' population in the Cape for instance, it is known that unemployed people pulled in by the police for pass or other offences are offered the choice of prison or 'volunteering'

for the army. Similar tactics -- sometimes going as far as kidnapping (see article on false SWAPO guerrillas) -- are bound to be employed by the occupation forces in Namibia in an attempt to give SWATF some appearance of legitimacy and to entrench the Turnhalle-SADF power structure ●

Fake Guerrillas Defect to SWAPO

Three members of a group called 'Reconnaissance 5', which is a S.A. Defence Force group that operates in Namibia as a phoney SWAPO unit, recently defected to PLAN, SWAPO's military wing. We reprint below extracts from an interview that appeared in the May issue of the SWAPO Information Bulletin.



'SWAPO is the people'. Even the use of fake guerrillas by the SADF cannot change this.

Would you please tell us your name, where you were born and what you did before?

My name is Simeon Amushila, I was born in 1951 in the village of Otamazi in Ongandjera area. I went to school at Etilya'sa and completed Standard III in 1969. After that I worked as a migrant worker until 1976 with the Bantu Investment Corporation at Okakarara, then at Cohen Garage in Windhoek and lastly at Rio Tinto mine near Swakopmund. Afterwards I bought a truck which I used as a taxi between Windhoek and Ondangwa.

Could you tell us something about your political orientation and whether you had been politically active before?

I took out a SWAPO membership card while working at Rio Tinto in 1976 but even before that time I had been a SWAPO supporter. I attended many SWAPO public meetings especially when I was working in Windhoek.

How did you fall into the hands of racist South African Security Police?

I was hauled from my lorry early in the morning about 0200hrs in

Defectors (contd.)

September 1979. We had just arrived and parked in front of the Katutura compound when all of a sudden the whole area was sealed off by the police carrying out a 'mopping up' operation against 'terrorists, loafers and undesirable elements'. There were hundreds of us rounded up in this operation. In detention I was asked about my alleged connections with SWAPO guerrillas. When I failed to satisfy my interrogator I was beaten and subjected to long electric shocks until I became hopeless. I was profusely bleeding through nose and ears while I was constantly threatened with death. Later on I was put under medical treatment for about a month.

We are interested to know where, by whom and how you were trained.

At the beginning of December 1979 our group of about 25 were blindfolded and taken by air from Ondangwa to near Durban in South Africa. Here we found a group of about sixty whites, but only two of them called 'Major' and 'Corporal' were dealing with us. The 'Major' addressed us. He said that we were very lucky people to be alive because we were their

enemies and they could have killed us. They did not do it because they preferred to work together with us and believed that we had accepted this friendly offer.....

He continued that here we were as friends, eating the same nice food under the same roof, and the only thing he expected from us was co-operation. He said that if we needed a woman or a house, we should not hesitate to tell him. He was there to solve all our problems.....

He threatened that if we tried to run away or defect, we would be shot dead immediately. This was in short what the 'Major' told us in English through an interpreter.

We were mostly trained in how to use an AK47, a TT Pistol and a light machine gun. Emphasis was also placed on physical toughness. This intensive training lasted about three months.

Could you please tell us where you were based, what your salary was and how false guerrillas operate?

We were based at Ondangwa airport base, located on the eastern part of it. Starting wages were R60



A PLAN (Peoples Liberation Army of Namibia) unit on the move in north-east Namibia. The scale and success of PLAN operations is tying down over 70,000 troops in Namibia.

a month but they could be increased if one was well disciplined. In addition one could earn R300 for each dead SWAPO guerrilla and R700 for each SWAPO guerrilla captured alive.


We operated in units of fifteen men, twelve blacks and three dark-painted white men. Two whites were responsible for radios, while a third one was an RPG operator. Apart from the AKs and TTs, the unit was also armed with a 60mm mortar and a light machine gun. We used to leave the base dressed in South African army uniforms and armed accordingly. But arriving at the target areas we changed into SWAPO combat uniforms and took matching arms. Three of us would then pay a visit to a certain drinking place commonly known as Cuca-Shops, on the information that SWAPO guerrillas appeared there for a drink and talked to the people. The rest would be laying in an ambush nearby. If we met SWAPO guerrillas we would talk to them like comrades, offer them drinks etc., and try to trap them.

What happens if those dark-painted whites are detected by a civilian?

That is very dangerous because it would give away the secret. Therefore, such a civilian is detained and taken away to an undisclosed destination. In fact, such a person would definitely disappear from that village without a trace. Usually a helicopter is called to collect such people for 'safe-keeping' somewhere. Their ultimate fate is not known to me, but I would not like to be one of them.

Do you know anything about the trapping and murdering of civilians by fake guerrillas and the burning down of houses?

Certainly, that is the order of the day in the operational area. As you might know, the majority of the false guerrillas are



Members of PLAN operational unit on the border between Namibia and Angola.

UNITA members from Angola who have no sympathy with our people at all. When they are mistaken for SWAPO guerrillas and given food in a certain house, they would, in most cases, murder the people concerned and set the house on fire.....

What is the general feeling among false guerrillas who have been forced to serve the enemy?

Even the enemy admits that in the very end SWAPO will be victorious. I remember, for instance, one afternoon a certain Captian Droe told some of us that the United Nations would one day conduct elections in Namibia. He believes that SWAPO will win the elections but he works now against SWAPO simply because it is the order of his government and he needs the money. Of course most Namibians who are victims of this dirty game are extremely unhappy, but some do doubt whether SWAPO would understand and accept them. Anyway, it is up to SWAPO to help them to overcome their groundless fear●

"GENTLE" COMPULSION

Black conscription: will "coloureds" be the first?

In July this year the boycott of classes by 'coloured' students all over South Africa was called off, the campaign which is still continuing having spread to other black schools. By that stage it was clear that the more than three months of mobilising and organising, and the brutal attacks of the regime's 'riot' police, had forged a new unity between the militant students and the community, and between all sections of the oppressed people of South Africa. The regime's attempts to divide black resistance through constitutional sops to 'coloureds' and 'Indians' have also failed.

It is in this context that the likelihood of compulsory military service for 'coloureds' being introduced should be seen.

In 1977 the possibility of introducing conscription for 'coloureds' was raised by PW Botha, then Minister of Defence. His Chief of Staff Personnel estimated that it would take until 1982 before sufficient 'coloureds' could be attracted through voluntary recruitment, and trained as instructors to handle the large number of conscripts, about 20 000 per year.

On 27 September this year, ex-Deputy Minister of Defence, Coetzee, suggested that the 'spirit of volunteering' was not what it should be amongst the black community. He said a basis of conscription and otherwise 'gentle compulsion' might be used to broaden the base of the national service system. No mention was made of the 1982 deadline for 'coloured' conscription.

The regime attaches considerable importance to the propagandist value of using black troops in the war, to support the fiction that all South Africans are united against a common, external enemy. In addition, recruitment

of blacks into the SA Defence Force (SADF) is aimed at relieving some of the pressure on white troops in the escalating war in Namibia.

The SADF is intensifying its campaign to recruit 'coloureds' into its ranks and the number of 'coloureds' volunteering for

service has increased recently: 1 500 signed up for two years at the beginning of this year. (The period of service was increased from one to two years this year.) Unlike white conscripts, black volunteers have no further commitments after their two years national service, but as many as possible are encouraged to continue in the Permanent Force (PF): About 100 (25%) did so in 1977.

Most of the training of 'coloureds' is in the SA Cape Corps (C.C.), based at Elsiesrivier and Faure near Cape Town. There are three separate units, the 1 SA C.C. Battalion (Infantry), the SA C.C. Maintenance Unit (logistics) and the SA C.C. school. The latter trains recruits in various non-combatant, service roles such as chefs and drivers, most



"Life is a battle, and I'm sure that in the past few days you have gathered some experience to fight it."

—address to participants in a Youth Adventure Group camp run by the SA Defence Force



Black troops in a high profile propaganda role — "Coloureds" on duty at the opening of the SA parliament.

of whom are then seconded to white operational units. The SA Navy and Air Force also employ a number of 'coloureds'.

After basic training, the recruits receive further training at white bases, for example, one company of 1 SA C.C. Battalion has received full paratroop training and it is believed some serve in the Reconnaissance Commandos (the equivalent of the Selous Scouts). After training they are sent to Namibia where several hundreds have already served—since 1976 as combatants on patrols.

The proportion of troops in the 'operational area' in Namibia who are black is over 20%, which is much higher than their overall

COMPULSION (ctd)

strength in the SADF. In this way they are used as apartheid's cannon fodder. Although not all SADF casualties are reported, in 1978, for example, the deaths of three 'coloureds' from the same town were announced, and another in 1979.

Recruitment into the SA C.C. has not kept pace with that required to meet the 1982 target for conscription. In an attempt to overcome reluctance amongst potential recruits, PW Botha announced in 1978 that a system of cadet training would be introduced in 'coloured' schools the following year. This was presumably intended to instill 'patriotic feelings' into the children and to popularise the military. The reaction from the community was hostile. The Cape Teachers' Professional Association rejected the idea completely, declaring it a 'ploy to divide and rule blacks who were moving towards greater unity'. The NEC of the ('Coloured') Labour Party was adamant, adding that it could not recommend military service or cadet training until all South Africans enjoyed full citizenship rights.

Trying a different tack, the SADF has begun running annual

Youth Adventure Camps for 'coloured' and other school children, introducing them to the 'adventure' of the army. As part of this propaganda onslaught the C.C. Military Band performs at numerous civic functions, and the Corps was given the 'Freedom of Cape Town' a few years ago.

At the same time there is evidence which suggests that the SADF has begun to enforce a form of 'economic draft', where unemployed youths are press-ganged into service by reducing other employment opportunities and improving SADF pay (it is already equal to that of whites). In addition, it is believed that youths picked up for 'petty' offences are given the option of prison or military service.

All these methods, however, are unlikely to raise the level of recruitment up to even 5 000 a year, increasing the pressure to introduce conscription. But the effect of conscription on a generation radicalised by prolonged confrontation with armed police and soldiers would be likely to lead to massive resistance at a time when the regime is attempting to politically neutralise the 'coloured' community and divide black resistance. ●

As previously reported in Resister (Nos. 4 & 7), thousands of white-owned farms along South Africa's northern borders are standing deserted. The apartheid government's attempts to re-establish a white presence to operate as an early-warning system against guerrilla incursions has proved a failure. In the Transvaal, 4,000 farms have been vacated by white farmers over the past few years. The government budgeted R14,6 million this year for grants to encourage white farmers into the area. In the first nine months of the year, only 28 new farmers have been drawn in. ●

4000

FARMS

DESERTED

Namibian 'Scouts'

As previously reported (see Resisters 8 and 9) the numbers of ex-Rhodesian Forces officers and troops moving down to South Africa has persistently grown. The South Africans have been making considerable efforts to recruit these people into the South African Defence Force (SADF), using amongst other things, cash hand-outs (£1600 signing on bonus for Privates) as inducements.

The specialist units such as the Selous Scouts and the Special Air Service, infamous in Zimbabwe for their savagery, immediately disbanded by the Mugabe government, were snapped up by the SADF. Recently virtually the whole of the Rhodesian Light Infantry Regiment has moved south to form part of the SADF.

Not unexpectedly, combatant units composed of these forces are be-

ing moved to the principal theatre of war in Southern Africa at the moment, Namibia. There have been reports of the brutal Selous Scouts posing as SWAPO guerrillas and bringing the 'benefit' of their 'refined military methods' to the SADF.

Also in South Africa are 2,600 former black auxiliaries previously under the nominal command of Bishop Muzorewa, who were training in South Africa when Mugabe won the election. These troops now form the basis of preparations for a South African trained, led and supplied force of 'dissident' Zimbabweans who will soon begin to play a role similar to that of the Mozambiquan National Resistance Movement, a South African front organisation that is attempting at present to subvert and create chaos in Mozambiquan society.

SPANISH SOLDIERS

Four Spanish soldiers have recently been given prison sentences for distributing pamphlets from UDS, the illegal Spanish soldiers' union. One of the men was sentenced to 2½ years while the others got six months. The sentences have caused an outcry because, since Franco, punishment for union activities in the barracks has never exceeded 18 months.

The pamphlets were distributed in December 1977, in protest at the decision of one of the country's provincial military commanders to grant Christmas leave to only 15% of soldiers. The men were arrested soon afterwards, following extensive searches, but were only brought to trial this year. During this period the Spanish parliament introduced a new military code.



The UDS has called upon soldiers to protest at the sentences, which were handed down by the military court in Jerez, by inundating their barracks with thousands of pamphlets. Opposition political parties in Spain have joined the protest, as have the mayors of several local towns. The campaign to annul the judgement of Jerez has been taken up by the French soldiers' organisation, Information for the Rights of the Soldier (IDS), and the Dutch Soldiers' Union, the VVDM.

SIMONSTOWN 'For Sale'

'To let: Harbour for West to meet Soviet challenge'. So ran the headlines of a prominent article in the London Sunday Times during September. Earlier in the same week, BBC TV news carried a lengthy feature along almost identical lines. Simonstown, the SA Navy's major base, is back in the news.

For years South Africa argued that Simonstown was a crucial factor in the defence of western global interests. While the NATO generals have always agreed with this argument, western political administrations have been forced in the last five years to play shy. Today, however, with a rampant cold war psychosis being stirred up in Washington, London and Bonn, Simonstown has once again become a key issue on the political map.

Historically, Simonstown is symbolic of the original formation of the SA Defence Force as an outgrowth of the British colonial forces. The navy is a case in point. Until 1946 South Africa's naval defences were controlled by the Royal Navy. In 1955, on the road to establishing an independent military force, the South African regime entered into the Simonstown agreement with Britain.

While primarily concerned with naval collaboration, allowing for a permanent British military contingent in Cape Town and access to all South African ports and joint naval exercises, the Simonstown agreement provided a formalised structure for western military collaboration with South Africa on all levels.

As a result of international political pressure against military collaboration with the apartheid government, the British Labour government was forced to terminate the agreement in 1975. NATO's military commanders were not impressed, but, publicly at least, their hands were tied.

Privately, however, military collaboration between SA and the west has continued. SA still manages to receive regular back-door deliveries of weapons systems, technology and spare parts. Despite the mandatory arms embargo enforced by the United Nations at the end of 1977, the SADF still claims to spend at least 20% of its weapons budget overseas.

In return NATO is slotted, for example, into the SA Navy's surveillance system headquarters at Silvermine, a few miles from Simonstown. To some observers Silvermine is nothing more than a glorified Lloyds shipping register. To others it is the most sophisticated surveillance system in the Southern Hemisphere. Whatever the truth is, the fact remains that the underground complex at Silvermine has, since 1973, provided NATO with a daily record of all shipping in the Indian and southern Atlantic oceans. Permanent communications links are maintained between Silvermine and the Royal Navy in the UK, the US Navy in Puerto Rico and the French and Argentinian navies.

Despite the collaboration between NATO and South Africa that has existed behind the scenes throughout the past two decades, successive South African regimes have criticised the west for not adopting a more open and



One of the SA Navy's six Reshef class fast patrol boats, designed for coastal defence. The first three were built in Israel, the others in Durban. Six more are to be built in Durban.

direct form of collaboration. In the late 1960s and early 1970s the SADF turned to France and Portugal in its attempt to build a deep-sea fleet that would be capable of rendering significant support to a NATO force in the southern oceans - the argument being that if South Africa had such a fleet, then NATO would be more inclined to accept open collaboration with SA. This programme was frustrated by growing international opposition culminating in the mandatory arms embargo.

Without a modern fleet of frigates and corvettes the above-mentioned ploy disintegrated. The SADF bitterly dropped any ideas of a deep sea fleet and turned to Israel and South Africa's own young but fast-expanding naval industry to 'concentrate on our primary task of defending our own coast and harbours'. According to Vice-Admiral Walters, then chief of the SA Navy, the SADF would, as from the beginning of 1978, no longer look to its 'voluntary duty to care for the security of the Cape route'.

NATO has long regarded the 'defence of the Cape sea route' as an important issue, primarily for the protection of western oil supplies. NATO commanders have privately admitted that 'contingency plans' exist for giving direct naval assistance

to South Africa 'if the oil route is threatened'.

But independent observers have ridiculed the concept of the 'security of the Cape Sea route', arguing that in military terms it is nonsensical unless seen in the context of overall security in the Indian Ocean area. The renewed interest in Simonstown must thus be seen in the light of developments in the rest of the Indian Ocean area, including the Persian Gulf.

The revolution in Iran against the US-backed Shah's regime, along with the insecurity of other western-supported states such as Saudi Arabia, has created a crisis for western strategic interests in the Persian Gulf.

The US is currently expanding its bases in Kenya, Somalia and Pakistan and the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia. A 'Rapid Deployment Force' of US troops is now on standby to be flown anywhere in the world that they 'might be required'. Within this framework of western military expansion in the Indian Ocean, it must be clear that the hawks' eyes are on South Africa's naval bases. It appears to be a strange coincidence that construction work at Simonstown that was recently completed has expanded the base to double the maximum requirements presently needed by the SA Navy.

SWAPO WILL WIN


At the International Conference in Solidarity with SWAPO of Namibia, held in Paris in September, a remarkable document was circulated on the floor. A memorandum on the military aspects of the liberation of Namibia, it was written by Maj.-Gen. von Meijenfeldt, a retired officer of the Dutch Army and former director of the Royal Military Academy of the Netherlands.

This document has excited attention for several reasons: Chief among these is that it

asserts that SWAPO (and by implication, the ANC) is capable of winning a conventional war against South Africa within the foreseeable future.

Maj.-Gen. von Meijenfeldt asserts that the use of military struggle by the oppressed in the South African situation is "moral, entirely responsible" - "one is forced to use violence because your opponent also does."

He argues that "there is an obvious connection between the political liberation of the black population of South Africa and the fight for political independence in Namibia". He builds his strategy for the liberation of South Africa and Namibia around



two central tenets: Firstly that despite South Africa's constant attacks on neighbouring states, its strategy is primarily one of "defence of the laager". Secondly, the SA regime has limited resources and manpower - in the final analysis, the "power basis (the white population of 4.6 million) is too limited, with respect to neighbouring countries, to employ an offensive war."

CENTRE OF FORTRESS

However, he warns, in the course of apartheid's defensive strategy "SA has sufficient military potential to carry out offensive operations within the territory of neighbouring countries. These operations should be opposed by making the encirclement of the laager as strong as possible and by shifting the scene of the battle to the centre of the fortress."

He continues:

"The vulnerable points in the SA fortress policy appear to me to be:

- the size of the area to be defended
- the infrastructure
- logistical support
- maintaining communications
- the claims made on the white population by the military effort, for example by military service."

STRATEGY OF EXHAUSTION

Von Meijenfeldt then postulates that the most effective strategy that SWAPO and the ANC would use, would be one of exhaustion, hinged around the abovementioned 'vulnerable points'.

"The military reply to the SA fortress policy" should include the following elements:

- * Isolation of the fortress-hindering external aid to the SA regime and thus gaining space and time for the liberation movement to build up its forces
- * "Actions within the fortress" - "Corrosion and destruction of the defence possibilities of the

enemy and undermining the preparedness to defend.... actions should take place throughout the whole area.... with the heaviest points in the cities and a few military objectives".

THE CLOSING OFFENSIVE

"The question remains", von Meijenfeldt points out, "of whether attacks on the fortress from within can force the enemy to concede. If that is not the case, then the closing offensive is necessary....the strategically important starting points for the offensive are -Southern Angola and Botswana in the direction of Namibia -Botswana and Mozambique in the direction of Pretoria."


SOLIDARITY WITH SWAPO



AND THE PEOPLE OF NAMIBIA

Throughout his argument, the General emphasises that support of the local population is the key to success for the liberation movements. He concludes: "I do not view the liberation of Namibia and South Africa through military action an impossible task. A lot of time will, however, be required to organise the necessary personnel and materials. If the ideal of freedom lives in the hearts of the people, ultimately no one can hold them back."

From COSAWR-Netherlands



In the first issue of RESISTER, which appeared 18 months ago, we expressed the hope that the publication would, amongst other things, be used by readers as a forum to express ideas relevant to war resistance in South Africa. Since then we have received and published a few letters, but the response in this field has been relatively disappointing. We are pleased, therefore, to publish in this issue a recently received contribution which we hope readers will not only find interesting, but which will spur them to develop further some of the topics raised. More letters from readers—resisters and/or supporters—will be most welcome.

Dear Resister,

I am a South African war resister who has left South Africa for specific reasons, that is to avoid conscription into the army. An army which is used as an extension of the ruling Nationalist party to implement and protect fascist policies, under the guise of 'national security'. And which is being used to coerce and terrorize the majority of the population who happen to be disenfranchised, poverty stricken, landless, and slaves of the means of production controlled by the white ruling class.

The developing civil war in South Africa, has resulted in a situation where there is very little room for people to sit on the fence, that is liberals and reformists, who should realise that there is no way that real change can be brought about within the structures of the system as it exists and therefore requires a revolution to overthrow and change the existing order.

Most war resisters who have left the country to avoid conscription have made a definite political decision to act against an oppressive regime and are obliged by that decision to support a revolutionary program of action against that regime.

RESISTER should adopt a clear revolutionary stance and give full support to liberation struggle led by the African National Congress and should not be inhibited by liberal and reformist trains of thought which might be the prevailing thought trends of a defensive ruling class. It must champion the views and aspirations of the oppressed masses who are the revolutionary classes and on whom the building of a free and just society depends.

Vacillating liberals and reformists will be politicized by the developing struggle some of whom will begin to support revolutionary struggle. But to adopt their way of thinking is to be relegated to the dustbins of history.

G.H.

MORE CONSCRIPTION

White South African males over 30 and even over 40 may be conscripted into the Defence Force, police or civil defence, according to a statement made by outgoing Deputy Minister of Defence, Coetsee, (now Minister of Justice and Prisons) at the end of September. Speaking

at a revue parade in his honour at Voortrekkerhoogte, Pretoria, Coetsee said that the national service system would have to be revised and have its base broadened. A basis of wider conscription and other 'gentle compulsion' might be used, he said.

REVIEW:

'CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION IN S.A.'

This recently-published book is a collection of research papers produced by the 'Durban Ad Hoc Committee on Alternative National Service'. The aim of the project was 'primarily to gather information which can be used in the various attempts to have the National Party Government introduce an alternative non-military form of national service for those resisting military conscription.

There are very strong constraints on any examination of the issue of war resistance in South Africa -- encouraging anyone to resist military service is an offence punishable by up to five years in jail. It is thus not surprising that this book, which was written and distributed inside the country, gives at best a partial treatment of the subject, and attempts to avoid the more political aspects of conscientious objection. But in a situation like South Africa and Namibia today, where the state is pitted against liberation movements representing the mass of the oppressed people, the political aspects are bound to be the most important.

The authors never quite resolve this problem. For instance, they note that the demand for an alternative non-military national service scheme is seen by the regime as a political threat to the 'security of the state', and correctly conclude that 'No amount of argument is likely to convince the Nationalist government of the morality of conscientious objection'. They go on to argue that those involved in the campaign for alternative national service should 'not

create conflict with the state' and instead point out to the regime that the issue of war resistance is creating a polarisation between the state and 'liberal groups' and that it is in the regime's interests to introduce alternative service in order to 'regain its losses'! But the fact of the matter is that the call for non-military service has gained wide support precisely because the majority of the people of South Africa do not recognise the legitimacy of the racist state, and many young whites are responding to this by refusing to serve its interests.

There are further problems with this 'pragmatic' call for alternative service, which

It is generally accepted that the South African Medical Corps, the medical arm of the SADF, is a non-combatant unit within the meaning of the Geneva Convention on War. In a case recorded by MILCOM, a non-combatant conscript who applied for a transfer to the Medical Corps, was told by Brig C.J. Lloyd (now OC SWA Command) that: 'The Medical Services are reluctant to accept him in their Corps. They consider themselves to be combatant.'

are touched upon in the book. The major problem is this-- If a system of alternative national service is introduced, it will undoubtedly be closely controlled by the regime, if not by the SA Defence Force. It will quite likely become part of the 'hearts and minds' strategy of influencing the local population so that they are prevented from supporting the

REVIEW CONT.

guerrillas of the liberation movement.

Another aim of the Ad Hoc Committee was to document how many war resisters there are, both inside the country and in exile, and what their motivations are. Most of the information comes from official sources, press reports and a survey conducted on the white English-language campuses last year by MILCOM, a commission set up by the National Union of SA Students in response to the growing number of white students who are leaving the country to avoid military service. As the authors note, most of these sources are suspect, and because of government repression, resistance to the military has become almost an 'underground' phenomenon, and people are unwilling to talk openly about it.

Even if there are no accurate figures, the picture that emerges is clear: There have been many hundreds of war resisters in the past few years, and only a small minority of them have been officially recognised by the SADF as 'conscientious objectors'. The only kind of war

resisters the SADF is prepared to make even small concessions to are those who 'belong to a recognised religious denomination by the tenets whereof its members may not participate in war'. These people are given the option of service in the SADF in a non-combatant capacity, or imprisonment for three years, following which they are exempt from further call-ups. Other resisters face continuous periods of imprisonment until the age of 65 when they are no longer eligible for military service.

The book also contains an analysis of the provisions made for conscientious objectors in Smith's Rhodesia, the USA and the Federal Republic of Germany, where an alternative national service scheme is in operation.

Despite its inability to come up with adequate figures, and its constraints in spelling out the political issues at stake in the call for alternative national service, this book is a useful contribution to the debate on war resistance in South Africa. It is a response to the dilemma facing many young men of conscience when they are called up to fight an unjust war against their fellow South Africans. ●

Readers of Resister may have friends who are being drafted into the South African Defence Force. If it is clear that these people are not prepared to fight for apartheid, and they feel they have no choice other than to leave South Africa and seek asylum abroad, then the following information may be relevant.

A. If they have a valid passport, a RETURN airticket and about two months living expenses

1. They should either have their call-up papers (or some other official proof of call-up) in their possession, or have arranged to have them sent to their country of destination.
2. They should travel direct (bar scheduled stop-overs) to the country where they intend to apply for refugee status/asylum. (Countries which have so far granted some form of refugee status to SA war resisters - usually annually renewable work/residence permits - are the UK, USA and the Netherlands.)
3. On arrival at passport control of the country of destination, they should be able to enter as tourists, coming for a few weeks holiday. If -and only if- they are for some reason refused admission they should immediately make a plea for political asylum. (This is done by stating to the immigration official that one has left South Africa for political reasons and that one has a 'well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of political opinion' if one should return. From the day that war resisters are meant

Useful Information

to report for their call-up, they will be liable for prosecution under various sections of the Defence Act. This should be grounds enough for a well-founded fear of persecution. Once an application has been made, one should have right of access to a lawyer.) They should insist on making a phone call, and contact the local anti-apartheid movement or one of the refugee assistance agencies.

4. If admitted as a tourist (and having decided for certain that they want to apply for political asylum) they should contact the local anti-apartheid group or refugee agency (in London and Amsterdam, also COSAWR).

B. If they have a valid passport, an airticket, but INSUFFICIENT FUNDS.

They should follow the procedure set out in A. However, they should be aware that they may have difficulty being admitted as tourists and may have to make a plea for political asylum at the point of entry.

C. If they don't have passport or an airticket.

They will probably have to make their way to countries surrounding South Africa - such as Botswana and Swaziland. Usually, they should be able to get permission to remain in these countries. However, there are many South African refugees in these countries and the situation is often not easy. Spending a period in one of these countries also makes it very difficult to apply for asylum overseas.

superfido

