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State Research

An independent group of investigators collecting and publishing information from public sources on developments in state policy, particularly in the fields of the law, policing, internal security, espionage and the military. It also examines the links between the agencies in these fields and business, the Right and paramilitary organisations.

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CONTENTS

News and developments

The Anti-Terrorist Squad Vetting the ABC Jury NATO Exercises in Scotland **UK Extends Political Extradition** Two new Heads of Intelligence Special Branch in N. Ireland and Scotland The New Army Structure TUC calls for Inquiry into Special Branch

Reviews

10

Spotlight on the CIA Why Israel Destroyed USS Liberty

Background Paper

Civil Defence Or Internal Defence?

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
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Page 24/State Research Bulletin (vol 2) No 8/October-November 1978

13





THE ANTI-TERRORIST SQUAD

Every time a bomb, explosive device, or rumour of a wave of terrorism occurs, the Anti-Terrorist Squad figures prominently in the news. Although terrorist activities or the threat of them is used to justify the current size of the Special Branch, the main responsibility for that area lies with the ATS. What is not generally known is that last autumn the permanent size of the Squad was dropped from 220 to 30, with the remainder returning to their normal duties (while still being on call).

This specialist squad was formed in January 1971 after a bomb exploded outside the home of Robert Carr, then the Tory Home Secretary. It was then called

the Bomb Squad, and was renamed the Anti-Terrorist Squad (ATS) in 1976 as part of a reorganisation of Scotland Yard. The bomb at Carr's home was one of a series of bombings of industrialists' property and state buildings known as the 'Angry Brigade' bombings. The day after the Carr bombing the special squad was formed under Det. Chief Inspector Roy Habershon, who happened at the time to be in charge of the local police station in Barnet. Five months later, after the bombing of William Batty, the Managing Director of Fords, the squad was increased from four to 20. Commander Ernest Bond was formally appointed to head the squad at the same time. By August 1971, the Bomb Squad was placed on a permanent footing with an establishment of 15 officers.

In 1973 the Provisional IRA bombing campaign in Britain began. The Bomb Squad expanded rapidly, so that at the end of 1973 it had over 200 officers. By 1977 the bombings had stopped and the ATS was reduced from its previous strength of 220 to

October-November 1978/Page 1

11619

a permanent squad of 30. It was then considered wasteful to maintain such a large squad when most, if not all, investigations relating to bombings and terrorism in Britain had been completed. Most of the officers were therefore returned to other duties although remaining available for recall. Early in 1978 some officers, principally specialists in the Middle East, were recalled after a bomb exploded in the London branch of a Turkish bank. It seems likely that some other officers concerned with anarchists and German affairs have been called on in the recent spate of raids and arrests of anarchists, and the arrest of the German woman Astrid Proll.

The composition of the Squad

Bomb Squad (and now ATS) officers, all hand-picked specialists, were drawn mainly from the Special Branch and the CID, especially C11, the Criminal Intelligence Bureau. The Criminal Intelligence Bureau was set up in 1960 to act as a central data bank of information on criminals (their methods of working, friends, life styles etc). Robert Huntley, ex-head of the Bomb Squad, describes C11 in his autobiography as 'a sort of MI5 spying on the underworld' (Bomb Squad, p.62).

The Special Branch, formed in 1883, are in effect the political arm of the police, whose role is to protect the security of the state against 'subversive' organisations and to aid the police in the maintainance of public order. They work principally through surveillance (of literature, of meetings, of demonstrations etc) of political and trade union activists, through monitoring the whereabouts of aliens, and watching the ports and airports. The Special Branch at Scotland Yard, which now has 409 officers, is divided into squads specialising in particular areas — such as left-wing politics, and the various foreign communities in London. The 'Irish Squad' of the Special Branch at the Yard is about 80 strong and works closely with the ATS.

The combination of Special Branch and CID officers in the Squad enables it to

combine the traditional skills of detection and collection of evidence of the plainclothes police with the political understanding and surveillance techniques of the Special Branch. Both methods of working have been clearly visible in the Squad's operations, although as usual, far more publicity has been given to detection side. Other officers drafted into the Squad have included Flying Squad men and ex-army explosives experts who actually handled the bombs. Labrador dogs, trained to sniff out explosives, have been used fairly extensively (1974, 782 times; 1975, 800 times; 1976, 772 times; 1977, 616 times).

The importance of the Bomb Squad, which was renamed the Anti-Terrorist Squad in 1976, was reflected in the place it has been given in Scotland Yard. It has always been part of 'C' Department (Crime) and at its formation it was part of C.1., which included numerous specialist squads. In 1972, the number of specialist squads in C1 was reduced (partly because of the growing importance of the Bomb Squad) and a new section, the Special Crime Branch (C13) was created to encompass the displaced squads. With the 1976 renaming of the Bomb Squad, it was transferred to C13. All the other specialist squads previously in C13, were transferred back to C.1.

When Commander Bond retired from the Yard, Robert Huntley became the full time Commander of the Squad. He was succeeded for a short time in 1975 by Commander Roy Habershon. Later the same year, 1975, the current head of the Squad, Commander James Nevill, was appointed to the post.

Intelligence-gathering

Information gathering has played a centrally important role in the operations of the Squad. During the 'Angry Brigade' bombings there were numerous raids on left-wing activists, which although taking place under explosives warrants, were clearly information gathering expeditions. Raids on left-wing activists continued during the IRA bombing campaign,

Page 2/State Research Bulletin (vol 2) No 8/October-November 1978

however implausible it was that such individuals were involved. A notorious raid on squatters in Charrington Street in London left the houses devastated, and the squatters totally bewildered - 'Organise a bomb factory? I find it hard enough to organise a clean pair of socks', one of them commented. More recently members of the ATS have carried out raids on homes in London and other parts of the country in connection with an alleged anarchist conspiracy to overthrow the state.

The Squad's Record

The story of the Bomb Squad has not, however, been one of total success or unqualified approval. Of 12 people arrested for the 'Angry Brigade' bombings, two had the charges withdrawn for lack of evidence, while five more were acquitted. In the Soar Eire case (1971) four people charged with conspiracy to possess firearms, had the charges against them withdrawn after four days at the Old Bailey when the role of an agent provocateur became clear. In 1973 Andy Ellesmore was acquitted on a similar charge for similar reasons. The Bomb Squad was much more successful in obtaining convictions against people charged with the Provisional IRA bombings. However, throughout the trials there were repeated defence statements of maltreatment and intimidation of the defendants; of 'confessions' extracted under duress; and of falsification of evidence and planting of fingerprints.

The early years of the ATS reveal four clear lessons:

- 1 The threat of terrorism has been falsely used as the 'justification' for the large size of the Special Branch and other specialist units, when the real specialists in countering terror have recently been reduced by over 700 per cent.
- 2 Use of the ATS for general and unjustified intelligence-gathering is growing under the 'justification' of antiterrorist activity, exactly as in West Germany.

- of terrorism.
- agents provocateur.

VETTING THE ABC JURY

When the trial of Aubrey, Berry and On the first day of the trial, September 5, When it was discovered, defence lawyers

Campbell (ABC) on charges under the Official Secrets Act was stopped by the judge in mid-September, several questions had been raised about the composition of the jury. All the prospective jurors had been 'vetted' for 'loyalty' by the security services at the request of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP). The foreman of the jury (who had volunteered himself for this role), turned out to be an exmember of the Special Air Services regiment (the SAS) who had seen active service in Cyprus, Northern Ireland, and the Far East. And, in addition to the foreman, two other members of the jury had signed the Official Secrets Act. it was discovered that the prosecution (through the office of the DPP) had secretly applied in July to a judge in chambers for leave to receive a copy of the list of people from whom the ABC trial jury would be chosen. The 82 people on the list were vetted for 'loyalty' by the security services (including the Special Branch). In the event, the prosecution counsel said that, as a result of the vetting process, there were no objections to any of the people on the list. But, he declined to define what 'vetting for loyalty' was based on. However, the security services, and possibly the prosecution, may well have known that three of the 12 people selected for the jury had signed the Official Secrets Act — a fact the defence did not discover until ten days later. attempted to have the foreman of the jury removed. Stuart Shields, John Berry's counsel, said that a man with experience in the SAS 'is unlikely to come to court with a

State Research Bulletin (vol 2) No 8/October-November 1978/Page 3

3 The ATS has been relatively unsuccessful in persuading the courts to convict British citizens it has arrested on charges

4 The ATS has been involved in the use of

mind open enough to be swayed by arguments' (Time Out, 22/9/78). However, the judge, Mr Justice Willis, overruled the defence application and ordered that the trial continue. It was the disclosures about members of the jury on the London Weekend Television programme, Saturday Night People, that led to the trial being stopped, and a new trial with a new jury being ordered.

Secret guidelines

After the trial was stopped it was reported in the 'Guardian' that lists of prospective jurors had been 'vetted' on 25 occasions since 1975 (27/9/78). These figures became public after an internal investigation had been conducted through the Attorney-General's office after widespread disquiet had been expressed following the opening day of the trial.

It transpires that an unpublished set of guidelines were secretly drawn up three years ago by the Attorney-General, Mr Sam Silkin, and the Home Secretary, Mr Rees. This was initially prompted because a series of trials were due to come to courts involving people charged after the Provisional IRA bombing campaign in Britain in 1974. The practice was soon extended to include major criminal trials which account for about half of the 25 instances of jury-vetting. The intention was to exclude from the jury those with known criminal 'associations' or convictions, on the grounds that they could be open to influence or bribery. The effect was to exclude from juries people thought to be sympathetic to the defendants.

The present practice, laid down in the guidelines, is that the DPP can, on his own initiative, decide to have a prospective jury list vetted (providing he informs the Attorney-General that he is doing so). Depending on the nature of the case, the 'vetting' is carried out by the Criminal Records Office at Scotland Yard (for evidence of criminal 'associations' or convictions), or by the security services (for political beliefs and activities).

before 1975 was when Lord Dilhorne, as Attorney-General in MacMillan's government, ordered the vetting of a jury list in an espionage trial. This, he said in an interview, was to find out if there were any Communists on the list (Listener, 11/8/66).

Lord Widgery's ruling

The guidelines privately agreed between Mr Silkin and Mr Rees run directly contrary to a direction given to the courts by the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Widgery, in 1973. He ruled that it was contrary to established custom to exclude jurors on general grounds such as race, religion, political beliefs or occupation. This continues to be the practice in the courts, at least as far as defence lawyers are concerned. The prosecution it appears are not under a similar handicap when it comes to conducting major trials.*

The prosecution also has the advantage of having an unlimited number of challenges to people becoming members of the jury, whereas each defendant is only allowed three challenges (reduced from seven in 1977). Since the occupations of prospective jurors was removed from the jury list in 1974, the only ground on which defence lawyers can challenge a juror is often solely on the basis of their physical bearing and appearance in the courtroom. The prosecution, on the other hand, in a case like the ABC trial, has at its disposal the whole apparatus of the security agencies to ensure that 'disloyal' jurors are excluded. The iniquity of this practice is the more obvious when the defendants have to prove their innocence, rather than the prosecution their guilt, as Aubrey, Berry and Campbell have to under the Official Secrets Act.

*The Juries Act 1974 does set out several groups of people who are excluded on the basis of their occupations. These are: members of the judiciary, those concerned with the administration of justice - including members of the legal profession, the prison service and the police - who are excluded for 10 years after they

The only known case where this occurred

Page 4/State Research Bulletin (vol 2) No 8/October-November 1978

have left office; the clergy; the mentally ill; and those sent to prison for five years or more.

NATO EXERCISES **IN SCOTLAND**

NATO exercises now contain a significant element of counter-insurgency and of training for troops to combat civilians. This became clear as a result of two exercises held this summer and autumn in Scotland.

In June, during exercise 'Whisky Galore' in the Hebrides, British and Dutch marines arrested a number of civilians, stopped people at gunpoint, and searched cars. A typical experience was that of Councillor Sandy Matheson, a member of the Western Isles Islands Council. He said: 'I was stopped at gunpoint by commandos who asked to search my car. I had only consumed three coffees, and was therefore not in any mood to argue with the soldier or the gun'. The troops who stopped Cllr Matheson were British. Those who stopped another man, Alex MacDonald, were Dutch marines. He was stopped three times; on the second occasion, he was asked to show his driving licence, and on the third occasion was made to accompany Dutch soldiers to an Army detachment headquarters. Several other people reported being stopped and questioned.

Military authorities at first tried to blame the incidents on language difficulties, although British troops had been responsible for some of the incidents. The immediate response from a Royal Navy spokesperson was that 'our Dutch soldiers on the exercise were over-enthusiastic. They did not have orders to stop civilians'.

But the Scottish Daily Record reported that Dutch soldiers on the exercise were sent out to seek 'Fifth columnists' played by British commandos wearing civilian clothes, as part of the exercise. Part of the exercise was thus clearly directed towards practising operations against a defending force which consisted, at least in part, of civilians. This was confirmed by the

remarks of Major Pat Howgill, commander Stopping civilians is of course illegal. But

of the forces 'defending' Harris from the practice invasion which formed the basis of the exercise. He said that a unit 'had learned that the 'enemy' were making use of civilian vehicles during the exercise and that some of the personnel were in plain clothes. It was therefore decided to put sentries on the road to search vehicles'. the practice for such operations would never have come to light if soldiers, searching for other soldiers who were impersonating civilians, had not stopped real civilians instead, including one elected councillor.

A sequel to this came on the day after the Three weeks later, the planning The reason for the attention paid to

incidents, June 10, when a heated meeting of the Western Isles Council, at the urging of Cllr. Matheson, decided to make strong protest to NATO and the Ministry of Defence (MoD). An apology from the Commander of the Royal Marines, Major-General Sir Steuart Pringle, was later described by Cllr Matheson as 'ineffectual and the hope that 'we have not dissipated our stock of goodwill in your community'. to oppose an MoD proposal to extend the runway at the Stornaway airport. The MoD does not require planning permission to do this, but the opposition of the local

improper'. General Pringle had expressed committee of the Western Isles Council decided to reverse a previous decision and authority would be a considerable embarrassment. The Chairman of the planning committee is Cllr Matheson, but it was made clear that opposition had come from a number of local groups. Another councillor suggested that NATO might be planning to use Stornaway as a major base in the event that it was forced to withdraw from the US-run base at Keflavik in Iceland. NATO withdrawal from Iceland is a policy which is supported by the country's two main left wing parties, the Socialists and the Communists. The lease for the base must be negotiated annually. Scotland by this year's NATO exercises was underlined by September exercise

'Northern Wedding', conducted in early September in Shetland. The exercise was in three phases. The first phase concerned the fictitious independent NATO country 'Zetlandia'. The scenario had 'Zetlandia' as an oil-producing independent country which had a regular contract to supply the Soviet Union with oil. Armed security guards at the Russian-owned oil terminal had linked up with local 'dissidents', and had seized the country's key installations. A force of NATO troops was therefore required to invade the country. In the exercise, this was said to be at the request of the 'legal' government of 'Zetlandia'. They had to secure 'key installations' harbours, radio stations, airstrips, radar masts, and so on. The sort of conflict with real locals which attracted publicity to 'Whisky Galore' was avoided by locating the 'imaginary' key installations away from centres of population. But real radio and radar masts, part of the SIGINT network, in remoter island locations, were 'secured' by the invading NATO forces.

Publicity was also avoided by the simple device of distracting the press, which is always pretty easy to do in such situations. Reporters were flown up to Shetland from all over NATO to cover the second phase of 'Northern Wedding', arriving, after the first phase was completed, on September 7. The second and larger phase, involving more than 8,000 troops, was a spectacular mass invasion of Shetland by sea and air, with many loud bangs and D-Day style attacks, made for TV news. This was duly covered, and phase one was not even mentioned. The MoD press release on 'Northern Wedding' failed to mention the first phase, giving details only of Phase Two and Three, from September 10th onward. Phase Three of 'Northern Wedding' took place on the coast of Norway.

The clear direction of 'Whisky Galore' and 'Northern Wedding' was thus against any threat — particularly by 'civilian dissidents' - to the oil supply of the West. Such a threat could come from Norway which although a member of NATO, is outside the EEC, and thus not subject to

Brussels decisions on energy policy or from an independent Scotland. There has also been a noticeable — and much publicised — Soviet interest in North Sea oil installations. But these exercises were not directed towards fighting off a large-scale military takeover, but to a situation where the oil was under the control of local civilians.

UK EXTENDS POLITICAL EXTRADITION

The Suppression of Terrorism Act, which received Royal Assent on June 30, comes into force on October 25. The Act enabled the UK to ratify the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (which it did in August). The Convention, which required three countries to ratify it before coming into force, came into force on August 4. Austria, Sweden and the Federal Republic of Germany have also ratified the Convention.

The Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism originated in May 1973 after the attack on the Israeli team at the Munich Olympic Games. Its central purpose is to strike at what is seen as the international nature of terrorist actions by requiring contracting states either to extradite or themselves to prosecute anyone wanted for terrorist offences. However, traditionally, in the majority of extradition treaties including the Council of Europe Convention on Extradition, offences of a political nature have been explicitly excluded from the list of extraditable offences. Many countries, including Britain, have a history of granting political asylum to foreign nationals wanted in their own countries for offences of a political nature.

To get round this, the Convention lists two categories of offences, one where contracting states must ignore the political nature of the offence (hijacking, kidnapping, the taking of hostages, the use of bombs, firearms are included in this category), and a second where the

Page 6/State Research Bulletin (vol 2) No 8/October-November 1978

contracting states may, if they wish, ignore the political nature of the offence. This second category includes serious crimes involving the use of violence against people or property.

The UK goes further

The Suppression of Terrorism Act, which translates the intentions of the Convention into British law, goes further than the Convention itself in several important respects. First, the distinction between the two categories of offences has been removed, so that under British law, the state will, from October 24, be obliged to ignore the political nature of all offences listed. Not only have the other signatories to the Convention not done so, but several have taken advantage of the clause allowing for reservations, to restrict the terms of the Convention. France has reserved its position in a memorandum saying: 'It is self-evident that efficiency in this struggle (against terrorism) must be reconciled with respect for the fundamental principles of our criminal law and of our Constitution, which states in its Preamble that 'Anyone persecuted on account of his action for the cause of liberty has the right to asylum on the territory of the Republic'.'

Italy, Norway, Portugal and Sweden have declared that the convention will not apply to political offences. The Republic of Ireland has refused to sign the Convention on the grounds that it contravenes the rights of asylum given in their constitution, although the British government is pressing for them to sign the Convention without reservation.

A second important aspect in which the Act goes further than the Convention is in the countries to which it applies. The Convention was designed to apply to member states of the Council of Europe who have ratified the Convention. The Act not only applies to these, but also to any country with which Britain has an extradition treaty, and can also be applied to any country which the Home Secretary nominates by Order in Council, i.e. without returning to Parliament. It can also be

applied unilaterally to Ireland.

The Suppression of Terrorism Act has become law without any substantial public debate, although it does significantly alter the traditional British attitude to political offences and the granting of asylum. Despite the seriousness of terrorism, such a blanket law which takes no account of the nature of the state requesting extradition, nor maintains provision for granting asylum to those charged with political offences, must be seen as a substantial erosion of political liberties. (See also Bulletin no 4.)

TWO NEW HEADS OF INTELLIGENCE

Two new appointments were made this summer by the Prime Minister. The first was the appointment of Sir Brooks Richards, who recently retired from the Foreign Office, to be the Co-ordinator of Intelligence and Security in the Cabinet Office. He takes over from Sir Leonard Hooper, who had held the post since 1974. The job of the Co-ordinator is to present assessments to the Prime Minister and the Cabinet from the security and intelligence agencies on internal as well as external matters (see Bulletin No 2). The second appointment is that of a new head for MI6 (or the Secret Intelligence Service, SIS, as it is sometimes called). MI6 is Britain's equivalent to the CIA being engaged in intelligence-gathering and covert intervention overseas. The new Director-General is Mr Arthur Franks, who takes over from Sir Maurice Oldfield. Oldfield had held the post since 1973. Mr Franks' name appears in the 1978 diplomatic list under the rank of counsellor at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office — as did that of his predecessor, Oldfield, up to his appointment as head of MI6 when it disappeared from the lists. Similarly, Mr Franks 'Who's Who' entry is singularly uninformative. Although a member of the Foreign Service since 1949, the last entry is for 1962 when he was posted to Bonn.

Earlier this year the Prime Minister sent a letter to the editors of all national newspapers with the request that they should not print the names of the new heads of MI5 (the internal agency) and MI6 who he had just appointed (though the letter did not give the names). The new head of MI5 is not yet known to us.

SPECIAL BRANCH IN N. IRELAND AND SCOTLAND

Further figures have been provided by the respective Secretaries of State giving the strengths of the Special Branch in Northern Ireland and Scotland. In a written answer to Robin Cook MP, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland said that the Special Branch of the Royal Ulster Constabulary had 279 officers (13/6/78). The Secretary of State for Scotland, also in a written answer, stated that 'in the eight Scottish forces there are about 70 officers engaged in Special Branch work' (13/6/78). It is not known whether this latter figure includes CID officers seconded to Special Branch work on a temporary basis.

In May, the Home Secretary Mr Rees announced the number of Special Branch officers in England and Wales. He said there were now 409 officers at Scotland Yard, and another 850 officers engaged in Special Branch work in the 41 provincial police forces (see Bulletin no 6). With the figures for Scotland and Northern Ireland this gives a total of 1,608 Special Branch officers in the whole of the UK.

THE NEW ARMY STRUCTURE

A major restructuring of the fighting capability of the British Army is nearing completion. The re-organisation was initiated by the present Labour government when it came to power in 1974 as part of a cost-saving exercise. The aim was to implement the Labour Party election manifesto pledge to cut defence expenditure by several hundred million pounds (the

defence budget then stood at £3,700 million). The effect of the re-organisation has been to change what is called the 'teeth-to-tail' ratio — to have fewer people . with more firepower at their command. These changes have been spread over the last four years and were largely completed by April 1978.

The total military personnel in Britain is 332,500. The total army personnel is 170,500 of which approximately 116,000 are in Army combat forces.

Most (but not all) of these 116,000 combat soldiers are now attached to one of the ten new Field Forces, which vary in size. Six of the Field Forces are in Germany, committed to Nato; these are the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Armoured Divisions (Field Forces, but known by their old names), the 5th Field Force and the Berlin Field Force. The Gurkha Field Force is stationed in Hong Kong, and the remaining three Field Forces (the 6th, 7th and 8th) are on the British mainland. There are no specific Field Forces covering Northern Ireland or other overseas areas; soldiers for these operations are drawn from the Field Forces on a short-term basis, thereby giving a large number of soldiers experience of internal security operations.

All Army operations on the British mainland are controlled from the HQ of the UK Land Forces (HQ UKLF) at Wilton near Salisbury (Northern Ireland has its own HQ which at the moment answers direct to the Ministry of Defence, but eventually it is scheduled to come under HQ UKLF). The British mainland is divided into nine regional Districts which control all the soldiers in their area including many of the static units. But three Districts - South East, Eastern and South West — are also now the HQ organisations of the 6th, 7th and 8th Field Forces respectively. The 6th and 7th Field Forces are both committed to Nato's operations in Mainland Europe in a war. The 7th would reinforce the British Army on the Rhine, while the 6th, along with certain other British troops (including the 22 SAS Regt), is Britain's contribution to Nato's

European Strategic Reserve.

Page 8/State Research Bulletin (vol 2) No 8/October-November 1978

But the 8th Field Force stays at home. In a war or similar emergency the military task of what the 1976 Defence Estimates (Cmnd 6432) called 'Home Defence' — helping the civil authorities keep the population under control and guarding key areas, installations and bases (including the American ones) — would fall to the 8th Field Force. This is a highly mobile formation ready to go anywhere in Britain, based in South West District, but backed up by soldiers drawn from the Service corps and static units in all the other Districts.

Home defence

The creation of the 8th Field Force has given a cohesion and direction to the troops allocated to the Home Defence role which was lacking previously. It would appear to strengthen the Army's internal security capability in a war-like emergency, and is in line with other internal security measures adopted by the government in recent years.

Closely allied to this restructuring of the Army have been the changes in the Territorial Army Volunteer Reserve (TAVR). The 1974 Defence Review recommended that it should be more integrated with the Regular Army. The TAVR was a moribund organisation in 1974, but has now been considerably revitalised with closer contact with their parent Regular Army counterparts, new equipment and an important role in mobilisation plans. 'When war threatens' half the TAVR would join the British Army on the Rhine (BAOR) and the other half would support the 8th Field Force in Britain.

The 1974 Defence Review (Hansard 21/3/74) was said by the government to be primarily economically motivated, aimed at implementing the Labour manifesto pledge to achieve savings on defence expenditure of several hundred million pounds (the 1974 defence budget was £3,700m). A complete examination of defence priorities was undertaken, and in the 1975 Statement on the Defence Estimates (Cmnd 5976) the government outlined its proposals for defence up to 1983/4.

In broad terms, the defence effort was to be concentrated on Nato, with non-Nato (post-colonial) military commitments reduced. In addition to the changes in the Army (above), the Royal Navy lost a seventh of its major surface ships, the RAF had a substantial proportion of its transport aircraft withdrawn, and the Ministry of Defence was subjected to a management study.

But some Labour MPs have shown that the Defence Review in fact represented little or no cut in real terms in defence expenditure. What has happened is that under the cover of making illusory economy cuts, the Labour government has rebuilt Britain's Military machine. *1977 NATO figures show that defence expenditure takes 4.9% of Britain's gross domestic product (GDP). Only the USA spends more (5.5%), while all other NATO countries spend less (France 3.9%; W Germany 3.4%; Belgium 3.3%; Italy 2.5%; Canada 2.5%).

TUC CALLS FOR INQUIRY INTO SPECIAL BRANCH

The Trade Union Congress, meeting at Brighton in September, called for an independent inquiry into the activities and functions of the Special Branch and the Special Patrol Group of the Metropolitan Police (as a result of their behaviour during the Grunwicks strike). In a composite motion, moved by Mr Dougie Grieve, the General Secretary of the Tobacco Workers Union, and backed by the Association of Cinematograph, Television and Allied Technicians (ACTT) and the Greater London Council Staff Association, the Congress also expressed its opposition to the proposals put forward by Sir David McNee, the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, to the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure. His proposals would, the motion stated, 'if implemented, represent a substantial move towards the Police State'.



DIRTY WORK: THE CIA IN WESTERN EUROPE. Edited by Philip Agee and Louis Wolf. Secaucus, N.J., Lyle Stuart, Inc., 1978, 386pp. US\$24.95.

Over the past five years the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency has received more public critical scrutiny than at any time since 1947, when it succeeded the wartime intelligence structures. Most of this attention has come from former intelligence officials and the new generation of investigative journalists. Several dozen books and articles have revealed some of the Agency's activities and personnel and begun to raise questions about this work: its secrecy, cost, results and public justification.

This book breaks new ground in publishing for the first time 400 pages of details of some 600 CIA agents and exagents who have worked in Western Europe. (Volumes on other continents are proposed.) The details include careers and 'covers', last known private addresses and phone numbers, ages and even the names of spouses. The information is arranged both alphabetically and by country, to underline that it is for the use of readers. This part of the book alone seems certain to have important repercussions: no secret intelligence organisation can function effectively under such a spotlight, which is precisely the intention of the editors. There can be little doubt that the Agency's top brass have been reviewing somewhat feverishly their 'response options'.

The remaining sections of the book bring together 30 articles, many reprinted, though some are in English for the first time. These introduce, somewhat unevenly, aspects of the CIA's work in almost every country of Western Europe, including manipulation of elections, political parties,

labour movements, mass media and student organisations. Readers are also instructed how to recognise a CIA agent from publicly available documentation.

In his opening article Philip Agee, ex-secret operations officer from the Sixties, examines five 'myths' of the CIA. (A slightly modified version of this article appears in the first number of Covert Action Information Bulletin, July 1978. P.O. Box 50272, F Street Station, Washington DC 20004.) He has little difficulty in showing that the Agency is not primarily engaged in gathering intelligence information about the USSR, which is a technical job for the National Security Agency's space satellites and, earlier, for their U-2 planes. Nor is the CIA out of control: it has faithfully carried out the instructions of successive presidents and their National Security Councils. The notion that weakening the CIA strengthens the USSR is briefly dismissed on the grounds that the Agency's actions and allied foreign elites weaken and isolate the USA. And there is no evidence that those who attack the CIA are foreign agents. Finally, there is the accusation that naming individual Agency officers scarcely changes the Agency itself. Philip Agee responds to this by insisting both on the personal responsibility of CIA people, and on the exposure of secret operatives as 'the most effective way to reduce the suffering they cause.' This last point appears to require far greater elaboration in a book of this character. The editors' assertion that 'demystification of the CIA and its allied agencies comes through exposure' is simultaneously the truth and not the whole truth.

Indeed, the book is long on description and short on analysis. The CIA acts on behalf of a government and an economic system, which involves not only destroying those who seek to challenge the system, but also maintaining an entire sphere of influence subordinated to it. It is precisely the 'need' to manipulate, police and corrupt a sphere of influence which has led all powerful nations to establish comparable intelligence organisations.

Page 10/State Research Bulletin (vol 2) No 8/October-November 1978

What appears to distinguish the CIA is the size of its budget and sphere of influence — and the fact that in the developed capitalist states there remains some limited possibility of publishing information about and challenging clandestine activity. This book is a milestone in this process, and should be in every CF public library.

Some further reading on the origins and work of the CIA and associated intelligence activity:

A Man Called Intrepid: The Secret War in 1939-1945, by William Stevenson. London, Sphere Books, 1977.

OSS: The Secret History of America's First Intelligence Agency, by R. Harris Smith. New York, Dell, 1973.

The Armies of Ignorance: The Rise of the American Intelligence Empire, by William R. Corson. New York, Dial Press, 1977. The Invisible Government, by David Wise and Thomas Ross. New York, Random House, 1964.

The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks. London, Jonathan Cape, 1974. CIA Diary, by Philip Agee. Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1975. **U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Reports and** Hearings, six volumes (the Church Report). Washington DC, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975-1976. CIA: The Pike Report. Report of the US House of Representatives Select Committee on Intelligence, 1976. Nottingham, Spokesman Books, 1977. In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story, by John Stockwell. London, André Deutsch, 1978.

A successor to CounterSpy

Covert Action Information Bulletin was launched in July in Washington by a team which has worked closely with Philip Agee. It continues the work of lapsed CounterSpy Magazine, especially in uncovering CIA personnel and operations around the world. The first issue features Philip Agee's reasons for exposing the CIA; the trial of Armando Lopez Estrada, acquitted of preparing an armed raid against Cuba; the groundwork for destabilisation; and the new CIA Chief of Station in Jamaica. Airmail subscriptions from Europe cost US\$16.00 for six issues, which will approximate to one year's publishing. The address is: Covert Action Publications, Inc., P.O. Box 50272, F Street Station, Washington, DC 20004, USA.

WHY ISRAEL DESTROYED **USS LIBERTY**

On 8th June 1967, as Israeli troops were fighting the armies of Arab nations in their drive to invade Sinai, the West Bank and Golan, Israeli jets and torpedo boats attacked an American ship, the USS Liberty, sailing just off the coast of Gaza. 34 American sailors died, and 171 were injured. The official Israeli explanation, publicly accepted by the State Department at the time, was that the ship had been mistaken for an Egyptian freighter thought to be carrying military supplies. Anthony Pearson has pieced together the real story behind the attack, a stunningly cynical episode in which Israel, to protect her territorial expansion, broke faith with her American allies, and attacked the US ship in order to stop the Americans discovering, at the height of the June war, exactly what Israeli intentions, particularly towards the West Bank, really were. The outline of the Liberty story has already been told, in two articles which Pearson was commissioned to write for Penthouse. But in this book, he has added a great deal more detail. Liberty was a spy ship, whose mission was to listen to the military messages of both sides as the war flared. Under the control jointly of the American Sixth Fleet and the National Security Agency (NSA),

Liberty was in the business of Signals

State Research Bulletin (vol 2) No 8/October-November 1978/Page 11

Conspiracy of Silence, by Anthony Pearson Quartet Books, London. 179pp., £4.99.

Intelligence (SIGINT). Powerful radio and radar aerials enabled her crew, many of them not sailors but NSA linguists and cryptanalysts, to understand the significance of the radio messages exchanged between units of both Arab and Israeli armed forces, and thus to follow the course of the war and to keep the US Government informed.

It didn't take long for Pearson to confirm that the deliberate Israeli attack on the Liberty was designed to stop the US Government finding out what Israeli troops were doing.

While the United States and Israel both had reasons to launch a war against the Arabs in 1967, their motives were overlapping rather than identical. The United States was principally worried about the spread of Arab nationalism, and particularly at the sympathy for the Soviet Union which often went with opposition to western control in the area. In various parts of the Arab world, pro-western regimes were being challenged. In both Yemens, and in parts of the Gulf, movements for genuine independence were growing. President Nasser's Egypt was seen as the source for much anti-western feeling, and in some cases for the arms which were being used against colonialist and neo-colonialist regimes. The principal aim of the United States was to neutralise Egypt.

Two strands in the US administration battled it out: those who wished to see a war which would humiliate Nasser, and force him from power, leaving the way open for conservative elements who would end Egypt's radical pan-Arab role; and those who sought to win Egypt away from its radicalism by more moderate means. The 'hawks', led by President Johnson's National Security advisor, Walt Rostow, won out. Israel was given the green light for war.

But there remained a massive complication. If there was a general Middle East war, then Jordan too would inevitably be involved. The United States had made it clear to the Israelis that as far as they were concerned, Jordan was an ally. King Hussein, a close friend of the west, was entitled to western protection.

The Israelis, on the other hand, while sharing the US opinion that it was necessary to neutralise Egypt, also wanted territory. The area which they were determined to have above all was the West Bank. In order to achieve this, they were prepared to use dirty tricks, learnt from the Americans.

As Pearson points out, the growing American interest in the Middle East, particularly after 1956, meant that they had to expand contacts very rapidly. In the intelligence field, they had very few people on the ground. They therefore came to depend, quite deliberately, on the Israeli intelligence forces. And in return for this service, Israel received advanced electronic communications equipment. When the June war started, the Israelis used their American technology to interfere in communications between Egyptian and Jordanian commands about the progress of the fighting on their respective fronts. Intercepting the messages, they broadcast falsified information in place of the real information. So King Hussein was told that Egyptian forces were making much better progress in defending Sinai from the Israeli invasion, and President Nasser believed that Jordanian troops were holding the West Bank.

The rift between King Hussein and President Nasser which followed the 1967 war was based, the King said later, on the fact that the Egyptian leader had misled him. Both Arab leaders were the victims of an Israeli intelligence hoax of almost incredible proportions.

The USS Liberty, of course, would have been able to hear all this. It was also informing the American government of the progress which the Israeli Army was making in the fighting for the West Bank and Old Jerusalem.

The last thing which the Israelis wanted was a cease-fire enforced by the great powers before they had completed the occupation of the West Bank. So the Liberty, which the Israelis well knew was a spy ship, had to be destroyed. Pearson describes in graphic detail how two Israeli

Page 12/State Research Bulletin (vol 2) No 8/October-November 1978

Mirages strafed the decks of the ship with cannon and machine gun fire, intent on bringing down the array of listening aerials. The Liberty's Captain, Commander William McGonagle, was the only officer not killed or seriously wounded. He remained at the helm of the crippled ship, eventually making contact with the main units of the Sixth Fleet several hundred kilometres away across the Mediterranean. For his gallantry, he was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honour.

After the incident, Pearson reveals that pressure was put on all concerned to play the affair down. Despite the anger of the US Navy, the citations of Commander McGonagle and his crew did not mention the nationality of the jets and motor torpedo boats which attacked the ship. The Israelis refused to pay compensation for the Liberty.

If the Liberty had remained on station unmolested, the real position of the Israelis would have been known to the US administration. This might have strengthened the case of those of President Johnson's aides who were opposed to unlimited Israeli expansion. The invasion of the West Bank might have been halted by the great powers before it had been completed. Moshe Dayan's decision to destroy the Liberty may well prove to be one of the small incidents which altered the course of history.

BOOKS AND PAMPHLETS RECEIVED

This listing does not preclude subsequent publication of reviews.

In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story, by John Stockwell. Andre Deutsch, London, 1978. 285pp. Cloth £6.50.

The CIA's Australian Connection, by Denis Freney. D. Freney, Sydney, 1977. 101pp. Paper A\$2.95.

The Blue-Coated Worker: A sociological study of police unionism, by Robert Reiner. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1978. 295pp. Paper £4.50.

Bombs for Breakfast: How the arms trade causes a vicious cycle of impoverishment, repression and militarism in the third world. Committee on Poverty and the Arms Trade, London, 1978. 42pp. Pamphlet 50p.

Tories — new turn to the right. Labour Research Department, London, 1978. 23pp. Pamphlet 25p.

Recollections of a Rebel, by Lord Boothby. Hutchinson, London, 1978. 272pp. Cloth £6.95.



One of the fundamental roles of the military, the police, the intelligence and security agencies, and key Ministries, is the defence of the British state, against any threat from external or internal sources. Although the 'defence' of the state is always represented as being in the interests of **all** the people, either against a foreign power (as in the two World Wars and the

CIVIL DEFENCE OR INTERNAL DEFENCE?

'Cold War') or against sections of the British people labelled 'subversives' or 'communists', its purpose is to ensure the preservation of the status quo. Today, the official ideology uses the terms 'Home Defence' (against an external enemy; previously 'Civil Defence') and 'Internal Security' (internal 'enemy') interchangeably. The contingency plans laid for one kind of perceived threat can also be turned to combat the other.

As early as 1965, a government White Paper recognised that a nuclear stalemate had been reached and looked forward to what is now known as 'detente' between the

West and the East. The scenario for Western Powers in the 1970s and beyond was accurately described by the newlyelected Conservative Prime Minister Ted Heath when he addressed the UN General Assembly in 1970. Mr Heath said, referring primarily to the Western industrialised countries:

'We have seen in the last few years the growth of the cult of political violence, preached and practised not so much between states as within them. It is a sombre thought, but it may be that in the 1970s, the decade which faces us, civil war, rather than between nations, will be the main danger we face'.

He went on to say that the primary global struggle would not be between West and East, but between North and South between the industrialised North and the underdeveloped Third World.

The possibility of nuclear war obviously cannot be discounted, nor can the lack of planning for the protection of the civilian population, which has been and still is, abysmal, be ignored. This paper, however, is concerned with describing the ways in which the planning and machinery ostensibly for 'civil defence' or 'emergencies' (as they are called today) can and have been used against the British people themselves. While nuclear war remains a possibility, the primary concern of the British state and its agencies today is with internal challenges whether from everyday political activity (evidenced by the greatly increased size and activity of the Special Branch), major strikes (like the firemen's strike), industrial disasters (like Flixborough), or, ultimately a general strike/civil war (as faced in Northern Ireland for the past nine years).

Laying the groundwork (1914-1945)

When the British state was faced with widespread internal dissent during the nineteenth century the army (and the yeomanry) was used extensively to breakup demonstrations and to put down local insurrections (see, **Public Order in the Age** of the Chartists, by T. C. Mather; A History of English Criminal Law, L. Radzinowicz. Vol.4). By the end of the century the 'new' police (formed over the period 1829-1856) had replaced the army as the means of maintaining 'law and order'. The military, anyway, were needed elsewhere to maintain and extend Britain's imperialist interests, particularly in Asia and Africa. They were not to return to the 'homeland' until the mid-1960s after the collapse of the Empire (later, from 1969, they were sent to Northern Ireland to take over from the police).

In 1914 Britain faced, for the first time in the hundred years since the Napoleonic wars, the threat of foreign invasion. However, no comprehensive plans were made by the War Cabinet, and it was not until 1919 that an embryonic plan for dividing the country into regions was drawn up. This was caused not by a foreign invasion, but because of ruling-class fears of a revolution in Britain itself (see, Whitehall Diary, by J. Jones (Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet) Vol.1. 1916-1925; My Experiences at Scotland Yard, by Sir B. Thomson (head of the Special Branch until 1921). There had been rebellions by soldiers (1917-1918), two police strikes (1918 and 1919), threatened strikes in major sectors of industry, and the widespread advance of socialist movements following the success in Russia of the October Revolution of 1917.

The Lloyd George Coalition government set up a committee to make preparations to counter strikes and other civil emergencies. The plan, known as the 'Geddes Plan', was drawn up by Sir Eric Geddes (who had been a member of the War Cabinet). It proposed that the UK should be divided up into 16 Districts, each under the political control of a Junior Minister with the title of 'District Commissioner' (a concept and title borrowed unashamedly from colonial practice). In fact the plan was amended and 11 Districts were designated to co-ordinating the military, the police, 'volunteer' bodies, and essential services. These first rudimentary plans were activated briefly for the railway strike in 1919 and the

Page 14/State Research Bulletin (vol 2) No 8/October-November 1978

miners' strike in 1921. The power to use troops in 'states of emergency', under strict parliamentary accountability, for certain functions was embodied in the 1921 Emergency Powers Act (see, Bulletins No 4 and 5).

When the Tories returned to government in 1922 responsibility for plans to combat strikes was given to John Davidson, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (and the chairmanship of a Cabinet committee to co-ordinate the Ministries involved to Sir John Anderson, Permanent Under Secretary at the Home Office). This arrangement continued under the first Labour government in 1924, with the knowledge of Josiah Wedgwood, the Labour Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (although without the agreement of most of the Cabinet, and the knowledge of the parliamentary party). Thus when the Tories returned to power in October 1924 the emergency planning structure remained intact, and was to prove very important during the General Strike of 1926. It enabled the government to recruit swiftly 250,000 Special Constables (and give its unofficial blessing to the privately-organised Organisation for the Maintenance of Supplies); to issue instructions to local authorities; to deploy troops and police; and to take almost total control of the media.

The mid-1930s saw a different — and external — threat emerge with the rise of fascism in Germany. The threat of actual invasion was now complemented by the advent of the aeroplane which presented a new kind of danger to the whole population. An Air Raid Precaution programme was hastily started by the Home Office in 1935.

The possibility of an invasion by Germany was indeed very real in 1940/1, and the 'Civil Defence Emergency Plan Y' closely mirrored those of the 1920s. The 11 areas of the country were now called 'Regions', and the Regional Commissioners appointed in 1939 remained in office until 1944.

The Civil Defence Corps was disbanded at the end of the war in 1945. However, faced with major strikes (by dockers and railwaymen) the Labour government set up the Home Office Emergencies Committee in April 1947 (this committee continued to coordinate plans for strikes and natural disasters until the major re-organisation begun in 1972).

The Cold War era (1945-1968)

The rapid confrontation between West and East in Europe, and the development of a massive nuclear capability on both sides, led to the passing of the 1948 Civil Defence Act. The Civil Defence Corps was re-constituted and a Civil Defence Department created at the Home Office. The Home Office was given the formal responsibility of preparing plans, and to co-ordinate with all the other ministries of the state.

When the Tories returned to power in 1951 they gave Civil Defence a high priority, the most notable outcome being the construction, during the 1950s, of 12 Regional Seats of Government (hardened to withstand nuclear attack) at an estimated cost of £1,400 million. The locations and purpose of the RSGs were exposed by the Spies for Peace in April 1963 (see The **RSGs**, by Nicolas Walter, Solidarity pamphlet, 1963; the magazine Inside Story No8 March/April 1973; Beneath the City Streets, by Peter Laurie. Penguin, 1972). These safe hideaways were intended for a select few, from government, state agencies and local dignatories — while the people as a whole were expected to fend for themselves.

By 1965, it was officially recognised that a nuclear stalemate had been reached — 'detente' of the 1970s had clearly been perceived by the government and the state, if not by the public. The Defence White Paper 1965 said that a major nuclear war could almost be entirely excluded as a result of the existing state of mutual deterrence, and deliberate aggression in Europe was unlikely. Three years later, in January 1968, the Labour government announced that Civil Defence was to be placed on a 'care and maintenance basis'. The Civil

Defence Corps (which had numbered 359,000 volunteers in 1960 and 187,000 in 1968) was disbanded; the Auxiliary Fire Service and a large section of the Territorial Army were similarly disbanded. It was the end of an era.

What needs to be emphasised is the historical similarity of contingency planning, where the prime consideration is the preservation of the status quo, of a particular form of political system, government, and state, and of the distribution of economic power. The source of a threat to this status quo is, at one level, immaterial.

The primary concern of planning between 1918 and 1968 shifted from the internal threat presented by British working-class movements to the external threat of invasion and air-raids by Germany; and then to another, and different, external threat of annihilation by nuclear war. In the latter period, of the Cold War, two parallel plans co-existed, the primary one being for Civil Defence and the other for internal emergencies (for strikes or natural disasters). The 1970s was to see the reemergence of the internal 'enemy' as the principal factor.

The transition (1968-1972)

Since the mid-1960s Britain had been experiencing the effects of the long-term economic recession, which by the beginning of the 1970s was openly recognised as affecting all the advanced capitalist countries. When the consequences of the recession in Britain led to widespread political conflict - with the declaration of four 'states of emergency' between July 1970 and August 1972 - key state agencies were given the go-ahead to re-organise completely the national contingency plans to pre-empt and counter the internal 'enemy', socialist and trade union organisations.

A Brigadier, on the General Staff of the UK Land Forces HQ, put the question succinctly in an interview given shortly after the end of the first miners' strike in 1972. He said:

'The whole period of the miners' strike made us realise that the present size of the police force is too small. It is based on the fundamental philosophy that we are a law-abiding country, but things have now got to the state where there are not enough resources to deal with the increasing numbers who are not prepared to respect the law' (Times, 23/5/1972).

What had been essentially a conflict over the relative distribution of wages and profits became a question of 'law and order'.

Two connected, but distinct, initiatives were authorised by the Heath government. The first, was to lead to the re-introduction of 'Civil Defence' in a new form, and the second, to the re-drawing of the national War Plan by the military based on the assumption of an internal 'enemy'.

The Regional Government system

In the event of a prolonged 'state of emergency' (ie General Strike), an insurrection, a major natural or industrial disaster, or a war, the government of the country would pass to special national committees and a system of 'Regional Government'. In effect, the democratic system, at national and local level, would be indefinitely suspended and power would be exercised by state agencies under the nominal direction of the government of the day. This scenario has been the basis of the state's thinking since the Geddes Plan of 1919. The officially declared system of Regional Government goes as follows. There are 12 designated Regional Government areas in the UK (officially termed 'Home Defence Regions and Sub-Regions'). Ten are in England and Wales,

and one each for Scotland and N. Ireland (see Appendix 1 for the full list, by county). Within the Regions there are 17 Sub-Regions. So, for example, Region 10 (North-West England) has two Sub-Regions, no.101 (covering Cumbria and Lancashire), and no.102 (covering Cheshire, Greater Manchester and Merseyside).

Page 16/State Research Bulletin (vol 2) No 8/October-November 1978

The boundaries of the Regional areas were adjusted on 1 April 1974, to coincide with the re-organisation of local government under the 1972 Local Government Act. The boundaries for the 52 local police forces in the UK were adjusted at the same time. The regional areas for the Territorial Army Volunteer Reserve (TAVR), and for the 10 Army UK Land Forces Districts now also largely matched those of local government, the police, and of the designated Regional Government areas.

In a prolonged state of 'emergency' or 'war' the functions of government would be taken over or operated through the 12 Regional Commissioners. These Commissioners, probably Junior Ministers, would act as the political head of the Region. The Regional Commissioner would be assisted by a triumvirate — the Regional Military Commander (for the military), a Chief Constable (for the police, from one of the existing forces), and a Regional Controller (for the local state administration, from one of local councils' Chief Executives). Equivalent appointments would be made at Sub-Regional (embracing several counties), County, and District levels. Democracy at the local, as well as national, level would be thrown out of the window.

The Regional and Sub-Regional Commissioners would be appointed by the Crown (presumably on the advice of the Prime Minister), and their names would be announced at the time of the 'emergency'. However, the people who would fill the other posts - for the military, police and local administration — have already been appointed and are known by the title 'Designate' (e.g. Regional Controller-Designate). This has been necessitated by the need for forward planning, joint conferences, and 'practice' exercises.

The re-organisation of 'civil defence'

As has already been mentioned the Labour government placed Civil Defence on a 'care and maintenance' basis in 1968. When the Tories returned to power in 1970, it was announced that this policy was to be

reviewed, and in 1972 a new policy towards Civil Defence, or rather 'Home Defence' as it became termed, was outlined in a circular from the Home Office to all local authorities (Home Office circular no.ES/1/ 72, 22 March 1972). The circular was issued from the 'Emergency Services Division' (F.6) of the Police Department at the Home Office (this Division was set up in 1971, and took over responsibility from the Civil Defence and Commons Service Department).

The circular placed three contingencies under the heading of the provision of 'Emergency Services' by local authorities — a wartime emergency, peacetime emergency, and disasters. Two new strategies were made explicit. First, that planning wartime and peacetime emergencies were, in future, to be considered together.

'It is considered that there is much common ground between war planning and the preparations required for and the organisation appropriate to a major peacetime emergency or natural disaster. Accordingly there are many advantages in creating a closer relationship than hitherto in local planning for different emergencies of peace and war' (Home Office circular, op.cit.).

The long-term implications of collapsing the two categories of 'emergency' into one were not lost on those concerned with 'Home Defence' planning. The principal of the Home Defence College (which is under the Home Office, and runs regular training courses on 'Home Defence' for local council officers, councillors and the police), Air Marshal Sir Leslie Mavor, said in relation to 'subversion' and 'sabotage' that 'the full possibility of the present internal threat is only just sinking in' (Guardian, 12/6/1975). The second new strategy revealed by the new policy was that nuclear attack was no longer the primary consideration. The same 1972 Home Office circular asked each council to nominate an emergency head-

quarters in one of its buildings (and a

stand-by HQ) 'irrespective of the degree of protection' against nuclear attack.

The effect of the policy introduced by the Tories, and still in operation, was not to reconstitute the old Civil Defence Corps but to place responsibility for 'Emergency Services' planning onto the county and metropolitan county councils.

Emergency Planning Teams

By April 1973, every local authority in the country had appointed an 'Emergency Planning Officer' to head an 'Emergency Planning Team', comprising executive officers, clerical and secretarial staff (this was laid down in the 1972 Home Office circular). The size of these 'Teams' varies from area to area, the Greater London 'Team' is comprised of 23 people, and the Tyne and Wear team of 7.

Each council has also been asked to allocate existing local government officials to 'designated' posts in the event of an 'emergency'. Thus, for example, the Chief Executive would become the County (or Borough) Controller-Designate and, in the case of Bolton, the Officer-Designate for the burial of the dead would be the current Director of Recreation (see two excellent investigations of County emergency planning: The County Warbook, Mole Express, 1977; Region 1 (North-East), by Martin Spence, 1978).

The training of local Emergency Planning Teams is largely undertaken by the Home Defence College at Easingwold in Yorkshire. This was established on its present basis in 1973, and the College's role is defined as follows:

'The purpose of the College is to alert the higher echelons of management in local government, the armed forces and other services and in industry to what is required of them in home defence, and in particular to assist local authorities to discharge their responsibilities for translating peacetime services to meet the needs of wartime and the situations posed by major peacetime emergencies' (Annual Review of Home Defence and

Emergency Planning, Municipal Yearbook 1977, p.69).

The College, in other words, has a much wider purpose. Thousands of officials and individuals have attended courses and seminars arranged by the College. From 1973 to 1977 over 6,000 people had attended courses, including more than 700 elected Councillors, all 52 County Council Chief Executives, and 191 District Council Chief Executives (Municipal Yearbook, 1978, p.75). Although the ostensible purpose of these courses is to prepare for 'Home Defence' (against nuclear war or an external enemy) and is presented to local authorities as part of their job in providing 'Emergency Services' (wartime and peacetime emergencies) an examination of their content, together with subsequent Home Office circulars, reveals a highly disturbing picture of what any 'emergency' (in peace or war) would hold for the people of this country.

Planning for Armageddon

A whole stream of circulars has been issued from the Home Office to local authorities, **Chief Constables and Chief Fire Officers** from the 'Emergency Services' Division of the Home Office. In 1975 alone the following circulars were issued:

- ES 1/1975 Nuclear Weapons
- ES 2/1975 Information Services in War
- ES 3/1975 Police Manual of Home Defence
- ES 4/1975 Construction Work and **Building Materials in War**
- ES 5/1975 Communications in War
- ES 6/1975 Post Office Telephone **Preference System**
- ES 7/1975 Major Accidents and Natural Disasters

Two of these circulars give an idea of what the state has in mind to do in an 'emergency'. 'Information Services in War' (ES 2/1975) foresees three stages, the first being the transmission of information to 'allay public concern', the second, giving practical advice, and the third, 'post-

Page 18/State Research Bulletin (vol 2) No 8/October-November 1978

attack' stage. For 'post-attack' can also be read full-scale 'emergency'. All information at this stage would be put out through state-controlled media. The major part of this being a radio service run by the 'War Time Broadcasting Service' (WTBS) manned by BBC staff, and supplemented by others from the Central Office of Information. The WTBS would be transmitted from an existing nucleus of wellprotected stations which are linked to Regional and Sub-Regional HQs, each of which has studio facilities of their own. At local level, it is suggested in the circular that newsheets and information offices would be staffed by selected journalists, local authority employees, teachers and other reliable people.

Another circular, 'Post Office Telephone Preference System' (ES 6/75), has been designed to ensure that communications are 'provided in war', and 'during a peacetime emergency'. Subscribers are divided into three categories: 1) those with lines 'vital to the prosecution of war and to national survival', 2) lines additional to Category 1 'necessary to maintain the life of the community in a peacetime emergency', 3) 'All lines not covered by Categories 1 and 2'.

The distinction between the Categories is quite explicit: 'Both Category 1 and Category 2 telephones are those whereby a subscriber can both receive and originate telephone calls'. Whereas, 'Category 3 lines will only be able to receive calls'. Put simply, this would mean that 95% of telephone subscribers would be cut off, and only be able to receive calls, while the whole 'emergency' system HQs and their staffs would be able to communicate with each other.

Both of these circulars indicate what is implicit in many of the others - on food, transport etc - that services and communications would only be available to the state and its personnel and not to the people as a whole (see Leveller, December 1976, 'Home Office prepares for war', p.21; and Region 1, op.cit.).

The course papers provided for the annual seminar for local authority

representatives at the Home Defence College provide another insight into state thinking. What is particularly striking is the great emphasis placed on 'law and order' (whether after a nuclear attack or in a major peacetime emergency). In one paper entitled 'The Police Service in War' the first item is: 'Special measures to maintain internal security with particular emphasis concerning subversive or potentially subversive persons' (Leveller, July 1978, p.10). The paper emphasises that plans to augment the strength of the police 'have been made'. The role of the Army in such a situation is also spelt out, their 'prime role is likely to be to assist in the maintenance of law and order'. The papers as a whole envisage a situation in which authoritarian powers are assumed by the state covering every sphere of life.

The insight provided by the contents of Home Office circulars and the course papers above are however very limited. They represent only those plans which the state is prepared to make available to local authorities on an 'unclassified' basis. They are in short merely the icing on the cake, and only give a hint as to the measures being contemplated in the highly 'classified' plans which have been drawn up by the military and other state agencies.

The battle for the 'hearts and minds'

A more accurate picture can be pieced together by looking at the ideology of the military. In 1971 the publication of Low Intensity Operations, written by Brigadier Frank Kitson, spelt out openly, for the first time, the possible measures which might be needed if insurrection, or a crippling national strike, were to occur. Although an ambiguity underlay the book, it was clear to any intelligent reader that the ideas put forward could be applied as easily to Britain itself as in a colonial situation. If a massive drop in the standard of living led to widescale protests, then swift action was required as 'fumbling at this junction might have grave consequences, even to the extent of undermining confidence in the whole system of government' (Low Intensity

Operations, p.25). Action was necessary, he argues, in the primary stages of the growth of 'subversion' which he simply defines as any action to overthrow those governing the country 'or to force them to do things which they do not want to do' (op.cit., p.3).

There is further evidence that the internal and the external threat would in future be considered as one for planning purposes. Prior to the 1972 re-organisation of 'civil defence', it is apparent that the parallels between the two situations were part of conventional military ideology. A senior British Army officer, Major-General W.G.H. Beach, wrote that 'By Home Defence is meant the defence of national territory against external attack." (Universities-Services Study Group Scotland, Report 1970/1, p.49). A few pages later, Beach gives a definition of 'Internal Security' (against the internal enemy):

'Although the function of (military) support for the local authority in the maintenance of law and order in peace is quite distinct from Home Defence it would be disingenuous to overlook that in practice a close connection normally exists between them' (op.cit., p.54).

Perhaps the best indicator of military thinking is given in the Army Manual: Land Operations Vol. III (counterrevolutionary operations), 1969. This Manual brings together the experience of a hundred years of colonial practice and sets out in great detail how to gain and maintain control of local populations. In terms of Internal Security, it defines the 'enemy' as 'subversives' who take 'action to undermine the military, economic, psychological morale or political strength of a nation and the loyalty of its subjects'. This differs little from the definition of 'subversion' given by Mr Rees in the Commons earlier this year in relation to the scope of Special Branch activities (see Bulletin No6). An essential prerequisite, the Manual argues, is a good intelligence system because this cannot be established overnight if an 'emergency'

occurs. In this respect, the British state, through its on-going surveillance of political and trade union activity, is wellprepared.

The Manual details the form of organisation necessary in an 'emergency', and proposes a dual system. The first point, which must formally be seen to be under the control of the government, would be headed by a 'National Defence Council' (on which the military would be represented). Underneath the Council would be a system of Regional Government exactly along the lines outlined earlier in this paper. On this count too the British state is well-prepared.

The second part of the system would be a military-directed, and parallel system, to the first. Alongside the 'National Defence Council', which would determine policy, would be a 'National Operations Committee' to direct the execution of that policy. This Committee would be headed by the military, and include the police, Special Branch, MI5, experts in psychological warfare, etc. There would also be 'Regional (and County) Operations Committees', under the control of military, and with similar compositions. There would be, in other words, from national to county level two systems running in parallel one headed by the government, the other by the military.

The second, militarily-directed, part of the 'model' put forward in the Manual has also been effected in Britain, alongside the planning for Regional Government and 'Emergency Services' which forms the basis of the first part of the system.

A memorandum, issued by the Home Office in 1975, 'Armed Forces in War' (which in this context can be taken to be any 'emergency') outlined the regional and local system for the military. The memorandum notes that the boundaries of the Army Districts correspond with the Home Defence Regions. In the event of war or an 'emergency', a Joint Services HQ would be established in each Home Defence Region, under a Regional Military Commander. Sub-Regional Military Commanders would similarly co-ordinate

Page 20/State Research Bulletin (vol 2) No 8/October-November 1978

the three services. It is envisaged that military units would be deployed with the approval of the Regional or Sub-Regional Commissioners (ie the political heads) in response to requests by the Chief Constable (the police) or the Controllers (Chief Executives of local authorities).

In peacetime, the responsibility for coordinating Home Defence planning for the military is the responsibility of the Ministry of Defence, and direct contact is maintained with Controllers-designate through Joint Service Liaison Officers (JSLOs). In war or an 'emergency' JSLOs would be appointed at County and District levels to advise and respond to requests from the Controllers and Commissioners. The Home Defence exercise, 'Scrum-Half', organised by the military from October 10-20 this year was intended to test the operational structure of the whole of this military-based system.

It is clear that although the 'Operations Committees' proposed in the Army Manual would only be set up in the actual event of a war or 'emergency', existing military contingency planning is consistent with their swift creation.

What has been considered so far in this paper are the systems planned for war and 'emergency' situations and the extent to which preparations have been advanced. And it is apparent that the British state is well-prepared on all counts.

However, there are many situations short of war or an 'emergency' in which the military, the intelligence services, and the police are involved, and for which contingency plans have been made by these agencies. One recent instance was the swift replacement of the country's 32,000 firemen in the winter of 1977/8 by 21,000 soldiers, aided by local police forces.

There is in existence a system of contingency planning covering strikes, disasters and terrorism over which (like in an 'emergency') there is little or no democratic control. And although it is beyond the scope of this paper to go into great detail it would be quite wrong to ignore the common systems, agencies, ideologies, and legitimations which are

available for 'emergency' and 'nonemergency' situations.

The 'hidden' system

When the Tory government set up the National Security Committee (NSC) in 1972 as a direct response to the challenge presented by industrial struggles, the Committee was given two major tasks. First, to re-draw the national War Plan on the presumption that the primary enemy was internal, not external. Directed as it was at full-scale 'emergency' situations (a euphemism for prolonged strikes or insurrection), this involved, in part, a threeyear undercover operation by the military to plot the transport, roads, bridges in and connecting — every town and city in the country. The whole task was completed by 1975, after a Labour government returned to power.

The second was to lay plans for contingencies (ie for everything short of an 'emergency'). This involved defining the situations in which the military could be used 'in aid of the civil power', without the declaration of a 'state of emergency' (under the 1920 Emergency Powers Act) and without reference to Parliament. The situations were i) where the police couldn't cope eg terrorism ('Military Aid to the Civil Power', MACP); ii) natural disasters, eg flooding ('Military Aid to the Civil Community', MACC); iii) and the use of troops to maintain 'essential services' during a strike ('Military Aid to the Civil Ministries', MACM) (see The Political Police in Britain, by Tony Bunyan, pp269-80 and pp293-6).

Planning for the contingencies defined above, involving primarily the military, the police and the intelligence services, is now carried out by the Cabinet's Civil Contingencies Committee (which replaced the National Security Committee in 1974), and its sub-committee, the Emergencies Committee (which took over once the firemen's strike actually started).

It became apparent during the firemen's strike that the military, working with the help of the police, were able to establish

bases (largely in local Territorial Army halls and premises) and a system of communications that did not necessitate the direct involvement of the local authoritybased 'Emergency Services' system. Their capacity to do this sharply demonstrated the degree to which contingency planning has been carried in this country (see Bulletins, no4 and 5).

Conclusion

This paper has sought to demonstrate one salient fact, that what used to be termed

'civil defence', against a presumed external enemy, is now primarily concerned with the internal 'enemy', the British people themselves.

Since the early 1970s, planning for war and 'emergencies' have been treated as one problem — how to maintain law and order and the status quo inside Britain (whatever the source of the threat). These plans have now been far advanced with little or no democratic knowledge or debate, and as such represent yet another instance of the power state agencies wield over democratically-elected governments.

Region		Sub-Region	Counties	Army Distric
1	North	11	Cleveland, Durham, Northum- berland, Tyne and Wear.	North-East (York)*
2	Yorkshire	21	Humberside; North, West, and South Yorkshire.	North-East (York)
3	East Midlands	31	Derbyshire, Lincolnshire, Nottinghamshire.	Eastern (Colchester)
		32	Leicestershire, Northamp- tonshire.	Eastern (Colchester)
4	East	41	Cambridgeshire, Norfolk, Suffolk.	Eastern (Colchester)
		42	Bedfordshire, Essex, Hertfordshire.	Eastern (Colchester)
5	Greater London	51	Greater London	London
6	South East	61	Kent, Surrey, East and West Sussex.	South-East (Aldershot)
		62	Berkshire, Buckinghamshire, Hampshire, Isle of Wight, Oxfordshire.	South-East (Aldershot)
7	South West	71	Avon, Dorset, Gloucester- shire, Somerset, Wiltshire.	South-West (Taunton)
		72	Cornwall, Devon.	South-West (Taunton)
8	Wales	81	Clwyd, Gwynedd.	Wales (Breco
		82	Dyfed, Mid, South, and West Glamorgan, Gwent, Powys.	Wales (Breco

APPENDIX 1: Regional and Sub-Regional Boundaries

*Army District HQ locations

Page 22/State Research Bulletin (vol 2) No 8/October-November 1978

District

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9	West Midlands	91	West Midlands, Staffordshire, Warwickshire.
		92	Hereford and Worcester, Salop.
10	North West	101	Cumbria, Lancashire.
		102	Cheshire, Greater Manchester, Merseyside.
11	Scotland	110	Lowlands (counties n.k.)
		111	Highlands (counties n.k.)
12	Northern Ireland	120	The six counties

APPENDIX 2: Bolton Metropolitan Borough (designated council officers; agreed by the Management and Finance Committee, 17.6.75)*

District Controller — The Chief Executive **District Food Officer** — The Director of Education **District Food Distribution Officer and District Emergency Feeding Officer – Officers** of the Education Department, to be nominated by the Director of Education **Transport Officer** — The Director of Engineering Intelligence and Information Officer – The Public Relations Officer **Communications Officer** — The Director of Administration Scientific Adviser – To be nominated by the Director of Education Officer for Health, Sanitation, and Refuse - The Director of Environmental Health Officer for Billeting and Care of the Homeless – The Director of Housing Officer for Works of Repair and Demolition – The Director of Architecture **Officer for Rescue** — The Director of Engineering Officer for the Burial of the Dead – The Director of Recreation

*County Warbrook, Mole Express, p8

APPENDIX 3: Bibliography

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State Research Bulletin (vol 2) No 8/October-November 1978/Page 23

West Midlands (Shrewsbury) West Midlands (Shrewsbury) North-West (Preston) North-West (Preston) Scotland (Edinburgh & Perth) Scotland (Edinburgh & Perth) N. Ireland (Lisburn)