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Militarism and Repression

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Acknowledgements

My special thanks are due to Dr. Beverly Woodward, ISTNA coordinator, for her criticisms, advice, and editorial supervision of this essay; to Julie Kittross for help with the research work; to Sandy Merritt, April Carter, Steven Wright, Peter Lock, and many others for help and suggestions; to Anne Randle for reading and correcting the original manuscript; and to Peter Kiger, who typed the essay in preparation for printing.

Thanks are also due to the following for permission to reproduce diagrams and cartoons previously published: Richard Falk for the maps on pages 76-81 (which appeared in an earlier version in the Bulletin of Peace Proposals, Vol. 8, No. 3, 1977); Escaro and Le Canard Enchaîné, Paris; Behrendt and Het Parool, Amsterdam; Gerald and Patricia Mische and the Paulist Press, New York; the Committee on Poverty and the Arms Trade, London; and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

I wish also to express my gratitude to the following bodies which provided funds for the research and publication: the Institute for World Order, New York, USA; Kerk en Vrede, Amersfoort, The Netherlands; and the Cheney Peace Settlement, London, England.

Finally, I wish to thank the War Resisters League (USA) and the War Resisters International for assistance and encouragement and the International Seminars on Training for Nonviolent Action (ISTNA) for sponsoring the entire project and for publishing the final manuscript.

Michael Randle

About the Author

Michael Randle, born in 1933, is a well-known nonviolent activist and writer living in England. A conscientious objector to military service, he was chairperson of the Direct Action Committee Against Nuclear War from 1958-1961 and in 1960-1961 was secretary of the Committee of 100, the movement launched by Bertrand Russell and Reverend Michael Scott to organise mass civil disobedience against preparations for nuclear war.

He has served on the Executive Committee of War Resisters International (WRI) since 1960 and was chairperson of WRI from 1966 to 1972. He has organised and participated in numerous radical nonviolent protests, including the Sahara Protest Action aimed at preventing French nuclear tests in 1959; the WRI protest against the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 which involved simultaneous demonstrations in Moscow, Warsaw, Budapest, and Sofia; and a number of actions and projects against the American war in Vietnam.

In 1967 Randle was sentenced to twelve months imprisonment for taking part in an occupation of the Greek embassy in London after the Colonels' coup in that year. In 1962 he was sentenced along with five others to eighteen months imprisonment under the Official Secrets Act for helping to organise a mass sit-in at an air force base where nuclear weapons were thought to be stored and carried on operational flights.

Randle is the author of 'Towards Liberation', an essay seeking to clarify the position of WRI on the question of peace and nonviolent revolution; and he is a frequent contributor to Peace News and other journals. At present, he is a visiting lecturer at the School of Peace Studies at Bradford University, England. He is married to Anne Randle and they have two teenage sons.

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Preface

In July, 1977, the International Seminars on Training for Nonviolent Action (ISTNA) sponsored a three-week long seminar in Cuernavaca, Mexico, that was attended by some 75 persons coming from five continents. The purpose of the seminar was to exchange ideas, experiences, and skills in the field of nonviolent action and training for nonviolent action, and to do an inventory of current resources in this field. Michael Randle was a member of the Preparatory Committee for this event.

The request for the essay that follows was formulated at the 1977 seminar. It was intended originally that it be published at the time of the 1978 United Nations Special Session on Disarmament, but factors beyond the control of the author and the editor have delayed its appearance. The participants at the ISTNA seminar believed it essential to communicate the fact that the arms race is linked not only to war and the threat of war, and their attendant costs, but to widespread repressive practices in the world today.

In the Third World in particular a growing concern about militarism has developed from the experience of living with increasing numbers of military and militarized regimes. Nonviolent activists, whether they be working for modest or for radical changes, are often the victims of these regimes. Among the participants in ISTNA events have been a considerable number for whom the phrase "governmental terror" was not an abstract expression but a reality that they and/or their friends had experienced in the flesh.

To be sure, many nonviolent activists voluntarily risk imprisonment in the practice of "civil disobedience." But for increasing numbers imprisonment is not chosen, but imposed and barely endured--or not endured. Death is the price that some--too many--are compelled to pay for acting nonviolently upon their convictions. In other cases torture or prolonged incarceration (often without any charges) are the penalties extracted for beliefs or actions that offend the governmental authorities or powerful forces within a particular society.

For those of us who have not suffered such dreadful misfortune and who do not have to work in such a repressive environment, it may be difficult to imagine what takes place elsewhere. Moreover, we often tend to suffer from selective perception. We may judge a regime by its ideology rather than by its record. We may not wish to believe that our own government plays a role in the misfortune of others (or in some cases we may exaggerate the role of our own government). And so forth.

Michael Randle is a man who has himself endured imprisonment (fortunately not in the most brutal circumstances). He is also a man whose perceptions are not distorted by his political commitments and preferences. In judging fault he makes every effort to apply a uniform standard. The essay he has written on militarism and repression is a thought-provoking overview of these phenomena as they exist in the world today and of some of the factors which link them together. Necessarily his coverage is partial. He has shown some of the general trends and painted in some of the details. And he has summarized some significant recent research of relevance to his theme. His essay will not close discussion on this subject, but will, we hope, stimulate new awareness and further attention to this crucial topic.

In seeking to identify the social and political structures that underlie or may underlie militarism and repression and link them together, Randle has been especially concerned with imperialism in its various guises. He concludes that both capitalist and socialist states have engaged in imperialist practices and argues that this is largely the result of the fact that both pursue a similar form of industrialization--or rather "hyperindustrialization." If this analysis is correct then the attainment of a demilitarized and nonrepressive (or at least less repressive) world requires not only new social relations, but a new technology (along with the recuperation of some old technologies).

Michael Randle is on the side of the victims of violence (including some who eventually take up violence themselves). But he stresses that we are all the potential victims of the "violence system" with which we presently live. He does not believe that this violence system can be overcome by further violence and therefore urges us to form new alliances in a steadfast struggle to develop alternatives to presently accepted practices. *This is a struggle in some ways different from every previous struggle. It is a struggle to change the character of struggle itself as it is carried out in the political arena.* Therefore it requires that we abandon a great deal of what we think we "know" in order that we may try something new.

Until the day when a demilitarized world is achieved, nonviolent activists will have to struggle for needed change under conditions of violence and repression. ISTNA and Michael Randle dedicate the essay which follows to all those who are participating in this form of struggle, to the victims of this struggle, and to all who have supported them.

Beverly Woodward
ISTNA Coordinator

Boston
March, 1980

INTRODUCTION

The period since World War II has seen an arms race unprecedented in scope and intensity and a process of global militarization. One consequence, in conjunction to be sure with other factors, has been the proliferation of wars costing several million lives. Others have been the impoverishment and oppression of millions of people; the spread of military government, especially in the Third World; and the widespread erosion or suppression of liberties in the name of national security. It is this second set of consequences that is considered in this paper.

The usual rationale for undertaking the crippling burden of military preparations is to increase security and preserve the freedom or way of life of the country or countries concerned. Yet we see that, however powerful may be the reasons for building up military strength in any particular instance, the overall effect of the arms race and the transfer of arms and military technology to new areas of the world has been the threat to the very survival of the human species and the curtailment or loss of freedom. Clearly, alternatives to the military option have to be found.

The thesis in this paper is that militarism is related to repression at two main levels, the instrumental and the structural.

The instrumental level refers not only to the self-evident fact that the military in many countries are a major arm of repression, used directly to keep the population in

subjection and carry out repressive practices, but also to the way liberties are threatened or infringed upon in the very process of raising and maintaining armed forces by such practices as conscription, the enactment of special legislation related to military preparations restricting freedom of information and discussion, and the administration of discipline and military justice within the services.

The structural level refers to the way that militarism influences economic, social, and political life in such a way as to make coercion and repression more likely. Thus, in the Third World, militarism contributes to a cycle of impoverishment and dependence and has been a key factor in the spread of military rule. But, equally, the hyper-militarisation of the superpowers and their major allies helps to keep intact the unequal division of labour which operates at the global level and under which the major economic role of the Third World remains that of providing raw materials for the industrialised powers coupled with a degree of dependent industrial production.¹ This hyper-militarisation acts directly insofar as military intervention is used to prevent radical change in Third World countries; and it does so indirectly insofar as advanced militarism stimulates the demand for a high-energy industrial economy which can only function if there is a cheap and plentiful source of raw materials.

First, to define the terms. By militarism I refer to the mobilisation of people and resources for organised warfare. The form of this mobilisation and of military institutions varies from one society to another and in different historical eras. More and more,

however, militarism is taking the form of setting up or expanding industrial-type armies and other services using modern weapon systems, the prototype of which is to be found in the military institutions of industrial capitalism in the 19th century.²

I shall here be mainly concerned not so much with the existence of armed forces in various countries, for this is nearly universal, as with their dynamic expansion, the militarisation of the political economy, and the promotion of military values and ideology. It is this dynamic expansion of military capacity and ideology which constitutes, for many commentators, the essence of militarism. To quote Marek Thee:

Under the term 'militarism' I subsume such symptoms as the rush to armaments, the growing role of the military (understood as the military establishment) in national and international affairs, the use of force as an instrument of prevalence and political power, and the increasing influence of the military in civilian affairs.³

This formulation, however, overlaps with the definition I would propose for the related phenomenon of militarisation, namely, the extension of the military and of military organisation into civilian spheres, a process that has its apex in military rule.

I have not attempted any sophisticated measurement of the intensity of militarism in the various countries under discussion but have relied rather on such gross indicators as the military expenditure per capita, the number of soldiers per head of population, the existence

or otherwise of conscription and so on, and, in some cases, salient aspects of foreign policy.

I do refer in places to the degree of militarisation of internal security forces. Here there is a danger of tautology. In a highly repressive state, the security forces are, almost by definition, militarised. However, this militarisation, in the sense of the introduction of military technology and a military style of organisation and discipline, may also herald the onset of a more repressive society--and there are indications that such a process is at work today in most of the technologically advanced countries.

By repression I mean:

i) the use of government sanctions to deny basic human freedoms, such as the right to live; to have access to the basic necessities of life; to hold, discuss, and propagate opinions; and to associate with others to achieve social, economic, and political objectives.

ii) the use of inhuman sanctions such as torture for any objective whatsoever.

In speaking of repression, then, I am focussing on the specific sanctions and practices of governments rather than on the broader structures of oppression within society. Nevertheless, the latter are seen as being at the root of most repressive practices; and so considerable attention is given to them and to the way they are reinforced by militarism.⁴


PART I: MILITARISM AND REPRESSION-- A GENERAL SURVEY

That both militarism and repression are on the increase is not hard to establish; indeed, the danger is that familiarity with the facts may lead us to take them for granted. Some salient features are mentioned below.

GLOBAL MILITARISM

Global military spending is now put in the region of \$US 400,000 million a year.⁵ As Figure 1 below indicates, it has been increasing constantly throughout the century; and the rate of increase has been particularly rapid over the past two decades. If the present rate of increase continues, it is estimated that by the end of the century the world will spend annually in the region of \$US 1 million million at 1978 prices.⁶

Fig. 1 **World military expenditure, 1908-77 (constant 1973 prices)**
US \$ thousand million




Reprinted from Armaments or Disarmament?, SIPRI, 1978, p. 6.

By far the largest share of this expenditure in recent decades is accounted for by the two major powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. In the period 1960-75, they are estimated to have spent two thirds of the world's military outlays; the next tier of military powers--China, West Germany, the United Kingdom, and France--accounted for another 15%. This is to say that these six among them accounted for some 81% of total outlays over this period.⁷ More recently, their share of the total outlays has declined, to be taken up by Third World countries; though it still currently accounts for 74%.⁸

It is in the Third World in recent years that military expenditure has been increasing most rapidly. Thus, for the world as a whole, the annual rate of increase in military spending stands currently at 2.6%, whereas the figure for the Third World is 10.3%.⁹ Third World countries now account for 18% of world military expenditures, as compared to 9% in 1960.¹⁰ And, whereas military expenditures as a percentage of GNP have been declining in the industrial countries (from 7.22% in 1965 to 5.77% in 1974), in the Third World they show an increase (from 4.36% in 1965 to 5.33% in 1974).¹¹ Nor do these figures tell the whole story, for they do not take account of military grants or of foreign military bases in the Third World.

Figure 2 on the next page shows the graph of Third World military expenditure in the period 1963-1976, with a breakdown of the expenditures of the main regions concerned.



As the diagram shows, the rate of increase in military spending is far from equally distributed. The Middle East region accounts for approximately one third of the Third World's military expenditure (excluding China) and has tripled its military spending (in constant prices) in the past seven years.¹² Africa is another region where military expenditures are rapidly increasing.

There are also wide differences within each region in the rate of increase in military expenditure and the closely related figures for arms imports. Thus, in Latin America during the early 70's, six countries--Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Peru, and Venezuela--were responsible for 85% of the total arms purchases in the area.¹³

The bulk of military expenditure in the Third World takes the form of imports from the industrialised countries. About 75% of the current trade in major weapons is with the Third World, and this trade has increased five-fold in the past 13 years.¹⁴ The four main suppliers are the USA, USSR, the UK, and France, which among them supplied about 90% of the major weapons sold to the Third World between 1970 and 1977.¹⁵ Figure 3 below shows something of the pattern of distribution of arms transfers by the major suppliers.

Fig. 3 The four main arms suppliers to the Third World, 1970-76

Supplier	Per cent of world total	Three largest recipient regions	Region's per cent of supplier's total	Largest recipient country in each region	Country's per cent of supplier's total
USA	38	Middle East	62	Iran	31
		Far East	27	S. Vietnam	12
		S. America	7	Brazil	2
USSR	34	Middle East	57	Syria	23
		N. Africa	13	Libya	13
		Far East	13	N. Vietnam	7
UK	9	Middle East	49	Iran	26
		S. America	22	Chile	8
		South Asia	14	India	12
France	9	N. Africa	24	Libya	16
		Middle East	23	Egypt	5
		S. America	18	Venezuela	6

Source: SIPRI data

Taken from Armaments or Disarmament?, SIPRI, 1978, p. 20.

Another disturbing feature is the increase in the number of Third World countries which are producing major weapons, indigenously designed, under licence or in cooperation with other countries.¹⁶ There is also an increasing trade in major weapons among Third World countries, though it is as yet a very small proportion of the total arms transfers in the Third World.

Thus, we can summarise the situation by saying that it is the countries at the Centre that provide the dynamic of world military expansion; but that it is in the Third World that this expansion is most rapidly advancing and where some of the dire consequences of militarism are most clearly evident.

REPRESSION

The intensity of repression is harder to measure, since repression can take varied and subtle forms. It is clearly on the increase in much of the Third World, where it is strongly associated with military government. In the countries of the Centre, both capitalist and socialist, the picture is less clear. Compared with the Stalinist period in the Soviet Union and the McCarthyite period in the United States, there has been a degree of liberalisation in these states. But if one takes a shorter time span, say the last ten years, there have been disturbing tendencies: the persecution of dissidents in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe; the surveillance and infiltration of radical organisations in the United States during the Vietnam war; and the rapid development of surveillance and other population control technologies throughout the industrialised world.¹⁷

This repression is not necessarily linked to increasing militarism and militarisation. Sometimes it can be shown to be so directly. But, for the most part, it is probably more accurate to say that the increase in both militarism and repression is part of a broader development of systems of domination at the inter-state and intra-state level--of imperialism under various guises, and of capitalist and bureaucratic-statist structures.

MILITARISM AND REPRESSION--THE LINKS

It has to be said at the outset that there is not a one-for-one relationship between militarism and repression. That is to say, one cannot look at the extent of militarism in a given country--whether judged in terms of military expenditure as a percentage of the Gross National Product (GNP), the number of soldiers per head of population, or the size and sophistication of the weapons system--and draw any automatic conclusion about the intensity of repression there. The United States is more heavily armed and has a higher number of soldiers per head of population than Guatemala or Haiti or Indonesia; yet repression and social exploitation is far more intense in these countries than it is in the United States. There is a much closer correlation, certainly, between militarisation as defined above and repression, and especially between military government and repression; though military governments too vary greatly in character.¹⁸ *Militarism is only one of a number of factors which influence the political, economic, and social climate. What can be said is that that influence is a negative one and that it interacts with others to create or reinforce those situations in which repression occurs.*

There are some direct links between militarism and repression which are considered below under the heading of instrumental linkages. Some of these are an inevitable, or nearly inevitable, consequence of militarism; others come into play only under certain political and social conditions, though the argument that will be presented here is that intensive militarism acts at the structural level to promote those conditions.

a) The Instrumental Linkages

Indiscriminate Warfare

It can be argued that war itself is an act of repression, because it always involves depriving numbers of people of the fundamental right to live. There are problems, however, in extending the meaning of repression in this way, because war implies a clash between two or more armed groups both intent on imposing their will and a measure of destruction upon the other; if war is repression, it is repression in a special context and one which I will not in general be dealing with here. One would have to distinguish too between wars of aggression and wars of defence or liberation and take into consideration the complex moral and political problems that these distinctions imply.

Nevertheless, it is worth reminding ourselves that it is in war that historically the most massive violations of human rights have occurred. And when, as today in the industrialized countries, the civilian population of the opponent has become a central, or even the central, target in any future major war, there is a case for saying

that the war preparations in these circumstances are preparations for repression taken to the ultimate in horror and absurdity. Extreme repression is sometimes defined as a war conducted by a government against its own population. Today, preparations for war with weapons of mass destruction are approaching the level of a conspiracy by all the governments concerned against their respective populations. The distinction between repression and war in general may be worth retaining; but the distinction between repression and a war of mass extermination makes little sense.

Conscription

With the rise of militarism, conscription has become commonplace. It has spread to much of the Third World, with Japan and India being among the most important exceptions to the general trend. It is nearly universal in both Eastern and Western Europe, apart from Britain, which ended conscription in 1962, and the Irish Republic, which has never had conscription. Canada, too, does not have conscription; and the United States has ceased to implement the draft since the ending of the war in Vietnam. Conscription is so much a part of everyday life in many countries that it is sometimes a matter of surprise when it is raised at all in connection with human rights and repression. Yet conscription is a system of forced labour--in some respects the most pernicious form of it, for the labour it teaches men to perform is to kill under orders. It is frequently backed up by harsh sanctions against anyone who resists or attempts to evade it. In Italy in the 50's, harsh and repeated sentences were imposed on objectors; and in Greece today sentences of four years are not uncommon, and occasionally much heavier sentences

are passed.¹⁹ In France, the insoumis, or total resisters who refuse to recognize the right of the state to impose conscription, are treated as if they were already in the army and face trial by military courts--a practice that was followed by Britain during the first world war. Reports from Eastern Europe suggest that there, too, the punishments imposed on objectors are generally severe.²⁰

Attempts have been made to get the Council of Europe to adopt a charter governing the legislation within member states relating to conscientious objection, and there have also been attempts at the United Nations over many years to have conscientious objection recognised as a human right. Even if such measures were adopted, however, the problem would not be ended. What needs to be asserted is not simply that people have the right to refuse conscription, but that governments have no right to impose it in the first place.²¹

Creating the National Security State

I refer here to the conglomeration of laws and practices surrounding national security which intensifies and takes on a more repressive character as the militarism of the state advances. We can divide these roughly into measures designed to protect military and state secrets and installations against foreign enemies, and those aimed against internal unrest, rebellion or terrorism. In practice there is a considerable overlap between the two. Moreover, what is kept secret from the enemy is also kept secret from one's own population; and this not infrequently seems to be the main object.

Laws designed to protect official secrets are to be found in most modern states and are frequently framed in a very general way. They are sometimes used to curtail political expression and to protect from exposure corrupt and inefficient government practices. Thus, in Britain, the Official Secrets Acts, first introduced in 1911 in a wave of anti-German hysteria, have been used to curb discussion of military and foreign policy, to punish political demonstrators, and to throw a protective screen around the workings of the civil service and government departments.²² The affair of the Pentagon Papers in the United States, where the government failed to convict Daniel Ellsberg of any crime for his actions in releasing governmental documents to the press, would have been highly unlikely in Britain or probably anywhere in Europe.²³ In Eastern Europe too, State Security laws have been invoked to try to silence radical criticism and dissent.²⁴

In addition to laws governing the protection of state secrets, there are normally laws and practices relating to the wider concept of state security. These again can have the effect of curtailing civil liberties and are often introduced during wartime or in periods of heightened international tension. The most obvious and disturbing example today in Western Europe is the system of professional interdictions, the Berufsverbot, in the German Federal Republic, which is designed to prevent anyone whose loyalty to the overall capitalist-democratic system is in doubt from being employed in any branch of government service. Its effects are particularly repressive on law students, who are legally required as part of their training to spend

two years in the public service on completion of their studies; and thus, if they find themselves debarred under the Berufsverbot from working in the public service, they are unable to complete their qualifications and to take up their profession. Teachers, magistrates, and judges are among those who can be debarred from practising their professions.²⁵

Anti-terrorist laws and practices are a further extension of state security, and again their overall tendency over a number of years has been to curtail political expression within the capitalist democracies and to form an integral part of the machinery of repression in much of the Third World. In Britain, the Republic of Ireland, West Germany, and Italy, anti-terrorist laws have extended the powers of search, arrest, and detention. Statistics on how these laws have operated, as well as a number of individual cases, make alarming reading.²⁶

It is true that the actions of some of the urban guerrilla and terrorist groups, especially those operating in the context of the capitalist democracies where there is not the wholesale repression that one saw in the Shah's Iran or that one sees today in Indonesia or much of Latin America, are frequently ugly, cruel, and reactionary--reactionary in their consequences if not in their intention. Such groups share with the governments they oppose the assumption that it is permissible to hold human life in ransom in the pursuit of political objectives; and they must bear a heavy measure of responsibility for the militarisation of the

social conflict that has occurred and the consequent restriction of basic freedoms. Nevertheless, in most instances the heart of the problem is the failure of governments to remove chronic injustices or to allow the process of democratisation, in the economic as well as the political sphere, to advance beyond a certain point--usually the point where the fundamental interests of elites are seen to be threatened.²⁷ This failure in its turn is often related to the postures and attitudes resulting from the Cold War and the confrontation between capitalist and socialist (or state bureaucratic) powers.²⁸

Militarisation of Internal Security

The militarisation of internal security is closely related to the developments noted above and refers to the rapprochement of police and military roles, especially in those countries where traditionally they have been largely separated. The rapprochement has taken the form, partly under pressure of urban guerrilla activities, of joint police and military operations and the transfer of technologies for surveillance, data storage, and population control developed in the first instance by the military.²⁹ Potentially, at least, the threat to political freedom is a serious one.

The danger, moreover, is increased by other military and industrial developments. Nuclear power and reprocessing plants, for instance, because they could be the targets of guerrilla attack, require intensive and extensive security precautions, which could include security checks not only on the personnel working in them but on their friends and contacts. The Parker Commission in Britain, which examined the arguments for and against the extension of nuclear reprocessing facilities

at Windscale, drew attention to this potential threat to civil liberties, even though it came out in favour of the proposed extension.³⁰ The problem will be posed in an even more acute form if plans go ahead for NATO to deploy tactical nuclear weapons in depth in Europe.³¹

Repression Within the Military

This topic merits a separate and detailed study; but *in general one can safely say that the civil liberties of people within the military are curtailed, sometimes drastically so.* In many countries they are forbidden to form trade unions, to take any kind of strike or industrial action, or to communicate freely with the civilian population on political matters. Military courts, moreover, operate within their own set of rules; and people within the military may find themselves being tried under conditions where normal judicial procedures do not apply for actions which would not be criminal in civilian life. In an age of widespread conscription, this repression and denial of civil liberties within the armed forces is particularly important.

Another serious development is the introduction of 'suspect training' by a number of Western, and doubtless other, armies. Thus, in November, 1972, a Belgian military court convicted six Belgian soldiers of practising 'high pressure interrogation', including the use of physical assault and the infliction of 'auditory, electrical and emotional shocks' on other Belgian soldiers during the course of a NATO exercise. Amnesty International in its Report on Torture cited Belgium, West Germany, Holland, and Britain as countries that included suspect training in the instruction of their troops.³²

b) The Structural Linkages

The gist of the argument presented here is that repression is linked to the attempt, often resting on military force, to impose structures of domination and to resist change. At the inter-state level, the principal structure involved is imperialism under its various guises, and the creation of spheres of influence by the major powers. At the intra-state level, they include structures of domination based on class, sex, race, culture and region.

The situation can be described in terms of the concepts of Centre and Periphery. There are Centre nations--the major industrial powers--and Periphery nations--broadly speaking, the Third World and some of the less industrialised nations of Europe. But internally, too, the Centre and Periphery nations have a structure of centre and periphery based on access to power and wealth, as epitomised in the class system. The mechanism of imperialism has been developed by, among other things, promoting a harmony of interests between the elites of the Centre nations and the elites of the Periphery nations, and discouraging contacts or common action by the internal periphery groups.³³ *Military might played a central role in the process of imperial expansion and remains as an ultimate bulwark in maintaining it.*


Thus, success in the imperialist game, which includes the struggle for strategic advantage between major powers, still strongly depends on military might and the willingness in certain circumstances to employ it. The major powers must be ready to support their client governments and to intervene in various ways to protect their interests. This can involve the supplying of arms and military

advisers; the setting up of counter-insurgency programmes, such as those established under CIA auspices in Latin America and other parts of the Third World; the fostering of coups, uprisings, and invasions; the use of intimidation and assassination, as well as more subtle methods of infiltration and political manipulation; and the de-stabilisation of 'unfriendly' governments. Finally, there is the ultimate sanction of war and invasion--the American war in Vietnam, or the Soviet intervention in Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

But militarism also plays a role at other structural levels in promoting imperialist systems. One such level derives from the fact that militarism at the Centre requires and promotes just that kind of high-energy, high-resource-consuming economy which in turn cannot prosper without the existence of a hinterland, or periphery, whose central role is to provide raw materials, including sources of energy. That was of course the role imposed on the Third World during the period of imperialist expansion in the 19th century; and, though today direct political control in the form of colonial government has virtually disappeared, the economic pattern remains largely intact. The interconnections are suggested in the diagram, Figure 4, on the next page.

Exactly how important a role the arms race plays in furthering hyper-industrialisation in the economies of the Centre is a more difficult question. Perhaps even without the post-war arms race, the pace and direction of technological change would not have been very different. Japan, for instance, which in the strategic sense has been demilitarised, has developed technologically in much the same way as the militarised super-powers; on the other hand, it was the latter

Fig. 4 The Militarism--Hyper-industrialism--Imperialism Cycle



who dictated the rules of the game, and Japan was bound to develop in the same direction if it wished to compete in the international market. *What can be confidently asserted is that neither of the superpowers could undertake substantial measures of de-industrialisation, or even turn aside from a new quantum leap forward in hyper-industrialisation based on nuclear power and high-technology innovations, without disqualifying itself from military competitiveness with its major rival. In effect, the arms race precludes serious consideration by the major powers of an alternative technological and economic development; yet this issue is a crucial one if the present structures of international economic domination are to be*

*dismantled and if serious ecological hazards are to be avoided.*³⁴

We should note that the problem is not one uniquely associated with a capitalist organisation of economic and social relations. Any major power, however thoroughly socialised its internal economic organisation, may act in a narrow self-interested way in relation to other national and economic units, including other socialist states and the countries of the Third World in general. If such a power sets itself on a course of hyper-industrialisation, then sooner or later, as its national resources diminish, it is almost certain to become parasitical upon the raw-material-producing areas and to enter the arena of imperialist rivalries.

At the present time the Soviet Union has vast natural resources and is the world's leading oil producer. Its international ambitions to establish spheres of influence outside its own territory may be more strongly motivated by strategic and ideological considerations (which have never been absent from any imperialist expansion); but, in the long term, economic considerations are certain to be a factor and may indeed already be playing a role. China, too, as it turns aside from the Maoist notions of a self-reliant economy and seeks the co-operation of the capitalist powers in a crash programme of heavy industrial development and the modernisation of its military machine, can hardly avoid becoming in its turn an imperialist (or hegemonic) power.

It is instructive to recall that the world's leading industrial power, the United States, has become increasingly dependent on outside sources for its raw materials, in spite

of the development of domestic primary production in many commodities. Up to the mid 40's, the United States was largely self-reliant in oil. Since then, it has come to rely more and more heavily on foreign oil supplies, first from Venezuela and Canada and then from the Middle East, a fact which has had tangible repercussions on its foreign policy--for instance, its attempt to create a sub-imperial power in the Shah's Iran which would act as 'policeman' in the Middle East area. The increasing dependence of the United States on imported minerals is shown in the table, Figure 5, below.

Source: Data are derived from publications of the U.S. Department of the Interior

Projected

U.S. Dependence on Imported Minerals		Percentage Imported		
	1950	1970	1985*	2000*
Aluminum	64	85	96	98
Chromium	Not Available	100	100	100
Copper	31	0	34	56
Iron	8	30	55	67
Lead	39	31	62	67
Manganese	88	95	100	100
Nickel	94	90	88	89
Phosphate	8	0	0	2
Potassium	14	42	47	61
Sulfur	2	0	28	52
Tin	77	Not Available	100	100
Tungsten	Not Available	50	87	97
Zinc	38	59	72	84

Fig. 5 Reprinted from *Towards a More Human World Order*, Gerald and Patricia Mische, Paulist Press, 1977, p. 129.

In a planned economy, some of the grosser instances of waste that have accelerated this process of increasing dependence could be avoided. But the basic dynamic is the same: hyper-industrialisation runs down the domestic sources of essential raw materials, forcing the major industrial power concerned to seek outside sources, and thus re-inforces a global pattern

of domination in which the Third World is assigned the principal role of raw material producer.³⁵ And the arms race contributes to this situation, not only because of the quantity of raw material and energy consumed directly in the process of military production and deployment, but more centrally because the arms race in its present form could not continue without the base of high-technology economies.

The pattern has domestic social implications, some of which have an important bearing on civil liberties. If there is a major development of nuclear power to meet the increasing energy needs--a programme envisaged as much in the Soviet Union as in the capitalist countries--security precautions, including surveillance and the monitoring of political activities of widening circles of the civilian population, will be necessary; this has already been noted in the previous section and has not escaped the attention of official inquiries into the implications of developing nuclear power.³⁶ More generally we can say that the high-energy economies of the hyper-industrialised nations are extremely vulnerable to technical sabotage in key areas, such as energy production; to industrial action; and even to simple breakdowns. In these circumstances, we can expect to see the function of the military as a reserve labour force being given greater prominence. Technical developments in the military sphere, especially the miniaturisation of very powerful weapons and their deployment in depth, also necessitate increased security and surveillance.

So far, we have considered some of the structural implications of militarism at the Centre. We can summarise the situation by saying that it makes the Centre more dependent, in the role of exploiter, on the Third World. Conversely, militarism in the Third World, or Periphery, makes it more dependent, in the role of exploited, on the industrialised Centre. And, because in the Third World there is normally much less room to manoeuvre economically, the political consequences there of militarism are felt more acutely and more rapidly.

Let us summarise the process. A major task in the Third World is to develop self-reliant economies, by, for instance, breaking away from single-crop or single-commodity production which meet the needs of the Centre rather than domestic needs.³⁷ Building up military strength almost invariably involves the importing of arms and related technology from the industrialised nations and paying in currency acceptable to them. Broadly speaking, such 'hard' currency has to be earned by selling goods and services on the international market, that is to say, those goods and services that are required by the economies of the Centre--cash crops, raw materials, migrant labour, tourist facilities. To this list one should probably add that of supplying cheap labour in situ to multinational companies, under whose auspices a kind of dependent industrialisation is taking place in many Third World countries. Thus, the traditional pattern is reinforced and the Periphery countries move even further away from developing a balanced, self-reliant economy.

There are further effects. Extending the area under cash crops is likely to take place at the expense of the majority of peasants and


small farmers in the immediate locality by making inroads into traditional subsistence agriculture. At the same time, especially if the process takes place in a capitalist setting, local elites are established or strengthened and the gap between rich and poor is widened. Similar elites are created in the urban centres by the process of dependent industrialisation. These elites, often culturally conditioned by the values and ideology of the Centre, tend to develop a broad harmony of interests (though not, of course, an identity of interests) with the elites of the Centre. We then have the classic mechanism, as analysed by Galtung and others, for the maintenance of the imperialist system.

Again, one should not exaggerate the role of militarism in this process; the process is occurring anyway, even in Third World countries where military expenditure is not excessive. Nevertheless, there are good reasons for seeing militarism as one of the central contributory factors in the overall process. Thus, military and related equipment can account for as much as one third of the cost of all imports into Third World countries.³⁸ Moreover, most Third World countries are dependent on the supplier country for servicing and maintaining sophisticated military equipment; for training personnel to use it; and to some degree on providing the infra-structure, in the form of roads, bridges, airfields, military complexes and so on, that are required to deploy it. In this way, long-term dependencies are established.

The links between the process described above and the onset of repressive military rule

are not hard to trace. The widening gap between rich and poor *causes* political unrest, while at the same time resources that could have been used to develop a balanced economy and provide some welfare services have been squandered on the military. The latter are now in a powerful position to intervene to 'save the nation from chaos', and to impose law and order within the existing internal and international framework. Trade unions, political parties, individuals, and even whole classes may then face harassment and persecution, insofar as they are seen as posing a threat to public order. Thus we can speak of a Poverty-Repression-Militarisation Cycle, as illustrated in the diagram, Figure 6, below.

Fig. 6



Reprinted from *Bombs for Breakfast*, Committee on Poverty and the Arms Trade, London, 1978, p. 19.

More and more Third World countries are becoming involved in domestic arms production as part of the drive towards industrialisation and import substitution. Figure 7 below shows the Third World countries engaged in the production of major weapons; the number producing small arms is of course far greater.

Fig. 7

Production of major weapons and components in the Third World, 1977

	Military aircraft	Guided missiles	Armoured fighting vehicles	Warships	Military Electronics	Aero-engines
Argentina	X	X	X	X		X
Brazil	X	X	X	X	X	X
Colombia	X			X		
Egypt	X	X				X
India	X	X	X	X	X	X
Indonesia	X			X		
Iran	X	X				
Israel	X	X	X	X	X	X
N. Korea	X			X		
S. Korea	X			X		
Mexico	X			X		
Pakistan	X	X	X	X		
Papua New Guinea	X					
Peru	X			X		
Philippines	X	X	X	X		
Singapore				X	X	
S. Africa	X	X	X	X	X	X
Taiwan	X	X		X		
Venezuela				X		

Source: SIPRI data

Taken from *Armaments or Disarmament?*, SIPRI, 1978, p. 21. Note that China is excluded from the list because it is treated as an industrialised power.

However, a good deal of military production in the Third World is carried out under licence from, and by subsidiaries of, firms based in the Centre; and some of these firms are rationalising their production on a global basis by having components produced in various countries for a single weapon in order to make the maximum use

of locally available assets.³⁹ In the case of Third World countries, the most attractive asset tends to be a cheap and disciplined labour force that has been deprived by an authoritarian government of the legal right to organise genuine trade unions or to take industrial action. Arms production under such conditions in Third World countries only reinforces the dominance structure of the Centre.

The attempt to establish domestic production of major weapons can prove even costlier than purchasing them from the industrialised countries. The Third World country has to import expensive capital equipment and has to continue, for the most part, to rely on the research and development work carried out at the Centre. This dependence is part of a larger process. Even within the industrialised Centre, military production represents one of the growth points of high technology; and when this technology is implanted in a Third World country, the technological gap between production in the military sphere and industrialised production as a whole becomes very wide. Thus, the Centre has to be relied on to underpin the high technology in the military production sector.

However, producing major weapons can be part of the process of becoming a junior partner, or sub-imperial centre, in the capitalist dominance system, involving the export of arms to other Third World countries, acting as armed policeman for capitalist interests in the region, and sharing in the process of transferring resources from Periphery

to Centre. This was the role staked out for Iran until the Shah was ousted by a popular rebellion; and it is being played today by such countries as Brazil, Argentina, and the Philippines.

A further, and in some ways related, level of imperialist penetration derives from the character of modern weaponry and the interaction between technology and social structure. This is an argument developed by the British marxist scholar, Mary Kaldor.⁴⁰ Part of this thesis can be summarised as follows. 'The dominant military technology today is the "weapon system", comprising a weapon platform (e.g., a ship, aircraft, or armoured vehicle), a weapon (e.g., gun, missile, or torpedo), and a means of command or control.' This weapon system was developed in the context of 19th century industrial capitalism and designed for the disciplined, hierarchical armies of the time--the 'industrial type' army.

Whereas formerly, the weapon was the instrument of the soldier, the soldier now appears to be the instrument of the weapons system. The resulting organisation is hierarchical, atomistic and dehumanising. It reflects the importance accorded to industrial products, particularly machines, in society as a whole. Furthermore, the weapons systems are themselves ranked and subdivided into an hierarchical military organisation, minimising the possibilities for individual or small group action. At the apex of the American or British navy is the aircraft carrier, justifying aircraft to operate from its decks, destroyers, frigates and submarines to defend it, and supply ships to replenish it. The bomber and battle tank have similar functions in the air force and army.⁴¹

Thus, the introduction of modern military technology can institute a process of profound change, affecting in the first instance the 'relations of force', i.e., military organisation and recruitment; and, beyond that, the broader social and economic structures.⁴²

Industrialisation and modernisation of a particular kind may well be stimulated by the importation of modern weapons and the establishment of domestic military production, as the examples of Brazil, Taiwan, and Iran suggest. But, while few would question the importance of a measure of industrialisation in Third World countries with little in the way of an industrial base, the direction and degree of industrial development is crucial. Industrialisation can result in the reproduction in an exaggerated form of the worst features of capitalist development: the impoverishment of peasants and rural workers; intensified exploitation of the workforce; and the concentration of production not on products that would raise the living standards of the majority of people, but on arms and luxuries for export and for the benefit of the local elite. In practice, it is just this kind of development that is stimulated by or derived from the establishment of a high-technology military production; Brazil and Argentina would again be good examples.⁴³

Much of the analysis outlined above applies in particular to the capitalist Periphery in the Third World. How far does it apply in the case of the socialist Third World states such as Cuba and Vietnam? The mechanism and effects are not identical, especially where there has been a significant collectivisation of agriculture and the weakening or elimination of the landed

elite. Nevertheless, a substantial military buildup, depending heavily on imported modern technology, creates dependencies and long-term problems for socialist Third World countries, just as it does for their capitalist neighbors. As I argued in an earlier footnote (Footnote 42), the hope that these countries would be able to develop an alternative, more self-reliant form of defence, based on their experience in the use of guerrilla warfare, has not in general been fulfilled, certainly not in the case of Cuba and Vietnam, and, in the case of China, even less so.

A high military budget cannot but result in a more intensive exploitation of the peasants and workers--or, at any rate, a sacrifice on their part, willingly or otherwise, of a proportion of the fruits of their labour and a diminution in the capital available for economic growth. It may well also accelerate the growth in the power of a bureaucratic elite and the intensification of repression not only of bourgeois and other privileged elements, but of groups of peasants and workers rebelling against economic hardships.⁴⁴ The problems are exacerbated by the fact that, in general, the socialist countries try to incorporate the trade unions into the governmental bureaucracy rather than to allow genuinely autonomous organisations; and this tendency can give rise to a situation analagous to that existing in right-wing capitalist countries where the labour force is disciplined and regimented.

It should not of course be forgotten that both Cuba and Vietnam were subjected to sanctions and military aggression at various levels by the United States and other capitalist powers, and that consequently these powers bear

a heavy responsibility for militarisation and its social consequences in these countries. Nevertheless, this has not been the only factor contributing to militarism in Cuba and Vietnam. Cuba has shown itself prepared not only to give verbal support to Soviet intervention against another socialist state, i.e., against Czechoslovakia in 1968, but to be a military partner with the Soviet Union in its strategic ambitions in the Third World. I refer to the Soviet/Cuban intervention in Ethiopia in support of a bloody military dictatorship, albeit one that professes a marxist ideology, and its attempt to crush Eritrean rebels whose cause was formerly espoused by the Soviet Union and other socialist states.⁴⁵ Then there have been the recent (1979) tragic and shameful events in Indochina: Vietnam's invasion of its communist pro-Chinese neighbour, Kampuchea (Cambodia), and the continued presence there at the time of writing (March 1979) of an estimated 100,000 - 120,000 of its regular forces, and the subsequent 'punitive invasion' of Vietnam by China. In these events, where the interests of the capitalist powers were not directly involved, one can see clearly how strategic and inter-imperialist ambitions among rival communist powers, including a willingness to exploit traditional enmities such as that between Vietnam and Cambodia, can contribute to militarism, war and repression. The events in Indochina too have been characterised by the ugliest kind of chauvinist, militaristic and hypocritical propaganda.⁴⁶

*Dismantling capitalist structures of domination, domestic and transnational, is essential for Third World countries, not simply in most cases to effect some desirable but inessential improvement in living standards, but also to avoid continued widespread hunger, sickness and premature death.*⁴⁷

*This does, I think, imply socialism--but it equally implies avoiding the re-emergence within a socialist (or at any rate non-capitalist) framework of new structures and forms of domination and repression based on bureaucratic party and government machines that are not accessible to popular control, on the arbitrary administration of justice, and on international structures of hegemony and imperialism. We should not evade the fact that cruel tyrannies can be established within a non-capitalist, as within a capitalist, framework, and that the brutal excesses of regimes such as those of Stalin in the Soviet Union, of Mengistu in Ethiopia, and, it appears, of Pol Pot in Kampuchea, bear comparison with the record of some of the worst right-wing military dictatorships. Moreover, events such as the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Soviet/Cuban support for the war in Ethiopia against the Eritrean rebellion, and the wars between communist states in Indochina, indicate that militarism, war and imperialism cannot be designated in some simple way as solely the product of the capitalist system. Radicals who deny or deliberately play down the fact of repression, militarism and imperialism in the non-capitalist world do a disservice to the cause of socialism, for they contribute to a situation in which socialism is equated with regimentation and repression, rather than with, to use Marx's own phrase, 'a society in which the full and free development of every individual becomes the ruling principle'.*⁴⁸

These, then, in the barest and inevitably oversimplified outline, are some of the principal ways in which militarism acts to consolidate structures of domination and thus leads to more intensive and extensive repression. In the following sections I will look at some of these factors in more detail. To conclude this outline,

however, I refer to an empirical study by Jan Oberg of the arms trade as an aspect of imperialism.⁴⁹ Oberg examines such evidence as the extent to which the major arms suppliers have established monopolies, or near monopolies, in particular Third World countries; the degree to which there is a relationship between a pattern of dominance/dependence in the arms trade and trade in general; and the size of the arms trade by the four main suppliers (the United States, the Soviet Union, France, and Britain) to their major Third World clients as a proportion of their total exports to these countries. (Interestingly, he finds no reason to exclude the Soviet Union from the judgement that the Arms Trade with the Third World is part of a pattern of economic dominance and even shows that in certain respects this pattern is stronger in the case of the Soviet Union than it is for some of the other powers; for instance, the Soviet arms trade with its main Third World clients is a considerably higher proportion of its total exports to these countries than is the case for the United States, France or Britain). He summarises as follows his main conclusions:

The overall conclusion is that AT arms trade grows out of the global dominance structure; it is not only related to political or purely military matters but also to economic structures. In the future AT will expand through military-industrial subimperialists, i.e. a number of peripheral countries will import the sophisticated materials together with resources for their own production of more conventional equipment which they will export part of to their peripheries. In other words, a quite new division of labour in terms of world military production is emerging, and surely it will serve central as well as subimperialist interests but not true socio-economic development for the periphery of the periphery. The problems of control thus, are far more complicated than anticipated in previous studies. Isolated proposals like talks, agreements, UN control etc. will not be efficient unless the fundamental structure of international society undergoes changes towards greater justice and equality.⁵⁰ (Emphasis in original)

PART II: MILITARISM AND REPRESSION AT THE CENTRE

The Cold War in the 40's and 50's froze political developments in Europe and sealed the fate of the East European countries. These countries had fallen within the Soviet sphere of influence as agreed by the major powers at Yalta, but the decision to turn them into client Soviet states to form a bulwark against possible Western (and particularly German) encroachment was certainly influenced by the mounting distrust between the Soviet Union and the Western allies in the immediate post-war period.⁵¹ All the belligerent speeches by U.S. and Western militarists, statesmen and politicians about liberating the countries under Soviet domination and such actions as the re-arming of Germany and the formation of NATO had the effect of increasing repression in Eastern Europe, as Stalin began to eliminate all those communist leaders, like Slansky in Czechoslovakia, whom he felt could not be completely relied upon to follow the Moscow line. In the West, too, the consequences of the Cold War were uniformly retrogressive: the denigration of peace and radical movements, and the rise of hysterical anticommunism, particularly during the McCarthyite period in the United States.

Much controversy centres on the question of which of the two superpowers, the United States or the Soviet Union, should be held primarily responsible for the outbreak of the Cold War. But, given the ascendancy of military thinking on both sides, given the brutality of the Stalinist dictatorship, and given the consensus widely shared among both politicians and people in the West following the defeat of Hitler that dictatorships had to be confronted by armed might, the chances of

*avoiding the Cold War were not great. They were considerably diminished when the Truman administration took office in the United States and a new aggressive attitude was adopted in the handling of foreign affairs.*⁵²

Today the Cold War battlefield has shifted from Europe to the Third World, where a struggle involving China as well as the United States and the Soviet Union is taking place to determine spheres of influence and to establish or maintain client states. Through interventions, subversion, and economic exploitation it is the people of the Third World who are being compelled to pay the main price of this struggle. In Europe the situation has been stabilised; not only are the boundaries of the East/West influence clearly established, but the limits of action by either side are understood. The United States and the Western powers will not take military action over a future Hungary or Czechoslovakia, just as the Soviet Union for its part will not interfere (at any rate militarily) in any manipulation or intervention by the United States to keep communist or radical governments out of power in Western Europe.

*One can even detect an element of collusion between the super-powers in maintaining a kind of controlled confrontation. This enables them both to maintain a position of dominance over their respective allies and provides them with a rationale for keeping in check dangerous political and social developments. To some extent it even makes it less likely that such developments will occur--for, faced with real or imagined external threats, societies tend to close ranks against radical innovation.*⁵³ *Thus, the threat from NATO provided the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact powers with a rationale for*

the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, just as the Soviet threat has been advanced in justification for U.S. and Western support of pro-capitalist dictatorships--in Spain, Portugal, and Greece in the recent past and in much of the Third World today--and for military intervention and war, as in Vietnam.

Genuine detente and disarmament would threaten dominance structures at many levels. There would be a strengthening of demands for more open and democratic government in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, a loosening of imperialist bonds such as those between the United States and much of Latin America, possibly a resurgence of nationalism in some of the Soviet republics, the need for a drastic re-structuring of the economies in both East and West to allow for the dismantling of the military-industrial-bureaucratic complexes, and perhaps a greater demand in the West for more industrial democracy and the removal of some of the worst injustices of the capitalist system. Whatever the precise effects, de-militarisation would set off a chain of events that are bound to be seen as a threat by those who have learnt to understand and manipulate the existing structures.

If this analysis is correct, it would explain the caution, dilatoriness and evasion that has marked the disarmament negotiations between the major powers for so long. Even this is to put the matter too positively; for, to all intents and purposes, there have been no negotiations on disarmament since 1964, when the talks at Geneva, initiated by the U.N. in 1961, virtually petered out. Since then, negotiations and agreements have focussed on the narrower objective of arms limitations.

Some of the agreements reached, like the Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963) and the Non-proliferation Treaty (1968), have a limited value. Most, however, are seriously flawed; and some have to be regarded as window-dressing. The non-proliferation treaty has the effect of allowing the superpowers to maintain their position of nuclear supremacy in relation to the rest of the world, since the provisions of the treaty under which the major powers undertook to act as quickly as possible to halt the nuclear arms race and to bring about nuclear disarmament have become a dead letter. The Partial Test Ban Treaty was not signed by France or China and permits the continuation of underground testing and thus the development of smaller weapons for battlefield use. The Antarctic Treaty (1959), the Outer Space Treaty (1967), and the Sea Bed Treaty (1971) ban weapons from environments that many observers suggest are of little military interest. Similarly, the bilateral SALT I agreements (1972) covering anti-ballistic missiles and ballistic missile launchers have a dubious value, since they have not halted the research into and development of new systems of anti-missile defence, while the upper limit set on the numbers of ballistic missile launchers actually allowed for an increase in the deployment of these weapons.⁵⁴

The United Nations Special Session on Disarmament (1978), which I discuss later, has injected some new life into the subject of disarmament and led to a strengthening of the U.N. machinery for disarmament negotiations. But the record of the major powers is overall a dismal one, and the agreements that have been reached are in no way commensurate with the urgency and scale of the problem. Their effect, broadly speaking, has been to confirm the

military preponderance of the superpowers while setting some limits on the economic burden of the arms race which has become too enormous even for these powers to bear. Insofar as agreements have reduced risks or limited militarisation in certain fields, they are to be welcomed. *But radical action for disarmament is only likely to come as a result of action from below--from the people more than from their governments; from the non-aligned nations, rather than from those nations involved in military alliances; in a word, from the peripheries of one kind or another, rather than from the centres.* It is interesting to note in this respect that the U.N. Special Session on Disarmament came about mainly as a result of the initiative of 77 non-aligned countries and the support and encouragement of a host of non-governmental organisations.

THE ECONOMICS OF MILITARISATION AT THE CENTRE

The economic consequences of disarmament, especially for the U.S. and its major capitalist allies, is an issue of debate. It is frequently suggested, for instance, that the major capitalist economies depend for their regulation and stability on a permanent arms race.

It is true that, particularly in the U.S., military production and associated research and development occupy a key sector in the high-technology area of the economy. This makes it a particularly useful instrument for stimulating production during periods of economic depression; conversely, it means that a sudden cutback in military production is likely to have a depressive effect on the whole economy. In other words,

if a government in the United States wishes to boost the economy through a bout of public spending, the field of military production is a particularly effective area in which to act, even though the longer-term effects of this expenditure are inflation, cutbacks in social services and reconstruction programmes, and, in all probability, an intensification of exploitation at home and abroad. In the end, there is no escape from the detrimental effects of excessive military expenditures, even though some of the burden may be transferred abroad, for instance by foreign arms sales. The United States is still paying a high price for the war in Vietnam and the diversion of human and material resources that accompanied it.

So, while disarmament and demilitarisation would require careful economic planning and a considerable restructuring of the major capitalist economies, its longer-term effects could only be beneficial. In the short term it could cause dislocation, but it is doubtful that it would automatically entail the collapse of the capitalist system--much as one might wish that that were so. Economic collapse is indeed more likely if disarmament is not achieved.⁵⁵ On the other hand, there are certainly by now powerful vested interests within both power blocs that will oppose the outbreak of a genuine peace.

Arms sales abroad do benefit the seller in exactly the same way as does the sale of any other commodity and may thus partially offset domestic military spending and help to make good deficits in the balance of payments. Thus, British, French, and United States arms sales to oil-producing countries has eased the burden of the increased oil prices. It is worth noting, too, that over the past twenty years the United States

practice on arms transfers has shifted away from grants towards sales. U.S. military aid fell from a high point of \$5.7 billion in 1952 to under \$600 million in recent years, while in the same period arms sales rose steeply, reaching \$1 billion for the first time in 1966, averaging \$1.8 billion in the early 70's, and reaching \$4 billion in 1975.⁵⁶



Escaro in *Le Canard Enchaîné*, Paris

THE IMPERIALIST FACTOR

No final assessment of the total impact of military expenditure on the economies of the Centre powers and of the superpowers in particular is possible without taking into account the imperialist factor, that is, the extent to which the export of arms and military technology to the Third World affects such things as trade patterns, investments, and access to minerals and other resources.

Jan Oberg's study, referred to earlier, examines statistics for the four leading exporters of major weapons to the Third World--the United States, the Soviet Union, France, and Britain--during the period 1968-73.⁵⁷ It suggests that the arms trade with the Third World is an important lever in maintaining the dominance of the Centre powers over their clients, for instance, by strengthening trade monopolies; but it does not support the suggestion that this arms trade in itself contributes in a major way to the national economies of the Centre countries or significantly offsets the burden of their military expenditures. Thus, income from major weapons exports to the Third World as a percentage of defence expenditures amounted to only 0.87% for the United States, and 1.09% for the Soviet Union; they are slightly higher in the case of France and Britain, namely 2.13% and 2.14%, respectively. As a proportion of Gross National Product (GNP), this trade amounts to an even smaller proportion for all four countries; and, as a percentage of total exports, it is really only of significance in the case of the Soviet Union, where it amounts to 4.45%.

The figures take on more significance when one examines the arms trade as a percentage, not of the overall trade of the Centre powers, but

specifically of their trade with the Third World. In the case of the Soviet Union this figure is 19.85%; for the United States, 4.94%; for France, 4.00%; and for Britain, 3.29%. But the dominance structure really only becomes apparent if one isolates the most important clients of these arms-exporting powers and examines the pattern of economic relationships between them.

Oberg takes the top ten arms clients of each power.⁵⁸ Their significance to the Centre can be measured by the fact that they represent in the case of the United States 87% of its exports of major weapons to the Third World; in the case of the Soviet Union 97%; and in the case of France and Britain, 73% and 71%, respectively. Among Oberg's findings are:

- * There is in general a strong concentration of supplier power in the area of arms transfers, in the sense that peripheral clients are usually dependent on one supplier and this supplier often holds a monopoly position for arms deliveries over a long period (where monopoly is taken to mean 50% or more).
- * There is a strong correlation between the arms trade and trade in general when the ten most important clients of the suppliers are considered, particularly as measured by the importance for the client country of imports from and exports to the country supplying arms. As regards the suppliers, the ranking of their ten most important arms clients on their general exports index tends to be less significant, except in the case of the Soviet Union where the arms trade and trade in general are most closely integrated.

* Arms exports form a substantial proportion of the total exports from the supplier countries to their ten major clients. They amount to 16.1% for the United States, 12.2% for France, 10.6% for Britain, and a staggering 34.7% for the Soviet Union.⁵⁹

Other areas that Oberg investigates are the relationship between the arms trade and foreign private investment (as it applies to the U.S., France, and Britain), and the arms trade and the extraction of resources.

Concerning the first of these, Oberg concludes that the arms trade and foreign investments are not closely related to each other when focussing on the overall pattern. However, if one isolates those peripheral countries in which a single investor accounts for 50% or more of the total investments (again defined as a monopoly situation), some remarkable combinations of economic and military control are found.⁶⁰ In total, 50% of all arms trade monopolies of the U.S., France, and Britain are also investment monopolies.

Finally, on the relationship between the arms trade and the extraction of raw materials, Oberg concludes that 'in general it is hardly possible to maintain that major weapons are primarily traded in order to secure raw materials and energy supplies to the centres'.⁶¹ There are correlations for particular countries and particular products, in connection especially with Britain and to a lesser extent France. In the crucial area of oil, Oberg draws up a list of ten major oil-exporting countries which account among them for 70% of world oil reserves and 50% of world production.⁶² He shows that 30% of French and 48% of British major weapons

exports to the Third World in the period 1968-73 went to oil producers in this table, and points out that Britain had negotiated a number of arms-for-oil deals. However, none of the oil producers in the table ranked higher than 10 in the major weapon export indexes of the United States, apart from Iran which ranked third in this table. In the case of the Soviet Union, Iraq ranked 6 and Libya 9 in the index of Soviet major weapons exports to the Third World.

Since Oberg made his study, concerted action by the oil-exporting countries has resulted in major increases in oil prices; and it would be interesting to investigate whether there has been a significant alteration in the pattern of arms exports to oil-producing countries such as would support, for instance, the allegation that the U.S. deliberately promotes arms sales in these countries to offset the rise in oil prices. If the pattern has not changed significantly, this would suggest that, while the U.S. does benefit from the sale of arms to oil-producing countries, its policy is influenced more by political and strategic considerations, including, of course, longer-term economic calculations regarding access to raw materials. This would accord with Oberg's own overall conclusion concerning this aspect of the arms trade:

Our hypothesis concerning such research would be that the Arms Trade does not serve as payment for resources but rather as a potential for central control over the military capability for the most important producers and exporters of raw materials in the Third World, like the Philippines, Zaire, Peru, Brazil, Malaysia, Nigeria, South Africa, Jamaica, Zambia, Bolivia and Thailand - not to forget the oil-producing Arab countries.⁶³

To summarise, then, the overall importance of the imperialist factor, one can say that, insofar as militarism helps the Centre powers to maintain or extend their international structures of domination and thus brings tangible long- and sometimes short-term economic benefits to them, it may justify itself economically, or at any rate partially so. However, insurrection, instability, or the success of the rival imperialist power in wresting away established clients can upset this picture. Insofar, however, as it is valid, its meaning is that excessive military expenditure by the Centre powers is in part linked to continued or intensified exploitation of the periphery countries. This once again suggests that the initiative to break the deadlock over disarmament and bring about the dismantling of imperialist and hegemonic structures is likely to come from the peripheries at various levels: from non-aligned governments, especially in the Third World; and from non-governmental organisations and movements generally which do not see their interests as being identical with those of their governments and elites.

TRENDS IN IMPERIALISM

Opposing imperialism effectively requires some notion of its manifestations and development. I want at this point to outline the perspective taken in this essay.

To consider imperialism simply as a stage in the development of capitalism is in my view unsatisfactory because it leaves out of account the systems of international domination that preceded the rise of capitalism and that, in the case of the Soviet Union and possibly China, have succeeded it. I argued in the first part

of this essay that socialist nation states, like capitalist firms, could pursue policies of narrow self-interest in their relations with other states, both capitalist and socialist. Thus, in the post-war period, the Stalin government in the Soviet Union exploited the economies of Eastern Europe, including, paradoxically, those countries that were industrially more advanced than itself--namely, East Germany and Czechoslovakia.

Today, Soviet domination is largely military and political in character and arises from its overwhelming military strength; its dominant position in the Warsaw Pact alliance; and its willingness, as shown by the invasion of Czechoslovakia, to intervene militarily in Eastern Europe if any of the Warsaw Pact countries step too far out of line. But, at the economic level, the pattern has altered considerably since the death of Stalin. Johan Galtung, the Norwegian peace researcher whose study of imperialist structures has strongly influenced the perspective taken in this essay, suggests that today countries like the German Democratic Republic, insofar as they use raw materials provided by the Soviet Union and exchange more highly processed goods in return, have achieved a degree of economic ascendancy over the Soviet Union.⁶⁴ I do not know how far that constitutes an accurate picture of the overall economic relations between the Soviet Union and the industrially more advanced countries of Eastern Europe, but it points to the possibility at least of complex patterns of domination and counter-exploitation between two or more partners.

It underlines also the need to distinguish among different types of domination. Galtung suggests five types: economic, political,

military, communication, and cultural. Normally, these tend to work in conjunction and to reinforce one another; clearly, for instance, the United States exercises a degree of dominance in all five areas in its relationship with several countries in its Latin American periphery. Dominance at one level, for instance at the military, can be converted to dominance at other levels, for instance, at the economic and cultural; but Galtung insists that it would be a mistake to accord primacy to any one type of imperialism or to believe that imperialism can be dispensed with if one element, such as private capitalism, is abolished.

It is the mutual reinforcement, the positive feedback between these types rather than any simple reductionist causal chain that seems the dominant characteristic. If economic, political, and military imperialism seem so dominant today, this may be an artifact due to our training that emphasises these factors rather than communication and cultural factors.⁶⁵

A useful survey of the history of international dominance systems is provided by the American scholar, James R. Kurth.⁶⁶ He postulates four major types of dominance systems: suzerainty, colonialism, hegemony, and, more speculatively, transnational systems, and suggests that they are related to the levels of development of both the dominant power and its client states.

A system of suzerainty is likely to occur where both the major power and the states it dominates are still at a 'traditional' stage of economic development. It is characterised by the ceremonial subordination of the weaker states but without their direct administration by the major power; the classic example would be the Ottoman Empire. This form of compromise is convenient for two main reasons. First,

while military values (force, honour, glory, conquest) may be dominant in traditional society, military methods (mobilisation, organisation, weapons, operations) are primitive, making annexation difficult. Second, with an agrarian economy, 'the demand for foreign goods, markets, and investment opportunities was low, and political influence in a small country brought few economic rewards'.

Direct administration of the weaker states (colonialism) is more likely where the great power is 'modernising', i.e., has an economy with a considerable mercantile element and an initial industrial one. Direct political control was the best way of ensuring access to foreign raw materials, markets, and investment opportunities. In the modernising society, military values were challenged by bourgeois ones, 'but they remained influential and were even intensified in reaction, while military methods were greatly improved'. The demand for foreign conquests was now matched by military capability.

Hegemony refers to the exercise of undue political, military, or economic influence by a major power over less powerful states that, however, retain their formal independence. It is the classic system of domination exercised by a 'modern' great power over modernising states within its sphere of influence. Although the modern society, one of the defining characteristics of which is that it has a considerable industrial sector, continues to need foreign raw materials, markets, and investment opportunities and thus can benefit economically from the political domination of less powerful states, it can be argued that there is 'an optimal limit to the extent of influence or, more precisely, integration'.

The smooth functioning of industrial economies requires a high degree of social mobility and social integration which in turn requires a high degree of social homogeneity. If so, multinational empires combine poorly with modern societies. These economic considerations push policymakers away from sovereignty and toward hegemony. Military values are usually reduced to one influence among several, military mobilization becomes somewhat more difficult because of increasing anti-military values, but military organization, weapons, and operations continue to develop.⁶⁷

As far as the situation of the client states is concerned, traditional societies generally are unable to withstand a prolonged hegemonial relationship because the legitimacy of the traditional rulers and the viability of the agrarian economy are undermined, and this can lead to the establishment of direct control by the major power. Modernising societies, on the other hand, resist the colonial relationship but tend to be less successful in fending off a hegemonial one; 'modernization generates nationalism, which can be focussed against direct foreign control and overt foreign presence, but which cannot find a tangible target in indirect foreign influence'.⁶⁸

The classic hegemonial system today is to be found in the U.S. relationship with its Latin American periphery.

It has been a model, or at least an excuse, for nearly every other hegemonial system in the twentieth century. And it has been among the most formalized, routinized, and institutionalized. Within the framework and under the legitimation of the Organisation of American States, the U.S. has carried out counterrevolutionary interventions, defense agreements, and the Alliance for Progress.... Hegemony, then, has been 'the American way' of foreign policy.⁶⁹

The 'transnational system', finally is the term used to describe the relationship between a so-called 'post-modern' or 'post-industrial' great power (in effect the United

States) and its client states or junior partners which are at the modern stage of development. The major example is that of the United States in relation to Western Europe in the 60's and 70's. Its characteristics are military protection against foreign attack, and economic involvement through trade and investment, with multinational companies playing a major role. Anti-militarist values, it is suggested, are likely to be stronger in a post-modern society, and the use of military intervention will decline; instead, there is likely to be an increased use of manipulation and corruption by means of multinational companies. Kurth foresees the possibility that 'by the 1980's, multinational but American-based corporations in West Europe may engage in the economic corruption of European politicians and officials and not merely in the remote forms of political influence of the present transnational system'.

In Latin America (and this applies to other parts of the Third World) there may be a two-stage developmental gap between the United States and the countries under its influence.

If one focuses on the post-modern character of the United States, the prediction would be for no more military interventions but for increasing multinational investments. If one focuses on the modernizing character of most Latin American countries, the prediction would be for continued receptivity to military aid and advisors (the less modern, the more receptive) but for increasing resistance to multinational investments in extractive industries (the less modern, the less resistant). And if one puts the two pieces together, the prediction would be for continued military aid and advisors, increasing multinational investment in manufacturing industries, and little or no prospect for military intervention in the future. This hybrid between an hegemonial system and a transnational one could well become a stable equilibrium that could last out the 1970's and more. In any event, the prototype here seems to be Brazil.⁷⁰

The weakness in this argument lies, I think, in the notion of development, which is presented very much as a linear--and natural--progression. Kurth does not raise the question as to whether the modern and 'post-industrial' societies in the form in which they now generally exist actually depend on the presence of 'less-developed' peripheries and are therefore not options that are open to all countries. Many of the modern European states, after all, that Kurth sees as forming part of a transnational system centred in the United States, have been major imperialist powers in their own right and continue to benefit from the global economic domination by the industrialised powers. Nor should it be supposed that the 'post-industrial' society is less dependent on industrial products and on the raw materials needed for them. I take it that the term refers to the decline in the proportion of the population directly involved in industrial production and to a shift towards research, service, leisure and educational pursuits. But what this implies as long as the demand for industrial products increases is further automation and greater demands on energy supplies, coupled possibly with increased imports of manufactured products. It has nothing to do with de-industrialisation which some radical theorists suggest may be necessary in some measure if there is to be an equitable global economy.

The central task in fact is to work towards models of development which are non-parasitic, that is, which do not depend on the existence of submerged and exploited peripheries and are therefore in principle available to all societies. We are, I think, only beginning to understand the implications of such an approach.⁷¹ But it is clear that the societies concerned would have a GNP per capita and a level of domestic consumption considerably lower than that of the United States and most of Western Europe today.

Kurth does recognize the importance of factors other than that of economic development in determining political outcomes. Thus, he stresses the importance of a victory by the bourgeoisie over the landed aristocracy if reactionary oligarchy or dictatorship is to be avoided. But his developmental concept focuses too narrowly on particular aspects of economic growth and relies rather heavily on the level of GNP per capita as the criterion of development. He therefore, I think, pays insufficient regard to other indicators of overall economic and social development, such as the degree of self-reliance and long-term viability at the economic level, and the state of welfare services, or the equitable distribution of resources at the social level. Cuba, for instance, is less industrialised and has a lower growth rate of GNP per capita than Brazil; but it has better welfare services, a lower rate of infant mortality, a higher average life expectancy at birth, and less pronounced inequalities of wealth. Only in the narrowest sense could Brazil be said to be more developed.

Moreover, insofar as highly industrialised major powers do depend on periphery sources, we can expect an intensification of the competition to control the dwindling sources of supply;⁷² and this could mean more military interventions, whether proxy, advisory, or direct, rather than less.

Nonetheless, Kurth's analysis throws light on the development of international systems of domination and on the forms it has taken according to the needs of the imperialist power and the vulnerabilities of the less powerful states. It draws attention also to the continuum that exists between economic domination, financial

manipulation, and military intervention, and thus illustrates again the need for a coherent radicalism incorporating both anti-imperialist and anti-militarist approaches.

If Kurth is right in thinking that anti-militarist values are likely to be especially strong in modern and 'post-modern' societies, then mobilising anti-militarist sentiment could be a key factor in preventing or hampering foreign interventions by the Centre powers, and in the longer run in upsetting the stability of international systems of domination. Already, in the case of the American war in Vietnam, the anti-war movement--which extended into the very ranks of the armed forces--was certainly a factor in the U.S. decision to withdraw; and the experience could well affect the willingness of the present and future administrations to engage in foreign wars. Currently, the U.S. faces recruitment problems which could become critical. The military complain that voluntary recruitment is proving inadequate and are pressing for a re-introduction of conscription; student bodies and other organisations are warning that any attempt to do this will be met with militant resistance. There were reports, too, when the Soviet Union intervened in Hungary and later in Czechoslovakia, that disaffection among the first lot of troops to be sent in led to their replacement. Again, from China there have been reports of opposition in the form of wallposters to the recent invasion of Vietnam. Thus, all the major powers may be vulnerable to some degree to well-organised anti-militarist movements and campaigns.

REPRESSION AT THE CENTRES

The stability of the Centres could be threatened by events in the peripheries: the external peripheries, particularly in the Third World, and the internal peripheries comprising submerged groups, classes, and nationalities. It is in response to such threats that repression becomes likely.

Thus, it is not even necessary to postulate a genuine socialist revolution in Third World countries for the smooth working of the capitalist centre to be disrupted. If the suppliers of vital materials, especially oil, can unite sufficiently to make use of their resources for the optimal development of their own societies, rather than, as a priority, meeting the needs of the Centre, this could cause serious problems. The clash of interests is highlighted by recent developments in Iran, where the new government has been reported to be considering limiting the export of oil so that it can be available for a longer period to meet Iran's development needs; Western governments, on the other hand, want to see maximum production and export at the present time.

The action of the OPEC countries in 1973 had dramatic repercussions on Western industrial economies (and, it has to be said, on the far weaker economies of many Third World countries) and shattered the dream of virtually unlimited expansion of production and wealth. If it should be the case that the industrial economies of the Centre now face the prospect of a prolonged period of contraction, then what might be called the liberal-capitalist answer to the social problem will no longer be available; it will no longer be possible, in other words, to buy off social discontent by increasing the total wealth

available. The elites of the Centre could then face a choice akin to that faced by elites in the Third World--between a radical re-structuring of society to make it more equitable, and resorting to overt repression.

This is to put the problem at its simplest. In practice, the threat to political stability does not necessarily take the form of an unambiguous struggle between the existing authorities, acting on behalf of vested interests, and a radicalised majority of the population. Authoritarian groups of the left as well as of the right may seek to obtain power in the general discontent and impose their own brand of domination. Scapegoats are sought within society for the increased hardship--blacks, feminists, gays, foreigners, and so on--and racism and chauvinism can penetrate all sections of the community. In such a situation there can be genuine threats to security, including threats to the lives of innocent people; thus, it is not possible to castigate all security measures taken by the authorities as repression.

The problem is that the response to terrorism or rioting can take the form of draconian laws and other measures such as the increased militarisation of police and other security forces, the surveillance and infiltration of organisations known to be critical of the existing order, and the development of new weapons and repressive technologies which affect the liberties of all members of society but which particularly limit the freedom of action of movements and individuals seeking radical change. This is an especially serious matter in a period when radical change is exactly what is required. And the trend in the capitalist democracies, in particular in Western Europe, is very much along these lines. One can acknowledge the

reality of security problems, especially those relating to the protection of innocent people, and still see the present developments as disturbing and dangerous.

In a later section I touch briefly upon alternative approaches to security; here I want to make three points. *The first and obvious point is that where a deep social injustice exists, security problems are bound to arise, and the priority must be to deal with the roots of the problem and seek to remove the social injustice. The second is that repressive legislation coupled with technological/military fixes tend to be counter-productive--that is, they increase the security problem by escalating the conflict.* I shall refer in this connection to a recent study of the Northern Ireland conflict which appears to support this point. *Finally, it is worth reminding ourselves that no government can provide total security either for the population as a whole or even for those people at special risk. If this point is forgotten, there is apt to be a demand for ever-tougher measures in response to disturbances or outrages; and the militarisation of the conflict soon develops.*

The caveat against militarising the social conflict applies no less forcibly, in my view, to those seeking to bring about radical changes. Terror and destructive violence clearly can put pressure on governments to institute changes or may lead to revolution under certain conditions. But such actions can also enable governments to step up repression and official terror, and even win public support for so doing; they tend to require tightly-knit, hierarchically structured organisations which can become instruments of domination in their turn;⁷³ and they can create deep and violent divisions in the society which appear to legitimise further coercion from above to control them.

There are certain situations of extreme repression, or legalised terror, where it is difficult to see how violence could be avoided if things are to change. Even then, the non-cooperation of the people may be more significant than armed struggle, as the Iranian example shows. But in the countries of the Centre, both capitalist and socialist, the possibilities for nonviolent action, including where appropriate civil disobedience and noncooperation, do exist; and the authorities are normally under some restraint in the degree of violence they can employ in dealing with anything short of armed insurrection. In these circumstances, the decision to launch an armed struggle for radical change is a particularly grave one which can lead to a thoroughly reactionary chain of events. Thus, one can agree with much of the critique of capitalism made by the Red Army Faction (Baader-Meinhof group) in West Germany, yet feel that its strategy was tragically mistaken. In the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, nonviolent action in its various forms is probably the only realistic option to those seeking progressive changes; and it has been widely used, at times with great daring, wit, and imagination.⁷⁴

a) Repression in the West

In Western Europe, the overall effect of the increase of anti-terrorist measures in recent years has been to increase the powers of the police and the authorities at the expense of suspects. The trend is well-illustrated by the British example, where the Prevention of Terrorism Act was first passed in 1975 in the aftermath of an IRA bombing campaign in mainland Britain. This legislation increased the powers of the police in a number of ways, permitting them to detain a terrorist suspect for up to 48 hours for questioning, and for a further five days on

the issuing of a detention order by the Home Secretary; it empowered them also to search premises on a warrant issued by a police inspector (or anyone above him in rank) instead of having to apply to a magistrate. Another section of the act empowered the Home Secretary to exclude people from mainland Britain whom he considered, on police evidence, to be involved in the 'commission, preparation, or instigation of acts of terrorism', and to expel from mainland Britain, on similar grounds, people from the Irish Republic or Northern Ireland (itself legally part of the United Kingdom) unless they had resided in Britain for twenty years or more. The Act is subject to Annual review and was modified in 1976 to permit exclusion from Northern Ireland as well as mainland Britain, thus correcting a particularly glaring anomaly. When the Act was first introduced, the National Council for Civil Liberties in Britain criticised the measures it introduced and argued that the police already had sufficient powers to combat terrorism; what they did, in the view of the Council, was to legalise after the event certain abuses of police procedure--a complaint that has also been made about German anti-terrorist legislation. Something of the impact of this legislation can be gathered from the statement of the then Home Secretary, Mr. Rees, in a Parliamentary reply on April 7, 1978; he told the House that of a total of 3,167 people who had been detained in Britain under the Prevention of Terrorism Acts, 142 had been charged, and 125 had been served with exclusion orders.⁷⁵ This means that a great many innocent people were subjected to detention, albeit for a short period; it would be interesting to know how many of these had radical or republican views, and how many others were picked up only as a result of having Irish connections.

Germany and Italy are two other states that have armed themselves with wide powers in response to terrorist threats. In Germany, new legislation was passed in February, 1978, following the kidnapping and murder of Hans Schleyer. Among other things, it permits the police to search all flats in a particular building if the exact location of a suspect is not known and to set up road blocs and detain for twelve hours anyone in a vehicle who is not able to produce proof of identity. Lawyers, too, may be denied access to their clients if suspected of abusing their position. This measure has been used on at least one occasion to debar a well-known liberal lawyer on the basis of a simple denunciation.⁷⁶

In Italy, the Lex Royale of May 22, 1975 (Provisions concerning the preservation of Public Order), permits the police to conduct on-the-spot searches of vehicles for weapons and explosives where people's actions have aroused suspicion; makes it an offence to wear masks at demonstrations; makes it easier to expel foreigners; and permits summary trial in cases involving armed resistance to government authority. A further law passed in March, 1978, allows judges and prosecuting attorneys access to documents from other trials in which the defendant was involved; gives police the right to interrogate arrested persons in the absence of an attorney (though statements so obtained cannot be submitted in evidence at a trial); permits the Minister of the Interior to authorise the tapping of telephones for a period of up to fifteen days, with the possibility of an unlimited extension; and obliges landlords to notify the police every time they rent or lease an apartment.⁷⁷

Turning now to the operation of the police and other security services, one sees in certain instances a tendency towards greater centralisation⁷⁸

and generally the increasing use of new control technologies. The latter affects three principal areas: first, the gathering, storage, and use of information, which includes surveillance, data storage, and communications technology; second, crowd and riot control through the development of non-lethal (or ordinarily non-lethal) weapons; third, suspect interrogation, including the use of drugs and techniques of disorientation. The overall effect has been a militarisation of the police in many Western societies; the development of a police-industrial complex, that is, a growth in the size and number of firms employed in producing police and para-military technology; and closer co-operation and co-ordination between the police and the military.

An English researcher, Steve Wright, in a study of new police technologies, uses fewer general categories than those above and identifies seven areas in which the new technologies operate.⁷⁹

1. Area denial technology. The broad function of this is to replace people with technology in boundary security. Examples are electric fences, new types of barbed wire, and fragmentation devices manufactured in East Germany and deployed along the East-West boundary.

2. Intruder detection technology. This makes use of vibrations, ultrasonic sound, and infrared or microwave radiation to detect intruders in a given area.

3. Communications technology. This allows local, regional, national, and international and even global linkages, using techniques ranging from UHF and VHF transmitter/receivers at the local level, to microwave telecommunications systems, radar, and communications satellites at the national and international levels. Wright

gives as one example the 'troposcopic scatter equipment' sold to South Africa by Marconi U.K. which provides long-range links up to 800 km. apart and is to be used for military policing in Namibia.

4. Computers. Police computers may be linked to the computer systems of other state services such as Inland Revenue, Customs & Excise, Vehicle Licencing Authorities, and intelligence services. Police communications can be integrated through a central control room to a computer, if one is in operation, to give computerised communication, command, and control systems. 'It is significant,' Wright comments, 'that a modern police operations room is becoming almost indistinguishable from its military counterpart'.

5. Surveillance Technology. This ranges from the use of parabolic microphones to monitor conversations at a distance of up to 1/2 km., to such things as radar surveillance, radio transmission surveillance, telephone tapping, and TV monitoring. Some of this technology was developed by the military and in some cases is still under its control. Wright gives the example of the eavesdropping network organised under the auspices of the National Security Agency in the United States in conjunction with the U.K. army signals intelligence network--SIGINT.

Through satellite links, microwave chains and spy ships like the Pueblo, this network covers the earth with major installations in the USA, Europe, South Africa, the Middle East and Australia. Such a globeoctopus serves many functions, all of which relate to maintaining the preponderance of the US empire. It is used to carry out worldwide surveillance of all telecommunications, including many states' internal telephone traffic, and radio conversations between liberation groups. Some of this information is passed on to the counter-revolutionary forces within those states. The system also picks up information from the commercial sectors in other states which through formal and informal channels finds its way into the decision making centres of the North American multinationals.⁸⁰

6. Dispersive and Coercive Technologies. These cover such things as CR and CS gas, rubber and plastic bullets, sound- and noise-emitting systems designed to disperse crowds, and injector weapons which consist of a drug-filled syringe fired from a special gun.

7. Interrogation and Torture. These are the systematic use of techniques to break down the resistance of suspects, such as sensory deprivation over considerable periods. Techniques of this kind were used by the British army in Northern Ireland when internment was introduced there in 1972.

Wright also produces evidence, using Northern Ireland as a case study, that suggests that the use of repressive technologies in internal conflicts, coupled with other repressive measures such as internment, tends to have the effect of escalating the conflict, thus leading to the introduction of still severer systems of control.⁸¹

Some of these technologies are, as the above summary indicates, used directly for military purposes; that is, they form an integral part of the military response to the threat of external attack. That threat itself can be a real one: Hitler did invade much of Europe including the Soviet Union; the Americans did move into Vietnam with massive forces and conduct a long and bloody war there; the Soviet Union did invade another socialist country, Czechoslovakia, just as more recently Vietnam invaded Kampuchea and was in turn attacked by China. *It is not necessary, then, to postulate that the threat of external attack is always a hoax foisted on the people by ruling elites in their own self-interest in order to be convinced that the military response to such threats is*

today an inappropriate and dangerous one, especially for the industrialised states of the Centre. Again, I will at a later point look briefly at alternative approaches and suggest that, as far as the major powers are concerned, the principal danger of attack comes not from any territorial ambitions of opponents but from the instability of the arms race itself.

Meanwhile, increased security measures, including legislation, necessarily accompanies a major arms race. Some of these measures relating to surveillance, area denial, and so on, were touched on above. But it is legislation concerned with national security and the protection of military and state secrets that most directly threatens free discussion and open government. The Official Secrets Acts in Britain provide an obvious example.

The existing British Official Secrets Acts date back to 1911 when the bill was rushed through all its stages in Parliament in a single day during a German spy scare. Section One prohibits, among other things, the communication or receiving of official information which is or might be of use to an enemy and seriously diminishes the accused's presumption of innocence in that a person can be convicted without being found guilty of any particular act 'if, from the circumstances of the case, or his conduct, or his known character as proved, it appears that his purpose was a purpose prejudicial to the safety and interest of the state'.⁸² Section Two prohibits the unauthorised communication of any information handled by government employees, whether or not the national security is involved, and has proved a powerful means of preventing the public scrutiny

of the operations of the police, the prison service, and the army, as well as of all government departments. One of the amendments to the Acts introduced in 1920 made it possible for all proceedings except the sentencing to be held in camera.⁸³

The Acts have been used in a political way, most notably in the Wethersfield case in 1962, when six members of the Committee of 100, an organisation dedicated to bringing about nuclear disarmament, were charged with conspiracy under Section One of the Acts for preparing a demonstration involving civil disobedience at a United States air base,⁸⁴ and in the recent Aubrey, Berry, and Campbell case discussed below. In 1939 a conservative MP, Duncan Sandys, later to become Minister of Defence in a post-war conservative government, was threatened with prosecution for revealing in the House of Commons the inadequacies of anti-aircraft defence around London.

And the threat of prosecution has proved even more powerful in curtailing public discussion of issues that governments have felt were too sensitive or too embarrassing. Since 1912, a committee of Press and Service representatives has existed whose function it is to warn newspapers, through what are known as D notices, about items that the government does not want to see published and that could involve a breach of the Official Secrets Acts. How much public discussion has been curtailed by this system it is impossible at this point to know. However, it is known that in 1963 a D notice was issued to try to stop the press from reproducing the contents of a pamphlet, Spies for Peace, which had been published and widely circulated by a radical pro-disarmament group and which revealed the existence and whereabouts of the network of underground Regional Seats of Government which

are intended for use in the event of a nuclear war. The existence of the Acts also enabled the Atlee government in the post-war period to make, in complete secrecy and without informing Parliament, the momentous decision to embark on the production of British nuclear weapons.

Two recent prosecutions--the Aubrey, Berry, Campbell case under the Official Secrets Act in Britain, and the Humphrey/Truong espionage case in the United States--illustrate how legislative measures and technological developments may be used in conjunction to restrict civil liberties, and show also the convergence in states involved in an arms race between national security concerns and the desire for governments to control and limit the information available to their domestic populations.

The first case had its origins in a campaign to prevent the expulsion from Britain of two American journalists, Philip Agee and Mark Hosenball. Agee, a former CIA employee, had written a book disclosing some of the undercover activities of the CIA in many countries;⁸⁵ and Hosenball in co-operation with Duncan Campbell had written an article in the radical London magazine, Time Out, about the activities of the National Security Association (the CIA's British counterpart), the Government Communications Headquarters, and British Army Signals Intelligence, SIGINT. Both Duncan Campbell and Crispin Aubrey, another journalist, were associated with the Agee-Hosenball Defence Committee.

The third person who was to be involved in the prosecution was an ex-soldier, John Berry, who had worked with SIGINT while in the army. After reading the Time Out article, he contacted the Agee-Hosenball Defence Committee; and

eventually it was arranged through a telephone conversation for Campbell and Aubrey to interview Berry at his flat. Immediately after the interview the three men were arrested by police waiting outside the flat, and the tape recording they had used for the interview seized.

Three aspects of the case are noteworthy. First, the interests of the CIA and American and British military intelligence because of the links with the Agee/Hosenball case and the operations of SIGINT. Second, the fact that the police could only have known about the meeting in Berry's flat through the use of telephone tapping. Third, the fact that the electronic evesdropping carried out by SIGINT had been outlawed by an international convention signed in Geneva in 1965.⁸⁶ Thus, in this case, the British government used its security laws to try to prevent publicity for its breaches of its own international obligations.

The case, however, ended in an embarrassing defeat for the authorities. The prosecution were forced in the course of the trial to drop most of the more serious charges; and, though the three men were convicted on some of the less serious counts, they received only nominal sentences: Berry was given a suspended sentence of six months imprisonment (which meant that he didn't serve any time in prison), and Aubrey and Campbell were conditionally discharged.

The United States has no equivalent of the British Official Secrets Acts in the sense of a law prohibiting unauthorised disclosures by present or former government employees, though it does have laws against espionage--defined as giving an enemy secrets damaging to the national security of the United States. The Humphrey/Truong case, however, threatens to introduce something akin to the Official Secrets Act to

the US by the back door, that is, by stretching the meaning of existing legislation.

On July 6, 1978, Ronald Humphrey, a former official of the United States Information Agency, and David Truong, a Vietnamese graduate student and anti-war activist, were each sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment on convictions of spying and of stealing United States property. The two men are alleged to have passed on confidential information to officials of the Vietnamese government; but, as assessments by the State Department and the CIA confirm, the documents in question contained 'little of a sensitive nature'. Nevertheless, a major counterintelligence operation, supervised by the Attorney General, Griffen Bell, and the highest officials of the CIA and the State Department, was conducted against the two men to secure the evidence for a conviction. Private mail was opened and electronic bugging and hidden cameras used, and these methods were personally approved by President Carter.

Given the relative unimportance of the information involved, it would seem that the case were aimed not at defending national security but at protecting present and future administrations from the kind of embarrassing leak that occurred with the Pentagon Papers. The conviction of stealing government property is particularly important in this respect, because the law invoked was one aimed at preventing thefts by government employees of substantial items such as typewriters and other hardware, and has never previously been used to cover official documents. If the conviction is upheld at the Supreme Court, this law could be used to prevent unauthorised disclosure of information and thus permit a retreat from more open government. It would also be the first time that the Federal Government had won

approval from the Supreme Court for the use of electronic surveillance in a national security case.⁸⁷

In other countries, too, national security laws are being used against dissenters as a means of curtailing public discussion and the spread of information. In February, 1979, the trial began of a Norwegian anti-militarist, Ivar Johansen, charged with spying as a result of his work in collating material, all of it publicly available, concerning the location of the Early Warning System, and of the work of the Norwegian Intelligence Services, including their infiltration and surveillance of radical organisations.⁸⁸ In East Germany (as previously noted), the marxist scholar, Rudolf Bahre, was arrested in August, 1977, after the publication of a study critical of existing socialist states.

In spite of the repression that is already occurring in some places and of the dangerous tendencies outlined above, the Western democratic-capitalist countries have not yet entered the nightmare world of Orwell's 1984; and the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe could be seen as slowly and erratically emerging from the Stalinist nightmare as opposition becomes bolder and more open. Moreover, the fate of the Shah's regime in Iran illustrates the fact that no government, however mighty its army, however powerful its allies, however cruel and efficient its secret police, is invulnerable when faced with the total non-cooperation of the vast majority of the people.⁸⁹ As long as people have not been tricked or cowed into submission, there is still hope.

b) THE SOVIET UNION: A MILITARISED SOCIALISM?

*In some respects the situation is similar in the Soviet Union, the superpower at the Centre of the socialist world. There and in Eastern Europe, however, the repression remains more stark than in the capitalist democracies. Not only are individual (or 'bourgeois') rights of free expression curtailed, but workers seeking to establish independent trade unions or taking industrial action to improve their working conditions face harassment and persecution.*⁹⁰

The situation does vary greatly from one country to another. Thus, in Poland, following the industrial strikes of 1976, and the widespread nonviolent protests throughout the country organised by the Workers Defence Committee (K.O.R.), criticism and opposition has become widespread and open. In Czechoslovakia the dissidents face harsher penalties; opposition nevertheless continues and the activities of the Charter 77 group have acted as an inspiration to radical, marxist, and communist opposition groups throughout Eastern Europe. The latest weapon being used by the Czechoslovak authorities against the dissidents is the denial of work, a sanction that strikes particularly hard, as unemployment in theory and unemployment benefits in practice do not exist.⁹¹

It is noteworthy that much of the opposition today in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is socialist or communist in orientation; the people concerned oppose the existing autocratic bureaucracy but wish to see the establishment of a democratic socialism, not a return to capitalism.

Much work has been done in analysing the causes of the development of repression and the rise of Stalinism in the Soviet Union. Here I want simply to suggest that the contribution of militarism to this process merits further attention.

*To a considerable extent, militarism was foisted on the infant Soviet Republic by the allied intervention on behalf of the anti-bolshevik forces in the civil war.*⁹² A second external factor was the failure of the League of Nations Disarmament Conference in 1932 and the rejection of both the Litvinov proposals of the Soviet Union and the Hoover plan for strategic disarmament put forward by the United States and supported by the Soviet Union.⁹³ Finally, the rise of European fascism and reaction in Japan determined Stalin to engage in a crash programme of rapid heavy industrialisation and militarisation.

But not everything can be blamed on external factors. The emphasis on the key role of the vanguard party and the determination to build a strong centralised state led to the emergence of a bureaucratic and military elite which was soon to resort to repression to maintain its supremacy. The key event in this process was the attack on the Kronstadt commune in 1921, where striking sailors and workers had put forward demands for a devolution of power to workers and peasants.⁹⁴


A second factor was the recrudescence of Russian imperialism and Stalin's determination to re-unite within a single federation the various states that had made up the old Czarist regime. As early as 1922, Stalin's treatment as head of the Commissariat of Nationalities of the Georgian communist party led to a disagreement between him and Lenin. And, one by one, the states that had opted for autonomy under the generous terms of the Declaration of the Rights of the People of Russia adopted by the new Soviet Republic in November, 1917, were re-incorporated, in some cases by manipulation or outright invasion. The three Baltic states of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania were not brought within the Soviet Union until 1940, and then only by means of invasion. Finland alone managed to retain its independence, but it too was attached by the Soviet Union in 1939, an

event that led to the Soviet expulsion from the League of Nations. But the most barbarous act of the epoch of Stalinist imperialism was the deportation of whole populations to Siberia and Central Asia, mainly during the latter part of the war. The victims included 400,000 Germans of the Volga who had settled there since the mid-eighteenth century, the Crimean Tartars, the Kalmyks of the Russian Steppes, and the four nations of the Caucasus--the Chechens, Ingush, Balkars, and Karachays; in all, an estimated one and a half million people.⁹⁵

In the post-war period, the Soviet Union established client governments in Eastern Europe--East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria; and, in the purges of the late 40's and early 50's, actual or potential opponents of the Moscow line were removed and in some cases tortured and executed. As already noted, the Cold War and the overwhelming military strength of the United States at that period contributed to Stalin's determination to create buffer states in Eastern Europe and to remove anyone who stood or might stand in the path of this objective.

Whatever the genesis of Soviet militarism, there is no doubting its repressive consequences. Conscription was introduced in 1918 after Trotsky had been made Commissar for War, and in the face of massive desertions the death penalty was re-introduced for this offence and was sometimes applied in the case of malingering.⁹⁶ In the early post-revolutionary period the Cheka (later OGPU) was the chief instrument of internal repression; but, as the Kronstadt incident shows, the Red Army was the final arbiter of power and during the Stalinist period was to play a central role in the mass deportations and the suppression of unrest in the labour camps.

Militarism fostered repression in another sense insofar as it was bound up with the rapid industrialisation and forced collectivisation of the 30's, which are thought to have resulted in the death of several million people through famine and through economic war against those peasants who resisted the new policies. *It is likely too that militarisation affected the development of society at a profounder level, including the relations of production, and has distorted the very notion of communism so that it has come to be associated with bureaucratic centralism and regimentation rather than with the vision of Marx and other socialists.*



Arc de Triomphe Literamí noviny*

9 March 1966

* Czechoslovakian publication suppressed in 1968

Today, the Soviet Union faces considerable problems not only with Eastern Europe but within some of the non-Russian republics. Thus, during the period of the Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia in 1968, there was widespread interest in the Ukraine, which has close cultural and linguistic ties with Czechoslovakia, in the events that were taking place; and it appears that Czechoslovak radio broadcasts were eagerly listened to.⁹⁷ No doubt, this was a factor in the Soviet decision to invade Czechoslovakia and to try to bring developments there under control.

But, in spite of its military strength, the Soviet Union can no longer exert the same influence in Eastern Europe as during the Stalin period. The various governments there now have more independence, as Romania's relatively independent foreign policy shows. In addition, these governments have themselves to contend with an increasingly open opposition focussed upon such issues as human rights, national aspirations, freedom for trade union organisation, and freedom of expression and association. As one Czechoslovak writer, Jiri Pelikan, puts it:

The fact is that there exists in all socialist countries - with differences of degree and according to specific conditions - a situation of permanent political crisis resulting from the discrepancy between the socialist ideal and the reality of its practical application, between the interests of the overwhelming majority of the population and the privileged group holding power, between the great possibilities of economic expansion and the low standard of living of the working people, between the population's desire for independence and fraternal solidarity and the domination of the great power, the USSR.⁹⁸



Whether or not there is a creative outcome to these struggles or an attempt to re-introduce Stalinist repression may depend in no small degree on whether an intensified arms race and a renewed Cold War can be avoided.



PART III: MILITARISM AND REPRESSION IN THE THIRD WORLD



The main points concerning the links between militarism and repression in the Third World have been touched upon in the previous two sections. I shall re-capitulate the argument briefly.

Militarism and repression are linked in the Third World mainly, though not exclusively, through the mechanism of military rule. Excessive military expenditure contributes to the social and economic crisis that makes military intervention in politics, and repression, more likely. It strengthens systems of international domination by creating long-term dependence on the major arms suppliers and distorting economic development. These processes have been most thoroughly analysed in relation to the capitalist periphery; but militarism, the establishment of national and international dominance structures, and repression are probably causally linked also in the case of some socialist Third World countries. Imperialist or hegemonic powers also play a direct role in repression through military intervention, subversion and de-stabilisation; through military and para-military training programmes; and through supplying weapons and technologies to contain social unrest and rebellion.

The spread of military rule in the Third World is graphically depicted in the following series of maps produced by an American researcher, Richard Falk.







The progression that is indicated by the maps towards military and militarised rule, notably in Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia, is startling. One factor in this development which should not be overlooked is the instability of many of the political boundaries inherited from the colonial past, a factor which can be seen at work in the current wars in the Horn of Africa.

Military rule, whether of left or right, is strongly associated with repression. Thus, a review of the record of military regimes in Latin America by the International Commission of Jurists notes how frequently they implemented a permanent state of emergency and invoked special powers.⁹⁹ Similarly, a study by Miles Wolpin of military and civilian governments in the Third World shows that there is a greater incidence of known or reported cases of political detention, torture, executions, and disappearances among military regimes than among civilian ones, with right-wing military regimes having a particularly bad record.¹⁰⁰

The consequences of military rule do, to be sure, vary according to its origins and political orientation; there is, for example, a sharp contrast between the former military regime of Nasser in Egypt and that of Pinochet today in Chile. Class factors, which are in turn linked to the type and stage of economic development, are a crucial factor in determining these differences. A leftist military regime is more likely in a country where little industrial development has taken place and the military intervene on behalf of an alliance of social groupings--comprador bourgeoisie, peasantry, and urban classes--against the landed elite. The tendency for such regimes, however, is to slide to the right as industrial and other economic developments take place and as a gulf opens up between the bourgeoisie and more radical peasant and nascent proletarian elements; this slide to the right can be observed both in Egypt itself and more recently in Peru.

In many of the Third World countries where the first phase of industrialisation has already occurred some time ago, we are witnessing the bourgeois military coup and the establishment of military regimes concerned primarily with defending the privileged position of the bourgeoisie (who are in some cases in alliance with the landed elite) against the threat of radical challenge from below. This situation obtains, for instance, for many of the larger countries in Latin America, like Argentina and Brazil.¹⁰¹

Finally, there are the socialist variants of military or highly militarised rule which may follow a populist guerrilla war (or less frequently a coup) directed against a native ruling class (Cuba, China, Ethiopia), against colonial rule (Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique), or against a combination of colonialist and imperialist intervention, as in Indochina.

In analysing the causes of the shift towards military rule in the Third World, Falk in his study focusses on the economic pressures:

The perspective taken here is that this setting (i.e. of capitalist Third World countries) is being fundamentally shaped by a crisis in capital formation that pervades, to varying degrees, all but a few of the resource-rich Third World countries. This crisis is generated by a series of factors. Perhaps the most significant of these is the inability of modern political elites to maintain stability without redistributive and welfare programmes to pacify the poor, and their consequent inability to sustain growth via re-investment if adequate programmes of this sort are established. There is not enough capital to go around. In these circumstances, attempts at compromise tend to satisfy neither end of the political spectrum. As a result discontent, instability and economic chaos emerge, creating a context that invites a takeover by those social forces (the military and its allies) willing and able to impose 'discipline' on the polity.¹⁰²

It should be noted that redistributive programmes, such as land reform, do not necessarily deplete the capital available for investment; nor should pacifying the poor be the political objective, even if it frequently is so. However, the analysis does underline a point made in the last section that, in the majority of Third World countries, the liberal-capitalist option of buying off political discontent is not available.

The contribution of excessive military expenditure to this process is to heighten the problems of capital formation and to strengthen imperialist economic bonds. There thus develops the poverty-militarism-repression cycle described in the first section of this essay.

It is worth stressing just how great an impact military expenditures are having on Third World economies. *We have already noted that weapons and associated equipment may account for up to one third of the cost of all imports to the Third World.* A U.N. study, Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race,¹⁰³ emphasises the urgent need in the Third World for investment in productive areas and the consequent need to 'keep the increase in their current public expenditure under close scrutiny with a view to releasing maximum resources for investment' and points out that one of the largest items in current public expenditure in many Third World countries is in the military field.

Another perspective on the problem is presented by two researchers, Hossein Askari and Vittorio Corbo. Examining the consequences of military expenditures in the Middle East, they state:

...it is crucial to observe that military expenditures for a given year affect the GNP not only for that year but also for many years thereafter; since if these had been invested in productive capital equipment, output would have been forthcoming as long as the capital had lasted.¹⁰⁴

The authors calculate that 'the annual losses in 1969 (due to past military expenditures) amounted to 125% of total oil revenues of the Middle Eastern countries of that year'. In the same year, losses expressed as a percentage of each country's 1960 GNP were: Jordan 117%, Syria 77%, Israel 69%, Iraq 63%, UAR 54%, Saudi Arabia 36%, Iran 33%, Yemen 21%, Kuwait 10%, and Lebanon 10%. In 1969, moreover, the United Arab Republic's loss of potential GNP was approximately ten times that of annual receipts from the Suez Canal in 1966; and Israel's loss of potential GNP in the same year was approximately three times its total capital import.

The political and economic impact of such a massive waste of resources and potential is becoming apparent from a number of systematic investigations relating to the Third World as a whole. Two researchers, D.G. Morrison and H.M. Stevenson, making a comparative study of the factors affecting military coups d'etat in Latin America, Asia, and Africa, report finding that

- * *the higher the expenditure for military organisms, the greater the political instability;*
- * *the greater the political instability, the lower the average rate of economic growth;*
- * *the greater the military expenditure, the lower the rate of economic growth.¹⁰⁵*

These findings were supported by empirical data in all three regions, with the correlation between high military expenditure and political instability being particularly strong. The indicator for political instability used here was the number of governmental depositions or major disturbances of a nation's political order caused by

or associated with unorthodox behavior of that nation's military officers during a post-World War II period.

It should of course be observed that we are dealing with tendencies, not with rigid and invariable laws, and that, moreover, the average statistics may conceal wide differences. Heavy military expenditures in Brazil, for instance, have been associated with industrialisation and economic growth; and Mary Kaldor, as noted earlier, isolates a sub-group of capitalist Third World countries of which this is true. They are, as we saw, either oil-rich or heavily dependent on the United States. It is also worth noting that they include some of the most repressive right-wing military dictatorships in the Third World--Brazil, Thailand, Taiwan, Iran (during the Shah's rule), and South Korea. (Among the other countries concerned are Saudi Arabia, where there is a right-wing monarchy; Libya, where there is a leftist military regime; and Israel.)

This data may indicate that the problem of capital formation per se is not necessarily the most crucial in propelling Third World governments towards repression and military dictatorship; the consolidation of imperialist economic patterns may be even more important, and in particular the emergence of powerful local elites with a broad harmony of interests with the dominant elites of the Centre nations, and the gearing of the economy towards exports, luxuries, and, not infrequently, arms production. In this situation it is not necessary for there to be a general economic stagnation for the mass of the population to experience increasing deprivation. For example, a World Council of Churches report published in April, 1979, on South Korea showed that the 'miracle' of economic growth there concealed


increasing poverty, especially in rural areas, and that it was built on massive foreign loans (\$US 11.25 billions in 1978) and the active co-operation of largely Japanese and U.S. investment. It has also been accompanied by the repression of trade union rights, academic and religious freedom, legal rights, and press freedom.¹⁰⁶

Kurth, in his contribution to the volume of studies on military rule in Latin America already referred to,¹⁰⁷ argues that it is a combination of the levels of development (as measured by GNP per capita) and the class situation which most crucially affects the likelihood of civilian or military supremacy in political life. He follows Barrington Moore¹⁰⁸ in stressing the importance of a victory by a conquering bourgeoisie over the landed elite. Kurth writes:

Countries which have passed through a social revolution or civil war in which an urban middle class or bourgeoisie defeated the military forces of landed elites are then able to maintain a stable democracy or at least civilian supremacy. In Mexico the Revolution destroyed the power of the landed elites, in Uruguay the civil war defeated them and diminished their power, and in Costa Rica the civil war of 1948 resulted in the incorporation of new urban groups and the abolition of the army. In a semi-developed country [which Kurth defines as one with a GNP per capita of between \$400 and \$800] it seems that a stable democracy or at least civilian supremacy is the bequest of a conquering bourgeoisie.¹⁰⁹

The developments in Latin America since this was written are significant. Uruguay has become one of the most repressive military dictatorships in the region. And, while Mexico still has a civilian administration, it has become more conservative and repressive; moreover, social and economic developments there augur ill for its political future.¹¹⁰ Again, this is an indication

that the significant class struggle today in much of Latin America and the Third World is between a bourgeois elite and the majority of the urban and peasant population; with or without the presence of a powerful landed elite, the bourgeoisie is resorting to repression and military rule in the course of this struggle.



Whether one emphasises the loss of investment capacity or the consolidation of internal and international structures of domination, the contribution of excessive military expenditures and transfers of military technology to the increasing incidence of militarised political repression in the Third World would seem to be considerable. If the empirical evidence is not yet conclusive, it does point firmly in this direction.¹¹¹

The situation in socialist Third World countries has already been touched upon. I do not feel competent to expand the comments made earlier; clearly, however, there is a need for a close and dispassionate scrutiny of dominance

structures, internal and international, in the state socialist world as a whole. The following points seem to me to be worth noting.

First, a division has opened up within state socialist countries in the Third World on development strategy as well as on international political alignment (to the Soviet Union or China). This division is seen at its most extreme between countries like Vietnam, Cuba, and Mozambique on the one hand, and the Kampuchea (Cambodia) of Pol Pot on the other. The first strategy envisages extensive and fairly rapid industrialisation, which necessitates considerable outside assistance and investment coming largely from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe; the second emphasises to a far greater extent economic self-reliance based on the rural commune. China, which had given priority to the second strategy, now seems to have switched direction and plans a programme of rapid industrialisation with Western and Japanese assistance.

Second, a high degree of militarisation on the conventional 'industrial' model has occurred in most of the socialist Third World. Kampuchea under Pol Pot is a possible exception, insofar as it seems to have relied for the defence of the country after the revolution on a strategy of guerrilla warfare. Vietnam by contrast has built up a massive conscript army, equipped with tanks and sophisticated weapons supplied by the Soviet Union. Cuba is one of the most militarised states in Latin America, ranking first with Venezuela in military expenditure per capita and having by far the largest number of soldiers per head of population in the region.¹¹² Similarly, in the Far East, North Korea and Mongolia are among the highest military spenders per capita and have a high proportion of soldiers for the population. It is perhaps too soon to judge whether socialist states in Africa like

Mozambique and Angola will follow a similar pattern of militarisation or will try to develop alternative strategies based on their experience of guerrilla war. But, in Angola at least, where there is a large Cuban military presence and many Soviet advisors, the development of such an alternative strategy seems unlikely. However, it is worth repeating that the United States and other Western governments do bear a considerable responsibility for the militarisation that has taken place in the socialist Third World.

Third, Oberg's figures concerning the integration of Soviet arms trade and its trade in general with the Third World, much of it concentrated on socialist and leftist governments, underlines the need to re-examine the economic and other links between the Soviet Union and these states to see how far a pattern of Centre and Periphery is emerging--as clearly has already been established at the military and political level between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The Soviet/Cuban involvement in Ethiopia against marxist-led guerrillas in Eritrea who were formerly supported by the Soviet Union indicates that we are in the realm of realpolitik and imperialist ambition rather than socialist solidarity. Similarly, the wars in Indochina between Vietnam and Kampuchea, and between China and Vietnam, suggest a power struggle between the rival major powers of China and the Soviet Union, both of them willing to exploit local ambitions and antagonism to further their ends.

Finally, repression has been widespread throughout the socialist Third World, with the worst examples being that of (pro-Soviet) Ethiopia and (pro-Chinese) Kampuchea. In the latter countries, and possibly in China in the 50's, repression has reached the proportions of legalised terror.¹¹³ Thus, repression has been associated with both the Soviet and Chinese models of development.

It is sometimes argued that without this repression, perhaps even without a period of terror, the power of class elites, and hence the old dominance structure, could not be broken. If this were the case, the outlook would be bleak indeed; but the achievements of radical civilian governments in the Third World, such as Jamaica since 1970 and Tanzania, hold out some hope at least of less repressive alternatives.¹¹⁴ It should not be forgotten either that repression in the socialist countries is directed not only against 'class enemies', but at various times against socialists, marxists, anarchists, trade unionists, and unfortunate individuals whose thinking has not caught up with the latest nuances in the official line.¹¹⁵

Meanwhile, a hopeful and significant development has been the emergence of movements and popular demonstrations for human rights and the curbing of arbitrary power in China. Contrary to the expectations of so many Western liberals and radicals during the sixties and early seventies, it appears that concern for human rights is not simply an obsession of the Western elite and that, surprisingly, peasants and workers in socialist China object like anyone else to being thrown in prison, harassed, or even executed for no good reason.¹¹⁶

THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE AND INTERVENTION

When their domination or influence has been threatened, the major powers have resorted to various forms of military, economic, and diplomatic pressure on Third World countries; and this has at times contributed to the emergence or perpetuation of repressive regimes.

a) The Capitalist Orbit

In the capitalist periphery, it is the United States which now exercises a predominant influence; though the importance of the European ex-colonial powers should not be overlooked, especially in relation to Africa.

The United States intervened militarily to overthrow forces which it regarded as hostile to its interests in Guatemala (1954) and in the Dominican Republic (1965). In Guatemala it supported an invasion which resulted in the overthrow of the elected Arbenz government and thus brought to an end ten years of democratic rule in that country. Today, Guatemala remains in the grip of a right-wing military terror.¹¹⁷ In the Dominican Republic a popular rebellion was overthrown with the help of a massive United States intervention, and a conservative pro-U.S. government came to power.

Outside Latin America, major U.S. military interventions have occurred in Lebanon in 1958 and in Korea and Vietnam. The Lebanon landings were aimed partly at supporting the government of President Chamoun against widespread disaffection and rebellion in the country, but its other objective was to unseat the revolutionary military government of General Kassem which had just seized power in neighbouring Iraq and was seen as a threat to Western oil interests. In this latter objective the U.S. landings were unsuccessful, though Kassem was eventually overthrown in 1963 in a CIA-supported coup.

The Korean and Vietnamese wars were concerned with broad American and Western strategic goals, including the containment of communism, and, in the case of Korea, repulsing in the first instance the attempt by the Soviet-backed regime in North Korea to reunite the country by invasion. While

some case can be made for the intervention in Korea, there can be no justification for the long, brutal war in Vietnam. In both cases, the war brought immense suffering to the people of the countries concerned and involved U.S. support for a succession of corrupt military dictatorships.

CIA operations and proxy interventions have occurred more widely and with varying degrees of success, the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion in Cuba in 1961 being the most notable setback. The Center for National Security Studies in Washington cites instances of CIA intervention in 27 countries or regions, including the United States itself, where anti-war groups were infiltrated and disrupted in the sixties and early seventies, and in Western Europe, where it has channelled funds to subsidise political parties, individual leaders, trade unions, and other groups.¹¹⁸ It was involved in the coup which overthrew the Mossedegh government in Iran in 1953, in the strikes and disturbances which led to the overthrow of the Progressive Peoples Party government under Cheddi Jagan in Guyana in 1963, in the coup which brought General Mobutu to power in Zaire in 1965, in the overthrow of Kassem in Iraq in 1963 and of Sihanouk in Cambodia in 1970, in the destabilisation which preceded the coup in Chile in 1973, and so on. It spent millions of dollars providing weapons and other assistance to the FLNA of Holden Roberto in Angola in the civil war against the MPLA backed by the Soviet Union and Cuba, and it helped to train a secret army of Laotian and Thai mercenaries in Laos from 1962 to 1973.

Moreover, military intervention and covert operations by the CIA are only part of the picture. The advising, training, and arming of military and especially counter-insurgency forces of pro-Western governments has been at least as important, particularly after the success of Castro, when

the U.S. government switched its emphasis away from strategic deterrence to the prevention of internal subversion. This policy had particularly grave consequences for human rights in the Third World, since it increased the capacity of governments to repress their populations.

During the sixties and seventies, the CIA helped to set up and train a number of notorious security forces, including SAVAK in Iran; DINA, the Chilean secret police; and the South Korean CIA. Some of these bodies have become major instruments for the infliction of torture and repression. During the Kennedy administration, the Office of Public Safety was established (1962) to co-ordinate an expanded programme of training and equipping police and counter-insurgency organisations in the Third World. Between then and its disbanding in 1975, the Office of Public Safety had distributed some 200 million dollars worth of arms to foreign police organisations and trained over 7,500 senior officers at the International Police Academy in Washington and other U.S. schools.¹¹⁹

Concern in the United States over the way the government was assisting repressive regimes abroad led to Congressional hearings in 1973 and eventually to various legislative measures. The Foreign Assistance Acts since 1973 contain a clause (Section 32) urging the President to deny economic and military assistance to countries practicing internment and political imprisonment. In 1974 a clause (Section 502B) was introduced recommending that military assistance be denied to countries committing gross violations of human rights unless there were exceptional circumstances which the President was required to explain to Congress.¹²⁰ In July, 1975, when Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 became effective, it became illegal to use aid

funds 'to provide training or advice, or provide any financial support, for police, prisons, or other law enforcement forces for any foreign government'.¹²¹ In the same year the International Police Academy in Washington was closed.

But these measures were far from fully effective, and it appears that the International Narcotics Control Program has taken over where the Office of Public Safety left off. As Michael Klare states:

During the fiscal years 1973-78, the International Narcotics Control Program awarded \$142 million in grants to law enforcement agencies abroad with some of the largest grants going to countries which had also been major recipients of Public Safety assistance: e.g. Bolivia, Colombia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Peru and Thailand... Typically such grants consisted of the same mix of small arms, radios, jeeps, helicopters, surveillance devices and data processing equipment provided under the Public Safety Program.¹²²

Military supplies and assistance also continue to go to many repressive regimes in spite of the legislation designed to control this and despite President Carter's public emphasis on the importance of human rights. Certain steps have been taken, such as the suspension of military aid to Argentina and Uruguay in 1977. But in February, 1978, the annual review of the State Department on the human rights record of countries receiving economic and military aid (a review ordered by Congress in 1976) attacked the record of many of America's allies, including the regime of President Marcos of the Philippines, which was accused of torturing political prisoners and of pervasive corruption. Yet, State Department sources confirmed that, of the countries criticised, only Nicaragua would be debarred from buying arms and military equipment in the United States. In the other cases,

including the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Indonesia, security considerations outweighed human rights.¹²³

United States military and other assistance does, of course, go to many different types of regimes; and the question arises as to how far it is particularly concentrated on those that are repressive. Klare observes:

Among the countries most often cited by organizations like Amnesty International, the International Commission of Jurists, and the UN Commission on Human Rights for consistent patterns of abuse are: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, Uruguay, the Philippines, South Korea, Thailand.

These countries are not the only ones with bad human rights records of course, but they stand out for Americans because of persistent reports of torture, assassination, and arbitrary arrest, and because all are recipients of substantial military and economic assistance from the United States.

Consider: between 1973 and 1977, we provided these ten nations with \$1.1 billion worth of arms and equipment under the Military Assistance Program (MAP) or 43% of all such grants awarded during this period (exclusive of Vietnam war assistance). Military credits under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program came to another \$1.2 billion, and economic assistance to some \$2 billion, bringing total U.S. taxpayers' contributions to these repressive governments to a staggering \$4.3 billion. In addition these countries spent over \$18.2 billion on arms under the FMS and Commercial Sales programs, thereby accounting for 37% of total U.S. weapons sales worldwide. And despite President Carter's pledge to cut back on arms aid to nations which violate human rights, these ten countries are scheduled to receive over \$500 million in U.S. military assistance during the fiscal year 1978.¹²⁴
(Emphasis in original)

Another study examined the evidence for the hypothesis that the U.S. gives more economic and military aid to repressive regimes in Latin America than to others which are not so repressive.¹²⁵ It found that there was a positive correlation between the level of U.S. aid and the violation

of human rights, with the correlation for military aid being stronger than for foreign aid in general. To quote the author:

While the correlations between various types of aid and human rights violations are far from perfect, the findings presented in this paper reveal not isolated instances but rather a clear pattern of aid distributions that favour Latin American governments which abuse their citizens' human rights.¹²⁶

A more fundamental and difficult question is how far United States foreign policy is, overall, a significant cause of the emergence of military and repressive rule in Latin America. This is one of the questions taken up by Kurth in the study referred to earlier. He argues that the evidence for a causal link between American military policies and military rule in Latin America is strongest for those countries which suffered U.S. military intervention or occupation in the first three decades of this century--Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and Panama--all but the last of them being among the states that have suffered the longest and harshest tyrannical regimes in Latin America in the period since World War II.

What can explain this apparent if imperfect association between U.S. military occupation in one period and a tyrannical regime in a later one? For one thing, of course, the U.S. military in effect appointed Trujillo and Somoza to their military commands and therefore to the base from which they later took political power. (To a much lesser extent, the U.S. government did the same for Batista in 1933.) More importantly, however, the effect of the U.S. occupation in the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua was to level what remained of the traditional political institutions and to erect a single institution, the army, which towered over the traditional rubble, the urban rabble, and everything else. To a lesser extent, the same process occurred in Cuba (where, however, the relatively high commercial development encouraged countervailing urban political organizations for a time), Haiti (where all political institutions, including the Guardie, remained weak), and Panama (where the relatively high commercial development which grew up around the Canal also encouraged countervailing political organizations).¹²⁷

However, he suggests that U.S. military impact on various Latin American states since World War II has been much lighter and 'has resulted in no clear pattern of political regimes common to several states'. Writing in 1973 he noted, however, that:

Some current regimes do seem to be either more military (Peru) or more conservative (Dominican Republic, Uruguay) or both (Guatemala) than the regimes (or in the case of the Dominican Republic, than the rebellion) that existed at the time of the intervention.¹²⁸

Similarly, Kurth finds no clear pattern of political regimes common to those states receiving the highest level of U.S. military aid.

In the period 1962-70, the six largest recipients of U.S. military aid were by rank and by current regime, 1) Brazil, conservative and military; 2) Argentina, also conservative and military; 3) Chile, radical and civilian; 4) Peru, radical and military; 5) Venezuela, moderate and civilian; and 6) Colombia, moderate and civilian. In sum three military and three civilian regimes; or two conservative, two radical and two moderate ones... A similar lack of common regime pattern results if we look at U.S. military aid per capita, or per soldier, or at U.S. economic aid.¹²⁹

He concludes:

In brief, the comparison of Latin American states for the last decade or so gives little support to the argument that U.S. foreign policies - defined in the strict sense of U.S. military interventions, advisory interventions, military aid and economic aid - are a major explanation for Latin American military rule. Regrettably, we conclude that a convincing case for the argument has yet to be made. And it will be a case all the harder to make in the future, if the U.S. military and economic aid programs in Latin America continue at their current diminished level.¹³⁰

Again, the comment applies that developments in Latin America since Kurth was writing throw a different light on the situation, especially CIA complicity in the overthrow of the Allende government. (Kurth in fact attaches considerable significance to the fact that at the time the United States had not apparently attempted to have the Allende government unseated.)

Nevertheless, Kurth is no doubt correct in suggesting that, overall, U.S. military interventions in Latin America are not a major explanation of Latin American military rule. *It is rather the broader pattern of 'structural violence' in the shape of U.S. domination in the economic and other domains and the effect of this, discussed earlier, on the internal structures in Latin America and other parts of the Third World, that should be designated the major cause of military and repressive rule.*

It is when this system of structural violence breaks down and United States or Western interests appear to be at stake that military intervention becomes likely. And even where such interventions do not result immediately in repressive regimes, their effect is to rule out the radical options that alone offer Third World countries some hope of freeing themselves from the domination of the Centre. Indeed, Kurth himself concludes that 'insofar as American economic presence and especially American direct investment are included as an adjunct or result of U.S. foreign policies...the argument that U.S. foreign policies are a major explanation for Latin American military rule may become more convincing'.

No doubt the present Carter administration and many Western governments would feel more at ease if fewer of their allies and partners in the Third World were repressive dictatorships. The question is whether they are prepared to

countenance the structural changes that could bring this situation about or whether they will continue to block radical change by various means, up to and including subversion and military intervention.

b) The Role of the Soviet Union and China

The last two decades has seen the emergence of the Soviet Union as a major influence in the Third World, and of course a leading arms exporter to it. Prior to 1955, it had supplied arms only to the European socialist bloc countries and to China, North Korea, and North Vietnam. In that year there was a change in policy towards the non-aligned developing countries; and economic relations, including arms sales, were developed. A SIPRI publication, The Arms Trade with the Third World (1975), summarises the developments since then:

During an initial phase the Soviet Union's dominant concern was to weaken the military alliances which the West was forming round its borders. Secondly, Soviet arms supplies were provided to other countries where the Soviet Union considered it had some strategic interest. Finally in recent years the Soviet Union had negotiated arms agreements on a worldwide basis. Although these three phases constitute a convenient way to describe the evolution of the Soviet policy, it should be understood that, in reality, the changes were not clear-cut, but were part of a process of gradual development.¹³¹

During periods in the sixties and early seventies, the Soviet Union actually overtook the United States as the main supplier of major arms to the Third World (excluding Vietnam), though the United States has since 1975 regained this dubious distinction.¹³² A SIPRI analysis of Soviet arms exports to the Third World reveals that in the period 1950-1972 these were concentrated on the Middle East (44.5%), the Far East (including North Vietnam and North Korea) (28.5%), and the Indian subcontinent (17.9%);

by comparison, its arms supplies to North Africa (2.8%), Sub-Saharan Africa (1.6%), and Latin America (4.8%) were small, though an updated study would show the Soviet Union's increased involvement in Africa.¹³³ Other aspects of the Soviet arms trade with the Third World, especially how it relates to the general pattern of Soviet trade with this area, were discussed earlier.

It is worth noting that the supplies of Soviet arms to liberation movements in the early sixties were quite limited, apart from those to the NLF and the Pathet Lao which reached them via North Vietnam. Thus, there is little evidence of a Soviet-directed strategy of expansion through the subversion of democratic regimes in the Third World, which was the rationale for the massive counter-insurgency programmes sponsored by the United States in this period, with such dire consequences for human rights. It was mainly from the mid-sixties onwards that the Soviet Union, partly in response to competition from China, began to support liberation movements in a major way in Angola and Mozambique, and also those directed against the regimes in South Africa and Rhodesia. By 1970, it had become the major supplier of arms to the African liberation movements.¹³⁴

Before its involvement in Afghanistan, the Soviet Union had not committed its own armed forces in combat in the Third World arena, though Soviet military advisors and technicians had been involved, for instance, in Egypt, Somalia, Ethiopia, North Korea, Vietnam, and Angola. It came closer to direct intervention in combat in Ethiopia and Angola, where Soviet military advisors have worked in conjunction with the Cuban military forces that now form an essential prop to the regimes in these countries.

Have Soviet policies--on arms transfers, training and advisory programmes--contributed to repression in the Third World? They have certainly

helped to build up the military strength of socialist Third World countries, thereby also increasing their capacity to repress internal rebellion and dissent, as for instance when the North Vietnamese government of Ho Chi Minh sent in the 325th Division of its army to crush a peasant rebellion in the Nghe An province in 1956.¹³⁵ And now that Soviet military supplies are going to three socialist countries that are involved in major counter-insurgency operations--Vietnam against the Khmer Rouge in Kampuchea, the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia against the Eritrean guerrillas, and the Angolan government of Augustino Neto against the FLNA and UNITA--we can anticipate that the repressive consequences of these policies will be much more severe.

Outside of the socialist countries, Soviet arms have gone to a number of particularly repressive regimes, including the Amin government in Uganda by way of Libya. Mrs. Bandaranaike's government in Sri Lanka (Ceylon) received Soviet arms in 1971 (along with supplies from the U.S., China, East and West Germany, India, Pakistan, Egypt, and Yugoslavia) when it was suppressing with particular ferocity the leftist JVP uprising supported mainly by students and young people.¹³⁶ Mrs. Gandhi's government in India continued to receive Soviet military supplies and Soviet diplomatic backing during the period of Emergency Rule when tens of thousands were imprisoned without trial; and even the arch-reactionary regime of the Shah of Iran, the major capitalist sub-imperialist power in the Middle East, purchased Soviet arms in 1968-69 and benefited from Soviet investments of \$250 million in various Iranian industries.¹³⁷

Chinese policies have been no less erratic. China, logically enough, supplied arms to liberation movements fighting anti-colonialist or anti-imperialist wars. But equally it gave military

and diplomatic support to the Bandaranaike government when it suppressed the JVP uprising, and it backed the right-wing military dictatorship of Yahya Khan in Pakistan when it was carrying out a murderous campaign of repression in East Bengal (now Bangladesh). Its foreign policy in recent years has been so influenced by the antagonism with the Soviet Union that it was even prepared to support the intervention in May, 1978, of French and Belgian paratroopers in Zaire after leftist rebels had launched an invasion of Shaba province from neighbouring Angola in an attempt to overthrow the corrupt Mobutu regime. China's ally, the Pol Pot government in Kampuchea, to whom it supplied arms and military advisors, was certainly exceedingly repressive and probably responsible for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of its citizens; indeed, if the most pessimistic estimates of the number of its victims prove to be correct, it would make it the bloodiest regime to have emerged anywhere since the end of World War II.

Clearly, the power struggle between the major powers is a drama in which there are no heroes.

PART IV: CONCLUSION

The premise in this essay is not that threats to the security of societies are always illusory, but that the military style of response to them entails at best enormous problems and that in general it has become an inappropriate response. It would be unreasonable to deny that there have been wars that have brought a crucial measure of liberation--wars against colonial or imperialist oppression, the Second World War which resulted in the defeat of the Axis powers and the liberation of Europe from Nazi rule. It should not be forgotten, however, that if military might eventually brought about Hitler's downfall, it was also the failure of the major powers to demilitarise after World War I that played an important part in his rise to power (a failure that was repeated after World War II). And the dilemma today is that, however pressing the reasons for militarising in any given situation, it does require disciplined, repressive institutions (the armed forces) and frequently entails, for the reasons discussed, increasing regimentation, the erosion of liberties, and the reinforcement of systems of internal and international domination.

Militarism in the era of total war can be doubly counterproductive. It can itself be a cause of international instability, even to the extent of creating the very external threat that it is supposed to answer; and it may bring about changes in the structures, institutions, and values of society as profound as those which might be feared from external attack or occupation. Militarism in the Third World, as we have seen, far from bringing independence, has become a major instrument for the continued domination of the industrialised Centre. Above

all, militarism now places in jeopardy the very existence of the species. For all these reasons the task of devising and extending alternatives to militarism has become a central task of our time.

A full consideration of such alternatives is beyond the scope of this essay, but I want to comment briefly on two main approaches--defence through guerrilla war or the preparation for it, and social defence through non-violent popular action--and to suggest some of the links between them.

A people's guerrilla war, it is argued, represents a more self-reliant form of force (in the sense of the term used by Mary Kaldor). It allows for greater decentralisation of the command structure and for the departure at various levels from the kind of disciplined hierarchy found in conventional 'industrial type' armies. And, because it is essentially defensive in character and relies on the quick strike at vulnerable enemy points, it does not involve such enormous outlays on capital equipment as conventional militarism. Moreover, it makes particular sense as a defence strategy today because technological developments, such as electronically guided anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles that can be operated by small groups of people, has shifted the combat odds in favour of the mobile guerrilla defendant and against conventional armies encumbered by rigid chains of command and unwieldy--if destructive--weapons systems.

It should again be mentioned that, in the classic treatises on peoples' wars, guerrilla action is seen only as a stage leading up to something approaching a full-scale military confrontation, though there is no reason of course why this part of the scenario should not be dropped if it is seen as inappropriate in a different context. But I

think one can question how significant, or how permanent, is the alleged combat advantage of the guerrilla defendant given the advances in counter-insurgency technology and the electronic detection and evasion devices now available to the armies of highly industrialised powers and their clients. Moreover, the more the guerrilla army has to rely on sophisticated electronic equipment, the less self-reliant it becomes and the more dependent on an industrially advanced supplier of military equipment.

In practice, many of the prolonged guerrilla wars have been maintained by considerable outside help in the form of weapons and supplies coming from one or more of the major powers. Thus, in the war in Vietnam the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and through it the National Liberation Front received massive military and economic assistance from the Soviet Union and China,¹³⁸ and reports suggest that the fortunes of the Khmer Rouge forces fighting today against the regular Vietnamese army may depend to a large extent on how far China is able to continue supplying them.

The experience of Cambodia raises a question mark against another commonly held belief about guerrilla warfare--namely, that where it is successful this in itself is a proof that it has all along had the support of the people and represented their wishes. The terrible repression unleashed by the Pol Pot government and the continued reports of atrocities by the Khmer Rouge forces suggest that this is not always and not necessarily the case. Intimidation, the ruthless elimination of political rivals, and the securing of an outside source of arms--coupled to be sure with some measure of support among the population and an unpopular enemy--may at times be sufficient to secure success.

It has not in general proved to be the case, as I noted earlier, that governments that have come to power by means of guerrilla warfare have continued to rely on this method for the defence of their societies, as the examples of Cuba, Algeria, Vietnam, and China show; instead, they have opted for some form of conventional military defence based on modern weapons systems and conscripted armies. Finally, the suffering and death inflicted on innocent people during the course of a guerrilla war, particularly where it takes place in an urban setting, raises fundamental political and moral problems.

Nevertheless, guerrilla warfare does represent, as compared to conventional warfare, a shift away from a purely military confrontation; and it increases the importance of political, psychological, and moral factors. Such factors are not without significance even in conventional conflicts, as more than one military strategist has pointed out. In guerrilla warfare outright military victory may not be necessary, and the object is rather to break the political will of the opponent and deprive him of the cooperation of the population. America's intervention in Vietnam ended in a military stalemate but also in a political defeat of sorts; the cost of remaining in Vietnam was too high and perhaps if the revolt at home, and in particular within the armed forces, had gone far enough, it would have become physically impossible to remain there. Much the same could be said of the French experience in Algeria and of the British in what is now the Republic of Ireland.

Robert Taber, in his study of guerrilla warfare,¹³⁹ proposes for the guerrilla something of a missionary role whose attacks on the repressive establishment destroy the hold of mystifying symbols and awaken the people to their power. This power itself derives from the need of all modern societies to secure the cooperation of the mass of the people:

The modern industrial society cannot function and its government cannot govern, except with popular participation and by popular consent. What is true of the industrial states is also true, with minor qualifications, of the non-industrial states and colonies on which the former depend for the raw materials and, often, for their export markets.¹⁴⁰

The effect of this is to put pressure on governments, particularly in the industrialised countries, to profess liberal-democratic goals of some kind and to make concessions to popular demands by providing welfare services and some degree of participation in political life. It also deters governments to some degree from having open confrontations with large sections of the population and resorting to obvious repression. This gives those seeking to promote economic and political advance a good deal of room for manoeuvre. Governments have constantly to bear in mind that, if they are too brutal, the very instruments of repression may break in their hands and the army and police deny them continued allegiance.

Similarly, at the international level, governments of widely differing character feel obliged to profess their belief in the principle of self-determination, and, if they violate this principle, to seek refuge in various subterfuges. Thus, they may claim that they are in reality only providing help for what is basically an internal insurrection (the pretext for the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea) or acting at the behest of the legitimate government to put down foreign-directed rebellion (as the U.S. claimed in Vietnam, and the Soviet Union in Czechoslovakia). But again, if the invaders or occupiers are met with prolonged non-cooperation by the majority of the population, this can expose the official pretext and put considerable pressure on the offending party to withdraw. In

principle, such pressure, if systematically applied, could be as effective as armed resistance.

If the basic function of guerrilla war is to trigger the non-cooperation of the people, then other, less destructive approaches may achieve the same purpose. Gandhi's Salt March in India in 1930, for instance, can be regarded as the functional equivalent of Castro's attack on the Moncado barracks in Cuba in 1953, or the Tet Offensive in Vietnam in 1968, in that it was a form of 'propaganda by the deed' which destroyed the illusion of the opponent's invincibility. *However, in the case of nonviolent action, ultimate success depends, much more so than with guerrilla warfare, on the initiative of the broad majority of the population.*

Historically, we are at a point where popular nonviolent or civilian resistance could play a decisive role in a variety of political contexts. It may be able to secure the overthrow of repressive and unrepresentative regimes. In Iran, popular non-cooperation brought about the downfall of the Shah; and in India and elsewhere civilian nonviolent action played a central role in ending colonial rule. It may force repressive regimes to modify their policies, as has happened in several countries in Latin America, in parts of Eastern Europe, and even in Norway during the German occupation, when the united resistance of the Norwegian teachers forced the Quisling government to abandon its plans to introduce Nazi teachings in the schools. It has thwarted military coups, notably in Germany in 1920 during the abortive Kapp putsch,¹⁴¹ and it was used to considerable political effect during the invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968. If the resistance did not prevent the Soviet Union from completing its invasion and installing a pro-Soviet government, it did have a lasting impact on the left throughout Europe and the human rights and dissident movements in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union itself. In the long term, it may prove to have been

the most effective form of resistance, insofar as it has set in motion forces that could lead to the liberalisation of the European socialist societies and ending the hegemony of the Soviet Union.

At the level of international politics, the problems of imposing an unpopular, and particularly an unpopular foreign rule has altered the strategic reality in the struggle between the major powers. Any government today would have to think long and hard before attempting to impose its rule by means of occupation on another industrialised state. The difficulty, and the domestic political hazards involved, are themselves a considerable deterrent to any such action, even if there were no threat of military retaliation. It seems highly unlikely that the Soviet Union has any territorial ambitions in Western Europe, much less in the United States, or that the Western powers have illusions of ruling the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe by force of arms.

Invasions cannot be entirely ruled out between the Centre powers; but they are more likely to occur in a war situation caused by a technological accident, the escalation of a local conflict, or the decision of one side to make a pre-emptive strike to remove once and for all the military threat from the other side. In this sense, it is militarism itself that increases the likelihood of outside attack as well as the more fearful threat of a nuclear holocaust.

The threat of invasion, or the manipulated overthrow of a representative government, comes today for the secondary rank powers more from their allies than from their alleged enemies.

Czechoslovakia has experienced this, and any Western European government that became too radical in its domestic or foreign policies would surely face some risk of being toppled by direct or indirect intervention by the United States. Intervention might be somewhat easier in such a situation, because there would doubtless be groups and sections of the population unhappy about the new policies who could form the nucleus and base of a client regime. But non-violent action and widespread non-cooperation would have a reasonable chance of preventing such a regime from operating effectively and would cause the maximum political embarrassment to the major power concerned.

The changed strategic situation and the particular vulnerability of small countries in the event of nuclear war has prompted several governments in Western Europe, or people close to government circles, to begin taking a serious interest in the possibilities of defence based on non-violent action or some form of unarmed resistance. The Swedish government sponsored a research project on this topic from 1969 to 1972, and a similar project has been sponsored by the Dutch government since 1974. There is of course a danger in this in that non-violent action, essentially a radical popular tool, could be taken over by the state and come to be seen as a means of defending the status quo, and that moreover it would be downgraded to the level of mere technique which would take its place among others, including military techniques and strategies, as a means of defending national boundaries. My own view is that non-violent action for radical social change and action for the defence of social and political gains already achieved (including where necessary the defence of political autonomy and representative institutions against internal or external threats) should be seen as part of a single process. However, there is no reason in principle why a government-

sponsored project should not have a wide frame of reference; and this fortunately has been the case with the Dutch project.¹⁴²

We could summarise the strategic-military situation at the Centre as follows:

1. The rationale for the militarism at the Centre, i.e., the arms race between the superpowers in conjunction with their allies in NATO and the Warsaw Pact, is to curb the territorial ambitions of the other side.

2. There is now little reason to believe that the major powers wish to occupy one another's territory, whatever may be their ambitions to extend their influence in other parts of the world. The very difficulty of imposing an alien rule on a modern state is in itself a deterrent to either side to embark upon invasion and conquest.

3. This built-in deterrent to invasion between modern states could be heightened by the development within each country of the practice and techniques of non-violent popular action that would seek to promote social advance within existing societies and defend social institutions and values against any internal or external threat.

4. It is now militarism itself that poses the major threat to the security of people in the countries of the Centre; and for the smaller countries especially a system of defence based on nuclear weapons makes no sense. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that it is within these smaller European states that serious consideration is now being given to non-violent approaches to the problems of security, including national defence.

5. While demilitarisation is an urgent necessity, it will not be easy to achieve because of powerful vested interests that would be threatened if it were to occur. Militarism enables the superpowers to exert a dominant influence over their allies, and it assists the Centre as a whole to maintain a dominant position in relation to the Third World. Moreover, it takes a bold imaginative leap to break free from long-established ways of approaching a problem, in this case the military approach to the problem of defence.

6. A central task of the 'peripheries of the Centre,' especially of the peace and radical movements, is to stimulate such an imaginative breakthrough and to challenge the militarism of governments through nonviolent radical action. It is possible today to envisage a transnational movement across the East/West divide encompassing movements in the United States, Japan, and Western Europe and radical dissidents in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union who would campaign against the militarism in their own societies and against military pacts and alliances.

Demilitarisation in the Third World presents additional complex problems. If the level of militarism is lower than at the Centre, political instability is high and the occurrence of armed conflicts more frequent; this is a situation in which disarmament may not be given serious consideration. On the other hand, there is a growing awareness in Third World countries that they are being used as proxies for major power struggles and as pawns in the competition for power and resources carried on by the nations at the Centre.¹⁴³ It is, therefore, possible to imagine a link-up between radical forces at the Centre and those in the Third World in a campaign to halt or restrict the transfer of military technology and

for the dismantling of various structures of manipulation and domination, including the military apparatuses which uphold them.

The United Nations Special Session on Disarmament in 1978 may be seen as a small example of such co-operation in the field of disarmament. In a sense, its achievements were modest and its most significant contribution may well have been that of putting movements and organisations from different parts of the world in closer contact with each other.

The final document of the Special Session¹⁴⁴ is notable for the clarity of its exposition of the dangers of the arms race and, by contrast, the cautiousness of the recommended programme of action. The document gives priority to the problem of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and to the reduction of armed forces and military budgets. On nuclear weapons, it urges disarmament by a process of balanced reductions coupled with other measures such as agreements to ensure that nuclear weapons are not used in combat, the establishment of nuclear-free zones, the prevention of nuclear proliferation, a halt to further qualitative improvements in weapons, and an end to nuclear tests. The ultimate goal is complete nuclear disarmament with adequate safeguards; but, controversially, the right of states to develop programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy is insisted upon.

Agreed and balanced reductions on a bilateral, regional, or multilateral basis are seen as the way ahead also in achieving the goal of complete and general disarmament; though unilateral measures of arms reductions or limitations are mentioned as a possible way of creating favourable conditions for success in the disarmament process.

The arms trade too and the transfer of military technology would be brought under control by a process of multilateral agreement.

What is lacking in the programme is any recognition that the urgency of the situation demands that some risks should be taken to achieve disarmament if we are to reach this goal before disaster occurs. The struggle against colonialism and racism has involved risks and sacrifices, as Gandhi and Martin Luther King and many others show us; and so too will the struggle against militarism. In the final document of the Special Session, however, there is an insistence that there should be no diminution whatever of security to any country at any stage as a result of measures taken, and that disarmament should proceed by agreed, balanced reductions.

Naturally, no one is opposed to bilateral and multilateral agreements, but there is nothing in this programme that gives grounds for believing that it could lead to the kind of dramatic breakthrough that is necessary. *What is needed at the present time is a cogent analysis of the strategic reality in the conflict between the powers at the Centre, an exposition of the counter-productiveness of militarism in meeting their legitimate security needs, and a call to people everywhere to denounce and refuse to co-operate with militarism.* Naturally, such an approach will not find favour in any United Nations or other inter-state meeting; but this in itself is further evidence of the need for radical action by the people to correct the bias of rashly-cautious governments. Fortunately, the document does envisage increased educational efforts and public campaigns by the U.N. and its specialised agencies regarding the need for disarmament and recognises the contribution that non-governmental organisations and research institutions can make to these. Such

activities could provide opportunities to develop more adequate programmes and forums for disseminating new approaches.

Turning now to the area of internal security, the contribution of non-violent action could again be considerable. Interestingly, the Dutch government project covers the field of internal as well as external security; and the working parties have been briefed to look at such things as the use of non-violent action to prevent military coups and to deal with situations caused by armed political groups.

There are those who argue that the supposed threat to internal security is no more than a pretext for the ruling classes in capitalist societies to strengthen and militarise the security machine and thereby help maintain the unjust status quo against the challenge of radical forces. Strengthening security may indeed end by having this effect, but it is also true that genuine internal threats to the security of the population and to representative institutions do arise; moreover, in much of Europe today, and in those parts of the Third World where some kind of representative government still exists, the threat comes more from the extreme right than the left.

There have been particular instances referred to earlier where the non-cooperation of the people has thwarted, or helped to thwart, attempted military coups; and preparing people for action of this kind does appear to be a more positive and less hazardous approach to this particular aspect of the security problem than militarising the security forces and enacting special restrictive legislation. Italy provides a clear warning of the dangers of the latter approach in that the special security forces there, the Servizio Informazioni Difesa, are known to have

been involved in several right-wing plots to overthrow constitutional government.¹⁴⁵

It may be that some security functions cannot be carried out in a wholly non-violent way, such as protecting individuals and communities from attack in certain circumstances. *There have, however, been interesting and courageous attempts to use non-violent methods to protect communities in riot situations in India and in some of the city ghettos in the United States;*¹⁴⁶ and no doubt far greater developments are possible in the direction of achieving a self-regulating, non-violent society. People do have the right to live without fear of harassment, robbery, murder, or rape. But it should be recognised that no system of security can give total protection and that if this goal is pursued beyond a certain point it will lead to a situation in which there is neither security nor freedom; the emphasis, moreover, should be on restraint rather than destructive violence and on trying to attack the structural causes of unsocial behavior rather than seeking technological fixes. Finally, we should be continually looking for ways to extend the scope of non-violent approaches to cover as many fields of social interaction as possible.

For people in many parts of the world, the principal threat to security comes from the repression or terror organised by the state itself; and, as we have seen, even in the capitalist democracies state power is encroaching upon the freedom of action of individuals and groups. There is, however, a danger that by constantly emphasising this accretion of state power we may make people feel a sense of helplessness in the face of it, and thus increase still further its influence. It is useful, therefore, in this final section to take stock of some of its limitations.

A Dutch scholar, Dr. Abraham de Swaan, in a study of state terror took as his starting point the fact that it is perpetrated by a bureaucracy and as

such shares the weaknesses and strengths of every bureaucratic system, as well as having some special problems of its own.¹⁴⁷ One classic problem it faces is information overload:

Not much work is so time consuming as monitoring, shadowing, spying; few data are so opaque as private conversations and correspondences. A stream of predominantly meaningless and mostly misleading reports gradually clutters up the police archives. Each attempt at systematization must ignore the significant detail, the ambiguous phrase. Automization of information is no help at all.¹⁴⁸

DeSwaan isolates certain fundamental contradictions facing terrorist regimes, including

.....that between predictability and uncertainty. If everyone knew (for certain) what acts would lead to arrest and torture and which would go unpunished, most people would refrain from the first and without worrying commit the others. But the purpose of an intimidation apparatus is precisely to impose so much fear in people that of their own accord they will abstain from things that otherwise would be hard for the regime to detect or prevent. Not even a police state can always keep under surveillance all people in all their doings....Yet, this uncertainty cannot be without limits: If nobody knows any more what will lead to arrest or ill-treatment, anxious law abiding would lose all sense, subjects would become careless or even daring.¹⁴⁹ (Emphasis added)

In this contradiction may lie the seeds of the regime's downfall:

Maybe intimidation comes to an end only when people begin to notice of themselves and others that they are beginning to calculate their odds in a different manner, when around them they register more anger than anxiety and when they themselves also begin to experience it in that way, when they stop to believe of one another that they still believe in intimidation, when multiple ignorance of one another resolves and people begin to recognize their own thoughts in the faces and the words around them. Whoever speaks or acts first, risks the most. But the problem is one of synchronicity. When enough people move at the same time, a threshold may be passed, the terror evaporates and either the regime collapses or it must wage war against its own citizenry.¹⁵⁰

This, I think, gives a sharp insight into the way an extremely repressive regime, such as that of the Shah of Iran, in spite of the efficiency of the dreaded secret police, SAVAK, in spite of the use of torture and intimidation, and in spite of its military might, could so swiftly lose its power to coerce the population into submission and co-operation. The same dynamic can be seen at work in Eastern Europe, where dissident and workers' groups have been increasingly prepared to express openly their opposition to the abuses of power. Paul Goma, the Romanian writer, discussing the miners' strikes in his country in 1977, describes how the paralysis of fear came to be broken:

Of course it was not we (the intellectuals) but the human conditions under which they live that caused the strike. But in a certain sense we determined the course of events by showing our fellow citizens that the risks are not all that great. Naturally you are beaten up or arrested, but in the end you win your rights. Our main contribution was to help to overcome the paralysis of fear. After thirty years of terror, the fear had penetrated everyone. Maybe this seems unreasonable; people say 'Am I really afraid? Of what? I do not know exactly'. But so many innocent people have suffered--not only ones considered to be anti-communist, but even the militants who helped the regime to become established.¹⁵¹

Here we see a terror system beginning to lose its grip in exactly the way De Swaan predicts. If even the militant supporters of the regime are liable to be arrested and punished, then indeed 'anxious law-abiding' no longer makes sense. In Romania, as elsewhere in Eastern Europe, the citizens are becoming more daring.

I do not want to imply that combatting repressive regimes is a simple matter or to underestimate the suffering that such regimes can inflict. It is important, however, to realise that

none of them, not even the most repressive and heavily armed, is invincible. And in the capitalist democracies we should not be so dazzled by the new repressive technologies or intimidated by restrictive laws as to lose sight of the considerable possibilities that still exist for organising popular radical action.

In spite, then, of the chilling developments noted in this essay and some recent political events like the return of a conservative trend in Britain and elsewhere, linked to a revival of some classic cold war attitudes and to support for increasing military expenditure, there is reason for hope. In the United States, Japan, and Western Europe, popular nonviolent resistance is receiving new impetus in the campaigns against nuclear power. Since the latter is becoming one of the cornerstones of today's industrial-military society as the supplies of oil and other fossil fuels diminish, these campaigns constitute, at least obliquely, a challenge to militarism. In Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, dissident leftist and human rights movements are developing with great courage an increasingly open--and perforce nonviolent--struggle against the regimentation of bureaucratic and authoritarian states, keeping alive the vision of a libertarian communism once associated with the bright hopes of the Prague Spring. In the Third World, popular movements have had some success at least in wresting concessions from repressive governments; and the Iranian example, despite recent developments, does at least illustrate that even the most powerful military regime is vulnerable to the mass non-cooperation of the people; it is this non-cooperation, coupled with the creative impulse of nonviolence, that may offer a way forward for oppressed peoples, both in the Third World and elsewhere. Moreover, as the U.N. Special Session on Disarmament showed, there are now some

governments and movements in the Third World seriously concerned about the problems of militarism and in particular the transfer of military technology from the Centre which is playing an important role in maintaining dependence and exploitation. Finally, the hazards of military defence based on weapons of mass destruction has opened the way for a serious interest in alternative approaches to the problems of security and the resolution of conflicts. *Thus, the preconditions exist for a powerful transnational radical and peace movement, linking people in East and West, North and South, in a common struggle against repression, militarism, and global structures of domination.*

FOOTNOTES

1. I have used the term 'Third World' in this essay in preference to 'underdeveloped' or 'developing', both of which carry overtones of the notion that there is a natural progression from some primitive state to the pinnacle as represented by modern industrial states. 'De-developed' would be a more accurate description of the historical process that has occurred in much of Africa, Asia, and Latin America--that is, the distortion and impoverishment of existing economies to meet the need of expanding industrial capitalism for raw materials and markets; but I have opted for the term 'Third World' as being the most neutral one in common use. It is not, of course, intended to suggest that the countries concerned are in any sense less important than the industrialised countries.

Another set of terms I make use of is 'Centre' and 'Periphery' as defined by Johan Galtung in 'A Structural Theory of Imperialism' (Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 8, pp. 81-117). The global Centre and Periphery comprises respectively the industrialised countries and the rest of the world over which it exercises economic domination. But both Centre and Periphery have their own internal structure of centre and periphery; and in the classic imperialist system, as described by Galtung, there is a broad harmony of interests between the 'centre (or elite) of the Centre' and the 'centre of the periphery'.

2. For a discussion of this topic and the formulation of some basic definitions, see Mary Kaldor, 'The Military in World Development' (World Development, Vol. 4, No. 6, June, 1976, reprinted in Disarmament and World Development, ed. Jolly, Pergamon, 1978). See also pp. 28-30 and footnote 42.

3. Marek Thee, ' Militarism and Militarisation in Contemporary International Relations', a paper prepared for the Pugwash Symposium on ' Militarism and National Security', Oslo, November 21-25, 1977. Reprinted in Bulletin of Peace Proposals, Vol. 8, No. 4, 1977.

4. Repression may also be associated with the attempt radically to re-structure society, as in Cambodia under Pol Pot or Ethiopia under Mengistu. Even then, repression has often as much to do with establishing a new system of dominance, based on the party and central government, as with dismantling the old one.

5. Armaments or Disarmament?--The Crucial Choice, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 1978, p. 5. In American terminology, the amount is \$US 400 billion.

6. Ibid., p. 5. In American terminology, the amount is \$US one trillion.

7. Ruth Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditures 1977, p. 6.

8. Ibid., p. 6.

9. SIPRI Yearbook 1976, p. 128. Cited by Signe Landgren-Backstrom in 'The Transfer of Military Technology to Third World Countries', Bulletin of Peace Proposals, Vol. 8, No. 2, 1977, p. 119.

10. Ruth Sivard, op. cit., p. 6.

11. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency: World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1965-1974, Washington, 1976, p. 14. Cited by Landgren-Backstrom, p. 119.

12. SIPRI, Armaments or Disarmament?, p. 5.

13. SIPRI, The Arms Trade with the Third World, Pelican Books, 1975, p. 259.

14. SIPRI, Armaments or Disarmament?, p. 19.

15. Ibid., p. 20.

16. SIPRI lists nineteen Third World countries producing major weapons and components, namely Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, North Korea, South Korea, Mexico, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Peru, the Philippines, Singapore, South Africa, Taiwan, and Venezuela. See Armaments or Disarmament?, p. 21. China, which also produces major weapons, is listed as an industrialised country.

17. On developments inside the United States, see for instance Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, Jonathan Cape, 1974, especially the section on Domestic Operations in the chapter on Espionage and Counterespionage. On the new technologies, see Steve Wright, 'New Police Technologies: An Exploration of the Social Implications and Unforeseen Impacts of Some Recent Developments', Journal of Peace Research, No. 4, Vol. XV, 1978, and Ackroyd, Margolis, Rosenhead, and Shallice, The Technology of Political Control, Pelican Books, 1977.

18. See pp. 82-83 below.

19. A law passed in 1977 provided for a maximum prison sentence of four years for conscientious objectors. Since then the courts have sometimes handed out much longer sentences (of eight, ten, and in one case eighteen years), but generally these have been reduced on appeal.

20. Thus, in August, 1977, a Czechoslovak objector, Jaroslav Vozniak, began serving a two-year prison sentence. (Information from War Resisters International Newsletter, No. 164, p. 6.) This sentence, of course, is not worse than the sentences of numerous objectors in the West.

21. Some anti-militarists suggest that a professional army would pose an even greater threat to civil liberties than a conscript one, for it would concentrate power in the hands of the professionals and remove a check on the irresponsible use of the military, e.g., for aggressive foreign wars or for implementing a coup d'etat. But it would be hard, I think, to argue that Britain since the beginning of the 60's, or the Irish Republic since its foundation, has been put at particular risk from its own armed forces because of the absence of conscription; and on the other hand the existence of conscription has not prevented military coups in many Latin American states such as Brazil, Argentina, and Chile. What one can say is that standing armies as such pose a threat to democratic liberties in that they concentrate military power in the hands of relatively few people and therefore create the possibility of a military takeover in certain circumstances. Thus, the campaign against conscription should indeed be placed in the context of a wider campaign against other aspects of militarism, including the standing army.

Moreover, those who claim the status of conscientious objectors for themselves and demand that conscientious objection should be recognised as a universal human right must envisage the possibility that enough people will make use of that right to render conscription impracticable, as it was in danger of becoming in the German Federal Republic during 1977 when the law was amended to make application for C.O. status much

simpler. One of the main objectives of organisations promoting the rights of conscientious objection is to persuade people to make use of their legal rights. Promoting conscientious objection, therefore, if it is to be something more than a demand for special treatment for a privileged few, logically and morally implies opposition to conscription itself.

22. See pp. 64-67 below.

23. Unlike most European countries, the U.S. does not have an Official Secrets Act. The distinguishing feature of such legislation is that the prosecution need not prove an intent to harm the 'national interest'. The U.S. has more limited legislation of this type that applies to specific types of information, e.g., information on secret codes used by the government and information regarding the production of nuclear weapons.

24. Thus, in August, 1977, a major new marxist theoretician, Rudolf Bahro, was arrested on a trumped-up charge of espionage in the German Democratic Republic and subsequently sentenced to eight years imprisonment. At the time of his arrest, his book, The Alternative: A Critique of Real Existing Socialism, was about to be published by a West German Trade Union Publishing House. Bahro's trial was held in secret, and the sentence announced in the East German news agency ADN in June, 1978. Bahro was released on October 11, 1979, under the amnesty to mark the thirtieth anniversary of the founding of the German Democratic Republic.

25. See Berufsverbote Condemned, the report of the first session of the Third Russell Tribunal, published by the Bertrand Russell

Peace Foundation, April, 1978, and the article by Helmut Gollwitzer and Angelika Menne, 'De Nouvelles Restrictions Aux Libertes en Allemagne de l'Ouest', Le Monde Diplomatique, March, 1978.

26. See pp. 56-60 below.

27. Thus, the Red Army Faction in West Germany was very much the product of the desperation of a section of mainly young people in face of the injustices of an entrenched capitalist system and of official support for the American war in Vietnam. Similarly, the urban warfare in Northern Ireland occurred as a result of fifty years of rule by a conservative Protestant ascendancy that systematically discriminated against the Catholic population.

28. I have used the term 'socialist' in relation to the Soviet Union and its allies in Eastern Europe and the Third World, since this is the term they themselves use. But this is not to suggest that the societies in question necessarily approximate to the socialist ideal; indeed, the Soviet Union, for instance, during the Stalin period was at most levels the very antithesis of it.

29. See Steve Wright, op. cit. (above, note 17), and pp. 61-63 below.

30. For a discussion of the report of the Parker Commission and the wider nuclear energy debate, see Ian Breach, Windscale Fallout.

31. See Peter Lock, 'In Memoriam: Constitutional Rights and the Liberal State--A Worst Case Analysis in Peace Research' in Repression and Repressive Violence, edited by Marjo Hoefnagels, Swets and Zeitlinger, Amsterdam and Lisse, 1977. Peter Lock is a member of the Arbeitsgruppe Rustung und Unterentwicklung (Workgroup on Armaments and Underdevelopment) in Hamburg.

32. Cited by Robert Polet in 'Military "Justice" versus Human Rights', War Resisters International Newsletter, No. 163, November-December, 1977, Supplement No. 2--Human Rights. See also the report in The Sunday Times, June 26, 1976, 'Why Britain Tortures Its Own Soldiers'.

33. Galtung, op. cit. (above, note 1). In this essay I have mainly taken into account the internal stratification based on social class. There are other kinds of social stratification, for instance, those based on race or sex, which at times reinforce, at other times cut across the divisions based on class. I am sure a study of some of these and their relationship to militarism would be rewarding, including the psychological aspects which social scientists generally avoid. I have not attempted to explore these connections here, not because I feel they are unimportant but because I could not deal with them adequately.

34. This does not imply that we can or should return to the past or 'go back to nature', though it does mean that the lifestyles of many people in the industrialised countries will have to be simplified at certain levels. Johan Galtung again provides some useful insights in his monographs, Alternative Life Styles in Rich Countries (Paper No. 29, Chair in Conflict and Peace Research, University of Oslo) and Self Reliance: Concept, Practice and Rationale (Paper No. 35), where he draws an important distinction between the concepts of self-sufficiency (an unattainable and backward-looking ideal) and self-reliance (which does not exclude exchange on an equitable basis, and corresponds to the goal being pursued in China, at least during the Mao period, and by some of the more radical Third World governments).

35. Galtung, in 'A Structural Theory of Imperialism', op. cit. (above, note 1) shows how exploitation is built into this system by what he calls the gap in the processing levels. See especially the table on page 87, where the effects on both Centre and Periphery nations of this asymmetric system are tabulated.

36. For instance, the Flowers Commission and Parker Commission in Britain.

37. For one of the classic statements of the need for a self-reliant policy in a Third World context, see The Arusha Declaration by President Nyerere of Tanzania in 1967.

38. Figure given by the Committee on Poverty and the Arms Trade (Britain) in its publication, Bombs for Breakfast, 1978, p. 18.

39. On this point see, for instance, Ulrich Albrecht, 'Arms Trade with the Third World and Domestic Arms Production', Instant Research on Peace and Violence (published by the Tampere Peace Research Institute, Finland), Nos. 1 and 2, 1976, pp. 52-60. Albrecht gives an example of a Swiss anti-aircraft gun that incorporates an electronic guidance system produced mainly in India by low-paid women workers.

40. Mary H. Kaldor, 'The Significance of Military Technology', Bulletin of Peace Proposals, Vol. 8, No. 2, 1977, pp. 121-123. See also Mary Kaldor, 'The Military in Third World Development', op. cit. (above, note 2).

41. Kaldor, 'The Military in Third World Development', pp. 68-69.

42. In analysing the effects of militarism on society, Mary Kaldor distinguishes between the technique of force (the weapon or weapon system)

and the relations of force (military organisation and recruitment). These together constitute the form of force in any given society, a form which reflects the social formation and prevailing mode of production, but which can in turn influence the social formation. The obvious problem with this thesis is that the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries employ a form of force that is virtually indistinguishable from that of the capitalist countries. But the fact itself may be an indicator of the extent to which the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have failed to transform the relations of production and complete the social revolution. Conversely, the failure to develop an alternative method of social defence (as Engels, for example, had anticipated would occur in a workers' state) and Stalin's determination to make the Soviet Union a military-industrial giant mirrored upon, but more powerful than, the Western powers, was an important factor in halting the revolutionary process and instituting a system of bureaucratic repression. (The pressure on the Soviet Union in the 30's to militarise in response to the menace of European fascism and Japanese reaction was of course very powerful.)

Mary Kaldor is more optimistic than I am about the extent to which socialist countries in the Third World have developed alternative forms of force. Thus, commenting on Cuba's relatively high military budget for its region, she argues that Cuba 'cannot be compared with other countries because it has a people's militia, rather than an industrial army'. ('The Military in Development' in Disarmament and Development, ed. Jolly, p. 75.) This is to overlook the fact that in addition to a militia estimated at 100,000 strong and paramilitary forces of 13,000, Cuba has a regular army of some 160,000 officers and men and

possesses 600 Soviet-built tanks--plus a small navy and air force. Conscription was introduced in Cuba in 1963 for all men between the ages of 17 and 45 and lasts three years. Similarly, Vietnam has a three-year period of conscription, an estimated army strength of 600,000, including three armoured regiments. Moreover, its invasion of Kampuchea (Cambodia) in early 1979 had all the hallmarks of a conventional blitzkrieg, including some aerial bombardment and the extensive use of tanks and artillery. China's People's Liberation Army is reckoned to number 3.25 million, and there is in addition a people's militia of some 5 million. At the time of writing, China is attempting to acquire some of the latest weapon systems from the capitalist countries, notably Britain. (All figures from The Statesman's Year Book 1978-9.) Its recent invasion of Vietnam also relied heavily on the use of tanks and artillery.

Insofar, then, as alternative forms of force have been developed in socialist Third World countries in the shape of people's militias and preparations for guerrilla warfare, they have been supplemented by conventional military forces, conventionally recruited.

43. Examining a selected group of Third World countries, Mary Kaldor suggests that there is one group which is characterised by high growth rates, high rates of growth in military spending, and military burdens above their regional averages; these include Brazil, Taiwan, Iran, Israel, South Korea, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Thailand--all either oil-rich or heavily dependent on the United States. A second group is characterised by high rates of growth in military spending, low rates of growth of GNP, and military burdens that are above the regional averages--these are the war, or near-war, economies and include Cambodia, Chad,

Egypt, Jordan, Somalia, North and South Vietnam (prior to 1975), and Zambia. Finally, there are the low-growth of GNP and low-growth of military spending countries which include Cuba, Equatorial Guinea, India, and Yemen.

The findings related to the first group may seem to be at variance with the suggestion of a Poverty-Repression-Militarism cycle discussed above. But impoverishment of the lower strata of peasantry and of rural and urban workers can go hand in hand with an overall growth in GNP and thus can exacerbate social and political discontent and lead to military intervention and repression in the way suggested.

Thus, in Brazil following the right-wing military coup in 1964, military expenditure rose steeply and a programme of economic development was adopted that met with the orthodox requirements laid down by the International Monetary Fund. The effects are described in the COPAT pamphlet Bombs for Breakfast (p. 30):

'Implementation of these policies required sustained repression, and from 1964-67 the economy went into recession against a background of growing militarisation and the suppression of all opposition through the use of arms and torture....By 1968 the IMF objectives had been achieved and the economy was set for a period of growth--or at least some sections of it were. Between 1968 and 1974 GNP increased at around 10% per annum and inflation remained relatively low at between 13% and 18%. Growth was concentrated in high technology industries while labour-intensive industries providing goods for wide sections of the population, such as shoes and textiles, declined sharply. The agricultural land in use for the production of soya beans for export increased by one million hectares per year from 1967-76, while the supply

of black beans, rice, manioc, and other traditional foods for local consumption stagnated and prices rose rapidly. The average worker's monthly food bill rose from 87 1/2 hours pay to 155 hours. By 1975 the government's own statistics showed 74 million people, out of a population of 104 million, living below subsistence level. The penetration of foreign capital increased substantially until multinational corporations in 1977 controlled 40.4% of the liquid assets of the main industrial and mining enterprises, retaining 55.3% of the profits.'

See also the further discussion of this point on pp. 83-85.

44. As, for example, in the revolt in the Nghe An province of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in 1956.

45. The former Italian colony of Eritrea became an autonomous unit within the federation of Ethiopia and Eritrea in September, 1952, in accordance with a U.N. resolution dated December 2, 1950. When Haile Selassie began unilaterally to annex Eritrea in 1962, this was denounced by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries as an act of imperialism, and they supported the marxist wing of the guerrilla movement in Eritrea.

46. The technique of the 'big lie' has not been excluded from this propaganda. Thus, The Economist (London) of March 5, 1979, quotes the following extract from the official Hanoi newspaper Nhan Dan which had appeared during that week:

'The fact that Indochinese nations are united against the Chinese reactionaries' invasion of Kampuchea and the massacre of the Kampuchean people proves that this is a just and sacred fight in self defence.' (Emphasis added)

47. Miles Wolpin quotes the following from a report in Seven Days, April 25, 1977: 'Twelve thousand people in the world die of starvation every day. Ten million children are underfed and close to death. Four hundred million are inert from hunger and almost a billion, a quarter of the world's population, suffer from the effects of malnutrition. These are the figures of Jean Mayer, Chairman of the National Council on Hunger and Malnutrition and President of Tufts University.'

48. Capital, Vol. I, 1867. Similarly, the Communist Manifesto speaks of 'an association in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all'.

49. Jan Oberg, 'Arms Trade with the Third World as an Aspect of Imperialism', Journal of Peace Research, No. 3, Vol. XII, 1975, pp. 213-234.

50. Ibid., p. 234.

51. The 'revisionist' critique of official American and Western versions of the origins of the Cold War is succinctly stated in David Horowitz, From Yalta to Vietnam, Penguin Books, 1967, though I think it gives insufficient weight to the contribution of the Stalinist tyranny to the post-war developments. Kurt Weisskopf, a radical Czechoslovakian journalist, recalls in his book, The Agony of Czechoslovakia '38-'68, his prediction in 1945 that, if the allies did not fall out seriously with one another, the power sharing between communists and others in Czechoslovakia might continue, but if they did so, then the communists would take over. He points out that the Western powers 'unwittingly aided the communists' when they took steps to rehabilitate Germany and thus raised widespread fears in

Czechoslovakia among communists and non-communists alike that they were witnessing a return to the policies of Munich. (The Agony of Czechoslovakia '38-'68 was published by Elek Books, London, 1968.)

52. See Horowitz, op. cit., (above, note 51), Part I, 'From Ally to Belligerent', especially Chapter One.

53. For the thesis that relations between the United States and the Soviet Union have gone from Cold War to Collusion by way of peaceful coexistence and detente, see Dominique Thevenon, 'De Yalta à Salt 2--les mutations des imperialismes' in Alternatives Nonviolentes, No. 28, May-June 1978, pp. 1-6. As of early 1980, there appears to be a swing back to a Cold War posture.

54. For a summary of arms control agreements and negotiations in the post-World War period, see SIPRI, Armaments or Disarmament, op. cit. (above, note 5), pp. 27-30. Still more useful is the commentary by Christian Mellon on both post-war treaties and the propositions put forward by each side in Alternatives Nonviolentes, No. 28. Mellon shows the disingenuousness of the various proposals and counter-proposals in that each side at every juncture has sought to gain some strategic advantage over the opponent. His commentary shows also the limitations of the treaties that have been signed.

55. The function and importance of military expenditure in the modern capitalist economy is a vexed question. One school of thought maintains that it is an essential regulatory mechanism that prevents overproduction, falling profits, and massive unemployment and has the advantage, not present in the case of other forms of public spending, of forcing competitors and opponents to follow the example of any given state in raising the military budget. This argument is forcefully

stated by Michael Kidron in Western Capitalism since the War, Penguin, 1968. This, however, is not the only view of the matter on the socialist left. Paul Cardan, for instance, in the introduction to the 1974 edition of his Modern Capitalism and the Revolution (Solidarity, London), regards the argument as 'grotesque' and points out that 'to have a prima facie plausibility the argument would require that the production of armaments had been increasing and was continuing to increase in relative terms, within output as a whole. In fact, over the last quarter of a century and for the industrial world as a whole, the contrary is true' (page 3).

56. Leslie H. Gelb, 'Arms Sales', Foreign Policy, No. 25, Winter, 1976-77, pp. 3-23. Summarised in Bulletin of Peace Proposals, Vol. 8, No. 2, 1977, pp. 171-2.

57. Jan Oberg, op. cit. (above, note 49).

58. The ten largest recipients in the periphery of major weapons from the U.S. in the period 1968-73 (ranked by percent) were Israel, South Vietnam, Iran, Taiwan, Turkey, South Korea, Thailand, Jordan, Greece, and Saudi Arabia; those of the Soviet Union were Egypt, North Vietnam, Syria, India, North Korea, Iraq, Cuba, Afghanistan, Libya, and Sudan. Oberg, op. cit., p. 218.

59. On the significance of the figures relating to the Soviet Union, Oberg comments: 'In other words, to import major USSR weapons also implies importing other commodities, but especially exporting to the USSR; and to import commodities in general from the USSR is rather likely to go hand in hand with importing weapons' (Oberg, p. 223). He also suggests that the figures 'may point to arms exports (by the USSR) as a way of paying for other goods'.

Earlier, in a comment on the development of the Soviet arms trade with the Third World, Oberg suggests that it is no longer possible to regard Soviet arms trade policy as a mere reflection of the American one. 'It may have been true during the fifties and early sixties, but the rapid relative expansion of Soviet AT [arms trade] cannot today be labelled a policy of 'peaceful coexistence' or be seen as a reflection of or a 'Gegenstrategie' towards American AT....' (Oberg, op. cit. (above, note 49), p. 220).

60. Oberg finds (p. 224) that, of the 23 Arms Trade monopolies of the U.S. (where monopoly is taken to mean having a share of 50% or more), 12 are also investment monopolies; of France's 13 AT monopolies, 10 are also investment monopolies; and of Britain's 17 AT monopolies, 5 are investment monopolies. 'In total, thus, 50% of all AT monopolies of these three suppliers are also investment monopolies.'

61. Oberg, op. cit. (above, note 49), p. 228.

62. The ten major oil producers in the Third World listed by Oberg and ranked according to their known reserves are Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran, Iraq, Libya, United Arab Republic, Venezuela, Neutr Zone, Nigeria, and Indonesia.

63. Ibid., pp. 228-29.

64. Galtung, 'A Structural Theory of Imperialism', op. cit. (above, note 1), p. 100.

65. Ibid., p. 99.

66. James R. Kurth, 'United States Foreign Policy and Latin American Military Rule', in Military Rule in Latin America, ed. Philippe C. Schmitter, Sage, California, 1973.

67. Ibid., pp. 288-9.

68. Ibid., p. 289.

69. Ibid., pp. 290-1.

70. Ibid., p. 296.

71. There is a growing volume of work related to this topic, including studies and essays by people like Galtung, Ivan Illich, Murray Bookchin, Paulo Freire, and others.

72. A U.S. Foreign Relations Committee Report in April, 1979, forecast increasing competition regarding access to oil resources.

73. See also the discussion on pp. 103-108.

74. Imaginative non-violent action occurred, for instance, during the Soviet and Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and in the campaign by the Workers Defence Committee (K.O.R.) in Poland for the release of miners arrested during the strike of 1976. For regular reports and assessments of developments within oppositionary movements in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, see the bi-monthly magazine, Labour Focus on Eastern Europe (Bottom Flat, 116 Cazenove Rd., London N. 16).

75. The Guardian, April 8, 1978.

76. See Helmut Gollwitzer and Angelika Menne, op. cit., Le Monde Diplomatique, March, 1978.

77. See 'Anti-Terror Legislation in Western Europe' in the newsletter on civil liberties and police development, CILIP, Vol. 1, No. 1, August/October, 1978 (c/o Berghof-Stiftung fur Konfliktforschung, Winklerstr. 4a, 1000 Berlin).

78. See, for instance, Hakon Lorentzen, 'Some Data on the Development of the Norwegian Police', in CILIP, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 9-17.

79. Steve Wright, 'New Police Technologies: An Exploration of the Social Implications and Unforeseen Impacts of Some Recent Developments', Journal of Peace Research, No. 4, Vol. XV, 1978.

80. Ibid., p. 308.

81. Steve Wright, 'An Approach towards a More Holistic Form of Sub-State Conflict Analysis', paper presented at the seventh ISODARCO Conference held in Ariccia, Italy, August 18-28, 1978. (ISODARCO is the Italian Pugwash Group: International School on Disarmament and Research on Conflict.)

82. It was this paragraph which drew cries of protest from Sir William Byers, the MP for Salford, when the Bill was pushed through Parliament in August, 1911. 'What about those who fought for our liberties in the past? What about Magna Carta?... I say no member of this House ought to vote for a Bill which contains these words.' (Hansard, August 22, 1911). Other MPs also expressed disquiet at the wide scope of the Act and were persuaded to vote for it on the assurance of the Attorney General that Section I would only be used against spies. But this assurance carried no weight in law and was later ignored in practice.

83. I have drawn attention to only a few of the salient features of the Official Secrets Acts. For a fuller description of their scope and implications, see Tony Bunyan's 'The Political Uses of Law' in The Political Police in Britain (Julian Friedmann, London, 1976). Bunyan comments:

'The Official Secrets Acts provide government with a formidable weapon with which to counter real or imagined spies and errant state employees. Restrictions of the rights of a defendant under the Acts offends in many ways against conventional rights within the rule of law, and it must be borne in mind that the Acts would become an even more formidable instrument should major civil disorder ever occur over a sustained period.' (p. 16)

84. Crown versus Chandler & Others, 1962. The case went to the Appeal Court and from there to the House of Lords. One of the five Law Lords who sat in judgement on the last occasion was Lord Devlin. He concurred with the other Lords in rejecting the appeal but later cited the case in a review in The Observer, July 18, 1965, as an example of a law being applied in a way that contradicted the assurances given to Parliament when the Acts were passed (namely, that Section 1 would only be used in cases of spying).

85. Philip Agee, Inside the Company: CIA Diary, Penguin, 1975.

86. See David May in The Sunday Times, April 23, 1978, p. 3.

87. A useful summary and discussion of the case is to be found in David Burnham, 'The Capacity to Spy on Us All', The Nation, September 30, 1978, pp. 295-298.

88. Peace News, February 23, 1979.

89. To rejoice in the overthrow of the Shah is not, however, to imply that all is well in the new Iran. Particularly reprehensible have been the wave of executions following secret trials and the attempts to put the clock back

for the women of Iran. The latter have shown that public demonstrations and non-cooperation are things which the new government in turn will have to take into account. At the time of writing, however, Iran seems to be moving towards some form of religious autocracy, and there have been reports of left-wing organisations and individuals, including many who had played an active part in securing the overthrow of the Shah, being attacked.

90. Independent trade union movements are being established in the Soviet Union, Poland, and Romania--and no doubt elsewhere in Eastern Europe; but those involved have faced sackings, arrest, and in some cases committal to mental institutions. Thus, Labour Focus on Eastern Europe, in May-June, 1978, records the cases of four Soviet workers involved in the trade union association, all of whom had been arrested and sent either to prison or to psychiatric hospitals. The same issue of the journal carries a report of the formation in the Polish mining centre of Katowice of a Committee for the Creation of Free Trade Unions on February 23, 1978. One of the members of the committee, Andrzej Czuna, was sacked, and another member, Kazimierz Swinton, was arrested and held by the police for 48 hours. Similarly, arrests and repression followed the strikes in Poland in 1976 and the miners' strike in Romania in the following year.

91. For further details and a list of names, see the 'Special Dossier on Political Unemployment' produced by Labour Focus in May, 1978.

92. As most readers will know, British, American, and French forces fought against the Bolsheviks in the neighborhood of Archangel and Murmansk before the Armistice of 1918.

93. Noel Baker, in a contribution on the historical developments on disarmament in Disarm or Die (published by Taylor and Francis, 1978, on behalf

of the Non-Partisan Fund for World Disarmament and Development), points out that the Hoover plan was accepted by Germany, Russia, and Italy and accuses militarist ministers in Britain, with the support of French and German militarists, of opposing and killing the plan. He quotes the judgement of the military historian, Captain Basil Liddel Hart, who wrote in 1961:

'If tanks and bomber aircraft had been universally abolished in 1932, as was then proposed--and nearly agreed--and a system of international inspection established as a check on their revival, there could have been no successful Blitzkrieg in 1939-40. For Hitler owed his initial victories mainly to those particular defence-breaking weapons. Numbers of troops counted for little in comparison.'

The failure of the disarmament conference assisted Hitler in his rise to power, and, in the judgement of Noel Baker and Liddel Hart, made possible the Second World War. The point is worth stressing because the received wisdom, encouraged by most official interpretations, is that the war occurred because of a failure to rearm fast enough by the allied powers. Whatever the case for arguing this in relation to the late 30's, it should not be forgotten that the failure to demilitarise at an earlier point was crucial in creating the problem of German militarism.

94. For a concise account of the affair, see Ida Mett, The Kronstadt Commune, published originally by Spartacus, Paris, 1938, and reprinted in an English version by Solidarity, London, 1967. Among the demands of the Kronstadt sailors were: immediate new elections in the Soviets; freedom of speech and of the press for

workers and peasants, for the anarchists and for the Left Socialist parties; the right of assembly, and freedom for trade union and peasant organisations; the liberation of all political prisoners of the Socialist parties, and of all imprisoned workers and peasants, soldiers and sailors belonging to the working class and peasant organisations; the election of a commission to look into the dossiers of all those detained in prisons and concentration camps; and the equalisation of rations for all workers, except those engaged in dangerous or unhealthy jobs. (See Ida Mett in the Solidarity edition, pp. 6-10, for a full list of the demands made and a commentary on their significance.)

95. See, for instance, Hugh Sefton-Watson, The New Imperialism, Bodley Head, 1961.

96. See J. N. Westwood, Russia 1917-1964, Batsford, London, 1966, pp. 40-42. Westwood states that 'in 1919 in the Petrograd Military District no less than 119,000 deserters were apprehended, while the total strength of the District was only 150,000. It was circumstances such as this which prompted Trotsky to sanction the death penalty for desertion, or even for malingering'. (page 42)

97. Galtung, 'A Structural Theory of Imperialism', op. cit. (above, note 1), pp. 115-116.

98. Jiri Pelikan, Socialist Opposition in Eastern Europe--the Czechoslovak Example, Allison and Busby, London, 1976, pp. 77-78.

99. International Commission of Jurists Review No. 17, December, 1976. Cited in the Amnesty International Report 1977, p. 116.

100. Miles Wolpin, ' Militarism, Socialism, and Civilian Rule in The Third World: A Comparison of Development Costs and Benefits', in Instant Research on Peace and Violence, Vol. VII. No. 3-4, 1977, pp. 106-133.

101. See, for instance, Jose Nun, 'The Middle Class Military Coup' in Imperialism and Underdevelopment, pp. 323-357, Monthly Review Press, 1970. The term 'bourgeoisie', however, is more precise in this connection, for it is a section of the professional middle class, especially writers, artists, academics, and so on, considered capable of providing leadership for an opposition, that have become one of the special targets of persecution in the military regimes in Latin America. On this point, see Hugo Neira, 'Guerre Totale contre les Elites en Amerique Latine', Le Monde Diplomatique, January, 1977.

102. Richard Falk, ' Militarization and Human Rights in the Third World', Bulletin of Peace Proposals, Vol. 8, No. 3, 1977, p. 220.

103. Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race, United Nations publication; New York, 1972.

104. Hossein Askari and Vittorio Corbo, 'Economic Implications of Military Expenditures in the Middle East', Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 11, 1974, pp. 341-3.

105. D. G. Morrison and H. M. Stevenson, 'Social Complexity, Economic Development and Military Coups d'Etat: Convergence and Divergence of Empirical Tests of Theory in Latin America, Asia, and Africa', Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 11, 1974, pp. 345-7.

106. World Council of Churches report, summarised in The Guardian by Ian Guest, April 27, 1979. The Hamburg Workgroup on Armaments and Underdevelopment has also produced valuable studies on the structural economic consequences of excessive arms expenditure and the transfer of military-related technology in the Third World. See, for instance, 'Consequences of the Transfer of Military-Oriented Technology on the Development Process' by Peter Lock and Herbert Wulf, Bulletin of Peace Proposals, Vol. 8, No. 2, 1977, pp. 127-136.

107. Kurth, op. cit. (above, note 66).

108. Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Beacon Press, 1966.

109. Kurth, op. cit., pp. 309-310.

110. The New Internationalist, February, 1978, points out that 88% of manufacturing companies in Mexico were privately owned by 1970, that social income is low, unemployment in excess of 10%, and that the bottom 40% of the population has been totally excluded from the benefits of economic growth. The Amnesty International Report 1978 also shows that violations of human rights are a frequent occurrence, especially in the form of arbitrary arrest, detention incommunicado of suspects for longer than the permitted three days, the maltreatment and torture of suspects, and disappearance after arrest. Human rights violations occurred most frequently in connection with student or labour unrest, land tenure disputes, the anti-drugs campaign, and left-wing guerrilla activity (page 129).

111. The strongest counterevidence regarding the proposition that excessive military expenditure is likely to lead to military rule is to be found

in the study by Phillippe C. Schmitter relating to Latin America. ('Foreign Military Assistance, National Military Spending and Military Rule in Latin America', in Military Rule in Latin America, ed. Schmitter, 1973.) Schmitter's study covers two time spans, 1945-61 and 1962-70; and his findings are that countries that scored highly on the index for military intervention in political life 'neither received more total or per capita military assistance, nor spent more on total or per capita military defence expenditures' (emphasis added). Schmitter moreover sets up a ranking of the degrees of military intervention in political life, using three categories--non-political, transitional, and dominant--and finds in general that the 'dominant' group tend to have a lower domestic military expenditure than one would expect from their per capita GNP. (Schmitter found that for the most part military expenditure is closely related to the level of per capita GNP, and this permits him to set up a military expenditure norm for any given GNP per capita.) Brazil and Argentina are notable exceptions in that in both cases domestic military expenditures have soared far beyond the levels that one would predict from their per capita GNP.

Schmitter's results, however, are in conflict with those obtained by Alaor S. Passos, as reported in the article 'Developmental Tension and Political Instability: Testing Some Hypotheses Concerning Latin America' (Journal of Peace Research, 1968, pp. 70-86). Passos' study, which served as a basis for the Morrison and Stevenson article mentioned in Note 105 above, showed a positive correlation between military expenditures and the number of coups d'etat in most Latin American states in the period 1945-65. Unfortunately, it is hard to know how much weight to give to either of these studies, given the fact, which both authors emphasize, that it is nearly impossible

to obtain accurate and complete data on military expenditures. This state of affairs limits the confidence one can have in any statistical analysis of this kind at present. A further important point, noted by Schmitter, is that the type of military expenditure (i.e., exactly how the money is spent) may be of more relevance than the total amount of military expenditure in predicting military 'intervention in domestic life.

Finally, the comments made in relation to Kurth about the developments in Latin America since 1973 apply also here to some degree. It should be noted, for instance, that it is in recent years that the arms trade with the Third World has rapidly accelerated and that the political impact of this is only now being felt.

112. Tables published by Ruth Sivard in World Military and Social Expenditures 1977 show that the ratio of soldiers to population was one to 78 in Cuba, as compared to one to 144 in Uruguay, the country with the next highest ratio. Mexico at the other end of the scale had one to 698, Costa Rica one to 961 and Trinidad and Tobago one to 961. (Figures refer to 1974 and the term 'soldier' covers all members of the armed forces.)

113. Hard facts on the human rights situation in state socialist countries are difficult to come by, and clearly the situation does vary greatly from one country to another. In Vietnam, a number of Buddhists and others who had been active in opposing the previous regimes and the American intervention have been arrested and imprisoned. Thus, a report published in 1978 by Que Me, a magazine produced by Vietnamese exiles living in Paris, in conjunction with the Vietnamese Section of the 'Khemero-Lao-Vietnamese Committee for Human Rights' in Paris, gives details of 163 writers, poets, and artists

arrested in Vietnam since 1975 (Charter 78--The Prison System in South Vietnam). The Amnesty International Report 1978 expresses grave concern over 'the continued detention of tens of thousands of people, who, so far as is known, have not been charged with any offence more than three years since the change of Government in what was formerly South Vietnam'. However, there have been no reports of the kind of bloodbath that was widely predicted by those supporting the American war in Vietnam in the event of a victory by the NLF.

In Cambodia the reports of massacres during the Pol Pot period came from refugee sources; and though these reports were difficult to verify, it seems likely that tens, possibly hundreds of thousands (some reports say millions) lost their lives through executions or the privations that accompanied the forced evacuation of the towns. Political beliefs have in this instance coloured to an exceptional degree what people were prepared to believe, and there will doubtless be those who dismissed estimates from Western sources of 2 million dead who will now accept the present Soviet-Vietnamese estimate of 3 million dead as undisputed fact.

In China the human rights situation remains bleak, as the recent Amnesty International report, Political Imprisonment in the People's Republic of China, shows. The report also provides evidence that in the years immediately following the revolution executions may have numbered hundreds of thousands. It points out that according to Polish sources the original unpublished version of Mao's speech, 'On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People', gave an estimate of 800,000 executions up till 1954 (page 29). The report also refers to documents collected and circulated by Red Guards during the Cultural

Revolution in which Mao is said to have told an enlarged meeting of the Party Politburo that 'two to three million counter-revolutionaries had been executed, imprisoned or placed under control in the past' (page 28). Moreover, in the 1954 elections to the National People's Congress nearly ten million 'still unrehabilitated class enemies' were not allowed to vote.

114. There are nonetheless disquieting features about the situations in both Tanzania and Jamaica. It is true that both have a relatively low level of military expenditure in comparison to other states in their region and in comparison to other states throughout the world; in Sivard (1979) Jamaica is ranked 89 in the world table of public expenditures per capita on the military sector, and Tanzania 103; Jamaica had four soldiers per 1000 of its population, and Tanzania 15 per 1000. However, these figures relate to 1976 and in Tanzania in particular in recent years there has been a considerable growth in military expenditures, due no doubt to the situations in Zimbabwe/Rhodesia and in Amin's Uganda prior to the Tanzanian invasion.

Amnesty International in its International Report 1977 expressed 'great anxiety' about the human rights situation in Tanzania, especially in relation to the island of Zanzibar, but also in relation to the mainland. It was particularly concerned about reports of the use of torture by the security police, about the number of people being held under preventive detention, and at what it considered to be reliable reports of the appalling conditions for detainees. The 1978 and 1979 reports, however, mention 'considerable improvements', including the release of a number of detainees, commutation of some death sentences, and efforts to abolish torture.

In Jamaica, widespread lawlessness and violence led to the declaration of a State of Emergency in

June, 1976, as a result of which it became possible to detain people without charge or trial for an indefinite period. The Emergency was lifted in June the following year and the last of those held without trial were then released. Amnesty International, however, continued to be concerned at the high number of those under sentence of death, which numbered 51 in November, 1977.

115. The Amnesty International report on China mentioned above gives the example of one young man named Zhang who was arrested in May, 1970, in connection with his participation in a political study group. He was subjected to a month in isolation and interrogated every day during that period from 8:30 a.m. to 12 noon, and from the beginning of the afternoon till 6:30 p.m. No arrest warrant or indictment was issued against him, but he remained in detention for two years without ever being given a proper explanation.

116. The response of the Chinese authorities to the 'democratic movement' has been to crack down on certain dissidents while at the same time instituting some reforms. One such reform has been the introduction of a penal code which should give some measure of protection to the individual against arbitrary arrest and imprisonment.

117. Peter Chippindale and Ed Harriman in Juntas United, Quartet Books, 1978, report on the activities of the Zacapa Panthers. 'Beginning in 1966 they spearheaded a wave of terror which left more than three thousand peasants dead...According to Time magazine, the American military attache in Guatemala City provided advice, and the American Government supplied over twenty million dollars' worth of supplies. Death squads, the most infamous of which was and still is known as MANO, Movimiento Anti-comunista Nacional Organizado, took over the

killings where the army left off' (pp. 69-70). When Carlos Arana Osorio became president in 1970 he declared a state of siege; within two months, 700 people were executed, and over the next three years 15,000 more were murdered or disappeared.

118. CIA's Covert Operations versus Human Rights, pamphlet produced by the Center for National Security Studies, Washington, 1978. Much of what is stated in this pamphlet is corroborated by the testimony of Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks in The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, Jonathan Capte, London, 1974.

119. Michael T. Klare, Supplying Repression, Field Foundation, 1977, p. 19.

120. For a summary of these developments see Roger Plant, Guatemala--Unnatural Disaster, Latin American Bureau, P.O. Box 134, London, 1978, pp. 103-109.

121. Michael T. Klare, op. cit., pp. 24-25.

122. Ibid., pp. 25-26.

123. The Guardian, February 10, 1978.

124. Klare, op. cit., p. 8.

125. Lars Schoultz, United States Foreign Aid and Human Rights Violations in Latin America: An Empirical Assessment, unpublished paper. (Schoultz teaches at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.) Not all regimes that violate human rights are military regimes, though in Latin America generally they are.

126. Ibid., p. 18. The author, however, stresses that this 'is not to assert that the U.S. aid program is responsible for these violations,

nor is it to argue that U.S. aid is purposely directed towards repressive regimes'.

The study shows that the level of the correlation between U.S. aid and the violation of human rights fluctuated considerably from year to year, with repressive regimes faring very unequally in the amount of aid received. Thus, in 1975, three of the six most repressive regimes--Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay--received 69% of total military aid to the region, while the three others--Chile, Haiti, and Paraguay--together received less than 2%. In 1976, the correlation between military aid and repression dropped dramatically simply because aid to Uruguay fell from \$9.2 million in 1975 to \$1.0 million in 1976 and aid to Colombia rose from \$0.7 million in 1975 to \$20.3 million in 1976, and to Venezuela from \$0.7 million to \$10.6 million. The disturbing thing here is that the drop in the correlation has less to do with a cutback in military aid to repressive regimes than with a steep increase in military aid to countries that are less repressive.

It is interesting to note that military aid to Chile increased significantly during the Allende period; military assistance as a percentage of U.S. aid to Chile in the years 1962-70 averaged 11.1%, whereas in the three years of Allende's government, 1971-3, military assistance averaged 60.2% of aid (p. 46). It has been argued that the increased military aid to Chile during the Allende period assisted the American Defence Department and the CIA in cultivating connections with high-ranking military personnel in Chile who were later to prove instrumental in staging the coup in 1973.

127. Kurth, op. cit., (above, note 66), pp. 301-2.

128. Ibid., p. 303. The replacement in the Dominican Republic of Belaguer by Guzman has not produced significant changes.

129. Ibid., pp. 303-4.

130. Ibid., p. 304.

131. SIPRI, The Arms Trade with the Third World, op. cit., (above, note 13), pp. 88-9.

132. Ibid., p. 17, where a graph illustrates the decline in the United States' and the increase in the Soviet Union's share of the major weapons market in the Third World from the mid-fifties to the mid-sixties.

133. Ibid., pp. 82-3.

134. Ibid., p. 99.

135. Bob Potter, Vietnam--Whose Victory?, Solidarity pamphlet No. 43, 1973, p. 18.

136. See Ceylon: The JVP Uprising, Solidarity, London, pamphlet 42.

137. SIPRI, The Arms Trade with the Third World, p. 95.

138. Bob Potter, op. cit., states that 'according to official Hanoi statistics, communist bloc grants and loans between 1955 and 1961 totalled more than \$1 billion, of which the USSR provided \$365 million and China \$662 million. This works out at over \$70 per person, which is roughly what the Saigon regime received from the U.S. in the same period'. (p. 18)

139. Robert Taber, The War of the Flea, first published 1965, Paladin, 1977.

140. Ibid., (Paladin 1977 edition), p. 25.

141. See Adam Roberts, 'Civil Resistance to Military Coups', Journal of Peace Research, Vol. XII, No. 1, 1975, pp. 19-36.

142. See Hylke Tromp, 'The Dutch Research Project on Civilian Defence 1974-1978', Bulletin of Peace Proposals No. 4, 1978, reproduced in a French translation in Alternatives Nonviolentes, No. 33, April, 1979.

The project was set in motion following the formation of a coalition government in 1973 between the Socialist Party and the Radical Party. In the following year, the Ministry of Defence published a document entitled On the Security of Our Existence which drew attention to the possibilities of social defence; and in 1975 a second document from the same Ministry, The Problem of Disarmament and Security, announced the government's intention to promote scientific research on the possibilities of 'the non-violent resolution of conflicts including by such notions as civilian defence'.

A Working Group was created in 1976 with the participation of several Ministries, which published its report in 1977. A second working group was then established with representatives from the same Ministries, six researchers from various fields, and an advisory panel of non-Dutch experts. This advisory panel comprises Theodor Ebert (West Berlin), Johan Galtung (Oslo-Geneva), Adam Roberts (London School of Economics), and Gene Sharp (Harvard).

Hylke Tromp notes how the governmental report in 1975 extended the scope of the discussion from civilian defence as an alternative to military defence to the broader concept of the nonviolent resolution of conflicts. He identifies two main approaches among the expert advisors, the pragmatic/instrumentalist approach

whose advocates are concerned to separate the discussion of civilian defence from ideological controversy and see it very much as a functional equivalent of military defence within the present social/strategic reality, and the structuralist approach whose advocates argue that the concept of civilian defence is in opposition to the existing structure of society in general, that the instrumentalist approach ignores or underestimates the functions fulfilled by military systems in the industrial societies, and that a radical change from military to civilian defence will only be possible if there are profound social changes. It is clear from this that the scope of the discussions has not been restricted.

143. Eqbal Ahmed, a Pakistani, has said the following with regard to the U.S. response to the crisis created by the U.S.S.R.'s action in Afghanistan at the beginning of 1980:

'In Zia ul-Haq of Pakistan, the U.S. is acquiring another Shah without oil. It is hard for me to imagine a regime more unpopular, isolated, and shaky than Zia's in Pakistan. And the arms he will receive will be used to suppress our people and jeopardize the security of the nation internally...I would say that, given the realities of the world today, there are no military solutions to problems of international relations, and as long as we remain focussed on the military equation, the solutions will evade us, and we shall remain victims of war, violence, and repression.' ('What's Behind the Crisis in Iran and Afghanistan', talk given by Ahmed on January 20, 1980, at the Riverside Church in New York. Text available from the Riverside Disarmament Program, 490 Riverside Drive, New York, N.Y. 10027.)

144. Office of Public Information, Final Document of Assembly Session on Disarmament, (23 May-1 July 1978), United Nations, 1978.

145. See J. Bowyer Bell, A Time of Terror, Basic Books, New York, 1978, the chapter on 'The Italian Experience'. There have been at least three right-wing plots to stage coups d'etat, in 1964, 1970, and 1974; and in October, 1974, the former head of SID, who had only been removed from his post the previous July, was arrested and charged with complicity in the 1970 and 1974 plots. The former head of the defence section of SID, General Gian Adelio Maletti, was arrested in 1976 and accused of funding fascist infiltrators and provocateurs and of creating parallel structures inside SID responsible only to him (Bell, p. 250).

146. See Narayan Desai, Towards a Nonviolent Revolution, on the work of the Shanti Sena during riots in Baroda, and James S. Best, 'Peace Patrols in the Midst of a Riot', Fellowship, March 1965, on the work of an East Harlem (New York) Peace Patrol.

147. Dr. Abram de Swaan, 'Terror as a Governmental Service', in Repression and Repressive Violence, edited by Marjo Hoefnagels, Swets and Zeitlinger, Amsterdam and Lisse, 1977.

148. Ibid., p. 46.

149. Ibid., p. 45. The word 'law' appears to have inadvertently been dropped when this paper, first presented at a conference in Brussels in November 1976, was printed.

150. Ibid., p. 48.

151. Paul Goma in an interview with Patrick Camiller, Labour Focus on Eastern Europe, Vol. 1, No. 6, Jan.-Feb., 1978.