

State Research

An independent group of investigators collecting and publishing information from public sources on developments in state policy, particularly in the fields of the law, policing, internal security, espionage and the military. It also examines the links between the agencies in these fields and business, the Right and paramilitary organisations.

State Research Bulletin

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The Review of Security and the State

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BULLETIN
No. 10

THE ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS INTELLIGENCE UNIT — SPY
CAMERA EXPOSED — WHY A POLICEMAN INVENTED A
WAGES RAID — THE ORIGINS AND STRUCTURE OF NATO

NEWS &
DEVELOPMENTS

TROOPS IN STRIKES: PARLIAMENT LOSES POWERS

The Defence Council, chaired by Mr Mulley, Secretary of State for Defence, has changed Queen's Regulations for the Army to enable troops to be used to replace workers on strike without the prior approval of Parliament. On June 1, 1978, the Defence Council deleted from Army Regulations the words 'and the emergency is limited and local'. They came out of para.J11.004b, which defines the use of troops under the 1964 Emergency Powers Act. The use of troops in the firemen's strike in the winter of 1977/78 was authorised by the government under the 1964 Act. However, this Act was not intended to cover the use of troops in industrial disputes, as the

Minister made clear in introducing the Bill to Parliament, because this was covered by the 1920 Emergency Powers Act. The 1964 Act was intended to cover the use of troops in natural disasters and in local crises. In line with the intention of Parliament, Army Regulations said that the Defence Council could authorise the use of troops, under the 1964 Act, where the emergency was 'limited' and 'local'. The use of the troops in the firemen's strike, when 21,000 soldiers replaced the entire 32,000-strong fire service, was neither 'limited' nor 'local', it was 'national' and 'extensive'. This contradiction between the intent of the 1964 Act, the Army Regulations, and the actual use of the troops was first reported in Bulletin No4 (February, 1978) and carried later in the national press. By simply removing the offending words from Army regulations, the Defence Council have gone totally against the intent of Parliament in passing the 1964 Act.

A spokesman for the MOD made light of this change and claimed that these words

'were inadvertently retained from earlier regulations'. This is patently not the case. This wording was included in the fully revised edition of the Queens Regulations for the Army published in 1975 (the two previous post-war revised editions being in 1955 and 1961). Second, as already stated, the wording reflected the intent of the 1964 Act.

Since December last year the government has authorised the training of troops to replace (in part at least) the tanker drivers, the lorry drivers, workers at water works, ambulance drivers and other sectors of local government workers. In the Commons Mr Rees, the Home Secretary, stated that there was no need for the declaration of a state of emergency until the government needed additional powers (like requisitioning lorries from private industry) which 'would enable the government to deal more effectively with supplying essential requirements' (**Hansard, 15/1/79**). While this statement is strictly accurate, as far as it goes, it ignores the intention of parliament in passing the 1920 Emergency Powers Act and the usual practice since that time.

The intention of parliament in passing the 1920 Emergency Powers Act was to allow for the use of troops in industrial disputes, to ensure parliamentary control over their use, and to place limits on the powers the government could assume. The Act specifies that where a dispute would interfere with 'the supply and distribution of food, water, fuel, or light, or with the means of locomotion, to deprive the community, or any substantial portion of the community, of the essentials of life' a state of emergency may be declared. Contrary to reporting in the press over the current strikes the **actual use** of troops in any of the above situations was intended to be placed under parliamentary control — through the **mechanism** of a declaration of a state of emergency. Put simply, the 1920 Act was passed to allow for the use of troops in strikes **with the approval of Parliament**.

The major constitutional change has been brought about, it seems, by very

immediate political considerations; with a razor thin majority, the Callaghan government might not be able to get a state of emergency through Parliament.

The intention of the government to use troops to replace striking workers without recourse to Parliament is not the only recent development in its approach to handling industrial trouble. Over the past four years the state's strategy to cope with strikes, called 'contingency planning', has reached a new and unprecedented stage. The creation of the Civil Contingencies Unit in the Cabinet Office, which grew out of the Tory government reaction to the miner's miners strikes in 1972 and 1974 and was retained by Labour, marked the beginning of this development (see Bulletin No2). This Unit prepares intelligence reports on every potential strike for the Emergencies Committee of the Cabinet (which is a sub-committee of the Cabinet's Civil Contingencies Committee). The extensiveness of this contingency planning was shown during the firemen's strike. More recently, when the army was preparing to train 15,000 soldiers to replace tanker petrol drivers, the Unit drew very detailed plans which included long lists of hospitals, power stations, sewage works, refrigerated food suppliers and communication centres to be supplied.

Regional Emergency Committees

Further evidence of this contingency planning came with the creation of 'Regional Emergency Committees' on January 11th, after the haulage drivers stoppage was made official. 'This is a unique occasion with no precedents', Mr Rodgers, the Secretary of State for Transport, told a press conference. An accompanying press statement said that this move was the activation of 'arrangements previously held in readiness ... Under contingency plans which were previously prepared the role of these committees is to deal with problems over the supply of essential services' (**DoT press statement, 11/1/79**). The 11 Regional Emergency Committees, based on the Department of

Transport's Traffic Areas, were set up to cover the following regions of the country: London (headquarters, Department of Transport); West Midlands (Birmingham); Yorkshire and Humberside (Leeds); North West (Manchester); Northern (Newcastle); South West (Bristol); East Midlands (Nottingham); Eastern (Cambridge); South East (London); Scotland (Edinburgh and Glasgow); and Wales (Cardiff).

The job of each committee is to monitor the strike, liaise with the union over supplies and prepare the police and troops for possible involvement in strike-breaking. The Chairmen of each Committee is the Regional Director of the Department of the Environment, and their members include civil servants from affected government departments, and senior police and military officers. For example, the London Regional Emergency Committee included representatives from the Ministry of Agriculture, the Central Office of Information, the Post Office, and the Departments of Trade, Industry, Energy, Employment and Health, together with senior officers from the Army's London District and the Metropolitan Police.

The Committees first met on January 12 and Regional Operations Rooms were set up. These are co-ordinated nationally through a team of officials at the Department of the Environment's Emergency Operations Room (in the main DoE building in Westminster). This team reports to the Civil Contingencies Unit in the Cabinet Office and to Mr Rodgers.

Lessons of the firemen's strike

The Winter issue of the Journal of the Royal Signals Institution carries an illuminating article on the operation of the 8th Signal Regiment during the firemen's strike in the winter of 1977-78. The regiment was asked to stand by to cover the County Durham area on November 8. On the next day, the Home Office wrote to local fire authorities saying that 'in the current industrial situation in the fire service ... contingency arrangements have been made under which it would be open to

them to seek military assistance in maintaining fire cover'. The strike started on November 14. A 'County Emergency Committee' was set up whose membership included the Chairman of the County Council, the Chief Constable, the Chief Fire Officer, the Chief Executive of the Council and the Chief officer of the army. This Committee handled general policy-making and authorised the purchase of additional equipment.

Beneath the Committee, four command points were set up. One, at RAF Catterick in North Yorkshire was to organise overall support and to meet demands from other areas for additional soldiers. Others in TAVR centres, were bases for detachments of soldiers, Green Goddesses and police car crews. These centres were directly linked by 'hotline telephone' to the Durham Police HQ Operations Room. 999 fire emergency calls which usually go to the Fire Brigade HQ were re-routed by the telephone exchange to the Police Operations Room. In turn, the Police Operations Room kept in touch, through the police UHF radio link with a 'Military Liaison Cell' based in the County Emergency Planning Office at Durham County Hall.

This structure confirms that there is a capability for the police and military to operate throughout the country relying almost entirely on their own bases and centres and communications systems, thus by-passing the local government structure.

SPY CAMERA EXPOSED

On December 11 the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) announced that he had decided not to press charges against six people who had discovered and removed a police camera they had found hidden in a pub. On September 25 Wilf Aves, a regular at the Grange Hotel, Hartlepool, noticed the camera concealed in a fake juke box and disconnected it. Five other people tried to take it to show to journalists on a local paper. All six were arrested by the police.

It later emerged that the camera had been installed some three weeks earlier by the

Cleveland Police with the agreement of the publican and the brewery, Camerons. The police statement said that it had been installed to provide evidence of drugs trafficking for the Cleveland Drugs Squad, and was monitored by two detectives sitting in an upstairs room; it was not wired for sound. Mr Aves however, said: 'Other wires led to the backs of pub seats and what I am firmly convinced were microphones' (Newsline, 29/9/78).

The discovery of the camera is one more example of the increasingly wide and ranging use of cameras for police surveillance. It is now standard practice for police cameras to cover major demonstrations; over 200 square miles of London are kept in constant view by cameras; cameras have been used for surveillance of shopping centres in Lewisham, Croydon and Liverpool; and for various reasons passengers on the Doncaster-Sheffield bus services and people using the changing rooms in the Farnborough Sports Centre have been watched by cameras.

There is no legal or statutory control over the use of cameras for surveillance. Decisions over their use lie solely with the police, and there are no moves to change this, despite the fact that it is now six years since the Younger Committee on Privacy recommended that such laws should be introduced.

THE ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS INTELLIGENCE UNIT

The Illegal Immigrants Intelligence Unit at Scotland Yard was set up in 1972 in order to co-ordinate information on a nationwide basis on 'suspected' illegal immigrants. Since its formation the Unit is known to have instigated several 'passport' raids on black communities in different parts of the country, in which few illegal immigrants have been discovered but many black people subjected to detention and harassment. These centrally organised raids represent only the tip of the iceberg of what

has become a common police practice of demanding proof, usually a passport, of a black person's right to be in this country. Indeed the experience of many black people suggests that police often act on the assumption that they are illegal immigrants until they can prove otherwise.

The Illegal Immigration Intelligence Unit is one of two specialist units, the other being the Drugs Intelligence Unit, based at Tintagel House in London. It became operational in 1973 and is part of C.11 section of Scotland Yard (C.11 acts as a central data bank on criminals, their methods of working, friends etc). In 1974 there were 12 officers in the Unit, which has now grown to 28 officers under the command of a Det Chief Superintendent. The Unit is engaged in building up lists of names of those it **suspects** are illegal immigrants or could have overstayed the time limit on their entry permits.

Many of the methods used are common to all forms of 'intelligence-gathering' which involves bringing together information from the records of state agencies, noting names in the address books of those search and/or detained, named and addresses elicited in interrogations, and anonymous tip-offs (which can often be without foundation). The 1976 report of the Commissioner of Police for London commented: 'This unit, which comprises both Metropolitan and provincial officers, has a national responsibility and is now a well-established part of the police intelligence gathering system' (June, 1977).

The capacity of the Unit is being extended by the inclusion of its records on a new police computer, the Metropolitan Police National Intelligence Computer, which is due to come into operation this year. This computer will hold the records of several specialist units in 'C' (Crime) Department at Scotland Yard and the Special Branch. The estimated number of names to be held concerning suspected illegal immigrants is 15,700 (New Scientist, 18/1/79).

The Unit provides information to local police forces throughout the country. It also liaises with the Home Office's

Immigration Service who have a special intelligence unit called the Immigration Service Intelligence Unit, based at Harmondsworth (the 'reception centre' for those detained on entry to the country). This unit has 30 members of the Immigration Service and seven clerks, and cost an estimated £212,500 for 1977-78 (Hansard, House of Lords, 6/4/78).

The number of people held by the police as suspected illegal immigrants has greatly increased in recent years. This is partly due to the special attention accorded by the police to this 'problem', and partly to the far-reaching powers granted under the 1971 Immigration Act.

Instant repatriation

A qualitative change in the law, made by Schedule 2 of the 1971 Immigration Act, authorized the arrest, without a warrant, and the detention of any illegal immigrants by a police or by an Immigration Service officer. For those detained under this law there is no right to bail and no time limit placed on the length of detention. Prior to this, under the 1968 Immigration Act, these sweeping powers were only available where an entrant had actually **been refused admission**. In all other cases alleged illegal immigrants and overstayers had to be prosecuted and brought before the courts, who, on conviction could recommend deportation. The Home Secretary then had to sign a deportation order.

With the 1971 Act, which came into force on January 1st 1973, came the power of instant repatriation, which is solely in the hands of the Home Secretary which in effect means with the Immigration Department at the Home Office, whose decisions cannot be challenged in the courts. The new law also gave the green-light to the police to conduct 'passport' checks and raids as a matter of routine.

Up to November 1977 a total of 5,326 people had been held in prison custody under the Act. The number of people held in prison awaiting judgement has increased steadily, there were —

715 people in 1975
1037 people in 1976
1396 people in 1977 (to Nov)

Many of these were held in prisons for long periods. On April 30 1978 there were 5 who had been in prison for 9-12 months; 7 for 6-9 months; 22 for 3-6 months; and 215 for periods less than three months (Immigrant Voice, October 1978). The number of black people detained in prison under the Immigration Act represents only a small proportion of those questioned and detained (at police stations) by the police.

'Passport raids'

Within months of the 1971 Act becoming law, at the beginning of 1973, several Asian organizations sent protests to the Home Secretary about random passport checks by the police and immigration officers. In July Robert Carr, the Home Secretary, said in reply to a parliamentary question that a directive had been sent to all Chief Constables stating that there must be no witch hunt for illegal immigrants. The circular, he said, laid stress on the need to avoid anything that could be construed as harassment or making a practice of asking for passports in connection with minor offences.

Just three months later the Illegal Immigrants Unit carried out raids on 13 houses in Whitfield Street in Camden, London, in search of illegal immigrants. The leader of the Camden Council said: 'This heavy-handed operation disturbed a lot of innocent people, but produced no illegal entrants; the net result was two seamen deserters and a man who has been charged with overstaying his leave'. The local Community Relations Officer stated: 'We want an assurance that in future there will be no automatic suspicion that a passport has been forged or obtained illegally simply because its holder happens to be black'. Carr refused a demand for an inquiry on two grounds. First, that this was a police operation over which he had no control, and secondly that: 'it would not be possible for the police or the immigration service to disclose precise information on

which the operation was based' (letter to Mrs L Jaeger MP, February 11 1974).

Another 'passport' raid organized by the Unit happened in Newcastle on December 6 1977. Homes and restaurants of members of the Bangladeshi community in the city were entered and 70 people questioned on whether they had the right to be in this country. 24 people who were unable to provide evidence that they were legal residents immediately were taken to the police station. Of these 18 were released the next day, but 6 were detained under the 1971 Act and sent to Durham prison. Three of these, having been held in custody for several weeks, have been allowed to stay in the country; three have been deported, including one seaman deserter and another person who was held in prison for 8 months awaiting a decision (in this latter case the Home Office would not accept that the person had entered the country before 1973 and was therefore covered by the amnesty offered to immigrants). One of those released, Rupa Ali, was held in prison for 42 days before being released on bail on an order of the High Court. The police claimed that the picture on his passport had been substituted — Ali and his family were adamant that it had not. Despite efforts by the police to prove their case the Home Office has now agreed that he can stay in the country.

These two raids represent only a small part of the picture of the everyday harassment of black people by the police through 'passport' checks. What the existence of the Illegal Immigration Intelligence Unit, and the everyday use of 'passport' checks demonstrates, is the priority that the police place on hunting for illegal immigrants compared to protecting the black community from racist attacks.

W.GERMANY: SECURITY FUNDS GO TO RIGHT WING GROUPS

Covert action by West Germany's internal security service, the Verfassungschutz, (Office for the Protection of the Constitu-

tion), equivalent to Britain's MI5, has been exposed. According to the liberal daily 'Frankfurter Rundschau', the Verfassungschutz has been spending up to two million deutschmarks a year (more than half a million pounds at present exchange rates) subsidising the activities of centre and right-wing organisations. The money was voted by the Federal Parliament (Bundestag) under 'Budget item 532 05' which was immune from detailed examination under a procedure similar to that of the 'secret vote' in the British Parliament.

Groups which benefitted from the subsidies included the Christian Democratic Student Organisation, RCDS; the Social-Liberal Student Union (right-wing social democrats); the Liberal Student Union; the foundations attached to Germany's four major political parties, the Frederick Ebert Foundation (Social Democrats), the Naumann Foundation (Free Democrats), the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (Christian Democrats) and the Hanns Siedel Foundation (Christian Social Union); the Christian Trade Union Organisation, linked with the Christian Democratic Party; and 'church groups'.

The funds were not given for the general expenses of the organisations, but to subsidise seminars and special meetings which the security service approved of. For example, DM4,419 was paid for a Christian Democrat Student seminar, organised in October 1976, for training students to debate against 'extremists' in student union meetings. Other sponsored activities included 'research into extremists'.

The technique of funding only activities which the sponsoring organisation approves is a recognised way of influencing democratic organisations, and keeping the sponsoring organisation's funds safe from a possible change of policy by the recipient; it was used by the CIA through fronts such as the Congress for Cultural Freedom. A spokesperson for the West German Interior Ministry said that the activities against extremists were seen as 'positive constitutional protection', as opposed to the other side of the Verfassungschutz's work, which consists of spying on left-wing organisa-

tions and individuals, and preparing the files on which depend the operation of the infamous Berufsverbot, under which anyone tainted with left or non-conformist ideas is prevented from getting public sector jobs.

The Verfassungschutz has been engaged in this covert action since 1951. It was set up by the British in 1950, and closely modelled on the lines of MI5. The British were anxious to prevent the whole of the new Federal German State's espionage capability falling under the influence of the Americans. The US secured the services of the Nazi General Reinhard Gehlen, who headed what later became the Federal Intelligence Service, BND, Germany's equivalent of the CIA and MI6. The British persuaded Adenauer to accept a conservative aristocrat, Otto John, as first head of the Verfassungschutz. John had fled Germany in 1944, after he was suspected in being involved in an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate Hitler. Until 1945, he worked for a British Intelligence German-language radio station beaming propaganda at the Nazis. It seems likely that the idea of using secret funds to finance organisations which share the political aims of the security services was of British origin.

WHY A POLICEMAN INVENTED A WAGES RAID

The Thames Valley Police have admitted that an officer working for their Special Branch interviewed a man researching the history and practice of Emergency Planning in the Reading area, under false pretences. Guy Smith had been researching Emergency Planning, for some months, during which he had contacted the Thames Valley police for information on their role in the war time Emergency Planning scheme. Shortly after he had finally been refused any information because 'internal security' was concerned, Smith was visited at his home by a police officer. The officer said that he was from the CID, and that Smith's motor bike was suspected of having

been involved in a wages snatch. The officer used this opportunity to question Smith about the work he was doing; who was paying for it, why was he doing it? Many details about the visit were suspicious. A 125cc bike as a get-away bike? The officer had checked the bike registration with the Police National Computer, and this was how Smith's address had been found. However, the address at which the bike was registered was a very old one in north west London, so clearly other checks had been made.

Smith made a strong complaint to the police following this visit. In response he received a letter from the Assistant Chief Constable which admitted first that the officer, Constable Mooney, was in fact working for the Special Branch at the time, not the CID, and secondly, that '... Mooney did see you under the pretext of an entirely fictitious matter, and as you say, no such robbery did in fact occur.' While the letter apologised for the way in which the enquiries had been made, it justified Special Branch interest in people working in such fields: 'I think it right that police should satisfy themselves of the authenticity and intentions of persons making such enquiries (ie into Emergency Planning).'

AUSTRALIA: MARK'S IDEAS ON NATIONAL SECURITY

Since his retirement as Metropolitan Commissioner in 1977, Sir Robert Mark has travelled the world advising governments on policing and counter-terrorism. His clients have included Kuwait and Australia. The publication of the Mark Report on Australia is a significant event which has gone almost entirely unnoticed in this country. It illuminates the international context and influence of British policing and concisely reveals much of Mark's own influential thinking. (Report to the Minister for Administrative Services on the organisation of Police Resources in the

Commonwealth Area and other related matters by Sir Robert Mark: Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1978 (ISBN 0 642 03627 6), price 1.65 Australian dollars.)

Mark's terms of reference, set out in March 1978, were to look at all policing in the Commonwealth Area (the government area of Canberra) and at 'measures for protective security and counter-terrorism on a nationwide basis'.

The Report advocates the setting-up of an Australian Federal Police force, complementary to existing State forces. The AFP would police the Commonwealth Area and coordinate several functions on a national level: training and support for counter-terrorism, Special Branch, diplomatic protection and escort of VIPs and (until State forces can be trained and deployed) policing of airports.

Mark sees an important role for Military aid to the civil power. He calls on government to ensure availability and deployment of 'appropriate military support' with special emphasis on SAS availability, training of explosives officers and ensuring minimum delays.

What is noteworthy for British readers is Mark's argument for military aid to the civil power, which, he says, 'can be an unnecessarily emotive procedure in free societies'. He states that the public will support military aid in dealing with emergencies and disasters (floods, air crashes etc.) and 'the maintenance of essential services'. 'In Great Britain', says Mark, 'they have moved dustbins and manned fire engines without objection by the trade unions' and continues 'not even the most eloquent radical can pretend that they undermine the position of trade unions or threaten civil liberty when employed in that way'.

There is an obvious contradiction in Mark's view when, in the following paragraph of the Report, he argues that 'troops should never, in any circumstances, be used to confront political demonstrators or participants in industrial disputes'. Such confrontation is the police's job. But what were the firemen's and dustmen's strikes if

not industrial disputes?

Mark has strong views on the role of the army. They boil down to two arguments: the use of the military has a greater deterrent value than the use of the police; and, if people are going to be killed, it is better that soldiers do it so that good relations between the police and the public are not soured by the use of guns. These arguments, which reappear in the Report, were first put forward publicly by Mark in his speech at Leicester in November 1975 (reprinted as an appendix in his report). He tells his Australian readership: 'In Britain, this philosophy is not concealed. Every Member of Parliament is aware of it. It has been the subject of a public lecture which scarcely caused a ripple of adverse comment, largely because clarification of the position alleviated public unease'.

Special Branches

The Report is even more opinionated on the Special Branch. Paragraph 38 reads: 'I should add that during my brief stay in Australia, I have noticed that the term "Special Branch" tends to provoke an emotional, unthinking and ill-informed reaction from people who clearly have no conception of its role, its limitations or accountability'. Yet in Bulletin No 4, (pp 58-60) we reported on the disbanding of the South Australian Special Branch earlier this year, following detailed revelations in a Report by Judge White that the Branch was 'infringing basic civil liberties and engaging in political surveillance of the most biased kind' and that the State Prime Minister was being deliberately misinformed about Branch work.

Mark makes no recognition of this. Instead, he believes that 'most criticism of Special Branch seems to come from people in sympathy with regimes whose Special Branches, unlike those of Britain and Australia, exercise executive power and enjoy a high degree of immunity from the judiciary'.

The Report contains the most explicit justifications for police surveillance of left-wing groups. 'Most democracies these

days are more vulnerable to internal subversion than external attack. Their governments have a clear duty to prevent the exploitation of the freedom of democracy by those who seek to undermine it. It is essential that the police in a free society should take careful note of overt or clandestine activities which allow even the suspicion of subversion. Far from there being a need to justify a Special Branch, it should be made clear that any government unwilling to establish and maintain one is failing in its duty to protect those freedoms regarded as essential to democracy. Opposition to Special Branches almost always comes from self-appointed political pressure groups whose newsworthiness encourages them to usurp the function of those who are democratically elected to guard and determine our civil liberties'.

A THREAT TO THE RIGHT TO DEMONSTRATE

A number of innocuous-sounding bills currently going through Parliament contain clauses which, if passed, would have serious implications for the right to demonstrate. The Cheshire, Merseyside and West Midlands County Council Bills all contain proposals that any demonstration or march should require seven days' notice, with details of routes, numbers attending and names of organisers. Failure to give notice, or a breach of these terms, could result in criminal prosecution and a fine of up to £200 on the individuals concerned.

No such requirements exist within the Public Order Act 1936. Lord Scarman's report on Red Lion Square did not recommend changing the law to require prior notice to the police (despite pressure from the then Metropolitan Police Commissioner). Home Secretary Merlyn Rees said in a parliamentary debate on law and order:

'After Lewisham and Ladywood, I made it clear that we would look at the Public

Order Act 1936. Our review has not been completed, but I have talked to police officers and they see few changes that will be necessary in the Act. In Northern Ireland it is the law that no-one can march unless the police have been notified. That is not the case in this country, but what is the point of modifying the law in this small way?' (**Hansard, 27/2/78**)

The private bills now going through Parliament are necessary parts of local government reorganisation. All county councils in England and Wales except the Greater London Council have to enact existing by-laws which they wish to retain, before the end of 1984. A number of Tory councils are hoping to retain old district by-laws requiring notice and details of marches and extend these by-laws throughout the county.

The TUC General Council have made representations to the Home Secretary about the proposed changes in the following terms: 'These provisions could inhibit spontaneous trade union activities and demonstrations which need to be organised within hours or days rather than weeks and that the imposition of criminal charges in some cases could serve to exacerbate already inflamed situations.' (**TUC circular No 55 1978/9, 30/11/78**)

The TUC has circulated its constituent bodies — regional, county and local trades councils — to investigate the proposals within their own counties and to protest at any such clauses. It says that: 'similar restrictive clauses were recently withdrawn from the West Yorkshire Bill following strong representation from the TUC's Yorkshire and Humberside Regional Council.' (**TUC circular, 30/11/78**)

The first attempt at a Second Reading of the Cheshire, Merseyside, West Midlands and West Yorkshire Bills were 'talked out' by some Labour and Liberal MPs on 16 January, but a further attempt at a Second Reading will be made, probably in February. The other Bills due to be presented in this parliamentary session, affect South Yorkshire Metropolitan

Council, Greater Manchester Metropolitan Council and Isle of Wight County Council. The Bill covering Tyne and Wear does not include this clause.

The Home Office has tacitly approved the inclusion of this new clause. They have, in the words of one senior council official 'kept a very, very low profile. They have not supported us, but they have raised no objections.' (*Guardian*, 4/1/79).

POLICE IN SCOTLAND: NEW POWERS PROPOSED

Increased powers for the police in Scotland are proposed in the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Bill introduced by the Government shortly before Xmas. This follows the Report of the Thomson Committee on Criminal Procedure in Scotland, published in 1975.

The Bill, expected by the Scottish Office to become law by the middle of the year, would give the police the general power to detain suspects in order to ascertain their name and address and to obtain an explanation of their behaviour, and to detain persons believed to have information about an offence in order to ascertain their name and address. It would also become an offence to refuse to remain with the investigating police officer, to refuse to give one's name and address or to give a false name and address.

Secondly, persons suspected of an imprisonable offence could be detained in a police station for up to four hours if this would help police investigations, or so that they might be questioned, or their identity established. Such persons could be physically searched (but not finger-printed) and have their clothing and baggage searched (using reasonable force). Suspects could have one person 'reasonably named' informed of the detention, although this could be delayed if necessary, 'in the interest of the investigation or the prevention of crime or the apprehension of offenders'. Suspects would not be obliged to answer any questions other than to give

their name and address.

The Bill has been attacked as 'half-hearted' by the Scottish Police Federation and by right-wing Tory MP, Nicholas Fairbairn, who has argued in Parliament for the abolition of the right to silence. The provisions of the Bill, says the official explanatory circular, will 'formalise' the police practice of inviting suspects to assist them in their enquiries.

IN PARLIAMENT

Northern Ireland searches

Statistics published by the Northern Ireland Secretary, Roy Mason, show a steadily decreasing rate of searches of property by security services during 1978. The figures are: January-March — 5,987 searches; April-June — 4,399; July-September — 3,600. Other figures show similar declines in incidents of shooting, armed robbery and explosion in Northern Ireland. (*Hansard*, 15/12/1978).

Metropolitan Police

In answer to a question from Alec Woodall MP, Home Secretary Merlyn Rees announced new arrangements for the inspection of the Metropolitan Police, effective from the start of 1979. Unlike all other police forces which report to the Inspectorate of Constabulary, the Metropolitan Police has, until now, reported directly to the Home Secretary.

Now, a new Force Inspectorate, comprised of a Deputy Assistant Commissioner, two Commanders, three Chief Superintendents and clerical staff, has been created. Their duties will be 'to provide a continuing assessment of the efficiency and effectiveness of the Force' and 'to visit branches and divisions to ensure that policies laid down for the Force are understood and properly implemented'. In the course of inspection, particular attention will be paid to 'the procedures and methods of handling complaints against the police and matters of police

discipline'. New measures have been taken to ensure effective channels of communication between the Inspectorate and the Home Secretary, who is head of London's police (*Hansard* 12/12/1978).

Prevention of Terrorism

Latest statistics on the operation of the Prevention of Terrorism Act show that a total of 3,589 people have been detained in Great Britain under the PTA, 24 people have been charged with offences under the Act, and 160 exclusion orders have been made. The police regions most involved in PTA detentions are: Merseyside 930, Metropolitan 803, Dumfries and Galloway 601, Hampshire 148, West Yorkshire 129, West Midlands 106, Strathclyde 89, Surrey 82. In Northern Ireland, 558 people have been detained, 33 have been charged under the Act, 277 with other offences and four exclusion orders have been made (*Hansard*, 15/12/1978).

Surveillance Cameras

In answer to a question from Christopher Price MP, Home Secretary Merlyn Rees said that under the control of the Metropolitan Police there are nine closed-circuit television cameras on fixed sites 'used mainly for crowd and traffic control'. There are 61 video cameras employed exclusively on traffic-control duties. In addition, ten cameras, capable of use either with closed-circuit or video equipment, are available as the need arises for purposes including traffic control and crime control. Mr Rees added: 'The Home Office has asked chief officers to satisfy themselves that the use of surveillance equipment is justified in all the circumstances and is authorised at an appropriately senior level in the force. Chief officers are well aware of the sensitivity of material obtained in this way' (*Hansard*, 27/11/1978).

REVIEWS

SECURITY SCOOPS

INSIDE STORY by Chapman Pincher, Sidgwick & Jackson, 1978. £6.95.

This book is largely concerned with the good deeds of various state agencies in the fight against 'communism' (and their occasional slip-ups), and the vacillation of politicians (especially of Labour governments) in support of this fight. It needs to be read very carefully in order to separate the facts Pincher presents from his underlying right-wing ideology and speculations. Like the NAFF and Thatcher's Tory Party, Pincher divides the whole world into two camps: pro-Western and pro-Soviet. There is no idea of indigenous and independent struggle by the British working class, or by the working classes of other countries.

With this major reservation, the book does contain, on the plain factual level, some important information which is worth placing on record. Harold Wilson, in his last days as Prime Minister, sent a letter (via Hubert Humphrey) requesting information from the CIA about their activities in Britain. Most of their answers were either denials or non-committal. The answer to Wilson's last question however confirmed what many have more than suspected. Wilson asked if the CIA had provided money to arm British mercenaries going to Angola? The answer was: 'Regretably yes' (p20). When the Ministry of Defence was re-organised the story was put about, as 'disinformation', that MI5 (the internal agency) and MI6 (the British external agency) had been renamed DI5 and DI6. A 'senior MI6 official' commented to Pincher, who had offered to correct the record, 'Why not leave it alone? It helps us to keep the issue confused' (p70). We are also informed that part of the 'evidence'

against Agee and Hosenball was based on telephone-tapping (p147). If anyone was in any doubt as to the pressure that the CIA could bring to bear on the deportation of the two journalists, then the close post-war relationship between the CIA and MI6 constantly referred to by Pincher should disabuse them. And just in case anyone thinks that British intelligence does not engage in the kind of 'dirty tricks' usually associated with the CIA, Pincher records that an agent employed by MI6 was responsible for the assassination of the police chief of the 'anti-British' ruler of Iran, Mosaddeq (p90). He also describes an unsuccessful attempt by British intelligence to assassinate Nasser during the Suez crisis of 1955.

Supporting the status quo

Apart from these facts, Pincher's book raises several substantive issues which can only be seen at a distance from the racy style of the text. First, Pincher's expertise rests not just on his 30 years' experience as a Fleet Street journalist but on his access to a network of contacts in high places — top civil servants, politicians, defence staff, MI5 and MI6 officials and many more. Every chapter contains references to a meeting or conversation with someone high-up in the establishment. This serves to emphasise the partiality in the application of the Official Secrets Act. Although Pincher claims to have been threatened with the Act several times, his immunity from prosecution rests simply on the fact that his stories support the status quo while those of inquiring and radical journalists usually do not.

Second, the book provides an insight into the unease of the defence, security and intelligence chiefs to working with Labour governments. Wilson's publicly stated disquiet about the loyalty of sections of MI5 is confirmed by Pincher. In 1975 Wilson was told that certain officers of MI5 considered him a security risk — the Prime Minister is the nominal boss of the security service. He asked the then head of MI5, Sir Michael Hanley, if this was true and

Hanley replied: 'that he believed it was true but that only a small number of right-wing officers were concerned' (p19). The broader implications of the assumption by these agencies that a number of MPs and Ministers were 'security risks', led to the withholding of information from certain Ministers and to an arrangement whereby only certain, reliable, Ministers were consulted on delicate issues. MI6 withheld information from certain Ministers on 'freedom fighters' because they were thought to be in sympathy with the liberation movements concerned (p19). Decisions like the sending of the SAS into Northern Ireland and the continuation of the Polaris nuclear programme were taken by standing Cabinet committees from which left-wing Ministers were 'carefully excluded' (p303). This aspect, which has continued under Callaghan, demonstrates that the subversion of democratic government by key state agencies is a much deeper malaise than a 'small number of right-wing officers'.

Anglo-American Co-operation

The third striking aspect of the book is the emphasis given to Anglo-American defence and intelligence relations, especially between MI6 and the CIA. This special relationship is cited time and time again as the reason for not informing Parliament and the public about events. As Pincher puts it, secrecy is largely concerned with politically embarrassing exposures rather than 'national security' — embarrassing in this instance to Britain's NATO partner. It is also interesting to note a number of instances where MI6, Britain's overseas spying agency, also operated inside Britain.

Lastly, the book contains several examples where Pincher agreed to write stories at the behest of one or other of the agencies. On other occasions he himself took the initiative. When the Czech defector Josef Frolik told the CIA and a US Senate Committee that there were 'agents' in high positions in the Labour Party and the trade movement, Pincher passed the

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THE CIA IN ANGOLA

IN SEARCH OF ENEMIES: A CIA STORY, by John Stockwell. London, Andre Deutsch, 1978, 285pp. £6.50.

Another ex-CIA man, this time a former operations officer for 12 years who

number 1976, tells the inside paramilitary programme in Angola. This account, by the Angola Task Force, is all on the multi-million dollar arms shipments. He has been so close to the ground that the Angolan operation is a fraud. Indeed, the fraud, incompetence of the CIA are so obvious in the story that he has dismissed any alternatives, though in Ambassador Young's report. He believes the reports of the congressional committees are 'mocking truth', and he dismisses the results of CIA propaganda to Americans, misguided by our propaganda, went to fight in bad circumstances. One died, and four children behind. He is designed to keep the public and press from knowing the truth... 'The Angolan situation is quite so prominently a matter of anxieties.

THE POLICE REACT TO RACIST VIOLENCE

THE POLICE REACT TO RACIST VIOLENCE, published by the London Stepney Trades Council, available from 58 Watney Street, London, £1.

Chapter 3 and a 13 page appendix of cases give carefully researched details of police policy and tactics when faced with mounting racist attacks in the East End of London since the beginning of 1976. Together they provide a picture of police hesitation, indifference and even hostility to complaints by Asians. Chapter 9 gives valuable information on the public order aspects of the police response, notably the introduction of the Special Patrol Group, leading to the Spitalfields area becoming 'the most heavily policed area in the country'.

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- development of co-operation between British and European police forces, military etc.

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information — which could not be published in Britain because of libel laws — to 'a patriotic organisation called Aims for Freedom and Enterprise' (p138). Later, in 1976, Pincher 'secured copies' of private interviews given by Frolik in Washington which he passed to the head of MI6. But, being a highly patriotic person, Pincher also passed copies to Stephen Hastings, Tory MP and well-known right-winger. Hastings, using the privilege of Parliament, named a number of MPs and trade unionists. His allegations, which were widely reported, were not that the named people were agents but that they had been 'prime target for Soviet Intelligence', which is quite a different matter.

Inside Story is, in the end, a record of anecdotes and assertions of a long-serving Fleet Street journalist of right-wing inclination. It needs to be read with care, and scepticism, if the lessons to be learnt from it are to be politically useful.

ARRESTS: WHAT TO DO

TROUBLE WITH THE LAW: THE RELEASE BUST BOOK, Pluto Press, £1.25.

Described as 'a working guide to the police and the law', Release's Bustbook is a practical guide to police powers of arrest, questioning and search. What makes it a crucial reference book is that it is explained in ordinary language and that it outlines the reality, as well as the theory, of police powers, court procedures and legal services. Simply the best thing of its kind available.

THE CIA IN ANGOLA

IN SEARCH OF ENEMIES: A CIA STORY, by John Stockwell. London, Andre Deutsch, 1978, 285pp. £6.50.

Another ex-CIA man, this time a former operations officer for 12 years who

resigned in December 1976, tells the inside story of the U.S. paramilitary programme of 1975-76 in Angola. This account, by the chief of the CIA's Angola Task Force, is particularly useful on the multi-million dollar funding and arms shipments.

Stockwell has been so close to the ground for so long that the Angolan operation is a "misadventure". Indeed, the fraud, villainy and incompetence of the CIA are so intermingled in his story that he has difficulty in expressing any alternatives, other than his faith in Ambassador Young and President Carter.

He innocently believes the reports of the Church and Pike congressional committees to be the "full, shocking truth", and he summarises the results of CIA propaganda as follows: "Americans, misguided by our agents' propaganda, went to fight in Angola in suicidal circumstances. One died, leaving a widow and four children behind. Our secrecy was designed to keep the American public and press from knowing what we were doing ... " The Angolan public do not feature quite so prominently in the author's anxieties.

HOW THE POLICE REACT TO RACIST VIOLENCE

BLOOD ON THE STREETS, published by Bethnal Green and Stepney Trades Council. Copies available from 58 Watney Street, London E1, £1.

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'The Bow Street Gunners', **The Leveller No 22 January 1979**. Reports on the Special Patrol Group's activities in the London Borough of Lambeth.

'Impact Weapons — the shape of things to come?' **Police, Vol XI, No 4, December 1978**. Discussion of future trends in tougher police weaponry.

'Extracts from the speech delivered by Sam Silkin before the Parliamentary Labour Party', **Undercurrents, February/March 1979**. Part of the text of the Attorney-General's justification of the ABC prosecution.

'New Statesman editor in pay of British security services', **New Statesman, 22/29 December, 1978**. Clifford Sharp, not his successors.

'New Police Technologies: An Exploration of the Social Implications and Unforeseen Impacts of Some Recent Developments' by Steve Wright. **Journal of Peace Research, No 4, Vol XV, 1978**.

'New Light on the Police and the Hunger Marchers' by Royden Harrison, **Bulletin of the Society for the study of Labour History, No 37, Autumn 1978**. Details of the appearance and disappearance of police records from the Public Record Office.

'The British Security Industry', by K.G. Wright, **Police Studies, December, 1978**.

'Could It Happen Here?' by William Gutheridge, **The Police Journal, Vol LII, No 1, January-March 1979**. On the possibilities of a coup d'état in Britain.

'Lifting the Veil on Police Computers' by D. Campbell. **New Scientist (18 January, 1979)**. Summarises information on the Police National Computer and the Metropolitan Police's intelligence computer.

NEW BOOKS AND PAMPHLETS

This listing does not preclude a future review.

Scottish Prisons And The Special Unit, Scottish Council for Civil Liberties, 70p. An examination by Dave MacDonald and Joe Sim.

Iran: Dictatorship And Development, by Fred Halliday, Pelican, £1.50. Useful background, written before the Shah left.

Justice Deserted, Harriet Harman and John Griffith, NCCL, 50p. A look at the subversion of the jury.

Wallraff The Undesirable Journalist, by Gunter Wallraff, Pluto Press, £2.50. Entertaining collection of the work of one of Germany's most intrepid radical journalists.

Women And The National Front, a Searchlight pamphlet, 30p. Useful examination of the Front's attitude to women.

Immigration: How The Law Affects You. Release, 30p. A sound, realistic guide to British immigration laws.

The Abuse Of Power, by James Margach, W.H. Allen and Co, 95p. The political correspondent of the Sunday Times examines various Prime Ministers' attitudes to the Press.

Swords Into Ploughshares, by Gordon Schaffer, London Co-op Political Committee and All Britain Peace Liaison Group, 20p. An argument for an end to the arms race.

BACKGROUND PAPER

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) will be 30 years old in April. The alliance of 15 member nations, of which Britain is one, remains dominated in all practical respects by the United States. Although the basis of the NATO alliance is military, it also plays an important political role in determining the foreign policies of its European members, by ensuring that they do not diverge substantially from US foreign policy. Militarily and politically the origin and purpose of NATO are centred on the 'Cold War' with the Soviet Union, and the implications of this strategy impose demands and limits on each of the member countries.

This paper cannot give a comprehensive review of NATO in each of the 15 member nations over the past thirty years, nor can it give attention to all the issues affected by NATO. What follows therefore is an account of its origins (up to 1955), a description of its present structure, and of the British contribution to NATO.

The NATO treaty area is Western Europe, North America, and the Atlantic Ocean as far south as the Tropic of Cancer. From Norway and Iceland through to Turkey, the only non-socialist countries not in NATO are Sweden, Switzerland, Ireland and Spain. Member countries are Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, West Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, the UK and the US. These countries have one-seventh of the world's population, and produce over half its goods and services (1975: Population 550 million, sum of GNPs, \$3,100 billion). Nearly five per cent of this production is military (\$149 billion). Total armed forces in the NATO region are over 5 million and

THE ORIGINS AND STRUCTURE OF NATO

most are committed directly to NATO and in time of war they all would be. Though the US has forces world-wide, its primary military commitment is to Europe.

NATO's legal basis is the North Atlantic Treaty signed on April 4, 1949. Subsequent pronouncements of the North Atlantic Council, NATO's supreme political body, are also important. The treaty provides that an attack in Europe or North America against any of the signatories 'shall be considered an attack against them all, and ... that if such attack occurs, each of them ... will assist the party or parties so attacked' (Section 5). In a recent book, former British and NATO Chief of Staff Lord Hill-Norton calls it 'a treaty of alliance ... for the defence of a way of life, not only by military means but also through co-operation in political, economic, social and cultural fields' (**No Soft Options, 1978, p.15**). The treaty allows for review of its performance at any time after 1959 (no country asked), and since 1969 any country can withdraw on a year's notice.

NATO's origins

NATO's continuing rationale is defence against Soviet expansion. This disguises the assumption by the United States, after World War II, of a global 'responsibility' for the free world, and in turn minimises the political and economic, as against the military, importance of NATO, an integral part of US support for capitalism in Europe.

The Soviet Union, at various conferences during and after the war stated its post-war security requirements clearly. It needed a ring of buffer states which were either neutral or pro-Soviet, to prevent yet another invasion of its territory by Germany. In other respects, Stalin was quite willing to co-operate in dividing the world into super-power spheres of interest.

The West challenged these Soviet requirements from its position of nuclear

monopoly. This was the core of the 'Cold War'. Confusion over the exact nature of the threat which the Soviet Union is alleged to represent is evident even at the highest ranks of NATO. A former Chief of Staff wrote that it meant: 'a threat to the very way of life which the allies have chosen. Within this concept, the threat may include loss of sovereignty, loss of territory, or loss of money on a national scale, or it may be posed by military power or action as well as by direct political pressure or blackmail, or, more subtly, by economic measures.' (**No Soft Options, p16**).

In fact, NATO's origins lie well before the end of World War II. The nineteenth century 'Pax Britannica' — the comparative peace during which Britain was the most powerful power — depended on Britain preventing the emergence of a European power or alliance that could unite Europe and challenge the British Empire. Britain used its influence as a balance against any power or alliance which seemed to be getting too strong. The Army and Navy prepared for war in Europe, but acted mainly as imperial police. British policy was designed not so much to prevent war, but to limit its effects on Britain.

Collective security

World War I ended this system. There was a socialist revolution in Russia and the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires splintered into many small nations. The United States began to emerge as a political as well as economically important power. US President Woodrow Wilson sponsored the idea of collective security through the League of Nations which was established in 1920. It was to replace the pre-war system, and give the US a world role commensurate with its new strength. But the US Congress, constitutionally required to ratify all US treaties, rejected the League. Attempts to restore the pre-war economic system based on the Gold Standard also failed to ensure European security.

The US economic collapse in 1929 brought large-scale unemployment throughout the West for a decade. It spread

rapidly as national governments took measures which deepened the international downward spiral. There was neither a worked-out international system, nor a world power capable of organising an adequate response. The notion of allowing Hitler to overrun the Soviet Union was seriously considered in ruling circles: 'There was no serious lack of knowledge about German re-armament ... The failure to check (it) lay in the unwillingness of Britain, France and the United States to do anything that would stop the Nazis until it was too late to avoid war ... it was a political failure' (**Diebold, Control of Germany, CFR/RIIA, 1948, p91-92**).

World War II again threw European boundaries and states into flux. Probably the most influential proposals for a post-war settlement were the unofficial War/Peace Studies of the US Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) in 1939-1941. These were taken over, complete with personnel, by the State Department after the US joined the war. The studies called for an end to US isolationism, and for entry into the war in support of Britain. They looked for a post-war world with the US playing a leading role in a comprehensive system which would resolve the problems of the inter-war period.

The Economic and Financial Study Group of the CFR concluded that the US could avoid serious disruption of its economic and social structure after the war only if it kept 'free access to markets and raw materials in the British Empire, the Far East and the entire western hemisphere' (**Imperial Brain Trust, MR Press, p128**). Aid to Britain and the exclusion of Japan from European dependencies in the Far East were necessary for the US economy. William Diebold, research secretary to the group, explained that it had nothing to do with sentimental ties or anti-Nazism; "'Aid to Britain short of war'" was adopted as American policy because of the post-war value to the United States of successful British resistance; the idea is that our post-war problems will be easier to solve if Britain stands than if the Nazis dominate Europe. We are concerned with this war

because it affects the future shape of the world' (**New Directions in Trade Policy, W. Diebold, NY, 1941, p115**).

The post-war solution

This wartime 'Grand Area', consisting of the Americas, the Far East and Britain, was seen as the stepping stone to a comprehensive post-war solution. This initially involved the United Nations, formed in 1945. The UN was intended to be a collective security system that the US would join. The International Monetary Fund allowed nations to pursue Keynesian full-employment policies instead of the fatalism of the monetary rules of the Gold Standard. The World Bank encouraged private investment in Third World countries. GATT (the 1947 General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs) opened colonies and their European master nations to American trade, prevented trade 'wars', and thus helped integrate the whole Western economy through encouragement of growth of world trade.

Once the threat of German control of Europe, and exclusion of the US from its zone was removed, the central task of American policy was to interweave the European and American economies through aid, trade and investment. The importance of this move is stressed in the State Department's 1956 explanation of 'the justification of NATO (as) a simple exercise in elementary arithmetic. North America and free Europe now produce about 70 per cent of the world's manufactures, while the entire Soviet bloc, including China, produces only 20 per cent ... Soviet control of the territory and resources of western Europe would give the Soviet bloc 50 per cent of the world's industrial production, as against North America's 40 per cent' (**Robert Murphy, Department of State Bulletin, 1956**).

War production had brought the US economy out of the depression into rapid economic growth by 1940. The US supplied Britain and the Soviet Union with huge amounts of war material under the Lend-Lease programmes, but the end of Lend-

Lease in 1945 left both countries in difficulties. The Russians had suffered the main human costs of the war (plus those of Stalinism), and Britain, though one of the 'Big Three' powers, was dependent, as all European countries were, on American financial aid. The US alone emerged strengthened from the war, but fearful of relapse into depression if its plans for revising the world economy failed. At the war's end, the US, with one-twentieth of the world's population, produced two-thirds of its industrial goods, which were in great demand for survival and reconstruction.

Germany was occupied by the four allies (USSR, US, Britain and France) and Japan, the key to the Far East, by the US alone. The US had its hands on the levers of world power.

Collective security was the major problem. The Allies finished the war under the banner of the United Nations. The Security Council of the UN was intended to be the body responsible for world-wide collective security and mutual problem-solving, with no regional arrangements. But the Soviet Union was one of the permanent members of the Security Council, and when the US tried to use the UN against the USSR, Stalin replied with the veto. Except over Korea, the US soon stopped regarding the UN as an important arena, and set out instead, from the late Forties, to encircle Russia with western military alliances. NATO came first, then ANZUS, (Australia, N. Zealand and the USA), SEATO (in South-East Asia) and CENTO (in Middle East plus Pakistan). These moves were based on an anti-communist ideology not on a rational analysis of Soviet capabilities, nor an immediate communist threat in Europe or elsewhere. It was designed to defeat the domestic opponents of an active US world role, the isolationism which had prevented the US from joining the League of Nations, and kept it out of the War until Pearl Harbour.

The Republicans, traditionally isolationist, controlled the Senate. President Truman, a Democrat, sought the assistance of Senator Vandenberg, the leading

Republican senator, and was told that anti-communism was the best way to sell an active world involvement to the conservative senators. Assistant Secretary of State Lovett, who negotiated with Vandenberg, said that he felt that there was no immediate threat from the Soviet Union.

NATO Facts and Figures records: 'It was essential that the United States should be able, constitutionally, to join the Atlantic Alliance'. The Vandenberg Resolution passed by the US Senate in April 1948 (the circumstances of which we examine shortly) provided the legal basis for this.

European unification

In Europe, starvation claimed many victims in the winter of 1945-46. Once the US decided that European recovery was urgent, it decided to link its support for this with 'efforts at European unification (and) ... not to play a balance of power game with the nations of Europe' (Dean Rusk, US Secretary of State, **Dept. of State Bulletin, 1963**). The American's Marshall Plan, outlined in June 1947 by US Secretary of State George Marshall, called for European nations to get together and work out a joint recovery plan, which the US would fund. This required technical studies of national economies by experts from other countries. The Soviet Union was unconvinced by the straightforward benevolence of such a plan. The Marshall Plan Organisation became the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation, and then in 1964, when the US, Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand joined, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

Henry Kissinger stressed, in his book, **The Troubled Partnership (1965)** that 'American pronouncements have always equated a united Europe with supra-national institutions' (p34). The European Movement, which led the campaign for political and economic unity in the 1950s and 1960s, was in its early stages largely financed by the United States, including the International Organisations Division of the CIA.

The key to European reconstruction was Germany, which was split into four zones, each pursuing economic policies laid down by the occupying power. The US Treasury wanted to reduce Germany to an agricultural nation, destroying its industry; the War and State Departments saw it as the key to industrial reconstruction in Europe. Russia, twice invaded by Germany in 20 years, was pressing for reparations, and France was opposed to a strong Germany and potential repetition of the 1870, 1914 and 1940 invasions.

At the end of 1946, Britain largely yielded control of its zone to the US to form 'Bizonia'. Denazification in the US zone 'gradually degenerated into meaning the whitewashing of National Socialists', according to the US denazification chief, Joseph Napoli (**Annals of the American Academy, 1949**). The French clung to a more punitive policy in their zone.

The 1947 Dunkirk Treaty between France and Britain, and the 1948 Brussels treaty which linked these two nations with the Benelux countries, still looked to the possibility of a renewal of German aggression. In March 1947, President Truman enunciated the Truman doctrine; the US would aid 'free people who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities.' The US took over Britain's anti-communist war in Greece, aided Turkey, and then the Brussels Pact nations. In 1948, France agreed to merge its zone of Germany with the American and British zones. The three western zones embarked on a currency reform which provoked the Russians to blockade Berlin for more than a year, and greatly assisted the passage of the Vandenberg resolution. The US and Canada informally joined the Brussels pact, and drafted its extension into NATO. The North Atlantic Treaty itself was signed in April 1949. Greece and Turkey joined in February 1952.

The re-arming of Germany

Soon after the start of the Korean war, in June 1950, the US decided that it was necessary to re-arm Germany. This was

partly in response to German demands (following the re-building of their industrial capacity) and partly to strengthen NATO forces in Europe. The North Atlantic Council discussed strategy, and decided that 'Soviet aggression' should be fought as far east in Germany as possible. The French remained unconvinced, although the French Foreign Minister came up with a plan in 1950 for an integrated European Army with a supra-national political body in control, which would have avoided the re-creation of a German General Staff. However, in August 1954, the French Assembly rejected the European Defence Community which was based on national armies, including a German Army.

The following month, the existing NATO nations invited West Germany and Italy to join the Brussels treaty. In October, the US, the UK and France agreed to end the occupation of West Germany and to accept a plan for the re-armament of Germany worked out in 1950 by German generals. In May 1955, West Germany joined NATO, with leading ex-Nazis in control of its armed forces. Nine days later, and over six years after NATO had been formed, the Soviet Union set up the Warsaw Pact.

The organisation of NATO

In theory, the 15 member governments control NATO through regular meetings of the North Atlantic Council (NAC). The permanent Secretary General of NATO, now Joseph Luns, a former conservative foreign minister of the Netherlands, chairs the twice-yearly meetings of foreign ministers ('NATO Ministerial Meetings'). He also chairs NAC in permanent session — the (at least) weekly meetings of members' permanent representatives (who have Ambassador status).

The North Atlantic Council discusses 'practically every subject of common interest and has the prime object of developing a joint posture in the formative stages of the evolution of national policies,' (**No Soft Options, p16**) intending to pre-empt independence in foreign policy at the policy formation stage. The treaty commits

members 'to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and ... (to) encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them', (Section 2). The Defence Policy Committee (DPC) is a NAC meeting but with Defence Ministers or permanent military representatives (except those of Iceland, France and Greece). The Secretary-General can initiate matters for the NAC and DPC to discuss. He carries out bilateral consultations with governments about NATO problems. He, or a Deputy or Assistant, chairs all the committees of NAC and DPC; he heads the staff which prepare for and execute NAC and DPC decisions.

Sub-committees of NAC/DPC deal with special subjects, and report back to these two main bodies. Among them:

The **Political Affairs Committee** helps by informal regular consultation to form a consensus on recommendations capable of unanimous decision by NAC.

The **Permanent Defence Review Committee (DRC)** has a crucial voice in determining the military expenditures of member nations. NATO's three top Commanders each year propose a size for each country's contribution. The DRC then ensures 'that there is an element of challenge ... which goes somewhat beyond the country's supposed intentions' (**NATO Facts and Figures, 1975, p114**). The 'challenge' goes to the DPC, which decides Force Goals which 'countries are to use as the basis for their force plans for the five-year period under consideration.' Countries then go through their own national budget processes; the DRC assesses the resulting contributions and may push for more. 'For over 25 years, the countries of the alliance have agreed to the systematic exchange of detailed and precise information on their military, economic and financial programmes on a scale unprecedented in peace or even in war, and have ... submitted to the examination and criticism of their partners,' (op.cit. p115).

The **Nuclear Planning Group (NPG)** has met twice-yearly since 1967 at Defence Minister level, and permanent representatives are in continuous session. It

is intended to associate non-nuclear members, on whose territory nuclear weapons might be used, with planning their use (**NATO Facts and Figures**, p109-111).

The **Conference of National Armaments Directors** exists to encourage collaboration on projects; in 1968, it set up a **NATO Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG)**. The industrialists concerned 'recognised that a conflict of interest could arise ... and a moral code ... was unanimously adopted' (p143).

The **NATO Science Committee**, created in 1958, meets three times a year with national representatives able to speak authoritatively on national science policy. Through expert committees, fellowships, grants, and meetings to assess the state of particular subjects, over 50,000 people have been involved in NATO's science programme. There will be 117 NATO Advanced Study Programmes in 1979. The **Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society**, initiated by Nixon was formed in 1969. It has mainly worked on environmental pollution control. Both these committees help to improve NATO's image and to strengthen the technological base of the West.

Among many other committees is the **Civil Emergency Committee**, whose eight planning groups deal with supplies, transport, civil communications and **NATO Civil Wartime Agencies (NCWAS)**. NATO planning for civil defence includes reaction to anti-NATO, anti-war 'subversion', particularly in time of rising tension.

Military structure

The Defence Policy Committee is the inter-governmental policy-making body on military matters; the **Military Committee** is the top military authority. It gives military advice to the NAC and to NATO Commanders through its permanent chairman. It consists of the 13 national chiefs of staff (Greece and France maintain a liaison team). They meet three times yearly; the committee also meets in permanent session with military

representatives of the chiefs of staff, at NATO's SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe) HQ near Mons, Belgium.

The permanent Chairman of the Military Committee is elected by the chiefs of staff for two to three years, and represents them on NAC. The committee resembles a national chiefs-of-staff committee but in crucial respects is superior to national committees, which base their work on its decisions. It is backed by a permanent staff at SHAPE.

The 'Atlantic area' as they call it (i.e. the area covered by NATO) is divided into the three NATO commands plus the Canada/US Regional Defence Area (in which European NATO members do not participate).

The first is **Allied Command Europe (ACE)**, based at SHAPE is the most important, controlling all NATO's Europe land forces, with General Alexander Haig as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). ACE includes three subsidiary commands: northern (Brunn, Norway), central (Mannheim, W. Germany) and southern (Naples, Italy). The British General Sir Walter Walker commanded the northern area until his retirement, after which he founded the right-wing private army, Civil Assistance. Haig himself, who ran the White House for Nixon during Watergate, hopes to follow the first Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, Dwight Eisenhower, to the Presidency itself. **Atlantic Command**, based at Norfolk, Virginia, USA, is the second major command, and the top naval post. The heads of both these commands are always Americans. **Channel Command** is the third, and much less important, command covering the English Channel and its approaches. It is headed by a British Admiral based at Northwood, Middlesex.

NATO officers are normally also national commanders of national forces in the relevant area. Thus, SACEUR is also Commander-in-Chief of US Forces in Europe. Under these NATO commanders are national units under national command, like the British Army of the

Rhine (BAOR) headed by Sir Frank King.

In addition to military units, NATO provides military infrastructure for Europe. NATO has 10,000km of pipelines, mainly for aircraft fuel, in Europe and Turkey. It also provides 220 airfields, mainly in Germany, 50,000km of cables and communications links including satellites, naval bases, ammunition stores, missile radar sites, and more.

The development of NATO's strategy

In 1945, the Soviet Union had no strategic nuclear capability. Initial US and NATO strategy, if Warsaw Pact troops advanced into western Europe, was to use nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union. As the USSR produced and deployed more inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) from the late Fifties onwards, a situation of mutual assured destruction (MAD) was reached, in which neither side could wipe out the other without itself being destroyed. It was no longer credible that the US would react with 'massive retaliation' to minor incursions in Europe and, for example, risk self-destruction to save Berlin. There followed a long debate about getting European fingers on the nuclear trigger, or increasing the exposure of Americans in Europe in the event of war, and similar barbarities.

In 1967, the new NATO strategy of flexible response emerged, which involved matching forces at conventional levels, so that the response to a conventional attack need not be nuclear weapons. There is now a whole set of East-West 'crisis management procedures', many of which evolved from the brinkmanship of the Kennedys over the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. Various steps would now be taken before even tactical nuclear weapons are used. But the major presupposition, of endless hostility to the Soviet Union, remains.

NATO strategy discussion is bizarrely hypothetical; apart from the 1962 Cuban crisis, NATO authorities have never seriously expected invasion or nuclear attack from the Soviet Union. But it is necessary to assume Soviet expansionism in

Europe to justify publicly NATO's militancy.

Military balance

Thus NATO's declared aim is to defend member nations against external aggression, i.e. the Soviet Union. It judges its relative security mainly by assessing the balance of NATO and Warsaw Pact Forces in Central Europe. In other words, NATO assumes that Russia's aggressive intentions are self-evident, rather than examines whether this is in fact so. In reality, neither the Warsaw Treaty Organisation nor NATO could overwhelm the other in central Europe.

The 1978 Yearbook of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) stated that NATO in central Europe had 603,000 soldiers and direct support troops, 6,430 tanks and 1,320 combat aircraft, against the WTO's 727,000 troops, 15,700 tanks and 3,700 combat aircraft. NATO had 2,236 tactical nuclear weapons in the area, to the WTO's 1,405. Even Lord Hill-Norton admits that decisive superiority is not possessed by either side. Comparisons of forces are problematic; for example, NATO plans to use tactical nuclear weapons against WTO tanks in wartime, and does not even attempt to match WTO tanks one-for-one. Military technology has changed so much that the nature of a large-scale conflict in Europe is hard to predict. This is in itself a stabilising factor, given the risks involved in the escalation of conflict.

Britain's contribution to Nato

The 1977 Defence Estimates announced: 'Britain's defence effort is now concentrated clearly on the Alliance; both directly in the form of a considerable front-line contribution to NATO, and indirectly through the support, training, logistic and R & D (research and development) effort needed to maintain the effectiveness of the front-line forces' (p11). The 1978 Defence Estimates show an increase in this concentration, with withdrawals from Oman, the

Caribbean and elsewhere. In 1979, British forces are involved in all NATO commands, though in North America they only train.

Britain's naval commitment is as follows. Some Royal Navy vessels — an assault landing ship, a frigate and some submarines — are with SACLANT's West Atlantic Command. More significant RN presences are with other commands. In the Mediterranean area, there is a frigate allocated to NATO, whose presence there has increased during the Seventies. The 'on-call naval force'. Army, Navy and Air Force Units are based in Cyprus and Gibraltar. In wartime, they would all be NATO forces, except for a handful of troops with the UN peacekeeping force in Cyprus. NATO forces in the Mediterranean include 2 British frigates, and RAF Canberras, Hunters, and Whirlwind helicopters, allocated to IBERLANT (NATO sub-command running from the Iberian peninsula to the Tropic of Capricorn) and Southern Europe command, with HQ at Naples. 'All the UK's major ships and amphibious forces are therefore assigned to NATO, and would in time of tension or war, be concentrated in the Eastern Atlantic or Channel areas' (**Defence Estimates, 1978**).

The British army is located in three places. Most important is Germany, followed by Britain, and then by Northern Ireland, the only 'hot' war. 'Some 70 per cent of the Regular and Reserve Army is assigned to SACEUR with the greater part of the remainder being committed to the home defence of the UK' (**Defence Estimates 1977, p22**). All land units (except the Irish regiments) are circulated through Northern Ireland (with NATO permission) to spread the stress, and give combat experience. A 3,000-strong Berlin Field Force is maintained under the Four-Power Berlin agreement. All other British forces in West Germany are NATO-assigned. New arrangements make 1 (BR) Corps the core of the British Army of the Rhine (itself the core of the British army). 1 (BR) Corps consists of four armoured and one artillery divisions and a field force. With German,

Dutch and Belgian forces, it is responsible for a sector of the border with East Germany.

Most RAF units are NATO-committed, based either in Britain or West Germany. RAF Strike Command at High Wycombe is under an officer who is also NATO C-in-C UK Air Forces, and in wartime would have authority over the USAF squadrons based in East Anglia. Strike Command supports all three major NATO Commands, and operates Fylingdales, part of NATO's missile early warning system. The RAF in turn depends on NADGE (NATO Air Defence Ground Environment) which monitors plane movements and controls interception of intruders. In Germany, the RAF operates strike and support aircraft — Harriers, Buccaneers and Jaguars — plus helicopters and Rapier and Bloodhound missiles.

Finally, there are Britain's four Polaris missile submarines which 'maintain a continuous patrol and constitute an integral part of NATO's strategic nuclear force', and a limited airborne nuclear capacity. It is highly doubtful whether Britain will be able to maintain this 'independent' deterrent in the 1980s, the cost of replacing them being prohibitive.

Propaganda for NATO

In addition to NATO's formal structure there are a great number of directly sponsored and supportive private organisations which promise political and propaganda back-up in member countries.

The first of these is **The North Atlantic Assembly** founded in 1955 as a conference of parliamentarians from NATO countries. It has 172 members, selected by national parliaments in proportion to member countries' populations. The UK has 18. It aims 'to help governments understand the alliance viewpoint when framing legislation', (**Facts and Figures, p103**). Plenary sessions each year are addressed by the Secretary General, and the Assembly votes on issues raised by its committees. Recommendations go to the Secretary General for his comments. No NATO body

is responsible to it.

In 1956, three foreign ministers appointed to examine non-military co-operation within NATO recommended 'the formation of national Parliamentary Associations'; 'Among the best supporters of NATO ... are those MPs who have had a chance at first hand to see some of its activities,' they said.

A meeting of 'Atlanticists' in the Hague in 1954 set up the **Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA)**, with affiliated organisations in each NATO country 'working to create ... opinion favourable to the Alliance and to NATO'. (**NATO Facts and Figures, p201**). In this country, the **British Atlantic Committee**, headed by a retired diplomat who used to be our permanent rep on the NAC, runs lectures, youth camps and young trade unionists meetings. The **Trade Union Atlantic Committee**, also based in Britain, with right-wing union leaders on its board, produces a monthly press service for trade unions that is intended to generate labour support for NATO objectives.

Since 1963, there has been an ATA-sponsored **Atlantic Association of Young Political Leaders** in NATO nations. The ATA, after a Teachers Conference in 1962, set up the **Atlantic Information Centre for Teachers**, also based in London, 'to assist teachers dealing with current affairs.' In 1958, NATO parliamentarians held an 'Atlantic Congress' in London, which recommended the creation of the **Atlantic Institute for International Affairs**. This was founded in 1962 and is based in Paris. It is headed by Americans, and does the kind of 'independent' thinking done in Britain by Chatham House (the Royal Institute of International Affairs) and in the US by the Council on Foreign Relations.

Finally there is the **Bilderberg Group** of politicians, academics, civil servants and businessmen from NATO nations, under the Chairmanship, until recently, of Prince Bernhard. This has been an important source of support and strategic discussion for NATO since 1954.

As well as this persistent NATO lobbying, security authorities in each NATO country have tried to achieve bi-partisan

agreement with parliaments and politicians to try to prevent 'defence' (i.e. NATO) issues coming under searching public discussion, and to try to encourage them not to exercise regular responsibility for them. Arrangements vary (the Portuguese dictatorship did without any political discussion until 1974) but the aim is that parliaments should debate only the general lines of foreign and defence policy, and then only within NATO assumptions. So NATO's accountability to national parliaments is almost non-existent.

Useful sources

The best short introduction is a pamphlet by Robin Cook MP and Dan Smith, **What Future in NATO?** (Fabian Society, 75p, from 11 Dartmouth St, London SW1H 9BN) which this background paper complements. The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) produces a monthly, **Sanity**, (£1 pa, 29 Great James St, London WC1N 3EY) and a pamphlet 'NATO Rules OK?' by John Cox and Dan Smith (30p).

Atlantic Europe, the radical view, (Tom Nairn, ed., Transnational Institute, 1976) contains an interesting article by Claude Bourdet, Democratic Defence.

The International Institute for Strategic Studies (28 Adam St, London WC2) produce annual figures for military forces in the **Military Balance** and publish an annual **Strategic Survey** and pamphlets. The Stockholm Institute for International Peace Research (SIPRI) produces the most important series of critical evaluations of NATO and CIA figures on the military balance in its **Yearbook** and special studies. The Atlantic Institute produces a quarterly journal and pamphlets and books.

It is essential also to read NATO's account of itself, particularly **NATO Facts and Figures** and the shorter **NATO Handbook**, both available from NATO's information service (NATO, 1110, Brussels, Belgium). **No Soft Options, the politico-military realities of NATO**, by Sir Peter (now Lord) Hill-Norton, with foreword by Secretary General Luns (C Hurst & Co, London 1978) is useful.