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
from the Trident programme and so unions, such as the AEEU, were persuaded to support the programme politically. The jobs didn't accrue and the reality is that the jobs currently devoted to the service facilities for Trident would be redeployed if a coherent defence policy were adopted instead of one based on nuclear weapons.

It is also clear now that both the public sector and manufacturing is in deep crisis for the lack of government support, which makes the arguments in favour of continuing with nuclear weapons on the basis of jobs less than credible.

In 2003 a number of unions affiliated to the labour party, acting against their own policy, voted down a proposal that nuclear disarmament should be put on the table for discussion. But the government's defence and foreign policies have now been discredited to a point where it would be difficult to brush such a move under the carpet or to present a credible case for such a move at a union executive.



The wreck of the Kursk in dry-dock. The type of Torpedo it carried used Hydrogen Peroxide as fuel. This is so volatile it can explode if the torpedo is hit or dropped. Britain uses the same type of fuel in some of the heavy torpedoes in her navy and runs similar risks as the Russian navy



This photo was taken in the Sudan in 1994 by Kevin Carter. It is of a little boy crawling to reach a UN feeding station, about a kilometre from where this was taken, and a vulture waiting to eat him. The photo won the 1994 Pulitzer Prize but what he had witnessed so affected the journalist he killed himself 3 months latter.

About 1 billion people in the world today live in absolute poverty. The bulk of this is a direct result of armed conflicts. A foreign policy based on nuclear weapons and built on bullying and the threat of military action has an end result in the destruction of lives and livelihoods, even where British troops aren't present.

Mr Carter left the Sudan just after the photo was taken. No one knows what came of the little boy

Britain has the option now—continue with a policy based on insanely dangerous and costly nuclear weapons or look for a different way of gaining prestige and respect in the world

MAKE SURE YOUR BRANCH IS AFFILIATED TO TUCPND

The Trade Union Campaign for Peace and

Nuclear Disarmament, formally TUCND, was formed in 1980 originally as the trade union section of CND. It became a separate independent organisation in 2000. TUCPND depend exclusively on TU affiliations for its funding. We have a wide range of national union's branches and trades councils affiliated and campaign through and with trade union organisations. Nuclear Weapons are not isolated from the rest of government policy and are an integral part of defence and foreign policy issues. The reasons for opposing them are economic and political as well as moral. TUCPND is a general peace campaigning organisation.

For information on affiliating your union branch contact


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BRING THE POLITICS OF THE BULLY TO AN END. DON'T LET OUR GOVERN-MENT BUY A NEW GENERATION OF





TRADE UNION
CAMPAIGN FOR PEACE AND
NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT
FORMERLY TUCND

SUMMARY

- 1) The decision to commit Britain to a new generation of nuclear weapons will be taken in the 2005-2009 parliamentary session. For the trade union movement this has to be a balance of the advantages against the disadvantages of having nuclear weapons. In reality this BALANCE IS MASSIVELY AGAINST A NEW GENERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
- 2) TRIDENT Trident is obsolete and probably was by the mid 80's before the Trident was launched.
- 3) ALTERNATIVE DELIVERY SYSTEMS The other formats for a possible future British nuclear weapons system are equally flawed.
- 4) A USABLE BOMB The US is moving towards developing a small nuclear weapons system they could use in "conventional warfare". This is an incredibly dangerous and wholly unnecessary step.
- 5) THE RISKS Nuclear weapons imply a small risk of a catastrophic accident.
- 6) APPROPRIATE EQUIPMENT this is not the type of equipment we need to defend ourselves or to perform a role in international affairs.
- 7) JOBS deploying the funds into other areas of the military or other areas of the economy would produce vastly more jobs that were created by Trident,

- or would be produced in a new nuclear weapons programme.
- 8) THE COST the cost estimate by the government for a new generation is astronomic. But such systems have always cost far more than their estimate.
- 9) PREPARING FOR ANY EVENTUALITY nuclear weapons do not, and cannot defend us from a possible nuclear attack. There is no eventuality which they could be used for.
- 10) THINK ABOUT WHEN THEY COULD BE USED nothing could make it politically acceptable for these to be used.
- 11) THE DAMAGE THEY DO NOW Britain having nuclear weapons does this country a great deal of harm, but it also does immense harm to international politics.
- 12) THE JUSTIFICATION because we hold nuclear weapons on sufferance from the US in practice the influence internationally that having nuclear weapons brings can only be used to support US foreign policy aims and economic interests.
- 13) WE NEED A FULL AND DEMOCRATIC DEBATE
- 14) UNION POLICIES

1) INTRODUCTION

TRIDENT will come to the end of its design life in the next ten years or so. This means the decision about whether or not to replace it with a new generation of nuclear weapons, has to be made now. It will take 10 to 15 years to design, build and deploy a new system. The current government have said they will take a decision on what to do in the life of this parliament.

They have also said there will be a full debate but there is little or no sign of this happening and its clear a number of steps towards a new system have already been taken.


The parliamentary Select Committee on Defence has asked for a discussion. The MOD have effectively refused.

But senior figures in the government have made it clear that they do not see the possibility of Britain being without nuclear weapons. This is astonishingly foolish - in line with a raft of rightwing policies pursued by the government.

For trade unionists the argument over a new generation of nuclear weapons one of a balance between what can be gained from having nuclear weapons against the risks, cost and damage implied in the process.

Britain's Nuclear Weapons have a very damaging

effect on our economy, on our defence and on international politics. They also involve risks both in their manufacture and in holding them. The advantages, that it gives Britain a status and influence in the world isn't valid. They do not create jobs. In practice they have cost Britain huge numbers.



A number of senior ministers have made it clear they want another generation of nuclear weapons, to replace Trident, regardless of the risks, the cost or the damage they do to our interests. Given the current leadership of the Labour Party it is essential a full and open debate takes place.

2) TRIDENT

In 1979 when Callaghan signed the deal to buy the Trident system from the US, the theory behind launching nuclear weapons from nuclear submarines depended upon their not being detected. Since then technology has moved on and Trident is detectable by the Russian military and possibly by others. Trident submarines are massive compared to other submarines. Nuclear reactors provide power by creating heat, which means the steam from their turbines has to be cooled. They create a 'plume' of heat in the surrounding seawater which can be tracked from satellites. Closer to the submarine it can be picked up by the slight 'bow wave' they create on the surface. They can be tracked by the noise they omit from their engines and from the propeller in the water. All this makes the Trident boats detectable in varying degrees.


Much of this didn't matter during the cold war, when Trident patrolled under the arctic icecap, because the heat plume and bow wave etc were shielded by the icecap. But Trident is now designated to operate far away from the icecap.

Systems such as this take a great deal of time to deploy. It is important, therefore, when developing such a system that you predict how the technology you might face will have advanced by the time the system is deployed. In the case of Trident it is probable that the Soviet Union had the tracking technology by the mid 80s when Trident came to be launched - in other words it was basically obsolete in terms of its design purpose by the time it came into service. At the moment, some within the military would argue, only Russia has the technology to track such systems. But it is probable that China will have this technology itself in the near future and could already have access to Russia's systems. It is unrealistic to assume they will not have it in ten or fifteen years time, if a new generation of nuclear weap-

Wars rarely start for rational reasons. They rarely, if ever, have anything to do with the reasons given by those who begin them. Very often the war is prepared for make war inevitable.

Britain has stubbornly resisted nuclear disarmament for five decades and one result is that now a number of other states are demanding them for themselves. Unless we change it is inevitable nuclear weapons will be used and inevitably with horrific consequences.

It would be a mistake to underestimate the impact Britain has in encouraging the spread of nuclear weapons. We have an opportunity now to begin that vitally important process of pulling away from the threat of nuclear war. Britain could make a huge difference to world events by changing tack and working to encourage nuclear disarmament.



Conceived of originally in the mid 60's Trident was obsolete by the time our first boat. Also the world has moved on leaving this type of weapons system an expensive liability rather than an asset.

ons are deployed. And, if China has the technology, you can have to assume that its client states will have access in most conflict situations – which would probably include North Korea.

Trident was also designed for a specific purpose, an all out attack on the Soviet Union. That meant launching all of the missiles simultaneously. Having launched a single mis-

sile the submarine would have revealed its position to any military base with relatively low tech systems within a couple of hundred miles. This was true as long ago as the 1960s. It would be quite rash, therefore, to use the existing Trident boats to launch other types of missiles, such as cruise missiles, designed to attack land targets. US submarines are used in this way, but they are accompanied by large numbers of other ships acting as air and ship defence systems.

In reality Trident, as a military system, is obsolete now, and has been since the mid 1980s. It is nonsense, in military terms, to consider nuclear submarines as an effective launch platform for such systems.

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3) POSSIBLE FUTURE ALTERNATIVE DELIVERY SYSTEMS

There are several possible options to replace the Trident system as a way of 'delivering' nuclear bombs.

The United States, Russia and China have Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) systems, where large missiles are launched at targets thousands of miles away. The Soviet Union and the United States aimed large numbers of these at each other during the cold war. But the budget for a system like this would be far beyond the capacity of any British or European state.

Medium range ground launched missiles might be, but these too are expensive and while there is little or nothing one can do to defend oneself from ICBM's, it would be possible to track and shoot down medium range rockets.


Nuclear armed "Cruise" missiles may be relatively cheap, about £2 million a piece, without the warhead, but their targeting system depends upon features upon the ground, which could be simulated to "fool" the control system – this happened extensively in the war against Yugoslavia. They may also be vulnerable to relatively unsophisticated ground defence systems - that is they could be shot down by anti-aircraft systems. And, if they don't detonate, as happened to lots in the war against Yugoslavia, in practice you have given your opponent a nuclear bomb, having just tried to use one on them.

Air launched systems would arguably be the more durable of the systems available, both in terms of the technology and in terms of a conflict. But they would require enormous funds to produce expensive sophisticated aircraft, radar and, either bases close to the target to launch such aircraft from, or aircraft which can circle the globe without being detected and shot down. The US thought they had such a system with their stealth bombers, but these proved to be detectable in the Yugoslav war when one was shot down. At about £1 billion a piece, when they lost the one the US stopped using them in that conflict.

Aircraft carriers, as an alternative to bases, are now also vulnerable. In the Falklands war, for instance, the Atlantic Conveyor was sunk by an Exocet missile which was actually aimed at HMS Hermes. Had she been hit instead of the Atlantic Conveyor, Britain would have lost the war at that point. Also China now markets a sophisticated heavy torpedo specifically designed to attack aircraft carriers. Iran tested a new generation of fast torpedo for its navy,

capable of sinking a ship of this size.

While it may be possible to guard against such a weapon there is always the possibility that the



One of these was shot down in Yugoslavia. Its vulnerability puts a big question mark over its possible effectiveness as a delivery system.

guard may not be 100% and the chances are the technology associated with this type of torpedo will improve over the next ten years.

The technology available now makes carriers vulnerable – that vulnerability would make it rash and really very irresponsible to deploy the carrier against anything but an unsophisticated enemy. None of the possible alternative systems are available to Britain, to deploy a new generation of nuclear weapons, make sense as a credible system.



What the sinking of the Begrano, killing 400 men, and the Atlantic Conveyer in the Falklands war should demonstrate just how vulnerable large ships are. The Hermes was actually the target when the Atlantic Conveyer was hit

Using carriers as the basis for a delivery system would, therefore, be very foolish indeed.

4) A USABLE BOMB

The logic of the US administration's position is to develop a bomb which is small enough to use in the context of "conventional" battle. They justify this by suggesting such a bomb would be used against hardened targets such as bunkers. But there are physical limits to what any such device could achieve and it would be possible to build bunkers capable of withstanding a direct hit from a small nuclear bomb. The British countryside is littered with bunkers which were intended to be proof against such attacks, built as part of the 70s and 80s government policies of preparing for a nuclear war with the Soviet Union. What the programme is really about is developing nuclear weapons which could be used against land forces. However, there is nothing which such a bomb could achieve which is not already available from conventional ordinance at a tiny fraction of the

What such a system would do, which conventional weapons would not, is increase the fear and intimidation associated with the threat of military action. The impact of this, however, will increase the resentment amongst the population of those states threatened with such bombs against Britain and the US. To justify its action in using such bombs it would be

important that they are joined by others. In other words, the US want to develop bombs they can use but doesn't want to be alone in using them. A classic problem associated with warfare is 'winning the peace'. What the US have found in every single war they have been involved in since the Vietnam war on has been that they can deploy an overwhelming military force but still fail to control the country after having overwhelmed the other side's armed forces. In fact, it has been a feature of warfare for 3,000 years. Using nuclear weapons would create three problems. There would be long term problems of radiation in the area bombed making it difficult to travel through the bombed out area. The health problems for people in the area. The resultant difficulties to revive the area economically after the use of such a bomb. This is what has happened in the areas of Iraq where Depleted Uranium armour piercing shells have been used extensively in Iraq. These factors make the possibility of 'winning the peace' remote, if not impossible.

There is also the possibility of one not going off and falling into the hands of the opposing forces, to be used against you at a future date.

5) THE RISKS

There are three areas of significant risk associated with nuclear weapons, their manufacture, maintenance and deployment.

Despite great care taken by the MOD there are grave risks associated with nuclear weapons. For instance in the early 90s the US congress had a report on the transport of their Trident war-heads the Drell report. It concluded that there were significant dangers arising from possible road accidents, from fire and from radio communications, which could possibly trigger a nuclear detonation as the war-heads were transported.

In Nov 2005 the New Scientist revealed that the government had run exercises simulating what would happen if a non nuclear explosion happened

to one of the warhead lorries—while they continue to deny such an eventuality was possible. This would spread lethal radioactive material over a wide area and the result of the exercise was the authorities were wholly unprepared.

In Britain convoys of specialised vehicles regularly travel from Coulport where the warheads are stored to Burghfield where they are refurbished.

The risk of a nuclear accident, possibly a detonation, happening on the road as a result of this traffic is very small, but the consequences could be vast, with millions of people being killed as a result. It is difficult to see how anything could justify taking such a risk.



A convoy of nuclear war-head carriers on route between Burgfield, near Reading and Faslane

6) APROPRIATE EQUIPMENT

To say that Britain needs to defend itself and needs an army etc to do so, is not the same as saying that we need nuclear weapons to do so. One may disagree with the aims inherent in the war in Iraq without disagreeing that Britain should have the military capacity to defend itself and to intervene militarily in far away places.

It is also not unreasonable to assume that political influence internationally can be legitimately gained from military capacity of military intervention.

One problem is that an immense political and economic vested interests has built up around our possession of nuclear weapons which obscures the basic arguments about what these things are designed to achieve and what context they could be used to achieve them.

The calculation should be about what is the most cost effective method of achieving the range of military tasks our forces are designed to address. Western military procurement has become increasingly sophisticated and yet it has failed to adequately address the tasks which modern military conflicts present. The war in Yugoslavia could have gone terribly wrong had a full scale military attack been launched through Kosovo. In Afghanistan the significant events in the overthrow of the Taliban was the donation of about £40 million of relatively low tech equipment to the northern league. The Iraq war has demonstrated a basic incapacity to address the type of warfare which presented itself and the defining characteristics of that war are political.

In reality the ability to provide clean water, electricity and building equipment is as important to the conflict in Somalia, as the capacity to deploy sophisticated helicopters.

The John Major government attempted to maintain the image of military capacity while cutting costs through its "front line first" policies. While each infantryman still had a rifle, they didn't have the infrastructure and supply to make them effective, such as decent boots, sanitation equipment etc.


If we look at the context in which military action now presents itself, the lessons which the British military learned in the conflicts of the 50's and 60's, as well as the lesson they learned in the Northern Ireland conflict remain relevant. But the equipment and resources associated with this type of conflict are very different to those associated with large scale invasion type of war which the US has been associated with and which the current government have been drawn into.

In effect the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and possibly

in the long term in the Balkans, have been lost because of the classic error of an inability to look at how to win the peace.

A problem with the procurement of military equipment is that an awful lot more goes into the design of the equipment than simply looking at the tasks it is supposed to be about trying to achieve – such as the ideology of the government.

Prior to 97 Britain's merchant fleet, upon which our capacity to wage war depends, had been depleted to an unsustainable level, yet we continued to procure very expensive and very sophisticated pieces of equipment. The fresh



new government of 97 did a number of things to address the problem, but the freshness has worn away and there are a range of areas which they are driven by ideology rather than pragmatism. An ideology which has failed to produce a usable army boot, enough body armour and any coherent long term care for those traumatised by warfare - 40% of ex service personnel end up with problems serious enough to prevent them functioning adequately in society – prison, alcoholism, homelessness, domestic violence etc.

For instance, because of New Labour's 'best value competitive tendering' procurement policies boots are partly made in Brazil, which means child labour is probably used for part of the process. The boots produced are really very poor, but that simply means the manufacturer gets to supply more of them to replace the ones which fall apart. Current procurement policies not only do damage to the interests of British industry they can't even provide a decent boot - and the reason for that the government applied an ideology to the procurement process rather than a rational assessment of how to get a boot which worked. The same problem now blights the whole of the military procurement process as well as the concept of the type of war we might face.

In military terms nuclear weapons have no coherent role. They can not win wars and would destroy any possibility of winning the peace. In the process they drain the funds which could provide appropriate troops, training and equipment.


7) NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND JOBS

In part the justification put to the trade union movement for buying the Trident system was that it would create lots of jobs. Initially it was argued that 28,000 people would be employed directly, in building the system and significant "offset" work would come from the Unites States to compensate for the money our government would be spending on the system in the US.

The number of jobs actually involved in building

Trident turned out to be about 14,000 and no work materialised as "offset" from the US.

Other work has accrued in terms of maintenance and servicing facilities but the reality is that facilities such as this would exist if part or all of the funds used on Trident had been deployed for other parts of the Navy.



Drive mechanism for a Polaris sub. The crews referred to this area as the 'American Sector' because all of the equipment detailed above was bought from and made in the US. In Trident boats all the missile and ancillary equipment is US

The initial estimate for Trident was £10 billion but the actual cost was more like £23 billion and the running cost comes out at about £1 billion a year. Funds of that scale cannot be redeployed easily and the value itself to some extent subsists in the skills and the facilities rather than simply figures on a balance sheet. Nevertheless deploying such funds towards other areas of the economy or towards other areas of military facilitates the number of people employed would be vast compared to the current system. In part this is because a large part of the cost goes into expensive equipment rather than on jobs, but in part the problem is that a large proportion of the cost of British nuclear weapons is spent on US equipment. In other words it produces jobs but in the United States rather than Britain. Because of British dependency on US technology, and the strings the US places on this process, any new nuclear weapons system is likely to have the same problem, of spending vast sums in the US.

As the Barrow yard began the work on Trident in the 1980s Trade Unionists in Barrow together with TUCND, were involved in producing a detailed report, funded by CND, on the alternatives for the Barrow yard which demonstrated very clearly that, even in that economic climate very many more jobs would be created if the yard had concentrated on the civilian work available at the time. What it also very,

a shipyard, 2 or 3 others are created in supply and service industries, from supplying steel to providing veg for the works canteen. That creates a figure of between 150,000 and 400,000.

very clear is that had the budget for Trident been

used to support other warship or civilian ship pro-

A conservative estimate of the number of jobs ac-

cruing directly in a civilian shipbuilding industry

tween 50,000 and 100,000. A multiplier normally

applied to jobs in large scale manufacturing is nor-

mally between 2:1 and 3:1. That is for every job in

from an investment of £10 billion would be be-

duction then an industry might exist

Another approach is that civilian industry can be created using the military production as its basis. Landrover, for instance, is successful because a large part of the base production is sold to the MOD, providing research and resources for civilian production. In 1979 it was clear the Navy needed access to at least another 12 Roll On/Roll Off ferries, to transport equipment to areas of conflict, but they didn't exist in the British merchant fleet. The new Labour government ordered these but the weird ideology they applied to the procurement process meant the ships were leased from a Danish company who had them built in Italy. They could, instead have used this order to provide a modern, safe design and the facility to build these cheaply. In effect a shipping version of the Landrover story – in effect using the military procurement as a springboard to enhance and expand the civilian manufacturing base. Every other major manufacturing country does this. The US even has this written into the Pentagon's charter.

The problem of Jobs and Nuclear Weapons is part of a problem of this government's approach to military spending overall.

8) THE COST

According to the government's figures Trident theoretically cost £10 billion to build. But there are very few people who actually believe this figure and a realistic figure would be much closer to £23 billion. The running and routine maintenance costs come to something in the region of £1 billion a year.



Jim Callaghan—he lied over the costs of the nuclear weapons programme

Rough estimates being banded about by the government for a new generation of nuclear weapons is about £23 billion. Traditionally successive governments have lied about the actual costs of nuclear weapons systems. In the mid 70's for instance Jim Callaghan, agreed an update to the Polaris system, to the Chevaline pro-

gramme, at vast

cost without even telling his cabinet about it. The initial programme was supposed to produce abut 25,000 jobs and an undisclosed number of jobs were to come from an agreement with the US government allowing British companies to tender for work on the US Trident system – in part to compensate the British government for the money they would be spending buying in US equipment.

However the US simply didn't implement the agreement for the 'off-set' work.

Other jobs were created in Aldermaston and a number of jobs have come from servicing the dock facilities etc used by Trident.

The Trident system implies the development of a number of other different arms of the services. So, for instance, other navy ships are designed around the need to protect Trident from detection and from attack.

However, assuming Britain would still have a Navy if Trident were withdrawn from service, its possible to imagine a much more effective naval system with the funds currently used to protect or enhance the Trident system. In real terms civilian jobs in the servicing of the Navy are threatened by the concentration of resources on servicing the nuclear weapons systems. The funds for the support systems for Trident would still be used within the armed services – so the impact of getting rid of nuclear weapons would be to increase the number of civilian and military jobs dedicated to other areas.

The reason for the build up of the nuclear threat against the Soviet Union, during the Cold War, was to put pressure on their economy as they, the Soviet Union, sought to match and better the capacity which the 'west' deployed against them. Towards the end of the Soviet Union something like 20% of their GDP was devoted to their military, which probably had a considerable impact on creating the crisis which brought the Soviet system down. It always was intended to be vastly expensive.

9) PREPARING FOR ANY EVENTUALITY

An argument used in favour of keeping nuclear weapons is that we need them in case some irrational government, at some stage in the future, develop a bomb and threaten to use it against Britain. Making a nuclear weapon is not so difficult given the right equipment. Mubarac, the Egyptian president, is reputed to have said, in response to one of the regular coded threats from Israel, that Egypt could develop and deploy a nuclear weapon in six months, from what they have available on the international market.

He is probably right, but to do so you have to have a nuclear industry capable of working the nuclear material. It implies a guidance system capable of getting the bomb to its target, which would not be



One argument used is that we need nuclear weapons to protect us in case vicious, cruel, mad and irrational people take power and use military force for their own personal advancement

jammed by the target country. It implies missiles of aircraft capable of reaching the target without being destroyed, which probably means not being monitored.

To suggest that the Baathist regime in Iraq had that capacity prior to the gulf war was simply dishonest. It is a misnomer to suggest that we need to prepare for a possible nuclear attack by a possible nuclear state in the future, by threatening the retaliation with nuclear weapons, and that is not what is being suggested by the US government.

What is certain is that the type of preparation you make for war defines the type of threat you will face. If you threaten the world with nuclear weapons then you risk other states acquiring them to threaten the world too.

Countering a possible threat of nuclear weapons in the future does not imply that we ourselves need nuclear weapons to do so. Following the US down the path they are currently following and suggesting that nuclear weapons would be used will itself create the political tensions which could result in states developing nuclear weapons to threaten the US. If other governments accept the logic of the US and sections of our own government that having nuclear weapons helps reduce the threat of nuclear weapons being used against them, then they will develop nuclear weapons. So the US government's position in practice guarantees that other states will develop nuclear weapons against the threat from the US and Britain.

10) WHEN COULD THEY BE USED

Dan Plech (New Statesman March 2006) detailed the we would have lost the war, and our economy extent to which Britain is dependent upon the US for its nuclear weapons, both in terms of providing the technology and much of the hardware and in terms of the political strings the US put on the agreement etc. It is not possible to consider the independent use of such systems independently of the US, or in any context which would not compliment the US foreign policy of its economic interests.

Outside of the coded threats Israel regularly uses against its neighbours and the India-Pakistan conflicts, the last credible time that the threat of nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear state was in the Falklands war, when Margaret Thatcher's government ordered the bombing of Buenos Aires. One bomb was dropped from an ageing V Bomber. This didn't imply Britain was capable of the mass bombing of Argentine cities, so it had no military significance of itself. What this did was to demonstrate that Britain could use a nuclear bomb without the US approval. But had Margaret Thatcher actually used a nuclear bomb against Argentina, the international reaction to such an event would have been huge. The economic impact of this reaction would have devastated our economy. It is unlikely her government could have survived the reaction in Britain to such an event and there would be a strong possibility that other countries would have intervened to settle the dispute over the Falklands in Argentina's favour. In other words



The bombing of Nagasaki—it is now very clear that no military purpose was intended in the use of nuclear weapons on Japanese cities. Instead it was an opening move in the Cold War, as a threat to the Soviet Union.

would be in tatters, Margaret Thatcher would probably have been tried as a war criminal and millions would have died in Argentina.

It is worth bearing in mind that the Falklands war was, in essence, the result a) of bungling diplomacy by the Thatcher government and b) their desire to



influence the general election.

Argentina's military government were un-phased by the threat. In practice, while it might be possible to physically drop a bomb on Buenos Aires, it simply wasn't an option to drop a nuclear bomb on them.

The fact the US and British political establishment have failed to learn lessons from recent history is a different question. Also the logical argument which comes from the way our government have behaved, the shameful duplicity around the Iraq war and the terrible cost may well suggest that putting the power to wage war in the hands of the prime minister is a bit like giving a suicidal adolescent a case of best dynamite and asking him to behave responsibly. The belief that our government are not going to use nuclear weapons and therefore they don't really matter, if we as a movement do not resist this renewal, isn't valid.

Armies reflect the society which produces them their reason for existence, the design of their equipment the relationship with society as a whole.

11) THE DAMAGE THEY DO NOW

Nuclear weapons have no role militarily but they do have an enormous impact on world politics. The US, Britain, France, have consistently used them as



Pakistan's Shaheen missile system. About 25% of Pakistan's population learn to read and write—but the literacy rate is much poorer for women. A vast proportion of Pakistan's GDP is devoted either to debt repayment or to the military.

a threat to those they consider a threat to their economic interests – for instance Margaret Thatcher during the Falklands war. China has made coded threats over their use and Israel uses not so coded threats against its neighbours.

There are two aspects to the damage they do. They distort our foreign policy, defining it as a set of threats. Those countries who have followed a different route, such as the far eastern economies have prospered in international trade – Japan traditionally has limited its defence spending to 1% of its GDP compared to a mean of 3% for Britain over recent years. Japan has chosen instead to spend these resources on developing its civilian economy. In practice we have been locked into a role which has damaged our long term economic interests and made British foreign policy subordinate to that of the United States.

The other area of damage has been in terms of international politics. The United States threatened China in both the Korean and Vietnam wars so China developed a nuclear bomb. India fought a

number of border wars with China and therefore feels justified in developing a bomb, and consequently Pakistan develops a bomb because its leaders feel it will lose face if India has the bomb and they don't.

The 'Partial Test Ban Treaty' was the first step to try and control the spread and development of nuclear weapons, signed in 1963 by Britain, the US and the USSR. That treaty committed Britain to working for nuclear disarmament. With the fall of Apartheid South Africa did away with its nuclear weapons so it is clearly quite an easy process to go through if the political will is there. But Britain did everything it could, during the cold war, to encourage the eastwest tension and has done absolutely nothing since its end to implement our treaty obligations.

Other countries have made it very clear indeed that if Britain and France believe they gain in terms of international influence by having these weapons then they should have them too.

Britain's possession of nuclear weapons has, therefore, done considerable damage both to Britain's economic interests and to international politics as a whole, despite the fact they have never been used as a weapon to achieve a military objective



India's Agni-II missile system.

India made it explicitly clear that one reason she was developing a bomb was the refusal of Government's such as Britain and France to make any move towards nuclear disarmament.

12) JUSTIFICATION?

Britain gains a great deal of credibility and "clout" internationally because we are part of the club of declared nuclear states. Britain and France have permanent seats on the UN security council.

But this has now generated a great deal of animosity towards Britain from throughout the world and it has led other countries to argue they should have nuclear bombs too, in order they should be given the same power etc. The influence which nuclear weapons brings is through the threat of military action. This "itself limits the way we can so possessing nuclear weapons itself distorts British foreign policy.

The major flaw in the argument that Britain gains

The major flaw in the argument that Britain gains influence because of our possession of nuclear weapons is the fact that, because we hold these weapons

on sufferance from the United States in practice the influence can only be used to enhance US foreign policy.

Britain is committed to getting rid of nuclear weapons through the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty. The fact that for the past 30 years neither Britain nor France have done anything at all to fulfil their treaty obligations has seriously damaged our standing in international politics. In Britain's case we are seen internationally as a foreign policy designed to compliment the interests of the United States.

Rather than enhancing Britain's influence, our possession of nuclear weapons has damaged it, locking us into US policy.

13) THE NEED FOR A FULL AND DEMOCRATIC DEBATE

Throughout the history of nuclear weapons various governments have lied and deceived about what was involved, about the costs and the risks involved. This has damaged the democratic process in Britain. Our government is seen as simply dishonest. It is clear that the current government are preparing a new generation of nuclear weapons. Scientists have been recruited over the past couple of years to develop this new generation and the facilities at Aldermaston have been expanded accord-

ingly.

Because of what has happened over the past 5 or ten years it is vitally important for the credibility of our government that a full and democratic debate takes place on this issue. Enormous damage will be done to our society if the government tries to pull the usual three card trick and foists a new generation of nuclear weapons on the next two generations of people


14) UNION POLICIES

No unions have a policy of supporting nuclear weapons. In the 1980's a great deal of effort was put into persuading unions to abandon policies of Unilateral Nuclear Disarmament by the leadership of the Labour Party, in favour of Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament. However, the debate was very much about the conditions which existed during the Cold War, which effectively ended with the fall off the Berlin Wall.

Most major national unions have policies specifically opposed to the Trident system, largely based on the huge costs associated with Trident and the lack of any coherent role.

Some unions have members working in the nuclear industry, but would consider the debate about Civil Nuclear power to be a separate set of issues to that of nuclear weapons.

When Trident was first agreed to, the Callaghan government great play was made over the vast numbers of jobs which, it was said, would come



In the past New Labour has been able to depend on sycophantic support from union general secretaries such as Sir Ken Jackson, using dishonest arguments about jobs. This type of approach isn't viable any more because its seen as a big liability in the unions' ability to retain members, and therefore to maintain its income