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


WORDS (INC)...

SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE KNOWLEDGE MACHINE !!!

BY PHIL VIRDEN

TIGER PAPERS PUBLICATIONS


HUH! WHAT...
Hey! Havent we met?
I THOUGHT I HEARD..
ILL RITE
IT SOUNDED LIKE IT WAS IN THIS ROOM
TOO DIMENSIONAL!
ONLY MARKS ON PAPER
NEMO! STOP PHISHIN AND GO TO SLEEP!
I MEAN.. IS IT VALID?
WHAT, IS
WHAT IS WHERE?!?
IT'S NOT THERE
IS IT HERE?
IT'S ALWAYS CHANGING
WHAT IS IT ALL ABOUT?
IT'S ABOUT TIME

WORDS INC

SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE KNOWLEDGE MACHINE

PUT TOGETHER AND PART-WRITTEN BY

PHIL VIRDEN

TIGER PAPERS PUBLICATIONS
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Copy? Write? If you do the
Buddha'll be bound to smile.

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until, inside the back.....THE SILVER SURFER frame by STAN LEE and JOHN BUSCEMA

The publisher will gladly remedy any reasonable complaints

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"I have very little imagination, my brain runs entirely to analysis; but I revel in playing a part that is devised for me."
Aleister Crowley Diary of a Drug Fiend

"The letter killeth
the spirit liveth
It is spiritually discerned"
William Blake The Book of Job

"Words,words,words!"
Arnold Wesker Roots

TALKING TO FRIZZY DAVE - INTRODUCTION

Are you going over the university, Phil?
Yeah, I suppose so, do a bit of work...
Well, I'll come with you, hurry up, I'm going to get some cigarettes. It's a nice day out there.
So what do you think of the book, what you've read so far, Dave?
I've read it all.
No, there's some more bits to go in.
Well I thought it was badly planned, I mean fancy putting that bit in there, Dave Evan's exam papers, they were terrible, who cares about people's finals papers? You might as well have put mine in - completely boring and irrelevant but perfect examples of how to bring you down by writing what you know they want so you can get a degree which does you no good anyway.
A good finals paper is a freak of nature, Dave, and anyway I like the way Dave Evans' papers went, the mistakes and all that people make. And it was short.
I don't know why you're doing it, why are you doing it? Why are you writing about this place?
Well, what do you recommend, go to Mozambique or somewhere and join the revolution?
You could do worse, could do worse things than that.
Yeah, well, it's an indulgence. I have the time and the inclination and there's plenty of facilities around here, the stuff is written and why not put it out? It might not be much, but it'll be the best book out of our department since I've been there.
Huh, huh, well that aint saying much, being the best among a load of wankers.
Don't depress me Dave, I've had a hard life.

So what are you gonna say in the introduction?
I dunno. They aren't going to like it, the book I mean..
Who aren't?
Carstairs and Taylor and that lot...
Oh you aren't going to go into all that lot about how they cut your pay last year are you? Nobody wants to hear that. Why should anybody be interested in your little problems, nobody's interested in you, Phil.
Well thanks Dave, I appreciate that, but I'm going to mention it. May not mean much to you, may not be much, But I have to live here and aren't going to let shit like that go.
I mean look that's hardly important is it? I mean you can't say this place represses people, look at it, it's a privelege, a luxury for the middle class and one or two others...
Did I say repression? Well, only when you introduced the word...
(pause: eyes follow a girl, teen dream strutting across the middle distance)
no, it's a dream come true, the utopia of an elitist mind, a fantasy made of concrete and glass, trees and grass, ducks quackling at the water...
Well you might call it a fantasy but it's real enough and it doesn't repress people...
It's built on repression, on oppression. What about the people who aren't allowed on it, built it and don't use it. The mindgames on it are directly to do with that... What did you do here? What did you learn in three years?
Heh, heh, not much. I don't know why you bother to write about this place.
It's where I am, it's all I know. I'm just another bore-shwah bleedin sociologist, Dave, cosseted away from reality, you don't expect me to actually have anything to <u>say</u> about anything, do ya?
Well, whose fault is that? You put yourself here, you can do something about it if you want...

Ah, Dave, you're questioning my very existence...
Yeah, I'm going to the snackbar, got any change? Do you think it'll be open?
I dunno. Let's have a look. No it isn't.
Listen, have you got any change, a fifty pee?

* * * * *

Time's running out for all that blabber and smoke, but let's hope this collection of writings is not pure air and rhetoric. Each of the authors, except the last, has been through this new university in the 1970s. Each piece was written to specific issue of political occassion. The ideas have been tested and found true against the central ideological productions of the autocratic consensus that rules education - a consensus that allows a surface novelty of pluralism all the way to theoretical radicalism and all those other isms. But the complacent dogma of the disinterested, neutral, objective and reasonable ideologues has been variously found out by these writers.

If you are involved in cultural production - in this case in creating and passing on knowledge - you have a certain choice. Either you submit yourself to the unreason of the powerful and hence join in the reproduction of a class system that supports privelege and fantasy rather than democracy and real knowledge. Or you fight the false consciousness that divides people and extends the rule of property. Knowledge, which in its official guise assumes the form of Universal Truth, a dead quantity to be hoarded and used against people, must be brought back to life. The overt and psychological violence of schooling - all the way from the compulsion of docility in five-year olds to the competition for graded degrees - reproduces a Knowledge and the sentiments to perpetuate a class rule.

Anybody who has yet to submit to the structured sadomasochism of(educational) hierarchy and its accomp-

Yeah, here you are. What do I get out of this deal?
Heh, heh, I'll give it to ya later. I'm going up the library snackbar, see what's happening. See you.
Yeah, see you later.

(Fade)

* * * * *

anied baroque and paranoid fantasies (theories, values, standards, aesthetics, etc.) knows this. All we do is interested, intended, committed in an attitude towards the world, in short, political. Do not believe you will not be penalised at this apex of disinterested Knowledge, the University, for speaking or writing against the consensus. After the successive screenings of examinations, interviews, tests and records, your case of knowledge and beliefs will by this time agree with the orthodoxy, most likely. But if it doesn't, watch out. Under a system of paranoia even unintended criticism gets its face kicked. An antidemocratic educational sytem does not suddenly change at the top. It starts at the top. Beneath the veneer of civilisation is that same old sex, money and violence.

In which case what I'll mention now is quite unremarkable, but it interests me and is one trivial example of the unreasons this collection discusses: Last year a conspiracy of the Authorities who oppress this corner of Higher Learning decided to insult and fine one of its better teachers. By using the weapon of the nicely named 'Efficiency Bar' they stopped his salary increment and labelled him the worst tenured academic the university has so far suffered. Remember, this is a dreamworld in which, amongst the middleaged wetdreams that substitute for a lost potency and intellect, words (like 'efficient') do not have to mean very much in relation to reality.

So a big hand to Vice Chancellor Carstairs for his persistent vindictiveness in the face of free speech. To Professor Taylor for great illusionism around the areas

of the work of his staff and for carefully blaming another when confidential exam information leaks out of his own house and upsets students taking their final exams. To Professor Cornish and the professors on Promotions Committee for arbitrarily deciding people need punishment without trial. To Professors Atkinson and Lister who joined in the farce of an appeal tribunal consisting of the Vice Chancellor's impartial cronies, and who repeatedly refused to accept the documented, witnessed refutations of all the charges against the teacher. To the members of University Council, the highest governing body, who rubber-stamped the appeal tribunal's confirmation of the original decision "to punish" the teacher, even when the irregular justice of the tribunal had been demonstrated to them. Well done everybody! You stole £1800 from a better man. Add it to everything else you steal in your normal daily dealings. But when you throw shit around some of it has to stick to your hands.

Here's some shit in your eye, too.

* * * * * * * * * * *

TIGER PAPERS PUBLICATIONS IS A RANDOM AND ORDERED OUTLET FOR IDEAS WORTH HEARING. COMMENTS AND CONTRIBUTIONS COULD BE WELCOME, ESPECIALLY ARTWORK OF ANY MANAGEABLE KIND. THERE IS NO JUSTIFICATION FOR TIGER PAPERS PUBLICATIONS.

Second printing amendments: very few. There's still time to spot the deliberate mistakes.

Response to critic: WORDSINC certainly does wilt in comparison to the complete works of Shakespeare or the Encyclopedia Brittanica. Still, is it not liken unto an onion in its many deep, deep layered meanings? Well, could make you cry, anyway.

Somewhere in the middle of this, besides the references to some chapters, there is a bibliography.
The Mirror of Production by Jean Boudrillard (Telos Press, St Louis, 1975) is a powerful critique of Marx and Marxisms which should certainly be included.

Otherwise, what can be recommended, aside from endless lists of great books, comix, music, images than (Da-dun!) da Great Book of Life!?

in the field of prosaic explicits L.Feuerbach The Essence of Christianity (the introduction), or before that the Preface to F.Hegel The Phenomenology of the Spirit are two ways into self-conscious total criticism. Marx's German Ideology (Part One) still strikes me as the best way into Marx, especially since it, obviously, is thought about thought.

The best total critique and comprehension of this century -again, limiting reference to the explicit prose of systematic analysis - is undoubtedly Situationism. Their theory and practice revealed and combatted contemporary illusions of reality and foretold the first fully national sign of the revolution of the spectators, France, May 1968. First of their texts is Guy Debord The Society of the Spectacle (Black and Red, Detroit). R Vaneigem The Totality For Kids and The Revolution of Everyday Life (Practical Paradise Publications, Box LBD, 197 Kings Cross Road, London WC 1) is part of the movement. Debord's The Veritable Split in the International (BM Piranha, London WC1V 6XX) gives the history of the movement and Leaving the Twentieth Century: the incomplete work of the situationiste internationalle ed. Chris Grey, Free Fall Publications, London, 1974 is an accessible compilation of bits of various writings. Let your library buy The Complete Works of the Situationiste Internationalle, Amsterdam 1975 (?)

Black and Red Publishing, Box 95[illegible]6, Detroit, Michigan 48202 puts out some good stuff: Fredy Perlman The Reproduction of Daily Life, M. Velli Generation of Revolutionaries, R Gregoire and F Perlman Worker-Student Action Committees, France May 1968, We Called a Strike and No-One Came, for example. And F Perlman The Incoherence of the Intellectual critiques C Wright Mills whose career should be of interest to any critic in the academy.

Stuff from and around the Buro Of Public Secrets is often revealing: C Shutes Behindism, 1974, PO Box 4502, Berkeley, California 94704 (The Buro of Public Secrets), K Knabb Double Reflection and The Buro of Public Secrets, Jean-Pierre Voyer Reich, How to Use, Knabb The Realisation and Suppression of Religion, G Rosenberg and C Shutes Disinterest Compounded Daily, D Denervert Theory of Misery, Misery of Theory are all, I think, from the Buro. R Cooperstein The Crisis of the Gross National Spectacle PO Box 950, Berkeley, Calif 94701: all those are pamphlets written in the wake of Situationism.

In theory Roland Barthes work since about 1950 has perhaps the most relevance: Especially and as a way into his work Mythologies. Also Writing Degree Zero, and for writers, S/Z (all Cape Editions, London?). In the practice of whatever it is analysis proposes: Jean de Berg The Image, Grove Press, Jimmy Boyle A Sense of Freedom, Pan 1977, Bomni Bauman How It All Began, Pulp Press 1977, Le Roi Jones Black Music McGibbon and Kee (espec last Ch.), Orwell's essays, etc etc etc.

There was once supposed to be a general, connected Social Science course at York. Its existence was a surface, ideological gesture towards the grand liberal vision of university education producing 'complete' experts, specialists in particular disciplines aware of the position of their new-found knowledge within the general scheme of wisdom. Unfortunately the staff seemed quite unaware of intellectual connections and disconnections although well aware, and largely complacently, of the material power of their control over separate domains of Knowledge. Most students were not happy with the 'connected' Part One, Social Science course that the different Departments joined administratively to put on.

Of course there were the odd idealists, but only the Politics Department, and perhaps some Economic Historians and Statisticians, had vested interests in keeping a common entry to Social Science at York. Applicants are far more likely to want to take Economics or Sociology than those more fringe disciplines, and so the staff in them relied upon the large pool of a captive first year audience to recruit students to their Part Two, specialist course.

In autumn of 1972, through the medium of their student association, nearly all of those due to take Part One exams pledged themselves to a boycott. They were persuaded to sit the exams by the offer of definite changes for the next year and the immediate constitution of a subcommitte of the Board of Studies in Social SCiences (all Social Science staff were members) to investigate the malaise. In the event, only a handful of staff were interested in forming that sub-committee. After all, who wants to waste his time with drawn-out, dreary, whitewash jobs? So, having kept my mouth more or less shut since I had arrived at York, and having got through my probation, I volunteered. Nobody seemed bothered about me getting onto the subcommittee and subsequently, through the backing of the students on it, being elected to its chair.

The members of the subcommittee worked hard and polled every member of staff and every student concerned, talked to a lot of people about specific points, and produced the report within a term. I got the impression that most students just didn't believe any investigation would do anything but delay change. On the other side, precisely one-quarter of the staff were interested enough in the course and its problems to reply to our very open questionnaire and invitation to ideas. But the sizeable minority of students and the few staff who did respond were more or less agreed that the existing course and assessment needed quite drastic revision.

Reading through it now, the 'infamous' Virden Report seems very gentle, played quite straight and 'seriously'. My main contribution to it reproduced below, is a fairly mild critique of the ideology - the contradictions - existing within and between the courses making up Part One Social Science, their teaching and assessments and the overall rationale. Its main suggestion, apart from the implication that closed exams should end, was that there should be a course put on to explain the historical roots and dispersions of the Social Sciences.

The Social Science Board barely touched the Report. Its chairman, a philosophically inclined Sociologist, and a very civilised liberal, did discuss the Report's principles. I don't agree with his reading of Hegel, nor with his pessimism about the possibilities of an undifferentiated Social Science (for we all do it anyway), but I have included his reply below. (His suggested reforms failed to materialise.)

Few other comments were made to me. I heard from one Politics Lecturer that the Report was "mysticism". The Sociology line, mastered by its napoleonic professor and articulated by its biggest mouth, was an unreasoned denial of the Report's analysis. Some changes (notably in the organisation of Economics), were immediately made, but marginal changes in courses and forms of assessment were not sufficient to persuade the next batch of students not to boycott the Part One exams. Attempts by staff to once more appease the students, in the autumn of 1973, merely aggravated the discontent and the boycott extended into a lengthy occupation of the Economics block, a nerve centre of Social Science organisation. If you ask me what that achieved, I'll give you a mystical homily: it's the travelling, not the arriving that counts.

Thanks to Keith Dixon for permission to reprint his thoughts of the time. The Report was published by the Social Science Board in Spring 1973.

THE VIRDEN REPORT

UNIVERSITY OF YORK: BOARD OF STUDIES IN SOCIAL SCIENCES: REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASSESSMENT

The Subcommittee was constituted by the Board of Studies in Social Sciences, minute 46/72, which reads:

> "Its terms of reference should be: Problems of assessment methods in Part One, including their effects on teaching methods and the achievement of a multi-disciplinary approach and to make proposals."

This Committee would like the Board to consider its policy statement as set out in the current University Prospectus:

"There are no separate entries in this prospectus for social science subjects individually because they collaborate in offering a degree course which initially includes all social sciences...A fundamental notion underlying the structure of the BA in social sciences is that specialisation in any one social science should be delayed until the student has a working knowledge of all of them. To this end the first four terms (Part I) of the course constitute an introduction to each of the social sciences, which all students take in common. This structure gives the degree two important characteristics: first, no one embarks on specialised studies within the social sciences unaware of the relationship between his chosen field and the others, and secondly, each student is given an opportunity to explore his or her aptitudes and interests within the social sciences generally in some depth before becoming committed to any particular field of specialisation."
(Prospectus, p 88) (Our underlinings)

In the face of certain internally agreed policy statements and procedures and the attitudes of some staff

towards Part I teaching and the integrative ideal, this report might be seen as an attempt to prevent the possible prosecution of the Faculty under the Trades Descriptions Act.

1. THE LOGIC OF THE EXAM-COURSE RELATIONSHIP

What constitutes 'valid knowledge' will depend upon the particularities of a teaching-learning process. Such a process involves pedagogic methods, curricula and assessment procedures. Pedagogy is how the student-teacher relationship is constituted, curricula are what knowledge is mediated, and assessment is the method used by both teachers and taught to work out how well the knowledge transmission process has worked. Problems of assessment cannot be detached from problems of curricula and pedagogy. Problems can arise in each or all of these elements of the educational process but a problem with any will infect the other elements.

Anyone who is committed to the educational process must be committed to some forms of pedagogy, curricula and (at least self-) assessment. Assessment procedures must be differentiated from selection-rejection procedures. Assessment can be made - very usually are - without some consequent selection or rejection of persons.

Recent student dissatisfaction could be due to their disinterest in education itself. The 'boycott' could have been an attempt to lessen the general imposition of educational expectations. Other reasons could be that students are not interested in those aspects of reality purportedly treated by the social sciences. Or that they are interested in the subject matter but not in the way it is treated by all or part of the social science course at York. Or that they are interested in the course but not in the way it is taught. Or, finally, that they object to the assessment procedures in Part I.

The recent organised objections to the Part I examinations were in general a withdrawal of legitimation of the Part I educational process, although in particular an expression of lack of faith in the assessment procedures. (See Appendix 2: A summary of the evidence from questionnaires)

The social sciences are constituted in the priveleged knowledge of persons certified as experts in certain aspects of social reality. Students on the social science course will be certified as 'competent' when they have satisfied those employed as experts in the fields concerned. A 'knowledge' of the facts and principles of the disciplines concerned can only be constituted in some utterance of the students studying the subject. Assessment will be by the appraisal of 'experts' of the verbal and written utterances of students. Assessment does go on whenever teacher and student meet.

Those who staff the social science faculty might like to think that the recent events, which led to the forming of this subcommittee, were entirely due to the lack of student committment to the educational process itself. The subcommittee feels this would be a very dangerous assumption to make and certainly a dangerous assumption on which to build ideas about what should be taught, how it should be taught and how assessment should be made. We dare say that some students at York are not committed to an enlargement of their understanding. But to assume that of all, or even many, students is to create a self-fulfilling prophecy.

The staff should realise that what has happened, and is happening, is that whereas those who hire the staff are satisfied that those hired are 'competent' in the proper intellectual fields, those they teach are very often not so satisfied. The administration, departmental heads and staff consensus may legitimate the present system of teaching and assessment but very many

students do not. (See Appendix 2)

Assessment is a continuous process of everyday interaction, but we are most aware of it when assessments are mouthed or written down. Students come to know or not know what is expected of them by the statements staff do, or do not, make to them and about them. Staff talk about 'the subjects' in lectures, seminars and tutorials, and about 'student capabilities' in relation to those subjects in seminars and tutorials and on termly reports.

3 Students, then, have to come to some conception of 'what is wanted' in the Part I exams. They have to decide what constitutes 'valid knowledge' in the staff's perceptions because if they cannot they risk an early end to their university careers. The type of assessment, then, presents a very real constraint upon what is taught, how it is taught by staff, and what is understood and how it is understood by students.

It is a well-known psychological fact (see C D Spielburger, Anxiety and Behaviour, 1966) that performance (what is being assessed) is in a curvilinear relationship with anxiety. If there are no problems there is little motivation to perform. A 'problem' is an 'unknown' which has to be known and thus elicits performance. Beyond a certain point, however, an increase in anxiety produces a decrease in performance. The higher the committment of the person to the performance and the less the situation is knowable, the greater the anxiety.

Our present system increases anxiety in several ways. In terms of commitment, one would expect anxiety, for, on the face of it, the student who does not pass the Part I exam does not survive as a student. At the least, to fail in Part I exams is merely to delay the anxiety further into his second year. (Students would have to re-sit the failed exams as they continued into the more specialised area of their degree.)

From the knowledge side, anxiety is fostered due to several factors. Students are faced with five closed 3-hour exams in a short space of time, a failure in any one exam merely delays decisions about rejection/selection. Each exam is to be marked by a small number of staff, who have mostly lectured on the 'course'. A student's knowledge of his ability in the weeks leading up to the exams depends upon what feedback (if any) he has had from staff about his ability, and what he conceives his state of knowledge to be. From his knowledge of the lectures and approved texts, the student must, merely to reduce anxiety, make prior guesses about "what is likely to come up in the exam". He must relate this to his own guesstimate of "what the staff want me to write'. Practically, this means, despite any staff protestations to the contrary, the student faced with closed 3-hour competitive exams must reduce the unknown (what actually will come up as questions) to some 'good guesses' which relate to 'the facts', 'the theories' and 'the 'right' answers'. Assessment can be more or less of a felt and rigid control of staff over students. To the extent that assessment is linked to an in-course selection/rejection process, it will be felt as more painful. The present assessment system is felt by students even more painfully because it is a once and for all, all or nothing competitive test of certain attributes which both staff and students agree are not necessarily the only or best attributes of mind worth testing. (See Appendix 2, sections 1-8). The present system is too often a process of reducing a creative understanding of the social science disciplines to certain often irrelevant human feats.

Closed unseen 3-hour exams are a test of the ability of a student to cynically and rationally guesstimate which questions will arise and to work out beforehand a 'best required' answer, his ability to memorise that answer and speedily write it down under conditions of unnatural social austerity. Since so much depends on 'giving teacher precisely what he wants', not only is originality stifled, which makes for exceedingly boring reading-marking, but severe psychic tension is created in those being tested. The student must also in the present system keep illness or accident, or any other personal emotional incidents at bay - or know in the state of dis-ease, how to go through the reprieval process of getting medical certification of illness or madness.

Despite anxiety-reducing techniques the anxiety must still exist. The actual questions that will arise cannot be known in advance, so attempts to reduce the unknowable to some manageable proportions can never be sure. Besides which, every other student is a competitor and each is employing similar tactics. And students are not certain precisely what is being asked of them. It is doubtful that they actually refer to the university prospectus. But it is sufficient that they acknowledge their own inner compulsions, and the encouragements of certain staff members, to 'think for themselves', 'really understand', 'relate this knowledge to that other knowledge', 'be creative', and so on, for them to face the contrary logic of an exam system that invites early closure, dogmatism and a servile regurgitation of received truths about separate subject matters.

This anxiety is not a fourth term phenomenon. A long process of learning, involving successive encounters with closed exams, which have increasingly hived off their fellow pupils/students from themselves as an academic elite, encourages fear of deviation from an academic orthodoxy.

Any assessment system has consequences for pedagogical style and subject matters and their receptions by students. There can be no perfect system. But any assessment system has its merits and demerits. We do not wish, either, to give the impression that the faults of the present system are entirely self-generated - students come to universities with expectations of an educational experience that must largely be formed by having lived through 13 years of the English school system.

Nevertheless, the present system, in which students are more or less constantly conscious of a once-for-all closed unseen competitive examination in which their academic lives are at stake, generates a certain atmosphere in which pedagogy, curricula and learning must operate. In the last resort teachers must be right, because teachers have the final power of rejection/selection after four terms. Consequently, a docile, servile attitude is encouraged in students. Lectures become necessary, notes must be taken, books must be read, tutorials and seminars attended, not in order to better discover intellectual fields and realities, but in order to 'get through the Part Ones'. A questioning attitude is something that must be encouraged in students despite the present system, rather than through the present system. Thus lectures are very often (see Appendix 2, 15) not comprehended and yet well attended and recorded in notebooks. Seminars and tutorials, ostensibly opportunities precisely for a close questioning of the staff by the students in order to make sense of the disciplines by meshing the students' everyday comprehensions with the more abstract understandings of the lecturers and text-writers, become mini-versions of the lectures. The present system does not itself encourage staff to make sure that they are understood because finally the truth is that students do not have to understand but merely to regurgitate what must be known in order to pass Part One

exams.

This is not to say that some staff and some students do not try to make themselves comprehensible and understand respectively, but that the present system does not in itself encourage it. Mutual understanding, the transmission of working knowledges, constituted in an understanding of principles and operations rather than huge conglomerations of 'facts', can only be effected by a real dialogue.

The teacher cannot know that the student understands him unless there is a novel and meaningful or 'sensible' response by the student *to* the teacher's own novel statements. The honest give and take of dialogue which makes for mutual understanding can only, of course, be effected when there is mutual respect and trust between teacher and taught. Less than sufficient mutual respect and trust might be an important element in the present system. Given the power relationship, again, what is taught does not have to make sense, or the disparate subject matters be related. The individual department might, out of the goodness of its heart, make attempts to present coherent and relevant courses that point out their own assumptions and their relatedness to other courses. But this is not necessary given the present system of assessment. The closed exams are separate, and thus the subject-matters become separate. There is of course a nod to the ideal of relating the disciplines via methodology and joint courses. But methodology varies with subject matters and disciplinary conceptual schemes - there can be no 'methods' divorced from 'substantives' and 'theories'. Likewise, joint course essays become opportunities for specialised study before Part Two.

In fact, the problem of relating the social sciences' can only be allievated if the present structure is to be largely retained, by institutionalising another course which would specifically be an epistemologically informed survey of the historical developments of the Social Science disciplines in Western culture. There is no intellectual reason why such a course should not be put on.

2. WHAT SHOULD BE ASSESSED

By reference to the University Prospectus statement, cited on page above, what should be assessed is:

1. Knowledge of all social sciences
   This is constituted in
2. A working knowledge
3. An awareness of the relationship between specialist fields, and
4. Some depth of exploration of aptitudes and interests within general social sciences.

The Subcommittee agrees with these aims. In our terms we suggested that assessment should be of:

(a) Some level of adequacy of knowledge of the social sciences
(b) An integrative ability to see the relationships between the various special fields
(c) An ability to creatively use the concepts and theories in relation to novel problems
(d) An ability to conceive of the relationships between social science conceptualisations and lived-in social realities.

You will realise that the Committee, in its own words (under headings (a), (b) and (c)) agreed with the Prospectus and thus the stated consensus of those who teach social science at York University.

The Subcommittee's additional criterion (d) was formulated as a recognition of a widespread feeling,

wider amongst students than amongst (perhaps regrettably) staff (see Appendix 2, 15) that what is taught bears little relationship with people's concerns. This criterion, then, involved the idea of relevance. The problem of assessment (and thus teaching and curricula), becomes widened to include some test of the students' awareness not only of the theories of Economics, Politics and Sociology, and the methods involved, but of their purchase upon significant everyday human life. A major part of the recent (present) crisis of legitimacy of the relationship of students to staff is that students did not understand why they 'had to' study what staff asked them to study. The Subcommittee thought it necessary to stress that they thought that the relevance of the social sciences to everyday life ought to be understood by every student (and staff member!) and thus, logically, ought to be assessed. The Prospectus, anyway, intends the same in its prescription of a 'working knowledge' of all the social sciences. Presumably if the student properly 'knows' social science, he knows how it works, or fails to work, in reality. Now to return to the initial statements - of the Prospectus and of this Subcommittee. The one is a statement of consensual interest on behalf of all teachers in the social sciences at York. The other is the consensus of this Subcommittee, having deliberated, referred to scholarly and systematic studies and to the feelings of staff and students (via a questionnaire, and the presented and solicited views).

1. 'Collaboration'

This is not to be assessed of students, except indirectly. To the extent that the course structure of Part One is not a coherent collaborative effort with due respect truly given to the stated aims of the Part I course, to that extent the student responses which are assessed will be less than satisfactory. High commitment and motivation cannot be expected of students if they can see no coherence or legitimate meaning to the course as a whole.

2. 'The Inclusion of All Social Sciences'

This does not pertain. Psychology is cursorily dealt with, and Linguistics not at all. Indeed, a major felt criticism of the present structure is precisely its failure to cope with the gap between student and staff understandings, which can be seen as a failure to deal with the epistemological problems of the human sciences. Students, of course, do not usually use these terms, but there is often a reference to a something lacking in the discourse that constitutes lectures, seminars, tutorials. That something is an attempt to mesh the teachers' relevances with those of the students. This can only be done by a quite explicit spelling out of assumptions, the reasons for these assumptions being made, a grounding of the present ideas in context of other ideas, a spelling out of how the disciplines, with their present problems and conceptual explanatory schemes and facts, have come to their present positions, in themselves and in their relationships with the other disciplines, by a historical epistemological and inherently explicable, process.

3. 'Specialisation Should Be Delayed Until A Working Knowledge of All Social Sciences Has Been Achieved'

The Part One examinations are supposed to finally assess this ability in all students who pass on to specialised fields at Part Two. But
(a) Do we assess 'working knowledge' or is it

merely rote learning in at least some fields for many students? Memory vs working knowledge? (see Appendix 2, 2-5)
(b) The poor standard of lower pass marks indicates no great working knowledge (according to the privately expressed views of many staff, and Appendix 2, 2-5)
(c) It has been suggested students should automatically pass on to Part Two if they fail only one paper. This would deny the intention of the Prospectus.
(d) Students at Part Two level are not generally capable of fulfilling this specification (according to the privately expressed views of some staff).

4. ''Part I As An Introduction To Each Of The Social Sciences Represented At Part II

The present course does this. Whether or not the introductions are coherent and meaningful to the students is something else. If they are not, then this is a fault of the teacher-student relationship (the staff just cannot or do not make themselves understood or relevant, or the students just will not commit themselves to understanding) or of the ecology of the situation (the library is inadequate, the campus is such that staff and students cannot meet easily, etc).

5. 'No Specialist At Part II Is Unaware Of The Relationship Between His Chosen Field and Others'

It is very difficult to be unaware of relationships one is really implicated in, but the awareness is too often, on the student side that of a sense of incoherence in the relationships of the social sciences, and on the staff side, that students are not aware, in any useful sense, of the relationships. It might well be besides that many staff themselves are unaware of the conceptual and theoretical relationships, although any staff member must be aware of the institutional relationships of the disciplines. The Joint Course and Methodology courses are supposed to make the connections. Yet both staff and students are aware that conceptual connections are not generally made, despite this intention (see Appendix 2, 14).

6. 'Opportunities For Exploration of Aptitudes and Interests Within Social Sciences Generally In Some Depth Before Specialisation'

If we take this to mean the opportunities to do some social sciences rather than read books and argue about how it has been done, or how it should be done, then this opportunity only occurs with the Joint Course project and perhaps to the most committed and dedicated essay writer who is willing to fall behind on other examinable work in order to 'really do' some social science. The present (almost) once-and-for-all closed exam, marked by those who have lectured 'on the topics' and used as a basis for the selection or rejection of students for Part Two level, fosters an academicist attitude which involves a repression of creative understanding and the practical political submission of students to what they conceive to be a monolithic consensus of 'the facts', 'the theories' and 'the correct answers' to 'the only problems' of the disciplines.

The Prospectus is a theoretical statement of intent which, in this instance, is negated by the practical activity of students who, quite rationally, respond to the threat of an end to their student careers by playing safe.

If the Prospectus statement really does present a true staff consensus of intentions, then the staff must face the problem of the present system which is that its practical organisation - of pedagogy, curricula and

assessment and their relationships - negates those intentions in important ways.

To summarise, staff intentions are <u>not</u> being fulfilled adequately in terms of:
(a) working knowledges of all the social sciences
(b) an (intellectually sophisticated) awareness of the relationship between the specialisms and the other fields
(c) a depth of exploration of aptitudes and interests within general social sciences.

In the Subcommittee's terms, which themselves derive from and are supported by the vast majority of those implicated in the social sciences at York University and who presented their views to the Subcommittee (see Appendix 2, Prologue and 1), integrative ability, creative ability and understanding of relevance are not being adequately taught and assessed within the present system.

(The Report continued with summary of current and possible assessment techniques, survey of present and proposed teaching loads, and a summary of the questionnaire responses.)

BOARD OF STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: SOME ISSUES RAISED BY THE VIRDEN REPORT

by

KEITH DIXON, CHAIRMAN BOARD OF STUDIES IN SOCIAL SCIENCE

There are at least three ways in which the division of knowledge into academic disciplines or subject categories may be conceived. One way is to regard such divisions as an expression of the <u>necessarily</u> differentiated nature of human experience and of the differing explanatory modes appropriate to those distinguishable experiences. There emerges from this analysis the notion of bounded 'forms of knowledge and experience' which generate distinct theoretical structures, differentiated concepts and characteristic modes of justification and/or falsification. Mathematics and Logic, for example, are regarded as a single domain of knowledge independent of the empirical world and deductively related only to sets of arbitrarily chosen axioms. Physical science is distinguished through its assumption of event-causality, and its ultimate reliance upon some, in principle observable, external empirical bedrock for testing its explanations. The human disciplines necessarily share a common explanatory mode in virtue of their subject matter - people; people as distinct from objects project schemes of action, form intentions, deliberate and choose one course of action rather than another and this teleological element confers (allegedly) a unique status to the human disciplines. The analysis may be extended to the more problematic areas of ethics, religion, aesthetics and (meta) philosophy.

The Virden Committee has implicitly set its face against this allegedly a priori or 'absolutist' conception of knowledge. For them knowledge is <u>socially</u> defined and controlled through the complex operation of political and social processes. What is to count as knowledge is defined, negotiated and propagated by various intellectual elites aided and abetted, or hindered, by other powerful vested interests.

Associated with, but conceptually distinct from this sociology of knowledge is that Hegelian derived perspective which seeks to define knowledge as necessarily internally coherent. Knowledge is a unity - a seamless web; analysis merely creates artificial categories and restricts knowledge within narrow and distorting boundaries. The integration of knowledge ("an empty concept yet to be filled" in Phil Virden's graphic phrase) is seen as a dialectical process of increasing synthesis - a necessary feature of all intellectual development. Now it seems to me that we have to reject both incoherent intellectual holism and a relativist sociology of knowledge. A presupposition of all ordered intellectual enquiry is that it is possible in principle to demarcate boundaries on grounds that are not arbitrary. The contingent difficulty is defining the precise nature of these boundaries. The problem remains a controversial one in philosophy - though not one, in my view, that is incapable of resolution.

At several removes from these highly general considerations is the question of the possibility of 'integrating' or otherwise blurring the subject-boundaries of our current social science disciplines. Clearly it is not the case that the division into Economics, Politics or Sociology is fundamental within the domain of knowledge. These disciplines may or may not share the same ambitions, techniques or models of human behaviour. The relatively sharply differentiated status of economics owes more to the establishment of professional consensus about the applicability and significance of certain models of behaviour than to any inherent claim to represent a form of knowledge established by a priori investigation. Sociology and Politics exhibit great diversity in their modes of explanation, models and use of extra-disciplinary perspectives.

It does not follow from these simple contingent facts, however, that an 'integrated' social science is either conceptually or contingently possible. An undifferented Social Science (generic social science?) implies a theoretical and empirical cohesion and a sophistication in methodology undreamt of even in its most developed discipline. Nor does it follow that an inter-disciplinary perspective on human behaviour (of the limited kind now on offer) is so much undifferentiated eye-wash. The attempted polarisation of the debate on inter-disciplinary studies which reads 'purity or mush' or alternatively 'synthesis or sterility' does not represent a proper way of conceiving the issues.

There is a dual commitment by York Social Scientists (in spite of some internal opposition and division) to the following propositions:

(a) that some attempt be made in the first four terms of the course to explore the possible inter-relationships and differences in terms of models, methods and substantive problems amongst the social science disciplines.

(b) that this process is undertaken within a differentiated but liberal curriculum which does not dogmatically reject nor enthusiastically embrace a defined ideological standpoint. There is nevertheless a commitment to Popper's so-called 'third world' of objective enquiry and argument.

The problem is, quite simply, one of institutionalising these limited objectives.

Of course we have experienced conflict and embarrassment when these assumptions have been challenged or when various members of the Board have, by virtual withdrawal from its proceedings or by the exploitation of technicalities, damaged its working consensus.

The alternative to conflict and embarassment however, is policy made by fiat or a restricted form of social science government. The central issues which face the Board are both moral and technical:

(a) Does the Board feel that there is an intellectual and pedagogic value in a broad curriculum at Part One level?

(b) Is it prepared to experiment, in spite of diversity of opinion, to try to establish the best way of exploring the relationships between the Social Sciences in an atmosphere of tolerance and mutual forbearance?

(c) Is it prepared to establish a continuous policy based upon sensible discussion and negotiation so as to maintain a stable and relatively predictable Part One course?

The practical problems which flow from a reaffirmation of the previously implicit answers to this question (apart from the issues outlined in the present agenda) seem to me to be as follows:

i) the determination of a <u>consistent</u> assessment system for Part One

ii) a discussion of possible changes in the number of compulsory subjects studied in Part I (see the Moodie Appendix)

iii) a discussion of the possibility of raising the status and/or extending the interdisciplinary component in Part One. (Perhaps by the setting up of courses which deal with the substantive as well as methodological problems shared or mutually considered by the different disciplines)

iv) a discussion of the possible mutual reduction of the <u>lecture</u> programme.

10

Apart from the immediate question of the Departmental response to the request of the Board to reconsider its assessment procedures, I intend to schedule discussion of these points over the next two meetings of the Board in the hope that some decision can be arrived at by Christmas and implemented by the Board for the Part One beginning October 1974.

Finally, on behalf of the Board may I thank Phil Virden and his committee for undertaking their extensive review of Part One Assessment and other related matters.

(In the year or so after this, the Social Science Board of Studies disintegrated, Part One course assessment became much less imposing, and the ideal and lethargic practice of Social Science collaboration ended on the scrap heap. Students now enter to read a specific, narrow Social Science.)

...DONNY

HEY, DONNY

LISTEN...

I'M GOIN' TO WORK, BUT I'LL BE BACK BEFORE CLASS TOMORROW

AND I'M LEAVIN' MY TWO CHEESEBURGERS IN THE ICEBOX

SO DON'T TOUCH 'EM, ALRIGHT?

132 ACTION-PACKED FRAMES, A SLEEPLESS AND DISASTROUS 24 HOURS, A LOT OF ROAD AND A LOT OF RUM LATER...

DONNY, YOU HERE?

WAY TA GO, DON! LEAVES ME WITH TWO DAYS' DISHES...

N' FLIPS HIS CIGARETTE BUTTS IN THE TOILET ...AGAIN...

STARVED...

GOD!!

GIMME MY CHEESEBURGERS

END

BILL BERGERON ©'71

FINAL MADNESS - DAVE EVANS' SOCIOLOGY EXAM SCRIPTS

These are the final examination scripts of Dave Evans, who failed to get a degree in Sociology in, I think, 1973. Dave must have been somewhat committed to Sociology earlier in his career, because he had written some work for assessment during his second year. By the last year, however, he devoted himself to higher - or is it lower? - things.

A chronologically arranged transcript of his scripts follows below. I don't remember him going into the exams with any plan of action. I wasn't that close to him, but it seemed as if plans were not his particularly strong point. As he says, somewhere in the scripts, he didn't know why he took the exams at all.

There's no point adding to the nice story Dave's scripts tell. Neither is the story, or my publication of it, any particular recommendation. I will say, however, that his scripts were felt as a great threat by several members of staff, some of whom wanted to adjust the agreed rules of marking just to give Dave an exceedingly bad fail mark. And that is just the sort of sick joke Dave was indicating.

Thanks to Dave Evans for permission to reprint his scripts.

Brackets [ ] denote my inserts to clarify ambiguities.

Surname -- Exam No 561

First Names -- Desk No 147

Title of Paper: Methods of Social Investigation I

(The examinee is supposed to deliver a number, but no name, in order to maintain anonymity before the assessor)

Questions Answered ---

(ii) Webb's article is in general an attempt to empirically examine the proposition, put forward by Durkheim in "The Division of Labour in Society" that deviance or crime will increase with an increased division of labour within a community. Durkheim's proposition was in essence that as a community grows in complexity, size and density, the dominant mode of investigation will evolve from the mechanical (or normative) type to the organic (or functional) type. And in this evolution a movement towards greater social organisation and division of labour would be expected along with changes in the collective conscience towards greater abstraction, with a greater rationalisation of law, morality and civilisation, also a decrease in normative consensus and an increase in deviant behaviour.

Webb decided to test the following hypotheses that:

1. There is a direct relation between the extent of the division of labour in communities and the extent of deviance within these communities

2. There is a direct relation between the number of people residing in communities and the extent of the division of labour within these communities

3. There is a direct relation between the social density of communities and the extent of the division of labour within these communities

4. There is a direct relation between the physical density of communities and the extent of the division of labour within these communities

5. There is an indirect relation between the size and physical density of communities and the extent of deviance within these communities.

So in this way Webb was testing part of Durkheim's proposition although leaving out his ideas on the decrease in normative consensus, collective conscience and law, morality and rationality of the civil life.

The variable deviance seems to be well defined for the purposes, though it does seem that the personal crime rate would act as a more valid index on the issue of alienation rather than property crime rate, for crimes against property, as noted, are more likely to be premeditated than personal crimes. And as alienation (which is what Durkheim is mainly interested in) is more of a sub-conscious than a conscious concept to most people, it would appear the personal crimes would be more effective in highlighting this aspect of Durkheim's ideology than crimes against property although obviously both types of crime are useful in analysis.

In many ways it seems that Webb has missed the whole point of Durkheim's arguments in the aspect of alienation and the effects of this on the minds of the members of the societies. Although this is not to be unexpected in an empirical study. In this way the study has not got a great deal of significance for the hypotheses are extremely limited, and are related to Durkheim's arguments only in a very limited sense. And though statistically and empirically the study may be valid (the question may be taken up later) it is of little importance in examining Durkheim'smain arguments. Though I'm sure no statistically minded sociologist will bother about this at all.

As to the essence of the statistical analysis the use of the Pearson product-moment correlations to test the hypotheses, and the use of a multiple-partial correlational analysis etc seems to be as good a method as any, as the conclusions to be gained from this study are of little significance. And if the expression that the end justifies the means has any truth at all then the statistical methods used are not justified particularly as the conclusions obtained from the study are amazingly vague (again not to be unexpected from empirical studies of this nature) and the whole article seems to have been a rather large waste of time. Thus it can be seen that I don't think much of the article or statistical analyses, probably a similar reaction to what the examiner will have to this examination answer.

Surname -- Exam No 561

First Names -- Desk No ---

Title of Paper: Modern Industrial Societies

Questions Answered 9A
6

9A As society becomes more industrialised there is an increased tendency within it towards greater specialisation and division of labour. With workers segregating into their occupational groups each with their

own skills and requirements. At the basis of the capitalistic system workers require manual skills while the elite of the system require a certain academic and mental precision to carry out their tasks in society. And it is at this end of the occupational *[order]* that the professional occupations are found, eg lawyers, professors, doctors, accountants, etc. The professions have been of interest to many sociologists who have carried out various studies attempting to discover the common elements of professionalisation which do or do not make these occupations distinct from others, with varying degrees of success.

In general the characteristics which most sociologists seem to come up with are, as E Greenwood notes,

1. A basis of systematic theory
2. Authority recognised by the clientele of the professions
3. A broader community sanction and approval of this authority
4. A code of ethics
5. A professional culture, reinforced by professional associations

The first of the characteristics relates to the tendency of the professions of requiring individuals who wish to make a career in one of them to undergo a long, laborious (and boring) education and training. For example, to become a lawyer requires a long formal education and also a career-oriented education in an institution recognised and often set up by the profession.

The purpose of this training is not only to train the individual in the special knowledge required of him, but also to integrate the person as completely as possible into the whole way of life and culture of the profession. Which is another important point.

For the greater a person integrates himself into the professional culture the greater success he will make of his career.

Professional associations are also significant, their purpose being to regulate the authority, education and culture that the professions require. Authority being an important part in the life of a professional. For to keep their advantageous and powerful position in the capitalist society the professions must have an authority recognised by their clientele and also less conspicuously by the community in general.

Because of their knowledge, built up over years in power in the industrial network, the professions have been able to maintain their elitist situation. For they have a thorough knowledge of the capitalist system that other occupations do not have. And it is their power position in the economic sphere and thus, in a disguised form, in the political sphere, which is one of the most important aspects of the professions. They have always had power, they have knowledge of the system, thus they maintain their position.

The way in which the professions require as total as possible integration of its members into the culture is also significant. For not only must the individual know thoroughly his place in the system he must also believe his role is justified and that the system is the only viable one (in fact his mind must be closed to other ideologies other than the myth of free enterprise).

It is these two aspects, power and belief which I think make the professions distinct from other occupations. Obviously, authority, the codes of ethics, and professional associations are significant. But other non-professional occupations have authority in their own sphere and associations and vaguer ethics. But due to the power and the belief in themselves that the professionals have allows them to present their authority as greater than that of other occupations, which of course it is,

having learnt from years in advantageous positions. This authority being backed by very formal and religious professional associations, which are often very bureaucratically organised to reinforce the authoritarian image.

So while it can be seen that the system of labour in the capitalist system is a continuum, and that to draw a line where the professions and other occupations meet is not an easy task. There are commonly accepted professions whose distinction comes through their power, gained by their knowledge, in the system. Their belief in the system, and through the fact that they are important in maintaining the system, which keeps their advantageous position intact. For example, professors churn out fodder for the capitalistic system, doctors keep these units of production well, etc. etc...

Thus, in conclusion to this extremely boring subject, it can be seen that professionals do constitute a distinct category of occupational roles, because of their consciousness and belief in the capitalistic system. They know how it works, they maintain it and thus maintain their position of power in it, with their minds as closed and as involved in trivialities as ever.

6. Society has become, with the overpowering effect of capitalism, divided, frustrated and imbalanced. The materialistic goal has been put up in front of people's eyes like a great plastic God and everyone's fallen for it, but the God does not bring fulfillment, it is meaningless and with luck the shiny plastic image will melt. But as things are the God remains, the people pay homage to it, but they find that the God only takes from them and gives nothing back. Capitalism is mighty, it is appealing and it destroys the souls of its followers. But the God in the name of rationalism refutes all other ways to fulfillment. Capitalism cries "I am the only God", rationalism destroys other beliefs and the individual is left in his soulless void, giving but receiving nothing in return.

Marx and Durkheim, the exposers of alienation and anomie, have both seen this effect. They both study the same thing but from different angles, each with different solutions.

Marx started his study of alienation from the individual in society, the worker in the productive network. While Durkheim studied society and its drawbacks. Marx started from the base, Durkheim from the whole.

Alienation and anomie are both due to the capitalist system. For Marx the worker in the system is alienated by being dominated by the materialism that surrounds his work, by the mind-dulling boredom of his mode of production, due to the ultra-division of labour. Who wouldn't be made soulless plunking rivets into a car day in, day out? There is no sense of creativity in the workplace, the object of production is external to the worker. Work becomes not a fulfilling exercise but a means of fulfilling other desires, but the worker is so mentally and physically exhausted by his work that his leisure time is spent trying to forget work and its alienation not fulfilling himself. The capitalist system, by dividing up the human units of labour sets man against man. His ideas and environments conflict. Thus man is destroyed in soul and also conflicts with his fellow man.

It is here that Durkheim and Marx come closest in the concepts, for Durkheim's main point is the lack of consensus in society. Unlike Marx he does not see the system as being at fault only the way in which it has grown faster than the controls necessary to keep it in balance. Durkheim reasoned that the capitalist system

produces anomie because there is a lack of consensus in the society. So while Marx and Durkheim are studying the same thing, they approach it from different angles. Marx wants self-fulfillment and Durkheim consensus. Which really again is the same thing but put in different words with different emotive influences.

Fulfillment comes through the self, the destruction of ego, and the realisation that we all are one, not just man and man, but every single thing. Marx and Durkheim both have glimpsed this. Marx sees self-fulfillment, Durkheim sees consensus. But neither have seen the full process from individual to one. Marx sees more. He wasn't just a sociologist; Durkheim sees through the sociologist's eye, so he can be forgiven for his naiveness (sorry if this sounds so condescending, I don't understand much, but I think analytically minded people and therefore sociologists see even less - they look and look but they don't see - anyway back to the essay).

So without doubt the plastic God of capitalism does produce soulless people. Life is based on balance, equality, circles. Capitalism is based on imbalance, inequality and taking, not giving. Industrial societies are unnatural and imbalanced, humans in dehumanised surroundings are bound to lose their humanity. It is surprised that anomie, alienation, conflict have been substituted for love, understanding and harmony. And this whole university and this exam are all part of it, in the long run everything is related, and I don't really understand why I'm letting myself do this exam, it's all part of the ethic of the plastic God we all know as money, materialism, capitalism.

And don't try to kid me that students are here to learn better, if we protest we're repressed, we're all fodder for the insatiable appetite of the capitalistic belly. Everything in the capitalistic world is given a desperate importance, everything has to be done at break-neck speed, to each what?, more in the pockets of the high priests of capitalism. There is nothing that has to be achieved, nothing that must be done, life is, it is harmony. Rushing about isn't harmonious.

I think I'll not bother answering a third question, Citizenship it was going to be on, but I don't want to be fodder for industrialism and blind rationality. Maybe we'll all learn one day!

Surname: Evans Exam No: 561

First Names: David Vincent Macintyre Desk No: --

Title of Paper: Social Psychology

Questions Answered: 4
6
8

4. The [?] or 'socialisation', as academics like to call it, of a child is very important in determining his personality, his ideology and his manner of speech and thought. And 'social' factors, unfortunately, do affect every aspect of the lives of most people, if not everyone. It is one of the fundamental laws of nature that every action has a cause. And as most humans are purely social beings, though they don't have to be, most of their actions are determined by social factors. Therefore, a middle class person's symbolisation process will in the large majority of cases be in the similar ilk of other middle class people. And so for working class and all other classes of people.

But this does not mean that this has to be the rule.

Human beings do not have to remain among the realms of ingenuous, social animals. The human mind is capable of complete knowledge and detachment from the blind rationalism which fills the minds of almost all in society as it is, with its false logic and petty organisation. People's minds are filled with trivia to which they attribute great importance. The human mind is, in general, used in a closed and extremely limited way. Rationalism has enabled man to exploit the world and being greedy animals they have limited their minds to this task. Because men have closed minds and need the security of being in tune with other closed minds there is a system of exchanging their rational knowledge to enable societies to continue their rip-off of the world. As the best way to exploit nature has been through capitalism and thus specialisation of labour, societies split up into groups with their own tasks and as capitalism has spread this segregation into groups has become more and more complete. With the groups forming their own cultures and symbolisation processes, but as man still is determined to be rational and logical in his own limited way, he learns from the others in his group. For he has an inkling of oneness and a desire for oneness, but he can only vaguely understand it in a social way. Therefore for the large majority of the world, symbolisation can be explained by reference to 'social' factors. But for a few symbolisation is explained in terms of the spirit, for those with open minds, those who can see through the illusion of Maya, symbolisation comes from the spirit and the whole, and most decidedly not from other people whose closed minds blind them from their potentiality.

6. As socialisation is a sociological word, and sociology is the study of social beings, and as social beings are concerned with their false logic and rationality, then to become a social being a human must close his mind and learn this rationality. Therefore they must learn their role in the capitalistic society. Thus socialisation is a role-learning process in general.

But this does not have to be the case. Socialisation could be the learning of the truth, of the oneness of everything. But it isn't. What a drag!

8. As Omar Kyam (I can't remember how to spell his name) once wrote, there are three things which you never find, I can't remember what the other two were, but the last one was that you would never find a man whose thoughts matched his deeds. So that while it is possible to learn a lot about people from their actions, it is not possible to learn their inner thoughts from them. For individuals do not have the strength of spirit to do what they know they should. For what an individual thinks on his own differs a great deal from what he does in a social setting, with all the pressures from other people. Also what he says are his attitudes again will differ from what they are when he thinks on his own. The inner thoughts, the important thoughts of men are kept to themselves. For men's minds are closed, there is only a small amount of communication. The human race is incapable, at the moment, of perfect communication. But this is to be expected, we live in finite bodies, in a finite, false reality. It is only in the infinite that communication and understanding is perfect.

Those who know do not speak. (I'm being a bit
Those who speak do not know. conceited here,
(Can't remember who said it!) sorry!)

Surname --- Exam No 561

First Names --- Desk No ---

Title of Paper: Sociological Analysis
Paper I

Questions Answered: 1
7
9
4(b)?

1. The word subjective is very appropriate in probably ninety-nine per cent of sociological studies. For almost invariably the work of sociologists is extremely biased. The way most sociological studies seem to go is that they start with an interesting idea and proceed to analyse and academicise (?) the idea until in the end they have gone round and round in circles, completely disguised a usually simple concept, and lost the whole track of what they set out to do. Sociology is extremely subjective, as are most academic disciplines, as everything studied within the discipline has to be studied in the strict academic manner described above, so that only more academics can unravel the concept from behind the barrage of long, laborious and usually meaningless words.

Therefore 'subjective' is a good word for describing the vast majority of sociological undertakings. Sociologists are a clique, they speak in their own ridiculous language, and they know fuck-all, except how to use long words and complicate simple things.

Objective is not a good word to use in connection with sociology, as to be objective one must cut down the influences of others and dissolve the ego. No sociologist that I've met or read has managed this. In fact, ego seems to play an important role in sociology - who can use the longest words, who can make simple things appear the most complicated.

Thus, 'Subjectivity' is appropriate, 'Objectivity' is not, except on the very, very, very rare occasion (I've not seen one, but surely there must be.)

7. The main points of Hempel's 'covering law' is to use an analytical, laborious and systematic methodological approach to sociological studies, aiming at a holistic discipline similar to the natural sciences. The utility of this way of thinking is great, for sociology, the understanding gained by this way of thinking is nil. O.K.?

9. 'System' and 'equilibrium' concepts are very useful in all things, for everything is related, and as the I Ching expression goes:'within the rhythm of the universe' everything balances. But sociologists are not very perceptive people as a whole, being blinded by analysing and superficiality. If they really thought about the significance of the concepts, not just on a superficial, literary level,then sociology would benefit (or more likely disappear altogether in its present form). Knowledge cannot be disciplined, segmented, understanding is related to everything and cannot be itemised into sociology, physics, etc. One day it will be realised that the study of any subject is ultimately the study of the same thing. I doubt if sociologists get much from the concepts of 'system' and 'equilibrium'.

4(b) Before I start this essay (!) I should like to receit a little rhyme quoted to me by a well-known lecturer somewhere in the York area. It goes... "T.P. is creepy but Maxy is saxy". Thus displaying this lecturer's liking via the word 'saxy' (whatever it means) of Max Weber. And his dislike for one Talcott Parsons. I don't like either. I did an essay on this topic once for Prof Robertson. It was boring doing it then so I don't think I'll bother again. All he did really was set standard ideal types, for various sociological concepts which had something to do with reality, but were not the same.

Actually it's not a bad idea, Weber was quite an intelligent man. But nevertheless long-winded.

Anyway the Derby is on soon and I want to see if Tsar wins ....

Surname: Evans Exam No --

First Names: David Vincent MacIntyre Desk No --

Title of Paper: Sociological Analysis
Paper II

Questions Answered: 116 (?)
7 (?)

8 116. It is not surprising that sociologists have employed theatrical language in their sociological studies. For there is a distinct similarity between the way in which sociologists and theatricals go about their work. Both strive to reflect society, and the games that go on in society and both in the end are only part of the games. Sociologists though take their games seriously and attribute to themselves a totally undeserved importance, which they try to enhance by making their game as incomprehensible as possible, even when they are reflecting the most obvious of concepts. Sociologists play with words and ideas, and in their own ingenuous way contrive to make their game as complicated as possible. They don't strive after knowledge, they strive after new games to play, to keep their complicated and, usually, muddled minds occupied.

Theatricals, on the other hand, are not academics, some are purely actors, others intellectuals, by playing their games they can reveal more about society than a thousand sociological text books, and also provide amusement and enjoyment to those not in their sphere.

Thus, both theatricals and sociologists play games. Sociologists for their own amusement. Theatricals for their own and other's enjoyment. Ultimately everyone plays some game or other. Some people learn from their play, others play at learning.

7. As people are the basic units of society, much can be learnt about society from the way people react to one another. In general people are enormously egotistical and project themselves at everything that is around them. That is why they usually do not understand what they see. When two people meet they will engage in ego projecting. If they're lucky they will balance and they will understand each other better. As in society groups project their collective egos. The strongest will win. Sociologists project their egos very well. But they don't understand what they see, because ego projecting is a barrier to understanding. Sociologists and just about every other type in society see themselves as important, thus they learn very little about anything other than what they are engaged in. This can be seen by the way in which sociologists always discuss sociology, how to be a sociologist, how to use sociological words. They know a lot about sociology but nothing about what sociology should be studying: people, environment, the world.

Sociologists know sociology but sociology knows nothing other than itself. Its a circle which gets nowhere. Though everything is. But you don't have to restrict yourself to such a small, insignificant circle, and such a boring and unimaginative one.

P.S. I hear people are taking my examination answers to heart. But don't take it all so seriously, we're all fools.

Perhaps in the next exam I will try and explain my point of view a little clearer - though I'm sure you don't really want to hear.

Surname: Evans Exam No: ---

First Names: Dave Desk No: ---

Title of Paper: An Explanation for Taking Exams Un-seriously!

Questions Answered: None

Why not read this?

As may have been noted from my last exam papers I have not been taking these exams very seriously, and in this paper, completely ignoring the questions set (I'll let the examiner know that right from the start) I will try to explain my reasons for this, you may or may not find them mildly interesting.

My main quarrel is with the basic assumptions that sociologists and almost all other 'ologists in the academic world have when attempting to further their knowledge. And that is that knowledge can be obtained by measuring, analysing and rationalising the phenomena that they wish to understand. Obviously very few (if any) of you will agree with this, as this has been, and will no doubt be your whole way of life, but I have my reasons for saying this. For these assumptions of the way of learning only serve to cloud understanding. It is like saying that you know what a person is like because he is six foot, has blue eyes, black hair, weighs ten stone and works in an office, etc, etc. The way of the disciplines is like trying to understand something by making a file on it...everything has to be neat, precise, rational, logical, and because of this sociology and the rest become more concerned with the way to study things rather than the things which are meant to be studied. (Thus, most courses have methodology papers.) And in this way, subjects which are capable of intellectualism retreat into academicism. And universities, instead of striving to turn out intellectuals turn out masses of academics, who of course fit in just right with the Western world, its rationalism, logicality and above all, its rip-off capitalism.

For the first lesson a student has to learn if he wishes to make a success of his student career is that he must submerge his own thoughts and adopt those of others. This is not usually a wholly conscious act, but is nonetheless clearly noticeable, even the ego-tripping lecturers must notice this (probably more than others!)

And thus to the exam system whose main aim is, despite all the pretences, to find out how well a student has memorised the thoughts of others. Those who do it well, and can combine it with increased rationalism, will be thrown to the capitalists with first-class recommendations, to perpetuate the industrial, commercial system.

There can be no pretence that the university disciplines attempt to encourage a student to intellectualise, for if this was so, great long reading lists, laborious lectures and so on would not be in existence, and especially the exam system. Thus it is all to do with academicism, whose only use is to provide bum-fodder for the capitalist system to wipe its arse on (if you'll excuse the expression).

And because of this, universities are no more than breeding grounds for elitist capitalists, allowing a small but well-guarded sphere for intellectualising,

which in the end is suppressed by the exam system.

It is not surprising that universities are hung up on rationality and logicality for the whole Western world is, for these types of mind are best for ripping-off the world, because they are closed minds, blind minds and selfish minds - engrossed in ego and greed. And you're not going to tell me that capitalism isn't all about ego and greed. For rationalism breeds blindness and a lack of understanding and this breeds conflict, greed, selfishness and most important of all unhappiness and emptiness (anomie and alienation if you like).

I mean, when I look at the Western world it amazes me that people ignore the shittiness of it all, they see it, but they look so hard they don't understand it.

10 Which brings me to the basic assumptions which are required for understanding and knowledge. The assumptions that Eastern religions and other wise teachings adopt. That is, as Don Juan puts it ("A Seperate Reality" - Carlos Casteneda) the secret is in seeing not looking. Western men of wisdom (?) rationalise, think, measure, true men of wisdom feel. Knowledge cannot be gained by projecting oneself at the phenomena to be understood, but by letting the phenomena enter into oneself. Understanding means becoming one with the thing to be understood. Not an easy task. When I look at Western societies its all so easy to see through, but as yet I know almost nothing in terms of understanding.

Anyway, I'm sure you're all bored and disagree (if you've bothered to read it) with just about everything I say. So I'll finish off now. I just like to say I've enjoyed these last three years, and although I won't have a degree to show for it I believe I've got more out of it than most. Don't take it all so seriously.

Cheers,

Dave Evans

The author of the next 'Note' is French, a long-time Situationist who had been involved in the 'manifestations' in and around Strasbourg University in 1966, themselves a prelude to the events throughout France in May 1968. A trace of '68 is the influential analysis of the role of students, the ludicrously but accurately titled: "On Student Poverty, Considered in its Economic, Political, Psychological and Particularly Intellectual Aspects, with a Modest Proposal for its Remedy". The continuity between what Baudouin helped to write there and what he was writing here is clear enough.

Social Science specialists who know nothing of the location of their partial Knowledges within any totality - the totality of the person, of society, of history, or call it what you will - know nothing of any practical use. But that nothing precisely fulfills an ideological purpose: the support of an established order which thrives upon ignorance and divides and rules. The dispersion of the Social Sciences and their inability to comprehend the actual life of the contemporary world is both an accurate, albeit unconscious, reflection of that life and an ideological expression of it. The surface images of separation that dominate our lives both make up and reflect actual connections of work, power and appropriation.

There is no longer a 'unified' Social Science course at York University, but the problems of making any sense out of the disparate disciplines remain for anyone working towards social analysis by reference to any of the established disciplines. The 'Note' is a succinct bit of real science that is still absolutely relevant.

It was originally written as part of the discussions of those thought to be immediately interested. But since it had transpired that a good many others were interested, it was soon published in the local student newspaper, Nouse. The previous term, Autumn 1972, had seen considerable student unrest around the Social Science Part One exams. A boycott had been bought off by the academics with the promise of an investigating committee and then changes in courses and assessment. Most students and many staff agreed that the Part One course should make some sort of coherent social scientific sense. The University Prospectus professed it. Why shouldn't the issues be raised in the only university-wide forum, the student newspaper?

Presumably unaware of the trouble Baudouin had already caused, which is to say the analyses he had voiced, the professor who hired him into our Sociology Department earlier in the academic year had raved to me at the time that he had netted "a genius". Then came the 'Note'. Nouse phoned each Social Science Professor inviting comments or replies. One Economics Professor did make a wan reply in the next issue of the paper. Another said down the phone that he hadn't read the young man's article but that he would give it a Beta double minus and anyway Marx was nothing to do with Economics. The others avoided comment. During the next few months, six jobs came up in Sociology, and Baudouin, on probation as a temporary lecturer, was invited to apply. He was repeatedly rejected and finally got the message. Despite excellent work and references, for some strange reason, nobody in England, in a year of relative job plenty, was at all interested in employing him. Except for a certain 'radical' professor who particularly disliked our professor and offered Baudouin a job if he would translate his, the 'radical' professor's books, into French.

France parades its repression more openly than England. But it is a country with more genuine respect for ideas. Baudouin said he had believed the myth of academic freedom over here. But in a class system freedom is always within the limits of the toleration of those holding irresponsible power.

The article first appeared, along with my "Reeling Stoned Interview" and various other bits and pieces in Nouse, 1st March 1973. At the time it came with some notes I had added as an effort to clarify Baudouin's expression to English readers. Of course he makes sense, but I've nevertheless taken the liberty of adding, better, revised notes to the 'Note'.

NOTE ON THE COMBINED COURSE OF PART ONE IN SOCIAL SCIENCES, UNIVERSITY OF YORK

BY BAUDOUIN JURDANT

Until then students in Sociology, Politics and Economics and 'Related Studies' all took, over four terms, courses from each of those Social Sciences. It was argued that specialisation, after the first four terms, would not then proceed until each student had achieved a certain minimal grounding in each of the disciplines. Each final degree could then certify a competence in all-round Social Science.

* The combined course in Social Sciences (Part I) has been supposedly designed in order to introduce the students to the particular problems involved in the study of social reality, viewed in its various aspects: economic, political, sociological, statistical, etc...
* Such a course is supposed to meet the proper educational requirements of providing the students with general ideas about a pre-given

totality

The 'pre-given totality' is the sum of the separate Knowledges guarded by the academic staff of the various disciplines.

whose elements seem not to be interrelated except in terms of actual rushing from one college to another, one tutor to another, etc...

This is not particularly ironical, nor very heavy: the only connections the students experienced were their wanderings back and forth within the pleasure park, the campus.

* Undoubtedly, the structuring principle of these roundabout activities is the Library. There, the Popperian Third World of objective Knowledge is supposed to offer through a personal and problematic synthesis, the wonders of membership in a universal, universitarian and authoritarian elite.

Sir Karl Popper, a grease eminence within the Philosophy of Knowledge, gibbers that all True Knowledge lies within libraries. The Educated Man (for it is a man's world) is a rugged individualist who forms his own Philosophy for Life by his intelligent reading of texts - so long as his Philosophy agrees with Popper's, that is. Clearly Popper's theory of knowledge is a justification for the role of the university within the established order.

* After having imprinted this magnificent totality in their minds through the farce of an exam where the assessment of knowledge can hardly hide its function of maintaining a power relationshit of staff over students,

Naturally, each of the Social Sciences assessed each student by separate examination, scrutinising each script for fidelity to its own peculiar version of Science and Knowledge in relation to 'its own' particular part of social reality. Economics questions and their proper answers were nothing to do with, or like Sociology ones, which in turn were separate from those of Politics which were different from Economic History which were aside from Statistics and Methodology... The assessment system positively discouraged students from making even theoretical, let alone practical, connections between the disciplines. Rather, the Economics Department, for example, had a vested interest in forcing students to 'get up to the right standard', while Sociology, at the pole to Economics, would hardly discourage students from failing an exam or two at the Part One level, and so keep up its numbers of students later in the degree

Part II undergraduates are invited to stuff themselves by choosing one of the ingredients of the social sciences cake that they half-baked during Part I.

* From the very beginning to the very end of the process, the students are confronted with the fragmentation of knowledge.

The Social Sciences of the established order - the established Social Sciences - are true to that order in their disintegration of their object of study, which is the person and the social whole. They are the conceptual and ideologically persuasive "Scientific" expressions of the fragmented life of the social order.

The 'solution' given to the 'problem' of this fragmentation

Since the 'problem' of integration only arises as a demand from students confronted with the nonsense of fragmented disciplines it is not an essential, eternal problem, but one with a specific location: bourgeois Social Science. The bogus problem gives rise to an unreal solution: the unreality could be vouched by any student who took those Part One examinations. The examinations did not miraculously knit the Social Sciences together, but instead heightened their separation.

finds its climax in Part I exam, by which the students are violently forced to acknowledge the existence of a totality imposed upon the production (reproduction) of knowledge by institutionalised devices and not by the very practice implied by this production.

3

Knowledge is produced under coercion, by students sitting like battery hens in the sheds of examination. Separate arrays of Questions are the stimuli which evoke the required responses of the writing of scripts, the mechanical enactment of whatever has been forcibly imprinted upon the memory. Such a production is a reproduction of Existing Knowledge. Exams or essays-on-certain-necessary-questions are the devices by which knowledgeable people, just like any other commodities on the production line, are reproduced in a flow of essentially homogeneous units.

The totality of Social Science finds expression only as the sum of the student's reproduction of the part-knowledges of each discipline. The acknowledgement of that totality is an acquiescent submission. It is not a recognition of what the totality is and what it does to people - in this instance, to students.

The absence of an actual, which is to say practical, social science, knowledge of this particular recurring event reinforces the ideological grip of the established, coercive Social Sciences.

* This totalitarian totality, instead of expressing the fundamental unity of the object

The object is the subject: the person - you, me, everybody and anybody.

dealt with in Social Sciences, dislocates social reality into several bits. This dislocation, based on methodological pseudo-necessities, enables the specialists to cast their idiosyncratic fantasies in the mould of pre-given systems of rationalisations. The explicit function that motivated the very form of the institution here involved (combined course of Part I) in terms of unification, is the precisely inverted reflection of an implicit function of dislocation.

Sincere and insincere attempts to combine the Social Sciences are only necessary when they are already, for some greater reason, fragmented. The Social Sciences are actually fragmented for good reason: that is how contemporary life must be, for that is how contemporary life is. Social Science is conservative ideology.

The production of knowledge, instead of taking its full relevance from the practice related to it, becomes a mere reproduction of knowledge which is enjailed in the web of ideology.

Social Science Knowledge is, literally, irrelevant to the questioning subject, for it is not a theory of an actual practice. It is not a theory of the acting subject in his (social) world. Social Science Knowledge can then only be a reproduction of the Knowledge of Authorities. It is ideology because it supposes itself Universal Science.

This institutional totality becomes the strait-jacket of knowledge, giving to it its reassuring aspect and impeding any creativity to renew it by a non-ideological practice.

The obvious Authority, the massive givenness of academic Knowledge, reassures the student that there is indeed An Answer and that, as his career so far has indicated, he will, with submissive perseverance, come ever closer to that ultimate secret. This effectively prevents the student from taking time to attend to the quality of any text, to think, and to come to his own conclusions.

* No wonder then, that the students, deprived of the full relevance of what they are doing and confined within the boundaries imposed upon their subject-matter by an institutionalised fragmentation, end up in cynicism, which is a trendy attitude to adopt if one wants to enter the British Intelligentsia. Of course, this cynicism can dress itself in a more respectable terminology: complete relativism for example, which leads to infinite understanding and no action, except the ones that are dictated to by individualism. This kind of 'understanding' is the mark of an outstanding bad faith. One way to get out of this (vicious ideological) circle without changing the (so precious) educational justifications of Part I course (to give to the students a paramount view of Social Sciences as a whole) is to transform this course into an introduction to the actual hammering out of the concepts that are used in all Social Sciences and to the actual production of their interrelated aspects as they have been exemplary worked out by Marx. Marx did not create the concepts of economics, sociology and politics in terms of their ability to reflect bits of social reality. But the difference between Marx and his predecessors is that he is the first who produced an objective knowledge ("concrete-in-thought") with their conceptual tools. This knowledge is objective because it stands as the result of a production, a thought whose dynamic principle is internal to the discourse itself.

The dynamic principle is the dialectic: material and ideal conflict and resolution.

* Instead of reproducing, for the sake of ideological solutions to ideological problems, bits of reality interrelated through the subjective means of an individual ideologically situated (where social sciences are mere metaphysical systems of class rationalisations), Marx was the first to produce an object of knowledge which, independently of ideological situations, could stand up to the test of being produced again by anybody willing to undertake this task of production.
* Since Marx, it is impossible for any of the social sciences here considered (economics included) not to be submitted to a confrontation with his writings. Whatever the result of this confrontation, in terms of acceptance or rejection (and where ideological investments are determinant), this acceptance or rejection is only concerned with the results of the argument and not with the production of these results.
* This production involves the theoretical practice of reading Marx, without falling immediately into the trap of an ideological choice in terms of for and against. If the choice is ultimately inescapable, it is not due to Marx himself, but to the personal answer given by the reader to a problem that, at

least, will have been posed during the reading process. It is obvious that most of the time the answer is there beforehand. It is a matter of mere intellectual integrity to work out the problem related to this answer. This problem is in Marx, nowhere else.

* Nowadays, a confrontation with Marx's writings has been generally transformed into a confrontation with Marx's ideas. Those ideas are the results of what people said of what people said of what...Marx said. It is more and more difficult to get acquainted with what Marx actually said (not so much what he said than his actual saying it, or writing it). It is urgent to return to Marx whose thought has not been conditioned by disciplinary boundaries that are now mere reflections of the institutionalisation of social sciences.

* The interdisciplinary intention which underlies the design of Part I course is a trick in order to impose upon the students a structure which could escape their criticisms. The need for interdisciplinary approaches is the covering up of the defects of a fragmentation which is perpetuated by the attempts to meet this need in terms of contacts between the specialists who are just afraid to lose their own significance, or the significance of what they are doing in the eyes of the students. That means that this significance is not assured by their practice in itself but through external relationshits with other activities: educational institutions.

There used to be an 'interdisciplinary' course component in the old Social Science Part I. For a term or so students would meet to discuss what?, problems of science? of method? of writing? of speaking?...Ostensibly seminars were arranged around a particular 'problem area'. There would be a tutor from the Economics grouping and one from either Politics or Sociology. The two tutors would speak a foreign conceptual tongue to each other, and the students would normally sit bemused, trapped in their poor mother tongue, common sense. In the end, each student would go off and write an essay as a piece of Economics, Politics or...(etc), and the essay would count a little in the Part I examination. Once more, the significance of the Social Scientist specialist would partake of the totality only as a sad and empty ritual of coercion.

* Concretely speaking, the combined course of Part I can stay as it stands now, although it could be reduced in time. The only difference is that it would refer to one bibliography: the complete works of Marx.

The tutorials would become critical reading sessions of Marx's works.

* The general question would be: at what precise points do the texts of Marx resist our ideologically moulded understanding? What are those points of resistance pointing at, for us: obscurities in Marx? weaknesses? Economical changes in social reality? Political changes? Etc...
* For those who are afraid to transform university education into political propaganda, it should be mentioned that the only way to refute Marx (incidentally, why is this refutation so necessary?) is not to invoke the inadequacies of Marxist descriptions or 'prophecies', but to enter the very dialectics of Marxist thought while respecting the principles of this dialectics to produce (eventually) another object of knowledge.

Marx said: "I am not a Marxist". I'm inclined to believe him.

* The surface of institutional knowledge has to be broken at a certain ppint, and not frozen to guarantee a safe (yet slippery) thinking through it.

It's up to us: do we waste our time or take it?

* Cynicism has to be changed into irony, ideological assumptions into critical understanding and practice, self-indulgence into intellectual integrity, class narcissism into class consciousness....

Rob Watkinson signed up for the Social Science course back in 1970. As a way of evading the trivialities and irrelevancies of the Part One course and its assessment system he transferred to Philosophy. He now teaches in a South London comprehensive school.

This article was written for a magazine put out by the sixth form, and replied to one which, in the previous edition, advocated deschooling. It pre-dates the "Great Debate" (the mass debate) on the state of education which supposedly began before Christmas 1976.

FOR TEACHING, AGAINST DESCHOOLING

BY ROB WATKINSON

DE-SCHOOLING: PIPE DREAM OR PRACTICALITY?

Many of Chris Eva's criticisms of the educational system in your last issue were valid on their own. Taken as a whole, however, the article reflected the complacent elitism and tendency to idealistic generalisation that underlies so much of the thinking and writing taking place in modern Western universities. Whilst discussing a system which aims to educate and cherish the widest possible cross-section of individuals, he carelessly neglects to consider certain aspects of that system concerning social class and opportunity. By embracing so totally the analytically incomplete ideas of de-schooling, put forward by Ivan Illich, Chris falls into the same trap as his mentor and ignores the fundamental premise from which any study of school must proceed. Namely, that education in any society will be a true reflector of that society's ideology and requirements. For a revolution to take place in the educational system, without one first taking place in the economic and social system as a whole, is impossible. In a society where a handful of the population own and control the means of production, and where the majority are not free but bound to sell their labour power in order to survive the state will ensure that the average school child is socialised to fit as perfectly as possible into his predestined slot in the outside world. Hence the continued enforcement of humiliation rituals and petty rules about such things as uniform. The formative personality must be discouraged from overt acts of individualism and taught that, in essence, he is no different from anyone else. In glibly inciting school people to rebel (mentally at least) against their preconditioned suppositions concerning the teacher's infallibility, is Chris Eva inferring that they should extend that rebellion to questioning the justness of the law, its agencies and indeed the capitalist system itself? If not, he is a reformist and belongs, like Illich,

in the ranks of those thinkers who wish, whether consciously or otherwise, to serve not the kids but the ruling class. They do this by allowing themselves, their ideas and their free schools to be used as mere safety valves which ensure that the inequalities within the system never actually create a dangerous boiling over. Herbert Marcuse calls the development of such social thermostats 'repressive tolerance'. The encouragement by the authorities, from cynical motives, of liberalisation policies and experimental schemes designed not to transform but to contain.

TEACHERS IGNORANT EGOTISTS OR EXPLOITED WORKERS?


The average teacher in a large comprehensive school is an extremely exploited and overworked individual. Because of the huge amount of teaching he is expected to do he becomes - all too quickly - an automated professional. He is alienated from his work which prevents him from discovering and evolving his own identity. If lessons are, as Chris Eva asserts, boring and a waste of time, it is not because they are compulsory but for the simple reason that there are not enough teachers. The powers that be do not consider the average child's education to be worth the cost of employing the resorvoir of unemployed teachers in order to provide their more fortunate colleagues with a decent amount of time to themselves in order to think carefully about their teaching groups and prepare lessons that are not only stimulating, educational and relevant to the kid's own lives, but which also reflect the genuine interests and activities of the teacher concerned. University lecturers are given sufficient free time to write books which their students read and use as vehicles for dialogue. School teachers are denied the time to create their own, genuine material and, therefore, they often lack commitment to the ready-made and frequently inferior resources that are at hand. Kids sense this lack of one-ness between the teacher and his product, so, because they are young and honest, they reject it as phoney and meaningless.

The most important aspect of teaching today should be to shift working-class children into the elaborated register of writing, speaking and, therefore, thinking. This shift cannot be achieved by career-oriented, middle-class cynics who, as Chris Eva correctly points out, are frightened of their alien charges. We cannot teach someone a new language if our every statement and gesture reflects a total contempt for their own. Work done in the classroom must be an entire experience - for better or for worse - in which all present are involved. To be successful the subject matter must LIVE and be seen to evolve in form as the lesson unfolds. Piles of dog-eared textbooks, written by someone who has not seen the inside of a classroom for twenty years, are as much a symbol of archaic repression in schools as is the obscenity of the cane and the practice of suspending children for minor offences (lateness, infringements of uniform regulations, etc), rather than for wanton acts of malice against the community at large.

In conclusion, it is worth saying that de-schooling as an idea might well benefit pupils of Chris Eva's ilk. Pupils, that is, with enlightened parents and an independent motivation to seek out the knowledge they require. A disestablishment of schools, however, would do nothing for the vast majority of children other than to rob them of the basic gains they have made since the early education reform acts. The essential notion of de-schooling is one of laissez-faire. Don't intervene and let the have-nots go to the wall. What really needs to be done in schools is what really needs to be done throughout society. Of course a planned curriculum is necessary, just as a planned economy is vital to avoid such gross contradictions as unemployment. At the present point in time there are 20,000 overcrowded classrooms.

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Anything to Be Helpful

Thirteen years or so of schooling gives most students in the Humanities and Social Sciences a deep intuition that what is written normally lacks significance or meaning. Academic competition encourages the student to amass superficial facts - even if the facts concern the understandings or principles held by the legions of 'authorities'. The creative and lively original submits to the bland and dead summary and the student skims each text for a surface gloss rather than takes the time to enter into close dialogue.

But an hour or so mumbling to one of the greatest minds in history has got to be fruitful. In this case it could innoculate the reader against years of agonising about social science method, the relation of theory to practice.

The "Theses on Feuerbach" might have been just a collection of short notes to Karl Marx, but they provide a beautiful terse text for meditational beginners like myself. The "Theses" is an icon of the scientific attitude towards the self, some simple lines including the essential concepts of self and other. Or, as Wilf suggested more accurately, they make a prose poem. The first bit of soul science poetry.

The message is the negation of all established separations of theory and practice.

This will be something like the lecture I give, as soon as I can, to first year Social Science students. It will be a close reading of the text in order to bring out some of the meanings and connections that people often seem to miss.

The text is the translation in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The German Ideology, Part One, edited by C J Arthur, Lawrence and Wishart, London 1970.

KARL MARX'S THESES ON FEUERBACH

It is not necessary that the reader should know anything about Feuerbach. Marx picks on him not because his is obviously the worst sort of social science, but precisely because Feuerbach's is the most advanced thinking of the time. If Marx's argument can transcend Feuerbach he will establish a more advanced awareness that will have inescapable revolutionary implications.

As a rule of social science - that is, the getting of knowledge worth having - the particular (in this case Feuerbach) is of interest only for its universal significance, and the universal

and abstract only for its particular relevance. Established Social Science breaks that rule and clusters around either a disgusting voyeurism in its particular studies or a pretentious philosophising in its abstractions.

The "Theses" then, are worth reading because they stand, to this day, as a criticism of bourgeois Social Science.

And, before we begin, it is well to remember that Marx is an artist, this is a short piece, we certainly have the time, so it is best to assume that every word counts.

I

The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism (that of Feuerbach included)

Materialism is the scientific attitude that works from the premise that all events in history can only be explained by steady reference to the material, organic nature of our being, People are matter, and that matters. Feuerbach is famed and blamed for his materialism. Marx will show that his attitude, which fools itself it is scientific, is in fact an idealism.

is that the thing, reality, sensuousness

I.e. people, the thing that social science explains.

is conceived only in the form of the object or of contemplation but not as sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively.

Marx here recognises the two poles of false consciousness that the Social Sciences took then and continue to take today. One false resolution of disconnected and false theory - the one that kids itself it follows rigorous scientific method - reduces the person, the active subject, to the status of a mere reactive object, dispossessed of consciousness and will. The opposite false resolution forgets the body, the objectivity and materiality of human relations, and treats the person as if he were 'pure', 'unmotivated', 'detached' ideation, or in Marx's term: contemplation.

The crude materialists fail to see that if we are all merely objects, only reactive, there can be no humanity, no speech and activity, and hence no science. The idealists are as blind to the mind's absolute dependence upon the presence of a species with material being, an articulation of bodies in relation to each other and concertedly in relation to the universe.

And nobody is fooled by any talk about such positions being merely 'models of man held for the sake of argument'. If you want to argue for argument's sake you aren't concerned with social science. Crude materialism and idealism have survived only as the ideological rubbish of those with a vested interest in mystification.

The object of social science is "sensuous activity", human being as both thoughtful and practiced survival. The object of social science is the subject, anybody and everybody (but it's best to begin and end at home).

Hence, as opposed to materialism, the active side was developed abstractly by idealism - which of course does not know real sensuous activity as such.

Idealism 'rescues' the activity of men from a reductionist materialism. But only abstractly, never concretely, only in general, not in the particular case. Because activity is always socially effective. It is within the realm of politics and economics. To approach the analysis of the actualities of political economy would be to come closer to the uncomfortable analysis of the position of the writer as actor for or against everybody else.

Idealism likes the idea of activity, in theory, but not in practice. It is a 'sophisticated' ideology produced by those privileged to be far removed from the activity of sensuous life - labour - which supports all life. The life of favoured intellectuals is the practice of theory but, by definition, in separation from significant activity. Humanists and Social Scientist pontificate about practice but their role separates them from a working knowledge of practice. Their monopoly of 'The Spirit' is at the expense of the loss of the body and is thus no more than a monopoly on the production of misconceptions about both body and mind.

Feuerbach wants sensuous objects really distinct from the thought objects,

He wants to treat people as different from all other objects which we, by means of our subjectivity, construe in our imaginations and construct in our practices. There are no objects without subjects to formulate them.

But he does not conceive human activity itself as objective activity.

Like all other bundles of energy, people have objective existence.

That existence is one of activity, of changing selves and the world. A strange notion in lands without love, Marx believes it is possible to actually talk about the object - people - and to recognise differences in activities, in labour, life and death.

Hence, in "The Way of Christianity", he regards the theoretical attitude as the only genuinely human attitude, while practice is conceived and fixed only in dirty-judaical manifestation.

Feuerbach, it would seem, is no advance on Hegel. And 'sophisticated' Sociology, from Weber until today has regarded the theoretical attitude as the only genuine attitude. Would you credit the myopia of our civilisation's great thinkers who cannot see that their view of reality is so coloured by their own practice - which happens to be the practice of theory? In its ideology idealism certainly delivers a truth: the truth of the lives of sterile intellects.

Sociology as Theory has always been an idealism founded in a misconception, a misreading and then a non-reading of Marx. One of Max Weber's worse bits of work, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, is the most essential reading on first-year Sociology courses. And the reason is because to Sociologists the book seems to argue that "Marx didn't deal adequately with consciousness". All Sociology students must learn that before they can go on to take a Sociology course in the right frame of mind.

Pass the racism Marx obviously experienced, and note that his writings focussed increasingly upon the analysis of practice as the "dirty-judaical manifestation". Marx realised that a true science of humanity will not emerge from a one-sided narcissistic analysis of 'ideas' apart from their practical contexts. He turned to a reworking of political-economics in his study of history.

4

So he does not grasp the significance of 'revolutionary', of 'practical-critical', activity.

Labour is revolutionary. It changes the world and thus the people in it. It is in a necessary relation to ideas that anyone might have - including most certainly the ideas of a leisured caste of intellectuals. To ignore practice is to commit an ideology in the name of a Social Science which purports to connect beliefs and existence.

II

The question whether objective truth can be attributed to thought is not a question of theory but is a practical question. People must prove

the truth, ie the reality and power, the this-sidedness of their thinking in practice. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking that is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question.

Thought that bears a true relation to reality will work in practice. The truth is a theoretic power which will work 'on this side', here and now. Theory which never meets a practice, the endless theorising of the schools, is irrelevant.

(How can we know the truth? Don't kid yourself. You can know. Besides, if there is no truth words make no sense and the very questioning of the certainty of truth becomes meaningless.

III

The materialist doctrine concerning the changing of circumstances and upbringing forgets that circumstances are changed by people and that it is essential to educate the educator himself. This doctrine must, therefore, divide society into two parts, one of which is superior to society.

Social Science still quite monolithically subscribes to a deterministic view of human behaviour which somehow magically excludes the behaviour of the Social Scientist himself. Humanity is clearly denied in this reduction of everybody's behaviour (except that of the magically aloof Social Scientist himself) to the reaction of objects to stimuli. The 'liberal' Sociological version is particularly obscene, for its protagonists vouch that they take the part of life's losers who cannot help their deviations from bourgeois rectitude 'because they are victims of circumstances'. Such a patronising blanket 'excusal' and 'understanding' of unconventional behaviour - speech, thought and activity which spills over into the marking of 'ignorance' and 'criminality', for example - denies humanity to those it 'forgives'. For 'the circumstances' and 'upbringing' are always the productions of interested people and groups whose activities can be located within structures of responsibility. 'Deviancy' is the reasonable response to nameable oppressions and unreasonable hierarchical order. But of course, to name the specifics of class oppression would be to locate the Social Scientist within that system.

So Social Science prefers to forget that 'circumstances' are collective political, economic and ideological productions for which everyone is responsible (but some, such as the ideologs, more than others). And, certain of their own superiority (for the social order ensures it),

Social Scientists forget that if people are shaped by 'circumstances' then that should apply to their own activities too. By rights, but not in fact, their own intellectual productions (such as platitudes like 'people's lives are shaped by circumstances') should be subject to scrutiny for determinative forces.

The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionary activity.

To live is to act, to change and to change things. 'The circumstances' are what we do and don't do together and with the world we inhabit. Existence is always a relation, a connection. To change the world is to change yourself.

IV

Feuerbach starts out from the fact of religious self-alienation, of the duplication of the world into a religious and a secular one. His work consists in resolving the religious world into its secular basis.

Feuerbach's materialism was to suggest that all the powers men attributed to God were really men's own powers which they failed to realise were their own. People have power, know things, will things, change things. Men fail to realise their own powers yet celebrate power by magically invoking the good will of the All Divine, the All Mighty.

Bringing heaven to earth is the pious centre of Marx's work. The failure of men to realise their own power is crucial. Realisation will move historically from an access to the real state of affairs in theory (in Marx's science) to a making real of communal power in practice (revolution and repossession of the means of production and distribution). Hence, in order to effect the fulfillment of this project, he continues:

But that the secular basis detaches itself from itself and establishes itself as an independent realm in the clouds can only be explained by the cleavages and self-contradictions within this secular basis.

I can't see that Marx has anything against a religious awe. What he criticises is the capital men make from the natural and inevitable confrontation between men and mystery. He criticises religions.

For if men are not conscious of their actual and potential earthly

powers the sources of the particular configurations of their false beliefs and practices must be sought in the system of materially interested divisions within the society. Forms of consciousness always have material meaning. Different forms of religious belief and ritual serve different class interests at different times in history. Profit is to be made from illusion.

The latter must therefore in itself be both understood in its contradiction and revolutionised in practice. Thus, for instance, after the earthly family is discovered to be the secret of the holy family, the former must then itself be destroyed in theory and in practice.

Religious beliefs - the myths of the holy family - have been revealed as the misguided metaphor for political economic practice - the earthly family (of man). Criticism cannot end with this revelation. It must extend to the critique of the whole social order which encourages such illusions in order to maintain oppression.

If the social order is not revolutionised in theory and in practice you can bet it will be counter-revolutionised. Life doesn't stand still for us to wish it better.

V

Feuerbach, not satisfied with <u>abstract thinking</u> wants contemplation; but he does not conceive sensuousness as <u>practical</u>, human sensuous activity.

The detached Olympian attitude of the intellectual can <u>abstractly</u> conceive of the alienation of the beliefs and practices of established religions. But it can see no way of transcending that alienation. It will merely contemplate it. Sensuousness, the body, so distant from the life of the bourgeois intellectual, cannot appear to him as the way the world is actually changed.

VI

Feuerbach resolves the religious essence into the <u>human</u> essence. But the human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of social relations.

Feuerbach reveals the nature of God to be the timeless nature of man. But, in fact, the nature of man emerges in history. It is the product of cooperative activity and of the subsequent passing of material artefacts and ideas down the generations. What is essentially human

depends upon the historical moment. That human essence is "the ensemble of social relations" is a promise for any social science. There can be nobody except in relation to others. Each and everybody can thus only be understood in relation to others.

Feuerbach, who does not enter upon a criticism of this real essence is consequently compelled:

1. to abstract from the historical process and fix the religious sentiment as something by itself, and to presuppose an abstract - isolated - individual.

2. Essence, therefore, can be comprehended only as 'genus', as an internal, dumb generality which naturally unites the many individuals.

This neatly applies to contemporary Sociology. It still avoids the fact that the nature of man is the artifice, the history, of peoples. The natural unity of people is always a historically evolved connection through material and ideal intercourse.

So millions of words are spilled over the pseudo-problem of defining an eternal, abstract 'religiousness'. Less time is devoted to the understanding of particular illusions in their material locations. Or, in other words, much time is spent in producing an ideology which pretends to be critical (Sociology) and less in actual criticism (the dialectics of historical analysis).

The "abstract, isolated human individual" is, of course, the classical model of man in bourgeois political-economy. And he, in his turn, is the conforming bourgeois adult male. Such a person is, in classic bourgeois reality, actually isolated and adrift in time.

VII

Feuerbach consequently does not see that the 'religious sentiment' is itself a social product, and that the abstract individual whom he analyses belongs to a particular form of society.

Human essence therefore becomes the essence of the bourgeoisie, which class is (naturally) united in its competition. This leads Social Scientists to completely misunderstand any other culture or time. But this does not matter. Since theirs is the reflected consciousness of the bourgeoisie, the masters of the earth, the silly but sinister logics of the Social Scientists are quite as secure as all the other properties of their class. A disconnected myth of a 'Science' of the

person becomes institutionalised by a class that can only continue by forgetting history, by mistaking the person.

'Religious sentiment' changes through history (I will hazard here the idea that it can take a good, realistic form as well as its numerous deformations). The forms of any beliefs, however, can only be understood as logical connections with the forms of practical existence.

VIII
All social life is essentially practical. All mysteries which lead theory to mysticism find their rational solution in human practice and in the comprehension of that practice.

Social science cannot assume that beliefs and practices are randomly connected. It shows, on the contrary, the hidden but good material reasons for particular beliefs in the service of particular interests. As the spoken, sung, acted and thought manifestation of a reflection upon existence (upon practice), a belief must be understood in relation to our knowledge of the objective reality of that practice. Social science must assume that whatever is said has its meaning, a material commitment to the life of some body (or else, once more, all speech becomes reduced to gibberish). It is possible to understand intellect, and its mysticisms, by reference to the wider practices of existence that intellect serves.

IX
The highest point reached by contemplative materialism, that is materialism that does not comprehend sensuousness as practical activity, is the contemplation of single individuals and of civil society.

"Contemplative materialism" just about encapsulates the contemporary Social Sciences. Each of the modern Social Sciences is separated from the practice it is supposed to understand. Each contemplates and what it contemplates is the single, isolated, abstract and timeless individual - which is to say the Social Scientist himself in his alienation. Each contemplates bourgeois society and categorises its functioning parts in a sort of soulless secular eulogy of the given order.

The 'hard-headed' Sciences of social life take their existence by reference to the myths of natural science. The Social Sciences think that to be scientific is to employ methods which look like those of the natural sciences. Yet, for all their looking, the Social Sciences

have yet to notice that the natural sciences are not contemplative, but active. Their concepts and theory only develop along with work upon the material world. Marx has here suggested precisely this method, the truly scientific method, for the science of humanity.

The Social Sciences have made a fetish of non-involvement, which they confuse with objectivity. Theories separated from practice can have little real idea about practical existence. The Social Sciences centrally contemplate themselves and call that 'the nature of man'. Real social science does not contemplate the isolated individual and the given ("civil") society, but reveals contradictions within and between individuals, contradictions within the social order. It does this in order to provide knowledge needed for the transcendance of those contradictions. The Social Sciences assume that the present social order - the order which supports their own involuted nonsense - is a fixed and permanent reality. This, of course, is a crude fantasy of wish-fulfillment.

X

The standpoint of the old materialism is civil society; the standpoint of the new is human society, or social humanity.

The Established Social Sciences, whether performing idealist or objectivist reductions, assume the categories of the given social order because they in fact depend upon that order for their very existences.

10

Social Science performs its role of ideologically justifying the established order either completely unconsciously (how can the bourgeois imagine another way of life?) or cynically (money talks).

Either way, the Social Sciences elevate the present order to the status of universal order. The "new" real social science understands that humanity is becoming, or coming to life, and that life ultimately depends upon cooperative, socially organised labour.

XI

The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.

If you don't take your time and make it better, it will take you and make it worse.

And all this has not been just another ideology. Marx's intention and practice is the criticism of ideology by the simple means of science.

The next pieces were written as texts to a first year lecture course earlier this year. The written word is far more efficient and convenient than the spoken, unless the object of communication is essentially dialogue. In which case it is certainly worth standing an academic in front of his audience, but to answer questions that might respond to proposals he has written and submitted in advance. For not many lecturers seem capable of taking a theme and just extemporising on it -free talking around it - to the benefit of their audience.

The normal lecture (leaving aside the question of its content), delivered from close notes which might as well have been duplicated and distributed to save everyone the bother of having got up, is no more than an ego-tripping, monological ritual of institutionalised power. Having to attend lectures is the collective enactment of the disparity between those who 'have Knowledge' and those who 'don't have it'. The lecturer down there mouthing and the students up there scribbling is a theatre that serves the primary purpose of reenforcing, by its natural, habitual, daily occurrence, the established order of the repression of true knowledge.

I was so lucky as to get 3 lectures on a course about "Structures of Exploitation", and it seemed worth talkabout home, so discussed the Social Sciences as "Last Ditch Friendly Persuasion". The handout began with a chunk of Marx, on Feuerbach and "The German Ideology", which seemed a good way into Marx for those who might not otherwise ever meet him. It continued with:

(WHITE, BLACK AND RED ALL OVER)

IN SOME OTHER WORDS...

Life is the conscious and unconscious relations between the self and the rest of nature. It is what is done - the practice - as the living keep body and soul together.

The social scientific object is the subject and his objects, the self in his or her time. (It is not somewhere else, or someone else, or something else, as 'Society' or 'Culture' or a whole host of other normal ideological terms can imply). The conception of the self is a theoretical practice, an abstraction the self performs upon himself. Social science is the attempt to be systematically logical in the search, or research, for the self. It is thus a practical philosophy, a philosophy of practice.

The scientific analysis of the self widens the field of self-consciousness, and so, in theory, the area and power of the activity of the self. Increased self-consciousness is increased knowledge of the self as part of the world, in the world. To know the self is to know what is other.

As is any activity, consciousness is collective. Mind is a communication between the self and another (even if the other is another time of the self, as with conversations with the self, thought). Relationships in consciousness are not causal but logical. We talk precisely to change things, to subvert material causation.

The science of the self recognises the life of an individual of a species with material being. The life of the species is both immediate and mediated, coming to live in consciousness. Consciousness consists in the

uttered or outered intentions, in the project-ions of the self.

Life proceeds by the embedding of abstract, symbolised intention in effects within the material world. Consciousness exists dialectically between the abstract symbolisation of intent (as by speech) and the concrete techniques of artifice within the made-over world of objects (the material and tools of both material and ideal production).

The first and last intention of theory is practical: the meaning of a theory is its (however finely mediated) implications for the life of the self.

The power of the self is largely constituted in the extensions of the self, in consciousness, in the symbolic and technical means to existence. The self is socially organised, consciously or unconsciously, although, naturally, sustained by individual creative effort. The embedding of consciousness in techniques divides labour around the use of the techniques, produces a surplus, changes needs and increases commitments to interdependence. The historically determined order of the activity of the self is both very concrete and abstract. By the distribution of surplus product the division of labour is re-enforced, while to even speak of conditions is to submit to the categories of the speech community.

The self can thus only be understood, in whatever aspect of himself, in relation to his world of others.

The person's behaviour is understandable by reference to his needs and commitments. His practice, material and immediate or ideal and mediated, is to be explained in terms of his survival for and against the world of selves and others he both actually and imaginatively lives within. His practice is the exercise of his powers, so is defined by his access to, and control over, resources, (ultimately the functions of his organic being, which include the more or less practised ability to live in the re-present).

Resources, material, technical and symbolic, are available depending upon group organisation, specifically the distribution of the product. All organisations, products of the interests of the powerful bestow power and privilege more or less inequitably, fulfill needs to various degrees and so command varying commitments to the maintainance of the social order. Institutionalised life is nothing other than the agreements between people about how to do things together. Stability or change in such orders are explicable by the life of changes in the configurations of groups manifesting greater or lesser needd and commitments and wielding more or less power in the negotiation of social order.

Practical dialectics involves persuasion. The meaning and legitimacy, the rights and reasons of activity, are the constituents of the life of the self that give it direction. Any abstraction, any re-presentation, is interested or motivated. As a tactic of survival within a social order to which he is committed, the speaker is as likely to hide himself from himself and from others, with his words, as he is to reveal the world, the world of himself.

Science is the reduction of false consciousness, or 'ideology'. Established Social Science enters the world historic stage rather as a persuasive device wielded in the service of material interests. The material separation of the self from its full potential finds its ideal representation in separated Sciences which focus psychotically upon different aspects of the whole person (Socio-logy speaks of the 'social' effects upon the self, Psyche-ology treats the soul as an attribute of the separate person alone,

Linguistics forgets that the person, not the language, speaks, Economics and Politics likewise divorce the aspect from the whole person in his world...)

The role of the Social Sciences in the structure of exploitation is the topic of the next chapter.

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TOO MUCH OF NOTHING

I have the privilege to be able to suggest that you can more or less forget most Social Science: it has produced some excellent stuff, but as exceptions to the massive overload of elaborate mystification. It is worth finding out about the enemy, but not worth suffering it gladly beyond the recognition of its obvious insanities.

What I have done below - probably done to death - is to summarise several good critical analyses of Sociology, in particular, but the Social Sciences in general. If you can get hold of them to read I hope my disjointed replays won't put you off the originals. I've also mixed in some random thoughts of my own. Sociology, you see, is a game anyone can play, given the chance.

For a material and ideological analysis of sociology, then:

Lucien Goldmann, The Human Sciences and Philosophy, Cape 1969, is a classic, very neat account.

Perry Anderson, "Components of the National Culture" in A Cockburn & R Blackburn, Student Power, Penguin 1969, is a brilliant analysis of recent English culture.

T Bateman (ed), Countercourse, Penguin 1972, views various disciplines.

R Blackburn, Ideology in Social Science, Fontana 1972 is various critiques.

What follows includes quotations and summaries of those texts. Besides that, however, there is:

C W Mills, The Sociological Imagination, Oxford UP, 1959. A classic attack on Parsonian conceptual games and abstracted empiricism's technology.

S Andreski, Social Science as Sorcery, 1972, a beautifully neat domolition of the schools of conceit that constitute Sociology. But he doesn't explain why the forms develop the way they do.

A Gouldner, The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology, Heinemann, 1970. A wordy but solid analysis of sociological theory from the USA.

For a good analysis of the context of Sociology - material developments since the turn of the century:

P Baran & P Sweezy, Monopoly Capital, Penguin 1968, which is probably a rerun of

I Lenin, Imperialism, Moscow Publishing House, 1916.

R Barthes, Mythologies, Cape 1972 (and pbk) is a great little analysis of a range of particular manifestations of ideology in everyday life. A prototype for

Guy Debord, Society of the Spectacle, Black and Red Publishing, 1970, which supplies analysis for France's May '68 action. A work of genius, the only general account of the culture of today to supply insights not contained already in Marx-Engels.

I could recommend a lot else Middle period Freud, W Reich as Marx-Freud, typographic McLuhan, Foucault on madness and reason, John Berger's analyses of art, Andy Warhol on Art!, Raymond Williams (until 1961)

on English culture, Machievelli, Raymond Chandler, Burroughs, Plato, Nietzsche, Hess's Steppenwolf, J B Priestly's The Image Makers (which is about two con men setting up a 'Department of Social Imagistics' in a new English university), Hume, Mailer, Chomsky, Hubert Selby Jnr. But that would be getting towards sheer self-indulgence. Or sheerer.

If you are serious about analysis you will at least glance at the roots of meta-theory, philosophy (which term means 'the love of good dialectics', and which discipline is where all analysis began and will end).

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"What 'science' is this, that only holds true when its subjects hold still? What scientists are these, who peer into everything below, yet see nothing ahead?"

"The trunk of political power has many branches. One of these is the professional organisation of sociology, the American Sociological Association. The upper, fatter portion of this branch is grafted seamlessly, with contractual cement, to the civil, economic and military sovereignty which constitutes the trunk. From that source, the organisation spreads outward and downward along the institutional scaffolding, carrying the authoritative views on matters of social reality into the universities, junior colleges and high schools. In addition to the general dissemination of propoganda, professional sociology has the major specific functions of aiding industrial, civil and military authorities in the solution of manpower control problems of a limited order, and of preparing university candidates for careers in the official burocracies. As a source of legitimation for the existing sovereignty, and as a laboratory of refinements in the processes by which tribute of blood, labour and taxation is extracted from the subject population, the professional organisation of sociology today represents the concrete fulfillment of the charter vision of its founding fathers."

(Martin Nicolaus, "The Professional Organisation of Sociology: A view from below", in R Blackburn (ed), Ideology in Social Science.)

Talcott Parsons wrote: "The fundamental origin of the modern professional system has lain in the marriage between the academic professional and certain categories of practical men". Sociology has thus taken the female role, economically dependent, routinely subservient to the will of The Man. Sociology offers the master diffuse religious or ideological legitimation.

There is a line of apostolic succession from Comte to the present. Comte's political sympathies lay with the 'retrograde school', "assorted papists, gothics, race mystics, ultramonarchists and theocrats" - the intellectual precursors to 20th century monarchists, racists and fascists. According to Comte, sociology was, by means of the 'positive' method, to integrate modern industrial capitalist forces of production with the sort of social and political relations obtaining in the theocratic feudal era. He proposed the establishment, at public expense, of a caste of scientist-priests who would endow the secular authorities with the unquestionable transcendental sanction they clearly lacked in his time.

France's first professor of Sociology, Durkheim, made his intentions as clear as those of his ancestor. His argument is refreshingly honest, to a reader today, in its contradictions which fail to reach any resolution. In his Rules of Sociological Method this is quite clear, yet he also clearly wants the phenomenon to be social when its operation is beyond the control of the individual and the population as a whole, imposing itself upon the population with a compelling force. Here is a

reverent empiricism, the supply of a scientific sanction for a patriotic posture towards the facts of social compulsion. Sociology formulates the laws of oppressed social life. His 'practical' sociological work, as expert in education, celebrates the inculcation of French Culture by repression in the schools. Durkheim later added the idea that the structure of oppression in any society originates in and expresses the collective unconscious will of the population.

Germany's first Sociologist, Weber, campaigned against the influence of Marx in a more explicit manner than did Durkheim. For Weber, the ideal typical form of the Prussian military bureaucracy became the highest and inevitable embodiment of rationality. His Sociology also introduced the 'experimental' method of comparative method - the comparison of the laws of oppressed societies in order to deduce the laws of societies in general. And he introduced the notion of 'value freedom' or 'neutrality' into Sociology, the notion that true science is apolitical. This, in the immediate context, justified the integration of the universities into the Nazi bureaucracy.

In the USA, Sociology became the way European conservative thought was introduced, under the guise of Knowledge, into the universities. Sociology began in the USA as a liberal, strongly Protestant social meliorism and democratic philosophising . It developed between the World Wars as participant (ie passive) observation, or 'conscience-free slumming' but only came of age with the normative functionist theorising of the '50s. Sociology had been an amateur and lecturing occupation until the Mayo study at the Hawthorne industrial plant. It particularly received its professional impetus from the Second World War, with the Stouffer study on The American Soldier, which employed batteries of empirical tests, questionnaires, indices, measures in order to aid the army in its control of the lower ranks.

In 1958, the American Sociological Society relinquished its sermonising role by changing its name to the professional American Sociological Association. Sociology had changed its dominant role to that of the extension of sophisticated research technologies to provide scientific results it could sell to business and government. In 1960 ASA moved to Washington and employed a full-time lobbyist. Membership grew from the 1600 of 1946 to over 12,000 in 1968.

Sociological research must persuade the powerful that it is useful. The road to power and prestige in the post-war profession is via research publication. This form of capital is converted into academic promotion, which yields access to greater research funds, and closer control over graduates and their research. Servility is rewarded (although it is naturally named 'civility'). The oppressors research the oppressed, both as the practice of the profession upon the social world, and within the profession, upon its own members. In 1969, 80% of the Sociological budget came from government and corporation contracts (Friedrichs, A Sociology of Sociology). The post-war research boom began with Pentagon money. ASA lubricates the links between the profession and its funds, and disseminates Knowledge out to the world and down to the colleges and schools.

"The German Social Scientists have always acted as an extension of the police. While the latter act against social democracy with truncheons, the former work wtih the weapons of intellect" (Rosa Luxembourg). Police and Sociology are functional alternatives. Research thrives on a low level of conscious unrest, widely diffused. But as depression converts unrest from the passive to the active - to strikes, riots and .

rebellions - intellect loses its function. When the ruling class switches its funds from the software to the hardware of containment, Sociology retreats behind the lines of the police and hopes the social organisation of repression will seem sufficiently inefficient to warrant Sociological research.

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History: The first moment of history is the production of the means to subsistence. The division of labour which produces the world is a separation of mind from body. By definition, and, more effectively, naturally, control of production and its distribution goes to the heads of the hierarchy of organised effort. Labour divided begets a product and surplus. Property is an overdispossession of working people. Mechanical work loses its mind in the activity, and its product in the surplus. Ownership appropriates material and ideal production. Since ideas coordinate any activity, the appropriation of ideas is essential to the maintenance of established order.

Ideas: Under ownership, confirmation of property, of the naturalness of dispossession or exploitation, arrives through all available channels of communication. What else in a social order producing for profit rather than use? The massive pre-existence of a division of labour, between thought and control and passive routine response, is a practical thought control during working hours. It is the nature of things. Besides which it is, apart from 'the odd anomoly', a working, productive nature. Losing a mind at work, each worker, in his 'spare time' finds the categories of experience preempted in the dominant production of ideas. Naturally - that is the precise bourgeois function in work and Culture. The free play of the market is the theft, by one class of another, of all mind and matter.

Materialism: The 'consumer society' is the reality of 'freedom' in consumption that is the sop to the slavery in production. A passive spectacular society is the product of life organised around the negation of active participation. It is also the ideological construct of a class in defense of its own privilege in the face of the demands of angry working interests whose real share of the product has scarcely improved this century. Passivity and spectacular consumption and hoarding in the domain of schooling is a necessary indoctrination masterminded by official Culture in general and in Education, the Social Sciences and Sociology in particular.

Knowledge: Ideal production can be the practised creativity of the person or the reactive reproduction of the Knowledge of Experts. Capitalistic organisation of lives, in which we rip profit from each encounter, denies our own knowledge. All that can be known is what Authority has said. Knowledge here becomes a commodity, an exchangeable value, a quantum of property, which we monopolise and for which we compete. Ideal production precisely follows the contours of material production. Labour is divided and activity becomes meaningless. The product of the Expert becomes a reproduct of the prevailing ideology, a special bit of Expert information that, by virtue of its quantifiable homogeneity, leaves the layman's comprehension and activity unmoved - except that an increase in secret and monopolised Knowledge takes us all closer to a better establishment of

Spectacular Passivity: under the commodity perspective all is possessed. Attributes of the person become possessions, for example, for which, in the nature of private property, each is responsible. Hence, conveniently, each is responsible for his quantum of, eg, Intelligence, Pathology, Schizophrenia, Depression, Hyperactivity, Subnormaltiy, Normality... Each 'has' the categories of the Psychic Experts as a material endowment, just as private property is passed down the generations.

Profit sells goods and ideas, passing them down from above, from the frivolous images and fantasies of luxury and entertainment to the serious business of education and the control of 'deviation'.

Nature: "It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness" and "...the ruling ideology is the ideology of the ruling class". The historical role of ideas in the service of vested interests is to hide the life of history behind the face pack of a timeless, universal, given Nature. By this token, and through the revelations, mandates and questions of Science, Law, advertising, the news, Education, the Social Sciences, the Humanities, the High and low arts and just plain common-sense, ruling interests get safely guarded by 'the nature of things'.

Ideology: or false consciousness, is revealed by simple dialectical questioning. It is a false relation between symbols, between propositions and the realities undergoing representation. Ideology occurs as convenient image or half-truth. Faced with dialectical reason ideology can only stand as overt lie, a contradiction between theory and practice, or fall to a revolution in practice. The truth displays no contradictions between its terms and between them and its related realities. Materialism, the practical philosophy or science of our lives, assumes all activity is motivated, including of course, theoretical activity. Ideology is interested lying which pretends it is disinterested Truth. No need to postulate any particular conspiracy, motivation is embedded in the systematic organisations of social activity maintained by the powerfully interested. "The nature of things", and especially importantly the nature of institutions, depends upon our believing the lies. As part of a wider structure of exploitation, the current Social Sciences have their own parts to play in perpetrating the Big Lie. Any lie - or truth - is a theoretical practice situated in history, in the life of political-economy.

Capital: Capitalist production demands the dispossession of the life of the subject. Systematic exploitation arrives as the global system of possession and domination, the world market of commodities.

School: Marshall McLuhan had school as an interruption in the education of the young. But miseducation has its purposes which are not accidental. The child learns his commodity nature as a matter of official fact, within the schools he moves through. The school establishes a norm, it takes each child on a line towards homogeneity and repetition and quantitative value. The text of the school is the practice of theory which, backed by crude psychological and physical violence, persuades each child that his existence is measureable in relation to each other child. The first message of school is: shut up and keep still. Each child's activity is tolerated only within the concrete, given, categories of school organisation of persons and their knowledge. Grading, streaming, tests, exams, I.Q., ability groups, the stream of common sense speech issuing from the mouths of teachers whose first problem is order ('stupid', 'thick', 'lazy', 'bright', 'hyperactive', 'disturbed', 'not got it in him', 'good home background', etc, etc. are the daily terms of the teaching profession as it processes its product) establishes a natural hierarchy in which, happily, 'the most intelligent' rise to the top. Schooling is a ritual of entry to the bourgeois world, in which succeeders and failures learn to submit to authority. It is a decade in which to break down the resistance of those who must lose their minds in work. It is another few years in which to persuade the bourgeoisie that they have not lost anything, but have won, as they deserved, the rights of privilege. (Cf T Wooton, article in Sociology, 1974, in which he finds that, at age four, working class children are no less articulate than middle class. Well, well.)

University: Continues the capitalist project in the realm of the Highest Ideas. It reproduces the ideas of the prevailing order. Ideas are hoarded for profit in a competetive system constituted exactly in tests and examinations.

Social Science: in the world arena is dominated by Empiricism. This is the pragmatic elevation and justification of the thoughtlessness of 'common sense'. It is the pretence to science. Established Social Science is the Expert ratification of the given world. In exploitative hierarchy the given world is always a taken world. Given nature is the lie of class appropriation. Social science could not be real until it becomes the theory of the practice of taking and making the world.

Sociology: Is the practice of theory without a practice. It is a contradiction in the terms it sets itself. It tries to be, or pretends to be, systematically Scientific in its search or research of the social world. It conceives the social world as other than itself. It tries to be Scientific or sound Scientific, and so becomes immediately ideological. It is a philosophy of practice which cannot recognise itself as such. The establishment of Sociology is a contradiction in terms. Science changes the world. To fund professional Sociology is to institutionalise the science of history, of political economy, of culture, of institutions. Max Weber's madness was no accident of his character. It was the personal experience of the madness at the centre of any Sociology which seriously tries to be neutral in its science. The only detached observers are the mad. (Generally, when Liberals get mad they become tories).

Socio-logics: Speech is the most abstract of our projects. We all speak of ourselves, make logics of social life. A scientific sociology is disestablished or anti-established. Sociologies are, if they really make sense of reality, if they really have practical significance, revolutions (but in theory). To speak sociologically is to criticise ideology.

Class: Theory is a luxury denied to most people. Surplus or spare time depends on the committed time of someone else. Commitments of time to production are clearly inequitable, and so are returns. Return is generally inverse to effort. The position of the university within the scheme of things is quite clear, too. The Humanities are built on this inhumanity, and it would be strange if they and the Social Sciences did not generally provide the Cultural and Scientific justifications for the system of exploitation, since both depend upon it absolutely.

The Answer: There are differences in emphases a further luxury of luxury of times of relatively distant conflict - Soweto, Vietnam, 1926 and Northern Ireland. But as a form of life, apart from the evergrowing niceties of their internal theoretical contradictions, apart from their contents of knowledge, the Social Sciences are the practice of conservative ideology. Each and each tendency, pretends to have, or be on the way to, The Answer. Conservative contents maintain that they have The Answer. Liberal contents suggest they are on the way to The Answer. Liberalism is always more complex. They work on The Answer, but social life is so diverse and difficult to understand. Liberalism always uses the delaying tactic of reason and reasonableness.

Alienation: Theory is the conception of action. Practice without theory is alienated being, as is theory without practice (One is materially richer than the other). Sometimes people refer to authentic life as praxis = the resolution of theory in practice and practice in theory. It is a completeness

a togetherness, a realisation. Utopia is a fascinating topic but quite irrelevant to analysis.

Alienated Theory: The Social Sciences are today's bona fide theories of practical life, or practices of theoretical life. Separated from practice they must become romantic, neurotic, dead reproductions of ideology, which is to say the class system. Joined with practical life they are merely more prestigious and wealthy official aides to Authority. The deep message of Social Scientific practice, as conscious theory and research and unconscious institutionalised practices around the control of knowledge, is the reproduction of the present by ignorance of it. This is manifest in time, for example, by Social Sciences' lack of future and past.

Time: To speak is to hold a sense of past and future in the present. All speech is re-presentation. Social Sciences' future and past is a mere repetition of the present. This is an instance of wish fulfillment, fantasy elevated to an ideological Truth by an irresponsible present. Analysis cannot proceed without a sense of time. Social Science believes what is ought to be, and tries to persuade itself and its public, by its ritual mumblings, that what is must be.

Arrogance: If you throw the terms of a Social Science theory back upon themselves, contradictions emerge quite quickly. Despite Sociology's paramount concern with 'clarifying' concepts, it does not descend from theory to practice in its self-analyses and hence misses the essential nature of its own practice. Somehow authors' texts on social life do not refer to themselves. Occasionally a liberal will take the point but refuse to resolve the contradiction (cf the introduction to Goffman's Frame Analysis in which he refuses to characterise his own position in history, ie in politics and economy and ideology). Such a refusal is perfectly reasonable. Ideology is founded in power and in fact power does not have to answer to reason. So reason is ignored.

Actuality: Professional Sociology dresses social theory in the threads of Science. It occurs in each of the advanced industrial countries, except Britain, in answer to Marxism, when those countries have reached their imperial peaks. Sociology is an effusion of industrial capitalism as its optimism gives way to a defensive depression - both material and ideal. It is late bourgeois metatheory, the justification of history as ideas, to combat Marx's materialism. In Europe it was the attempt at general systems of theory to deny Marxist totalising critiques. In America it was systematically pragmatic. America imported Weber and Durkheim via the medium of Parsons and became the post-war leader of world Sociology. There was little Sociology in Britain - only one chair - until it slowly emerged as conservative theory and liberal practical research (the cataloguing of class and its correlates, such as educational failure, income distribution, etc) in the atmosphere of post-war reconstruction. Sociology's big boom in Britain was during the university expansion of the '60s. Sociologists spend most of their time in research, and in teaching. This is mainly a poring and muttering over the arguments of the charismatic founding fathers, and the ritual movements of the gathering of facts. The main actual concern of the Sociologist is, like any other mortal, his creature comforts. His theory will reflect the cosseting of his body, the pain of his responsibilities to his property, his sexual angst. This won't figure overtly in theory. As in real science, the subject is absent. Sociology is 'pure' intellection. It fulfills a need for its conservatives and liberals: on the one hand, Real Facts, on the other, abstracted commitment. It must be complex or its practitioners lose their own justification.

England: Here Sociology emerged out of the liberal

intentions of social administration and welfare and the more polarised theorising of White emigres from European fascisms of the right and left. It was established at the end of England's empire, but still serves a colonising class wishing to ameliorate its worst contradictions. We could expect a greater intoleration of argument as class conflict moves closer to home.

The Wheel Thing: Words make a difference. The reification of concepts, acting towards them as if they were absolute things, is a false way. Any knowledge is an attitude towards the world, and any attitude takes conscious form as knowledge. Knowledge, or science and morality are aspects of one being. To know is to know what ought to be. Politics is the expression of the distance between knowledge and reality, a space expressed in practice. Bad karma, or activity directed by false consciousness, fucks over the world and the self simultaneously. Neurosis, the violence of politics and other such ecological disasters are the symptoms of collective cop-out.

"Britain - alone of major Western societies - never produced a classical sociology...or a national Marxism. British culture was consequently characterised by an absent centre. Both classical sociology and Marxism were global theories of society, articulated in a totalising conceptual system. They subsumed traditional disciplines within a synthesis designed to capture the 'structure of structures' - the social totality as such." Perry Anderson "Components of the national culture" in A. Cockburn and R. Blackburn Student Power
L Althusser:"It is by the very nature of the knowledge it imparts to students that the bourgeoisie exerts its greatest control over them."

The 'national culture' has been lifted by a particular class. The British Left has been a passive spectator and a deluded accomplice to this theft. Culture has been made against it, yet the Left has never questioned this 'national inheritance', actually an enduring bond of its subservience.

The Humanities and Social Sciences provide the concepts defining man and society that are central to political action. Traditionally socialists have denounced the manifest distortions of the contents of each discipline. But acceptance of the present distribution and demarcation is not revolutionary. It renounces purchase on the coherent totality, it fails to structurally account for them.

All the disciplines are represented within the universities, teaching courses legitimated by decades of tradition. Each has a respectable local pedigree and its leading practitioners enjoy external reputations, even if only in the English-speaking world. Except Sociology. There is still no chair in Sociology at Oxbridge, an interesting institutional aspect of an original and fundamental historical fact:Britain had no classical Sociology, and its form today is a withered half-life of routinisation. Sociology was the great intellectual achievement of the bourgeoisie between 1880 and 1930. It occurred simultaneously in France, Germany and Italy, and was recapitulated and adapted by Parsons between 1930 and 1950 for the USA. Britain missed the first founding wave of Sociology, and has proved more or less impervious to Parsons to this day. British Sociology, set up under the auspices of entrepreneurs from Economics, Psychology, Philosophy and social work and social administration - as well as instant experts from even more diverse fields - has been generally treated as a descendant of Victorian charity.

Classical Sociology was synthesising: Weber dealt with religion, law and the market in history, Durkheim with psychology and social solidarity, Pareto with politics in history. Each surpassed discrete psychology, economics and history to form unified theories. As Parsons indicated in The Structure of Social Action, Marshall was England's most important Social Scientist of that generation, and he failed to transcend analytical economics. Sociology thus arrived as a science to reconstruct social formations. It was developed later in Parsons' action theory which embraced every

aspect of existence in a single schedule of classifying concepts. (That Parsons' theory could explain nothing, had abolished history in its total deformation, is something else: Sociology in its extreme, the greatest tory metaphysic of the 20th century).

Sociology arrived largely as a response to Marx as a prior totalising system. It came as the bourgeois counter-reaction. Marx had summarised German Philosophy, English empirical Economics, French Politics. Marx's totality was different from the systems of later Sociology: it showed a complex whole loaded by the predominance of one level, the economy (or material being), so that genuine dynamic contradictions were generated by the discrepant hierarchy of its levels. Weber returned to a sub-Hegelian totality, idealism, which gave a circularity and equivalence to levels. This was later incorporated in Parsons' functionalism. But Marx had kept the central Hegelian notion of contradiction, which found only shadowy despondent expression in Weber's notion of charisma vs bureaucracy (although there was a surreptitious evolutionism in Weber's idea of rationalisation). Pareto saw an endless circling of elites. Durkheim's organic solidarity evolving from mechanical produced anomie - the ceaseless tendency to rulelessness in societies defined by their ensemble of collective rules. These are all degraded contradictions, eternal cycles of human nature. And each was a manifestation of the disquiet, the foreboding of the years around 1900. Parsons later developed an absolutely integrated totality, in which the contradictions were reduced, and only tension control and pattern maintainance remains. Sociology in the two times and places expresses the distance between European civilisation on the eve of an international civil war and an optimistic American capitalism in the epoch of its world domination.

Marx was ahead of his time. The bourgeoisie, the Academy, did not seriously confront him until fifty years later. It was only when the political rise of the working class became a threat to social order that the bourgeoisie reacted to Marx's science with Sociology. But it has rarely been a direct engagement with Marx (eg Durkheim's Socialism was unfinished and yet, through its considerable length it mentioned Marx not once. Sociology's evasion of Marx is either by ignoring him or by crass ignorance of him. And yet Sociology cannot be understood except as a reaction to Marx/ism).

During the early 20th century, Marxism generated new theorists - Lenin, Gramsci, Lukacs -, and generations after them. Marxist cultures arose in each European country and affected the national culture. European Social Science develop within debates with, or in tension with the heritage of Marx. Yet Britain did not know Marx until the literary courting of the 1930s, an ephemeral collective fever that dissolved with the Soviet-Nazi pact. That had been a sentimental leftism which failed to read Marx. The inherited liberalism of Culture existed the same beneath the new political allegiance against fascism. Marxism had been embraced emotionally by poets and scientists - the two vocations least suited to politics. The formal application of Marx only led to bad art and bad science.

Why did English culture lack a conceptual centre? The 19th century industrial interests accomplished a revolution in the economy but not a political or social one. They were checked by the previous capitalist class, the agrarian interests of the 18th century who had got control of the state and made it over in their own image. There were no insuperable contradictions between the 18th and 19th century bourgeoisies and their modes of production and distribution. The industrial bourgeoisie was deeply impressed by the horror of the French Revolution and, afraid of the nascent British working class organisation, never risked confrontation with the dominant aristocracy. Instead, by mid-century, it had fused with it in a

new composite ruling bloc. No general theory of society developed since the rising power had no general problems to solve. Only Economics and natural science developed - Darwin supplying a fringe aggressive totalising social theory. Utilitarianism justified the economy but was a poverty stricken philosophy or general synthesis. Philistinism needed no theory, and Victorian ideology was characterised by Tradition and Empiricism. There was a sedulous mimicking of 18th century Authority, and when the new had fused with the old bourgeoisie, by the late 19th century, 18th century ideology became second nature to all with power.

The bourgeoisie renounced social reflection, it refused to question society, to countenance the category of totality. It did not have to revolutionise society and so did not rethink society as a whole. Empirical, piecemeal disciplines of intellect corresponded with humble, circumscribed social action. Intellect addressed the investigation of Nature and society was accepted as second nature, the rising bourgeoisie accepted its comfortable place in the hierarchy. The feudal state had been dismantled by agrarian capitalist interests in the 17th century, the agrarian order was already capitalist, there was no need to overthrow the preceding ruling interest. A common mode of production united the two interests. Totality had been an unnecessary concept for the new bourgeoisie as it entered the ruling order, and became dangerous when it had entrenched itself in that order. 19th century criticism had been literary, there had been no general conceptualisation of political-economy. After Chartism's collapse labour had been no general threat, and its eventual representative party arrived twenty years after those of Europe, and was still untouched by Marx. The dominant class had no need to produce a counter-totality to combat labour. British culture has remained tranquil and parochial since the 18th century.

Intellectuals were well integrated into the ruling class by the end of Victorian imperialism. The aristocracy had captured the public schools and the universities by 1700. There was no separate intelligentsia. Law, based on precedent, or Tradition, was practised by a craft guild of the aristocracy, as opposed to the European separation of a Roman Law situated fairly independently in the universities. An intricate web of kinship knit scholars, lawyers, thinkers and scientists into capital and the state, a relationship mediated by the family rather than professional caste.

Into the stagnation of 'deep-rooted traditionalism and lively progressiveness' a White emigration was injected during the '30s and '40s of this century. England was a haven of peace compared to the European experience of occupation, civil war and revolution in Europe 1914-1945. England's culture still reflected the solid stability achieved in the 18th century. But Economics and English Literature were the only two Humane and Social Science disciplines relatively unmoved by the White emigration into English provincialism (and Economics received a considerable injection of foreign blood. Keynesian economics was never purely English, and found its most fervent disciples from abroad). Literary Criticism, the appreciation of English Literature, was naturally immune to the invasion, which included (the men who became masters of the English disciplines): Wittgenstein in Philosophy, Malinowski in Anthropology, Namier in History, Popper in Social Theory, Berlin in Political Theory, Gombrich in Aesthetics, Eysenck in Psychology, Klein in Psychoanalysis.

England had not before received such an emigration. Its reception was highly selective - the red emigres moved across Europe away from Nazism's advances, and finished either in the USA or in Russia. Intellectuals had fled to England before, but never had achieved intellectual prominence there. The best example is Marx, who had no following in England. Those emigres with affinities

for English culture came to England: the Austrian provincials rather than the German cosmopolitans, White counter-revolutionaries fleeing the instability of their own countries. Their common stance was a pragmatic anti-dogmatism. They flattered the English consciousness and were well rewarded. They exploited its weaknesses, specifically the slow death of English Humane Culture. There had been no English originals since Russell, Keynes and Lawrence, all of whom had matured before 1920. The cumulative absence of any historical experience had robbed the culture of its energy. It had become a deeply instinctive ad hoc conservative empiricism, the theoretical rejection of theory, a style rather than a method. The White Emigres systematised the rejection of system, they codified Empiricism, thus hardening and narrowing it - and, incidentally, opening it up to attack.

The void at the centre of English Culture generated a pseudocentre that pervades the whole culture: the timeless ego, psychologism, the nuclear psyche as the first cause of society and history. It also generated a surrogate totality: English Literary Criticism, a metaphysic that refused to justify itself, empiricism's strangest expression: Leavis.

Psychology as a belief in a psyche prior to its social determinations found its quantitative factuality in the works of Eysenck. Social Scientifically, action is the quantitative, atomised reactions that Empirical Psychology systematically invents and catalogues. There is no history, no politics, no biography even. And that explains action in English life.

Totalisation did occur in one discipline, Anthropology. But English Anthropology uniquely kept separate from Sociology (Durkheim s Sociology <u>is</u> Anthropology). By the end of the 19th century, the English bourgeoisie controlled one-third of the globe. Totalisation was thus exported onto the colonised subject populations. It was "useful to colonial administration and dangerous to no domestic prejudice" (McRae).

Literary Criticism thus became 'the displaced home of totality'. Leavis proclaimed Literature the 'chief of the Humanities', a claim accepted and unique to England. Previously, and elsewhere, Philosophy claimed the crown. But English Philosophy became technical and Literature became ethical. Classically, in all other cultures, the reverse happened: eg in France, Literary Criticism became a technical hermeneutic and Philosophy concerned itself with ontology and morality.

The way the void at the centre of English Culture found a content is interesting. To fill the void was to encounter the wrath of empirical, practical culture. Leavis' criticism did not judge by an external philosophical norm, but possessed the work by internalising it and ranking it with other possessed works. He was 'empirical and opportunist', but eternally caught between empiricism (which accepts) and criticism (which dares to judge qualitatively). He thus spoke an insistent metaphysical vocabulary ('life', 'health', 'vitality', etc) yet employed a positivist method. The criticism was circular: the interrogative form of criticism that presents the text as value in its suchness ("This is so, is it not?"). This can only work when critic and reader share a completely stable system of beliefs and values. Hence the nostalgia for lost organic community. Leavis' epistemology collapses without the unified culture of the audience. Organic community is no mere whim, but the cornerstone of Literary Criticism, its only validation. So English Literature cannot understand foreign or avant-garde writings. Incomprehension is built into its method. Since organic culture died with the separation of elite and popular

culture, Literature has, by definition, declined since Bunyan. Until the 20th century, the elite remained an organic unity, but now the mass media of electric technology have brought commerce and industry to the last bastion of Culture.

'Scrutiny's pessimism encountered the shallow optimism of literary Marxism in the '30s and proved itself easily superior. Marxism was seriously entertained by Leavis, alone of inter-war English intellectuals, but rejected because it partakes of the materialism of capitalist culture. Civilisation is spiritual, ideal. The Spirit is represented by Cambridge, and specifically 'Scrutiny'. In this scheme of totality reality regresses to the ideal: 'Scrutiny represents Cambridge' and yet Cambridge actually rejected Leavis. 'Marxism is a capitalist materialism' and yet Marxism actually rejects capitalism. Leavis's desperate logic was nevertheless a recognition that something was wrong with English Culture. He attributed it to 'mass civilisation' and the corruption of the literati. He was hooked by a totalising Empiricism and never could face the categories of sociology. Yet R Williams' Long Revolution (Penguin 1961; see also Culture and Society, Penguin 1961), was the only serious work of socialist theory of the English 1950s, and it emerged from Literary Criticism.

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Grail: Social Science knowledge is an esoteric translation of the mundane. It is an education out of direct and into convoluted forms of talk and thought. Social Science as a university discipline participates in the hierarchy of the modern desacralised Church of Scientific Truth. The ritual transmission of the grail - in seminars, lectures and its testing in examinations - is a measured introduction to the closer guarded secrets of the universe vouchsafed only to those who prove themselves responsible to that Knowledge. Incidentally, the priestly gatekeepers to the inner sanctums of Knowledge are also, in a society arranged around the myth of meritocracy, the gatekeepers to material reward. Knowledge does not then have to persuade each acolyte, it partakes of the power of money which speaks louder than mere words of reason.

Liberal: Social Sciences are the ideal productions of a particular historical conjuncture. Liberalism is a persuasive control. It has passed from its relatively detached, entrepreneurial status of the late 19th century and now exists as the mask the corporation presents to those it would control by gentle persuasion before brute force. Classical Liberalism was quite innocent. Corporate Liberalism is cynical. Social Scientific liberalism is a privilege based in the exploitation of metropolitan and colonial populations. The existence of Social Science assumes hierarchy, a privileged knowledge demanding leisure for its own elaboration.

Reproduction: The commodity rules and the university is no exception. It stands at the apex of an educational system that extols commodity as graded intellect. The production of Knowledge, as with production in general, is for profit not for use. Knowledge is hoarded as Authoritative Texts to be spent (generally forgotten) at each examination-marked gradation of intellect. Marx's comments on material production under capitalism apply just as well to ideal production, certainly in the fields of the Humanities and Social Sciences: "...the necessary result of this competition is a general deterioration of commodities, adulteration, fake production and universal poisoning..."

University: Its existence within a rigid hierarchical division of labour is the concrete manifestation of ideology. The natural division of labour is a historically contingent, political act. The university

expresses the necessary inverse of the supposedly natural stupidity of the mass of humanity who fail to make the educational grade. Intellect and Culture, preserved within universities, presupposes sub-humanity which is moronic and uncultured. The particular theoretical articulations that arise within the institutes of Higher Learning all take their Authority from the central ideology of meritocratic legitimacy. Authoritative University Texts constitute the Highest forms of Intelligence, and the very existence of hierarchies of grades, schools, secondary and tertiary schooling proves that we are all born with different quanta of intelligence. English racism finds support throughout the institutions of Knowledge: it was well known before niggers and wogs arrived that the indiginous working class suffered a genetic deficiency.

Quantity: Not quality, counts. Academic productions are seldom more than reproductions - redundant commentaries upon the already said. America has taken this further but the tendency has entered English academe. The repetition, in its sheer weight of consensus, reinforces the conventional wisdom. Novelty might be exploited, in the neologisms and invented jargon of the more daring academic careerists, but novelty, the gimmick, is a surface phenomenon, the repackaging of old forms. Compared with the social science and philosophy of the 18th and early 19th century, our century's Social Science is quite poverty-stricken in its actual sensitivity to human life. Social Science today is an institutionalisation of the 19th century divorce of social theory from social practice, and in the service of a rationalised, bureaucratised social order, a ritual smothering of the charismatic insights of engaged social theorists.

Assumptions: Social Science takes the person out of time, out of history, and strands him as an absolute object. This is the counterpart in the realm of ideas to the general political-economy of the person under capitalist social relations. In production the person's time and subjectivity is appropriated. In consumption subjectivity is returned as passive spectatorship. Activity which fails to submit to given forms is immediately 'unreasonable' (by definition), 'senseless' violence or madness. Social Science takes the print culture of Bourgeois intellection for granted. It assumes the class structure and process of a world empire of capitalism. Its effective social science is then, as Social Science, an ideology of persuasive tricks and coercions rather than democratic reason.

Methodology: "...Aphorisms, representing a knowledge broken, do invite men to inquire further, whereas Methods, carrying the show of a total, do secure men, as if they were at farthest." (Francis Bacon, The Advancement of Learning) Methods did not occur until the Renaissance, as a conscious formation apart from the ways of speaking themselves. They constitute the prime concern of Sociology. Sociology's first interest is Total Knowledge. Social Science has become the Scientific, Expert, Official, True version of social activity. Crude substantive positivistic Social Science and obsessive Methodologising and Philosophising Social Science attacks the same project - a vision of a utopia of total fascist determination, or prediction, in the realm of human affairs. Positivism is the technological way to ever greater precision, Theory and Methodology the conceptual way to the precise assignment of contents to concepts. Both are impossible projects which deny themselves in their own practice - the imaginative practice of a, however debased, creativity. Theory and Methods are institutionalised in Sociology courses, but since Theory rarely commits itself to actual analysis of the world, they become the philosophical and technical wings to a central concern with Methods, which with the institutionalisation of Sociology, can become the

endless generation of pure theory and purified technics.

Reflex: The test of a theory is its application to itself. Does the Theorist's theory account for his own practices, including his production of theory? On this test very little Social Science remains standing. It collapses as Scientific Truth and arises as ideology.

Educators: Social Science assumes a privileged status in relation to the social world. Much Sociology recognises, albeit perhaps unconsciously, this fact and refuses, by way of philosophical meandering, to actually say anything about the world. But that Social Science which does tell us about the world usually reveals causal determinations which, magically, do not apply to the Social Scientist himself. This is the perfectly natural unconscious reflection of the material position of the Social Scientist: he is actually a privileged idea-monger to a hierarchical order that he does not experience as a determinative causation of his behaviour. The Social Scientist, supposed to be the most fully conscious member of the bourgeois class, unconsciously performs a vital ideological function, the continuation of ignorance. Social Science systematically evades the practice of the subject, the social reality, whilst simultaneously arguing that its production is the way to the Universal Truth of the human condition.

Violence: The topics addressed, and the ways of the science, reveal the essential nature of Social Science. Its barbaric sensibility is manifest in the violence its texts visit not just upon what we might think of as reality, but upon language and sense themselves.

Truth: The more desperately Social Science rushes towards a vision of totalitarian voyeurism and predictive determination, the further the actual truth recedes below the horizon. The real danger of Social Science is not that its massive fact-gathering expeditions might ever come back with quantities of 'data' that actually correspond to reality. Since positivist Sociologists and Psychologists are so separated from the subjects they investigate this is not, happily, very likely. Rather the sheer accumulation of facts, the gross actuality of the professional enterprise serving interests with a faith in Science, delivers 'verification' of prevailing myths of reality that become convenient theoretical springboards for further domination by the Authorities, and further 'conclusive evidence' for the Truth or essential reality of the hierarchy of possession and dispossession. Scientific Facts are persuasive in themselves to a culture organised around knowledge as dominative Science. Thus, for example (again) the racism of Jensen and Eysenck does not provide us with new knowledge but merely more, 'more precise', more Scientific Facts to support a knowledge we already had: namely that, if in a bourgeois world Intelligence is measured by bourgeois criteria, workers, the Irish and blacks are certainly, on average, less intelligent. The ideology of scientism makes us feel better about something we knew all along. Conveniently racist Science ignores historical or political explanations of differences in human conpetence. Ideology, historically located lie, presents itself as Universal Truth.

Deviance: In the realm of Intelligence is just one example of the overdeterminative function of ideas in a class system. Not only is deviant practice coerced towards submission or alteration by the violences of established Authority, but deviation is Scientifically proved to be pathology. Conveniently a class order that appropriates the mind and activity of its work-force proves that its workforce could not act and think anyway. Deficiency gets its desserts, as efficiency gets its just rewards. The natural order and

Science combine to convince everyone that class is merely the reflection of the deficiencies and sufficiencies of pre-existent characters..

Class: The origins of Social Scientists are not particularly significant, although, naturally they are usually bourgeois of various tendencies. Of course, ranking within each profession accords with rank of origin. An academic must always 'fit in' with the ways of the ruling class. A professor has high status within our world. Don't expect him to actually reveal the nature of the world he purports to study. Anthropology has an aristocratic colouring, Economics a centrally bourgeois one, Psychology attracts the fanatics of positivism, Linguistics is, naturally, somewhat cultured by its travels, History scholarly, etc. Sociology and Politics tend to be petit bourgeois. Petit bourgeois culture tries somewhat desperately to become centrally bourgeois, to join the masters of the earth. Each discipline has its tory and radical wings. A stance that is possible and relatively popular is theoretical criticism. Western liberal democracy, which can afford many luxuries, can certainly allow criticism, so long as it remains theoretical. This is a manifestation, in the realms of ideas, of what Marcuse calls 'repressive desublimation' - fantasy and play is encouraged as sexual (material) activity within a generally passified society, so long as that desublimation does not issue in active politics. Even in its excesses of criticism, then, Social Science proves the efficacy and inevitability of the given order. The subtle theorising of Grand Theorists, Methodologists, Hard-Data Positivists and Radicals alike proves the essential rationality of the separation of theory and practice which actually perpetuates division.

Practice: Sociology conceives its practice as pure observation. If it cannot achieve that it still wishes it could or pretends it can. As unself-conscious practice (technical factgetting) and as Theory (philosophising and methodologising) Sociology seems more or less desperate for a final Knowledge. The endless concern wtih quantitative precision in the measurement of Facts and with filling each concept with its nice and only contents - both quite pointless exercises from the standpoint of science - betrays Sociology's psychosis. God is a fascinating topic for Sociology, not surprisingly when the profession is intent on replacing that concept with one of the techno-bureaucratic Know-All, a divination "Towards a Sociology of..." the total rule, Absolute Knowledge, the predictive reduction of the subject to the status of objects. It is the vision of a miraculous - or horrific, depending on your weltschmerz - Positivist future. It is also, by the token of its own imaginative production, a contradiction in terms.

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"Whereas the natural scientist constantly, relentlessly and progressively transforms nature, the sociologist obstinately abstains from transforming society in the name of 'value-free' (read action-free), neutral and even empirical science. The relation between subject and object only becomes a problematic when the subject must 'keep off' the object. It only becomes a problematic when the object is not a product of a practice of which a theory is the theory. In other words, the bourgeois obsession with subjectivity and objectivity is the effect of a particular relation between theory and practice."

(Mark Harvey, "Sociological Theory: The production of a bourgeois ideology", in T Pateman, Countercourse)

The Subjectivity/Objectivity debate is a relation of theory to practice and the product of practice. (It is the attempt to prove the 'purity' of the practice of theory: "Division of labour only becomes truly such from the moment when a division of material and

mental labour appears. The first form of ideologists, priests, is concurrent. From this moment onwards consciousness can really flatter itself that it is something other than consciousness of existing practice, that it really represents something without representing something real; from now on consciousness is in a position to emancipate itself from the world and to proceed to the formation of 'pure' theory, theology, philosophy, ethics, etc." (Marx)

Social Science knowledge is unrelated to any systematic transformation of its object (actually it is of course related to the transformation of its object - the people it studies, or would study if only it wasn't so difficult to actually say anything. The relation is a mediated extortion of the surplus, a gentle taking left to the frontline troops of management and the agents of the Law). The object and knowledge of it in Sociology both derive from the ideological function of the Sociology of Knowledge (or, more generally, the knowledge of Sociology. Having been funded as an Institution, Sociology will not fail to produce 'knowledge'). Sociology presents Society in its immediate, direct appearance. The methods of questionnaires, participant (ie passive) observation, surveys, analyses of value systems all systematically exclude the life of people - politics and morality and the knowledge of how society could be, or of any systematic material relations beneath the appearances of unself-consciousness. Theorising is totality for Sociology.

Knowledge divorced from practice can only be purely abstract, the product of a knowing contained entirely within itself. When the production of concepts is dissociated from the production of the objects of those concepts, the concepts will always bear an unreal and uncertain relation to each other and to actuality. A knowledge that refuses to be based on any practice other than theory can never be a theory of actual practice.

Whenever Sociology is used it is abused. For example, a theory of organisation becomes subservient to the patron when employed for organisational use. It cannot be a theory of its own use, it becomes a representation of organisations, not a theory of organising. Theory always becomes subordinate to practice - the running of the organisation - which organisation must not itself be touched or changed. Theory thus inevitably legitimates practice, it cannot scientifically comprehend it.

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Sociology: arose as rejection of Marx, in the persons of its Great Theorists. More mundanely, it is the last Social Scientific discipline, and took as its domain whatever the other Social Sciences had left over. It studied the aspect of 'the social', whatever that might be. Its Great Men have all articulated a tormented angst. Weber's endlessly qualifying scholarship took his neutrality into a catatonic depression which in its long silence was the antithesis to his massive wordy assault on All-Divinity. He emerged from that depression with a positively reactionary (Liberal) politics which, nevertheless, went a long way to clearing his head. Durkheim gave a clear picture of proto-fascist hope - society arranged according to the dictates of professional groups - and in the meantime of faith in a repressive practice of a more pragmatic nature. Parsons Social System of conceptual determination according to 'value consensus' (ie the prevailing interests) is a fascism of theory manifest in the abstraction of its presentation rather than the contents of its substantive analysis. Parsons, who still kept some critical edge through his mangling of language, admitted he would/could do no more analysis, quite openly, in an essay in 1945 (T Parsons, Essays in Sociological Theory, Free Press, 1964, Chapter "The Present

Position and Future Prospects of Systematic Sociology"). In the synthesis of activity and function that Parsons gave Sociology, Function triumphed as the sad and inarticulate deference to the powers that be.

Criticism: Disappears in the mass of 'abstracted empiricism' which is quite mindless of its own activity. It also disappears in modern theory which refuses, once more, to face the totality. For example, Homans expresses a positivist theorising which views science as endless quantitative research of variable by variable and the object as pre-existent economising psyche. This is the harder, traditional bourgeois attitude. Goffman, equally reducing the object to the timeless ego, expresses the new bourgeois world of impression-management, the hustle of the corporation liberal who deals in images to delay recognition of realities. The only serious criticism within Sociology today, which naturally remains in the realm of ideas, is the school which twisted off from Parsons' tail, Ethnomethodology or Phenomenological Sociology. But it most certainly treats the theoretical as the only human attitude.

Ways and Means: Sociology takes the Authority of the Published Text, the rational and routinised against the charisma of speech, poetry or song. Scholarship, just like real Science, lacks the subject, the speaking "I". (Reason is nothing personal but must be interpersonal.) Explicit and literal texts can be enlightening, but there is a masquerade of Science, Authority and Profundity which Sociology not only fails to evade but is organised to produce.

What is Sociology?: A count in 1969 revealed that, of the output of the major American and English journals of the profession to that date a full two-thirds of the articles worried over the conceptual problems of the practice of sociology. Sociology, when it is not a fairly mindless Fact-production, is literally the asking of the question "What is Sociology". It has rarely been analysis.

Grandaddy: Talcott Parsons was the last sociologist to talk about matters of general significance. He is the wise old man for Sociology and much American social theory to this day. The term 'Society' plays a big role in social theory, as a Durkheimian 'thing in itself', a thing apart from the actions of people in history. The concept is central to role theory, to general and whatever range normative functionalisms, implicit to empiricism, and now absent or ineffable to Ethnomethodology (this is a crucial, conscious absence, as reaction to the impossibility of Parsons' 'Society'). Sociology participates in Parsons' evasion: he cannot systematically account for his own practice, theorising. For him all creation is a deviance which lies beyond sociological comprehension as an unexplained pathology that must bend to the 'social' will. In Parsons' cosmology all action is explained as submission to others, and yet, most strangely (most ideologically), the necessary correlate to submission, domination, is absent. The reason for its absence is obvious. It is the reason for all dominations.

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"The intellectual movement corresponding to organised capitalism is to be found in the replacement of a philosophical tradition concerned with the problems of anxiety and death (or, conversely, with historical and transcendental hope) by a scientistic, rationalistic and ahistorical mode of thinking."

(Lucien Goldmann, The Human Sciences and Philosophy, Cape)

The material basis to life changed from crisis capitalism to an organised, monopolistic capitalism during the 1950s and onwards. State and international

regulation replaced free competition (and restriction). (The actual basis of post-war 'stability', which has only been a stability of the state-capitalist, colonising 'developed' countries, has been the conditions of international trade, the dependency of the prime producers upon the 'good will' of the industrial powers. The 'Third World' has slowly asserted itself against established industrial power and this is creating the conditions for greater instability, the establishment of permanent crisis.)

Social Science rises above Philosophy and the Humanities as the abandoning of the old humanist and individualist values of the science of an optimistic, assertive bourgeoisie. Positivism replaces the old values, a Social Science that does not think about itself, a technocratic efficiency. Criticism occurs only as that of the dying liberal culture, not of the emerging society. Ideal production and consumption follows that of all commodities.

There is a methodological denial of history - in Functionalism, in Structuralism, in Positivism. Social Science joins the overriding ethic of Science: the elevated value of the domination of nature by ahistorical, nondialectical and very efficient means.

The bourgeoisie discovered the 'social' dimension early in the 19th century, but did not develop it until the period 1870-1930. It had been used by Marx, quite concretely, as early as the 1840S. He demonstrated the social conditioning of the social sciences themselves, and the impossibility of transcending certain limits of understanding without simultaneously overcoming the limits of bourgeois society and beginning to serve the interests of the proletariat, by the very research of society. Classical Sociology occurred in the period of finance- or imperialistic-capitalism. The inadequacies of individualism and free competition began to become clear and were accepted intellectually by the bourgeoisie itself. It was the first era of monopoly, of trusts and cartels, of the saturation and political domination of the entire world market by the Western bourgeoisie who were driven closer to internal conflict by the over-production (or underconsumption) that a greedy system demanded. Internally, the class war was becoming overt in the form of unionisation and working-class politics and the use of more general strikes. (The solution to overproduction was conspicuous waste, World War.) Apart from within England, Sociology began in that period to contend with Psychology as the theory of humanity, but as an expression of a tendency. For the bourgeoisie maintained its power quite securely through one World War and the next, only altering its general philosophy from a heady optimism to a depressed fatalism, and moving from a paternal liberalism to a more defensive conservatism. Germany was the least balanced of the Western countries, the most rapidly changing, the most exposed to internal and external contradictions of market development. It thus produced the most significant social theory.

Established Social Science at this time made positive scholarly contributions, but the pessimism was still theoretical, not a lived reality, and so there was a steadfast refusal to encounter history as class history. There was little emphasis upon the economy. Weber can as easily be read as extensive corroborative footnotes to Marx. Durkehim's work avoided class by focussing on primitive societies.

But there has been a fundamental break between the Masters of Sociology and the disciples (inaugurated organisationally by the extensive institutionalisation of Sociology as technical research and theoretically by


Parsons' synthesis of historical sociology). The distance between the modes of theory expresses that between the height of European imperialism and its decline. Sociology has increasingly lost touch with reality as the new description has separated from general theory. There has been a radical elimination of history. Theory has moved towards a timeless abstraction or an absolute relativism. The particular is analysed out of context. Sociology no longer understands but domesticates, studying phenomena according to their 'adaption' to the established order. Sociology has become the ideas of a class in decline (or a class defending its interests by a more subtle control of Knowledge?) Psychology, in Sociology, as elsewhere, reasserts itself as the key to societal understanding (Psychology divides to rule). Exchange Theory, role theory, dramaturgy, Ethnomethodology, Methodologising, Theorising, relativism and the non-polemic of pluralistic licence, the study of unsituated particulars, the bland recognition of 'conflict', the measurement of class, the study of deviance outside of political-economy: Institutionalised talk about our lives together, if it hopes or pretends to science, is a contradiction in terms.

"To 'liberate' the branch (of sociology) means not to sit on it whistling the 'Internationale' but to saw it off. The point is not to reinterpret oppression but to end it."

(Nicolaus)

(One more contradiction for the road.....

TRANSFORMATION



THE TRUTH IS THAT EVERYTHING CAUSES EVERYTHING ELSE, WE DO NOT SPEAK THEREFORE OF ONE THING CAUSING ANOTHER.

The false consciousness of positivism still rules in the minds of contemporary Sociology, even and especially in the criticisms of the older Sociologies by the new versions of Ethnomethodology and Phenomenology.

Sociology's first foothold in British academic life was at the London School of Economics just before the second World War. In theory, the generation following T H Marshall shared his liberal, historical awareness and used loosely Marxist and Weberian categories of analysis. But, more importantly, as empirical practice, they provided continuity for the traditional ways of charitably concerned data collection within that past-war context of social democratic optimism.

The welfare perspective of piecemeal research remained the staple product of the profession emerging in the 1950s. The departments began in the provincial universities during that period were staffed by LSE graduates, older European emigres and migrants from the other academic disciplines. So theory begged and borrowed from various intellectual fields, from Philosophy and History to Psychology and Anthropology - but increasingly from American Sociology. By the late '50s and early '60s hard data collection and methodological 'precision' governed research as Parsons dominated 'modern theory'.

By the time the new universities were built there were still not enough home-grown Sociologists to staff the great expansion of positions. For Sociology had become mandatory to the thrusting, dynamic new universities. Many staff were still being recruited from other disciplines and it was this generation of 'impure' professionals who were to teach substantial numbers of future teachers and academics whose sole focus had been Sociology. By the end of the '60s, Sociology had stopped recruiting staff from outside the discipline and the first generation of 'pure' Sociologists began to filter into university staffs, but, more significantly, out into the Polytechnics, the technical colleges and the schools.

By the 1970s, then, senior positions in the universities were held by the founding professionals, now getting on in years, and holding diverse eccentric views ranging from near Marxism through pragmatic empiricism and welfarism to anthropological functionalism and psychology. Or, in the universities founded in the '60s, seniority was held by middle-aged and more centrally (American, Weber-Durkheim-empiricism) consensual professionals. There were fewer opportunities for the rising generation and yet it was they who had been actually trained as 'pure' Sociologists by their 'impure' elders.

The mission of the 'new' Sociology takes its 'radical' edge not so much from its original thought as from its resentment of the entrenched and yet 'less competent' controllers of the profession, and from its own introspective insularity which it confuses with profundity. The 'new' Sociologies have criticised Parsons and simple-minded empirical research. They have

'discovered' recent German, French and now English Linguistic Philosophies as 'the grounds' for any Sociology. But, since this is not the essential purpose of the arguments of professional Sociologies, they have revealed no new truths of practical importance. In the 'new' Sociologies the purpose of argument remains, in its false notions of science, research, theory and reality, the maintainance of itself as a privileged centre of ideological production.

The "Theses" happened some time ago. The context was finally written up last summer.

THESES ON ETHNOMETHODOLOGY

"...But you wear this great hat, this great expensive elaborate tottering ill-fitting uncomfortable carnival hat, all decked out with plastic flowers and tinsel and little bells, because it makes you feel good, feel cultured and civilised and Greek and superior, in spite of your hydrogen bombs in a world where men loot and kill as much as they ever did, and women and children starve in unprecedented numbers, and in a universe as cold and hostile and meaningless as it ever was. But graceful hats do not give their wearers grace, neither are dainty hats of any use to whores."

From Smallcreep's Day, by Peter Currell Brown

INTRODUCTION

What follows is a characterisation of a school of modern thought whose practitioners will steadfastly refuse any characterisation. Don't let that fool you: speech allows us to discriminate and even imperfect naming is better than the romantic search for Perfection. This will be a typification which is sorry for any stereotyping, but things can be said.

The belief that the macrocosm is contained in, or can be approached through, the microcosm seems good enough. The main force of this critique is applied not so much to the focus as to the ways of Ethnomethodology and Phenomenological Sociologies (hereinafter grouped together as "the 'new' Sociology"). A reading of Sociology throughout the '50s and '60s reveals that while the 'new' Sociology thinks of itself as

'radical',more or less openly insisting it is the saviour of professional Sociology, its productions participate quite fully in the illusions of Sociology that have been central to its theory and practice since Sociology's complete establishment. Both theoretical, which is to say 'thoughtful', Sociology and its naive empirical practice, what C Wright Mills called 'abstracted empiricism'[1], conceive of the science of Sociology as the hitherto perhaps unattained, but attainable accumulation of a final, determinative, objective knowledge. The 'new' Sociology retains that project as an assumption, or rule, generating its whole activity. In response to the obvious shortcomings of Grand Theory and naive positivism, the 'new' Sociology performs the latest twists and steps in a fundamentally conservative dance of words which fail to question their legitimating presuppositions.

To understand the 'new' Sociology is to situate it within Sociology's development. The professional, academic discipline of Sociology is the institutionalised response to the crisis in modern life and thought. But funded, quite naturally, by established interests, it operates from within the given order to become an institutionalisation, in 'scientific' thought and practice, of that very crisis. A broad and catchall metacultural activity that emerged as an answer to Marxism's total critique, the object of Sociological research and theorising must always be, in fact, the subject. In the first and last analysis the social world we can only ever hope to really know is ourself. To establish Sociology, to institutionalise the questioning of the society, of institutions, of ourselves, is to begin to live a contradiction: for established interests cannot tolerate subversion, theoretical or otherwise.

The first to hold chairs in Sociology, Max Weber and Emile Durkheim were, respectively, more and less aware of the interested nature of all Social Science. Weber specifically addressed himself to discussion of the role of the Sociologist, an intentional, committed agent attempting, he hoped, to be dispassionate, 'scientific' and 'objective' in his studies of the social world - a world of moral and political meaning.[2] Durkheim preferred to ignore his own politics, the effect of his own projections upon his reading of what he wished to be the neutral facts of the social world. But his arguments around the point were so transparent that it did not matter.[3] With Talcott Parsons, American Sociology's first general theorist, Weber's concern with the interpretation of meaning and Durkheim's hope for a positivism of social 'facts' became amalgamated in the programmatic Structure of Social Action.[4] Already that plan for Sociology was tainted by an ignorance and dismissal of the claims and achievements of a social science called Marxism. But, by 1945, Parsons had expressly stopped doing sociology and instead had begun the scientifically empty but ideologically necessary job of building grand conceptual schemes as an excuse, a project he termed "Normative Functionalism".[5] Parsons' contribution to conservative metaphysics was an attempt to interrelate the institutions of the given order and account for their structure in terms of their facilitating the performance of functions essential to the maintenance of that very order. That approach to Sociology had become, by the 1950s, the prevailing conceptual enterprise and justification of English-speaking Sociology. Ethnomethodology is its direct descendant. Garfinkel, inventor of the term 'Ethnomethodology', and its sturdiest theoretician and practitioner, singled out Parsons for praise as a mentor:

"Parsons' work, particularly, remains awesome for the penetrating depth and unfailing precision of its practical sociological reasoning on the constituent tasks of the problem of social order and its solutions."[6]

There is an agreement between Normative Functionalism and Ethnomethodology about the problem for Sociology. And its 'explanation' is, for both Sociologies, sought in nothing other than the description of the rules by which social life is organised in its daily routines. Whereas Parsons, after 1945, described the relations and functions of the general institutions of 'the Society', Ethnomethodology seeks to document the rules by which local interaction proceeds. Sharing the goal - a final, determinative description of the rules that constitute the possibility of social order - the two Sociologies differ only on means. The earlier theory approached the problem from the most general orders of 'Society' and its institutions and, via role theory, seemed to wish to work right down through the specifics of the orderings of institutions to the close description of the normative order manifest in the duties and obligations of the near infinite particular roles. Clearly this was a hopeless task, and the 'new' Sociology argues that analysis must begin from the ground itself, from the rules of the most mundane forms of organisation, particularly from the rules organising our sense of social reality in immediate encounters.

This 'new' Sociology is, then, a new approach to an old problem, the problem of all conservatives, that of the maintenance of the social order. The pervading feeling of the old Functionalism, a feeling the 'new' Sociology does little to dispel, is that the given order is the only possible order, and that the Sociologists' description of it is the objective, only possible account. In this respect both the old and the 'new' theoretically concerned Sociologies agree fundamentally with the more mindless empiricism of those Sociologists who care little for theory and justification but rather get on with doing Sociology as 'fact' gathering from statistical rates, questionnaires and so on. The mindless and the 'thoughtful' mainstreams of Sociology remain agreed in their presuppositions: that Sociology can be or become 'objective', that there is a 'reality' amenable to a neutral, final, determinative, scientific account - whether that is now possible or will, with the accumulation of research and the use of more sophisticated techniques of correlation, the extended use of computers, etc, etc, become possible. This positivism is a tenet central to nearly all Sociological thought and practice, and is only to be expected of an enterprise positively integrated within the established order of things.

Within that faith, however, the 'new' Sociology is a cult erected upon a disagreement about means. The respect it feels for Parsons does not extend to the old, unthoughtful positivism, for it quite rightly recognises that research must treat with integrity the reflexive, interpretive, meaningful phenomena of interaction. It is clearly not good scientific practice to accept the data of questionnaires and statistical rates without regard to the means of their collection and meanings intended by those, both public and professionals, who participate in their production. The 'new' positivism of phenomenological research follows Parsons in its description of the institutions of social life, but 'more realistically' believes that

"...the objective reality of social facts as an ongoing accomplishment of the concerted activities of daily life, with the ordinary, artful ways of that accomplishment being by members known, used and taken for granted, is, for members doing sociology, a fundamental phenomenon...Ethnomethodological studies analyse everyday activities as members' methods for making those same activities visibly-rational-and-reportable-for-

all-practical-purposes, ie 'accountable', as organisations of commonplace everyday activities. The reflexivity of that phenomenon is a singular feature of practical actions, of practical circumstances, of common-sense knowledge of social structures, and of practical sociological reasoning. By permitting us to locate and examine their occurrence the reflexivity of that phenomenon establishes their study."[7]

The 'new' Sociology is actually still a positivism when it does research but, with the benefit of a reading of Parsons directs its analysis to the description of the ground rules and assumptions of the organisation of daily life. Parsons' early post-war theorising had worked merely theoretically from the establishment of social order by the mutual expectations of 'ego' and 'alter'.[8] This reflexive nature of reality got somewhat lost in the grand theoretical systems and intuitive 'research' of the later Parsons. Garfinkel's work begins with the premise formulated by W I Thomas, and which underwrote the 'low-level' narrative Sociology of symbolic interactionist research: "If men define situations as real then they are real in their consequences". However, the 'new' Sociology is a 'high-level', logically stringent and philosophically pretentious practice which has grand designs. Rarely even so much as nodding to the symbolic interactionist tradition, it began its search for the rules generating all activity by reference to the Philosophical tradition of, specifically, Husserl and Schutz.[9] The 'new' Sociology began to fulfill Parsons' project in the research of local interaction, fully aware that previous Sociology (ie naive positivism and grand theory) had not systematically questioned the meanings of their resources - both the suppositions of their data and of their own use of the data. Sociology would now acknowledge that people are not mere 'judgemental dopes', whose lives are to be understood as merely reactive, whether to the broad social forces of grand theory or to the categories of questionnaire research.

So far as the 'new' Sociology is concerned, its study is:

"...directed to the tasks of learning how members' actual, ordinary activities consist of methods to make practical actions, practical circumstances, common-sense knowledge of social structures, and practical sociological reasoning analysable, and of discovering the formal properties of commonplace, practical common sense actions 'from within' actual settings, as ongoing accomplishments of those settings. The formal properties obtain their guarantees from no other source and in no other way...

"Ethnomethodological studies are not directed to formulating or arguing correctives. They are useless when done as ironies. Although they are directed to the preparation of manuals on sociological methods, these are in no way supplements to 'standard' procedure, but are distinct from them. They do not formulate a remedy for practical actions, as if it were being found out about practical actions that they were better or worse than they are cracked up to be. Nor are they in search of humanistic arguments, nor do they engage in or encourage permissive discussions of theory."[10]

The concern is clearly with the analysis of commonplace reasoning, by which, as any existentialist sociology would realise, the sense of the social order is maintained. The second quote, in which Garfinkel alludes to his project by saying what it is not, certainly insinuates that this 'new' Sociology, unlike the old, is 'scientific' since it excludes prescription, morality, politics, rhetoric. His 'new' ascetic and 'truly' scientific approach is actually unnameable - if there is any beauty in Garfinkel's writings it lies precisely in his wierd blending of mysticism and 'Science'. If we can assume that the 'new' Sociology is true to its

existentialist phenomenological rationale, however, the study is whatever is done.

A lot gets done, but it is not so clear that it is science, just because it supposes it is disinterested. Garfinkel justifies one particular essay in voyeurism thus:

"That persons 'rationalise' their own and each others' past actions, present situations, and future prospects is well known. If I were speaking of that, this report would consist of one more authoritative version of what everybody knows. Instead, I have used the case to indicate why it is that persons would require this of each other, and to find anew as a sociological phenomenon how 'being able to give good reasons' is not only dependent upon but contributes to stable routines of everyday life as they are produced from 'within' the situations as situations' features. (The subject's) case instructs us on how intimately tied are 'value stability', 'object constancy', 'impression management', 'commitments to compliance with legitimate expectancies', 'rationalisation', to members' unavoidable work of coming to terms with practical circumstances. It is with respect to that phenomenon that in examining (the subject's) passing (as 'normal') I have been concerned with the question of how, over the temporal course of their actual engagements, and 'knowing' the society only from within, members produce stable, accountable practical activities, ie social structures of everyday life."[11]

The 'new' Sociology recognises, then, that people establish a reality - social, natural or whatever - in their work and talk together. As against both grand theorising and abstracted empiricism the 'new' Sociology is 'phenomenological' in that it recognises that the life people establish is made in accountable and accounted talk about themselves. What Sociology will discover, by this new method, are the formal rules by which interaction and talk, and the talk about behaviour and talk, proceed. The ways the 'new' Sociology practices its research are by the close documentation and analysis of actual encounters and procedures, by getting participants to give reasons for their behaviour, or by the mild subversion of expectations. Such methods, the study of the methods of ethnic community, reveal what is assumed and accounts of why it is assumed. By working out what must have been assumed if sense was to have been made in an encounter such ethno-methodological study uncovers the normally implicit, institutionalised structures of expectations, the operations which could be actualised but which generally lie implicit to common interaction.

As becomes a cult which will rescue Sociology from itself, the 'new' Sociology finds its basis to lie in that 'highest' order of ideation, academic Philosophy. Philosophy performs the dual function of actually considering the most abstract problems of thought and of legitimating the activities of all who quote it. The 'new' Sociology, besides drawing on Phenomenology, takes as a landmark a study in logical positivist linguistic analysis, Bar-Hillel's discussion of the 'indexicality' of all talk.[12] Whereas symbolisation seems capable of achieving universality in the natural sciences, in the Social Sciences, as in normal daily conversation, expression is always indexical: meaning always depends upon the context of its use. Our activity and statements about the social world both assume worlds of understandings - sense is only completed by the particularities of each unique context, interaction and reason are maintained by people abiding by certain rules of mutual allowance so that an order of things exists, despite the lack of complete explicitness, for all practical purposes. Specifically, the Ethnomethodo-

logical approach is meant to reveal the rules by which we fill in the gaps in the sense of each others' speech. For example, the 'new' Sociology discovers that when we converse we assume contexts for our speech which need not be fully and explicitly stated at any time within the discourse; we assume that what is being said at one point, even though it might not then, will, in the course of the speech, receive later clarification (we know everything cannot be said at once); we assume that each participant to our interactions perceives the objects, including the talk, within it in the same way. And so on. Ethnomethodology sets out to count the rules by which people act as if participants to a completely clear, context-free, literal sense in behaviour and speech, although all activity is irredemably contextualised. It shows how people maintain a feeling of the massive objectivity of the world even though the world is tenuously constructed out of subjectivity.

The hope seems to have been that, by a careful documenting of a multitude of 'occasions', we will approach a definitive list of 'ground rules' for conduct and speech. There seems to be no particular system - or rule - to the researchers' choice among and within the infinity of occasions, but nevertheless, at least theoretically, the approach would yield a determinative, predictive ability to the Sociologist. The hope of the 'new' Sociology (which with the relativistic, 'philosophical' versions turned to an effete sort of despair), is that, somehow, by beginning at the ground and working upwards', Sociology might purge itself of all rhetoric and become a Science. But ritualistic phrases about intentions to 'maintain the integrity of the phenomena' are quite useless unless the Sociologist can see that the 'theoretic stance' the Sociologist is somehow privileged to take as he researches the 'natural stance' of those living and getting along with each other is itself a natural stance. No matter how much he might wish it, the Sociologist cannot become a mere camera, and it is, anyway, in the pointing, focussing and editing that the document is produced.

Theoretically, the warrant for the actuality, for the pure integrity, of the phenomenological account is supposed to lie with the affirmation of the people whose speech and assumptions have undergone analysis. Read any of the 'new' Sociology and this seems an unlikely event, but even were it to happen, and agreement were got, the likely response would be: "So what?". For it is by no means clear that the document of any 'new' Sociologist reveals any great new truth, and certainly not clear that any such document rests upon an unquestionable ground and thus yields an unquestionable truth. Garfinkel's accounts are surely as good, or bad, as any other accounts. However much he wishes them to be systematic and interesting, they are not 'objective' or 'scientific' in the sense that the 'new' Sociology understands the term. Indeed, to the extent that Ethnomethodology indulges in its absolutist Sociologising it fails to even try to comprehend its own categories and 'extra-scientific' motivations and becomes a high-flown, self-important subjectivism. What Sociology analyses and explains does not become more amenable just because it is the local, immediate situation.

The 'new' Sociological theorising, the 'permissive discussions of theory' which Garfinkel, understandably, does not recommend, often note objections such as these. The 'philosophical' and actually relativistic versions of the 'new' Sociology note that every event, including the research process, has its context, which, if 'indexicality' is to be 'remedied', needs explication.

And yet each context has its context. There do not seem to be sufficient grounds for the sort of optimistic researching that Garfinkel suggests, ie an exploration of the rules of the occasions of others in terms of the Sociologists' own insufficiently explored absolute assumptions. But the alternative is to face the regressional vortex of the phenomenological project - the impossibility of a complete exploration of the researchers' own assumptions let alone anyone else's - to face a hopeless, endless theorising with the message that nothing can ever be, safely, systematically, scientifically or even commonsensically, said.[13]

The absolutist version of the 'new' Sociology conveniently forgets 'its own' discovery, that activity is reflexive, and only carries on its research by defaulting on its research into its own rules or assumptions. The recognition that people make an 'objective' world for all intents and purposes, that people can and do 'remedy indexicality' does not become a self-recognition. The 'indexicality' of Sociological research is, of course, practically remedied, but we are not shown how. In fact, what the 'new' research finds, as with all other Sociology, is what is presupposed. Garfinkel's work can be read as a lengthy documentation of his original suppositions: that the social order is talked through, and whenever problems arise rules and reasons are formulated to encompass the case within 'normal form', and allow social life to continue. His argument is at once more precarious and more solid than Parsons': The social order depends upon the multitude of the trivia of daily conversations, which is the tightrope, yet to lack speech, communication, a common reason with our fellows, is to lack our humanity, and that is the safety-net for the social order. There must, therefore, be consensus, a common sense, rules underlying cooperative behaviour. This is at once presupposed, sought and found: of course there is a social order. The particularities of its routine confirmation are certainly interesting, but that is only half a sociology: what is as, if not more, interesting is the way that any order is established and maintained. Garfinkel's institutional settings and understandings are all somehow given. His choice (still the conservative disciple of Parsons), is to ignore the ways common sense or rationality are 'given' by the creative, novel, antagonistic activity of interested parties to social orders that always remain more or less violent and repressive.

The relativistic versions of the 'new' Sociology equally renege on their project. For it is clear that, for all practical intents and purposes, people do 'remedy indexicality'. Indeed relativistic theorising ignores its own productions: if nothing can be said, why go on speaking (for they certainly do go on speaking)? In fact this form of solipsistic 'philosophising' evades the central problem, which is to say, the investigation of its own activity, its own premises and rules of practice. For to admit that words make a difference and have an effect - even the 'new' Sociology's own forms of often, quite literally, nonsense - would be to leave the realms of an idealism that performs a strictly ideological function, not a scientific one, and to actually begin to investigate the practical intents and purposes. The 'new' Sociology has its purposes. But these do not seem to be mainly scientific.

Both the 'new' Sociology as research and as theory fail to overcome the contradictions central to their own activities. Garfinkel prescribes a research method which, somehow (through sheer will?), avoids prescriptiveness. The relativists, who actually philosophise rather than do research, face, in their turn, the paradox of any Cretan liar: if indexicality cannot

be remedied that very belief and the marks and sounds around it constitute nothing but meaningless gibberish. Grand theory and abstracted empiricism are found out by the 'new' Sociology, on the grounds that accounts are always indexical. Yet the 'new' research cannot proceed except from rules it leaves largely unanalysed, and the 'new' theory becomes little more than a 'clever' and fashionable reiteration of the implicit to most prior Sociological theorising and methodological discussion. That is the belief and persuasion that to actually do sociology is very fraught, in fact, impossible. Of course, words do make a difference, which is why the verbal production of the 'new' Sociology exists at all, and it is precisely this difference which, reflexively, the 'new' Sociology ought to address. The 'new' 'philosophically grounded' absolutisms and relativisms actually make some difference both to Sociology and the intellectual fields around it, and to the careers of the Sociologists. The hope of the 'new' research and the pessimism of the 'new' theory are the latest forms of the articulation of the childish wish for a totalising, objective Science for which the Sociologist, as mere medium for a neutral Truth, need not take responsibility.

This 'new' radicalism is thus a revolt within Sociology, a Young Turks movement which does not become, however, a radicalism within the world. Were it to be so it would systematically apply itself to the discovery of itself as it discovered 'the world'. It would recognise quite clearly that its own divinations are not and never can be those of the All-Knowing, the Divine. Since the main function of the 'new' Sociology, as that of the old, is ideological and not scientific, it does not allow an objectivity to the social world that is an interested subjectivity. There is a way of approaching the objectivity of the social world, including that process within it that is the construction of reason. An indispensible part of the way of a sensible sociology is the admission of the Sociologists' own objectivity: their concepts, assumptions, ground rules can be investigated and historically located. Any social organisation, including Social Science, most certainly 'remedies an indexicality', even in its supposed failure to do so in terms of its own ideals. The remedies are precisely for all practical intents and purposes, and however honourable the intentions of a Social Scientist, there is a politics and a prescriptiveness to his intents and purposes that bear directly upon his reasons, his reasoning. In terms of their own 'discovery' the 'new' Sociologists have not been very successful: they have not systematically investigated their own reasoning and reasonable practices. But beyond that, to the terms of an objective world of subjects, the 'new' Sociology fails to locate itself historically as an ideal production within a world order of political, economic and ideological establishment.

It is only within the political-economy of the 20th century that the writings and teachings of Sociology make sense. Like the old forms, the 'new' Sociology does not stop to ask itself about the real basis to its faith in its own Divinity - a faith shared, in the main, by all the Social Sciences. After and despite all the internally debated objections, the positive response to this assumption of the Divine status is the actual pursuit of empirical, or positivist, research. The negative response, the admission of the failure of theory in general - but always actually their, particular theorising - naturally, by the token and totem of 'the failure of talk', does not go so far as to question the very possibility of Sociology's Divine Right. That Divinity, the idea that Social Science will, should or must some day provide us with a final, total,

determinative, predictive knowledge of human life, is based upon a quite mundane separation of thought from practice. The division of labour has proceeded so far, has become so encoded in the terms of consciousness, as to convince the actually privileged 'observers' and theorists of social life that they have become closer to God, the Truth, to the extent that they are distanced from the social practice upon which they comment. In fact, Social Science's heady idealisms can only lead further and further from the truth. Compare the methodological writings of Weber, who faced exactly the problems of the 'new' Sociology, with any of the recent 'new' methodologies or theorising. The truth recedes as attempts to reach it via 'pure' theory advance.

On the face of it Ethnomethodology sounded like a good idea, even an exciting one. Before it Parsons' "Social System" had seemed like a sort of cosmological general hospital, a structuralism which would stop the conceptual universe bleeding to death. When the haemorrhage continued the younger members of the profession looked towards a sort of cottage-hospital, piecemeal bandaiding. Garfinkel's "Studies in Ethnomethodology", published in 1967, came as a godsend of theoretical and research justification for the young English profession that had burgeoned in the 1960s. 'New' and 'radically different' intellectual influences were cited for a messianic revival of a Sociology that, in its 'Theory', still referred primarily to Parsons. Garfinkel's writings mingled the esoteric and the mundane - German Philosophy and 'everyday life' - in a heady archaic and modern, Latinate and Germanising abstraction-of-the-most-concrete, 'bracketing' of 'reality' which was established as 'everyday' by the liturgical reiteration of words like 'common', 'practical', 'ordinary'. The new cult was above and beyond mere Sociology-as-it-had-been - but nevertheless remained actually firmly within its most important premises.

The 'new' Sociological research failed to comprehend that the understanding of 'everyday life' is always an interested knowledge. The approach still assumed consensus and mutuality, upon which, certainly, social life depends. But to understand the rule is only half the business of a sociology which wishes to understand activity. The practical applications of rules are supported by interested people. The 'new' Sociology does nothing to avoid the reification of social life that has characterised Sociology throughout its history. For instance, Garfinkel suggests that "the situation at hand has overriding importance in determining" the nature of social interaction.[14] And yet, of course, as the 'new' way elsewhere ostensibly recognises, 'situations' are only made real by 'persons', those real determinants of interaction. In the worlds of the 'new' Sociologists there is little negotiation, no coercion, no rhetoric, no conflict of interests.

The other path of the 'new' Sociology, the relativistic theorising, begins with Husserl and Schutz and spirals off from that 'existentialist phenomenology' towards logical positivist philosophising. It now tends to legitimate itself by reference to, on the right, the catalogues of the Cambridge Philosopher Austin, or on the left, Wittgenstein, the only recent non-Marxist Philosopher to have stepped right up to the edge of a useful sociology.[15] In the event, Phenomenological Sociology seems unlikely to go beyond that mysterious, unearthly Philosopher who himself never dared to leap the conceptual chasm between the study of language games and the study of purposive materiality, to bridge the two domains and hence perform a sociology or philosophy actually relevant to anyone's understanding of their existence. The charisma of Wittgenstein adds to

the authority of Philosophy and gives a convenient rationale to the 'new' relativism: any language game, any rationality, is as good or as meaningful, or meaningless, as any other. And the job of Philosophy/Sociology is merely to analyse/write. Like Philosophy, the 'new' Sociology conveniently ignores the material purposes of its own rationality, its own games.

Ideation based in and apologising for an established order finds its expression in the violence of its own forms. The 'new' Sociologies tend to be more or less concentrated blitzkriegs across the face of language, laying waste meaning and sensitivity in the name of clarity. It is difficult to believe that Garfinkel is entirely serious, but he does, after all, quite seriously discount irony. Those who follow lack even the humour of an original. The 'new' Sociological writings overtake the old as displays of weighty, mechanical-rococo piles of 'scientific/philosophical-sounding' jargon and phraseology, clanking lumpily over the pages like soulless science fiction creations which have escaped the clutches of their power-mad masters. They can be well read as attempts to persuade both reader and writer that here, indeed, is Science, or here, surely, is Philosophy.

The phenomenon of the 'new' Sociology is its own forms and its material basis. The 'new' has added further convolutions to the theory and practice of all Sociology. It is 'radical' because it disjoints logic within the old orthodoxy. It is an idealism that, as most Sociology before it, either describes the good form of a world given in consciousness or, at great length, opts to describe nothing at all. Its ideological function is manifest as its claim to a privileged definition of the scientific object, which it sees as a social order that is 'given' rather than the contingent product of an interested life. The ideological message of the forms of the 'new' Sociology is that doing sociology is an incredibly difficult activity, if not impossible, and therefore best left to an expert elite who somehow know better. Established Sociology is the general theoretical practice of a class enjoying, even in its undoubted alienation, certain privileges. It is therefore a theorising that legitimates itself by actually deferring to all the assumptions of the given order even as it protests that it subverts assumptions. It is the ideal form of repressive desublimation. It specifically defers to the ruling ideas about the concepts and practice of Science and Philosophy and their necessary divorce from a practice of social life. This 'new' Sociology, which tries to persuade us it is fervently 'phenomenological', completely fails to recognise, let alone incorporate, the insights of a phenomenological tradition in social science, running from Hegel through Marx and on, and of an interactional psychology beginning with Freud. The 'new' Sociological awareness of the tenuousness of rationality and its role in the construction of social order betrays its rationalising or ideological bias exactly by its refusal to include in its accounts the real phenomena of ideology or rationalisation.

The topic of Sociology has always been that residue of all the other Social Sciences which nevertheless encompasses all of human activity, a 'thing' called 'consciousness' or 'culture' or 'society'. Sociology emerged and became institutionalised as a theoretical and research method in opposition to Marxism. Its general theories provided a general secular cosmology, an exercise in consciousness that focussed upon the rational, conscious social and mental order. Its positivist research aped the natural sciences as a kind of assurance that all the details could be filled-

i n easily enough, and we would, one day, bend the social order to scientific control just as we had tamed the rest of nature. It took Sociology a long time to catch up with a general intellectual belief in 'the Absurd' - to lose some of its boy-scout optimism in the face of the actual progress of 'man's mastery of nature'. The 'new' Sociology with Garfinkel 'just does a scientific analysis' in a vacuum of meaning. With the relativists of the school it argues that nothing can be meant. In either case tthe traditional role of Sociology as
15 a comment upon general societal meaning is reduced to a description of privatised, individual, historically unlocated meaning or meaninglessness. Ethnomethodology takes its problem, just as had Parsons, to be the description of social order. It fails to transcend what might seem to be a quite vacant categorisation, to pass onto any comprehension of the life of the establishment, maintenance and degeneration of social orders (rationalities or whatever) according to the assertion of selves as well as the submission to 'given' orders. How and why orders are given will be the sociological problem for anybody concerned with understanding social life so as to take responsibility and actively live within it. Ethnomethod joins the tory mainstream of Sociological work, whose actual message, by virtue of the choices made in documentation is: "All men have to submit to social orders".[16] The relativistic versions of the 'new' Sociology, hitching their 'truth' to romantic images of a past European existentialism, offer a 'sophisticated' version of conservatism: "Nothing can be said, nothing can be done (so submit)". The 'radical' Sociology has done nothing to question the contradiction underpinning its own activity: it is a discipline established to investigate establishments. Self-analysis is the last practice of the Divine, and the 'new' Sociology proves no exception.

Sociology actually consists in a piling of ideas upon ideas upon ideas...It all has, however, a material meaning. While, no doubt, Sociologists look for Truth, Sociology is not so privileged as to evade ideology, which is to say the interested hiding of the truth. The prevailing notion of knowledge being that it is a commodity and a property that people possess and produce in concrete quantities - books and articles - most Sociological productions become blown-out ideological accounts which justify the given world in their positivist accounts of it, and their authors as authoritative, praiseworthy experts in social knowledge - or, in other words, the keepers of hoards of property that happen to be 'knowledge'. Ideology avoids truth in the name of Truth. Sociology's ideological function is to pretend that its 'scientific knowledge' is nothing to do with what would actually interest the socially situated people - which will indeed be 'rule systems' but also their generation in a political-economy of exploitation and repression, via word and deed.

The most general trait of ideological versions of social realities is idealism, which is to say that the versions dwell within the realm of ideas and fail to meet actual material realities. The 'new', 'phenomenonologically' inclined Sociologies present variations upon the old ideological theme of institutionalised Social Science. They are romanticised, 'Scientific' and 'Philosophically sophisticated' ideal expressions of the materialism we all support in our worse moments. They believe, literally, that it doesn't matter. In contrast materialist social science represents the approach and knowledge motivated by a more truly disinterested ethic which will really face material circumstances and interests. The idealism of ideology appears to mask the real material commitments of its producers and those interests they support. A materialist social science is 'idealist' because it

is prepared to squarely reveal and face its interested materiality - and, of course (the reason why it is politically subversive), the interests of everybody else. An existentialist and phenomenological social science has to be a materialism because in the first and last analysis we are members of a species struggling for survival. Materialist social science represents an ideal because it is convinced that our thoughtless irresponsibility, for ourselves and for each other, for the world ecological disaster, for the alienation - choose your focus or metaphor, what is meant is what is wrong - we are producing can be remedied if only we can lay the fear of the mother's son within us and don't give too much of a shit for our personal consequences. Real social science is a tall order.

All that, I hope, can help situate the following:

THESES ON ETHNOMETHODOLOGY

I
The chief defect of all hitherto existing Sociology - that of Ethnomethodology and so-called Phenomenological Sociology included - is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object or of contemplation but not as human sensuous activity, practice, not subjectively. Hence it happened that the active side, in contradistinction to materialism, was developed by idealism - but only abstractly, since, of course, idealism does not know real, sensuous activity as such. Ethnomethodological and so-called Phenomenological Sociologies may want sensuous objects really differentiated from thought objects, but they do not conceive human activity itself as objective activity. Hence, the Ethnomethodologists and so-called Phenomenologists regard the theoretical attitude as the only genuinely human attitude, while practice is conceived and fixed only as what appears to cultural dopes. Hence they do not grasp the significance of the real relations of power and privilege and the establishment of order between men, let along that of 'revolutionary', of 'practical critical' activity.

II
The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not just a question of theory, but is a practical question. In practice men must prove the truth, that is, the reality and power, the this-sidedness of their thinking. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking which is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question.

III
Certainly the Sociologistic doctrine that men are products of circumstances and upbringing, and that, therefore, changed men are products of other circumstances and changed upbringing, forgets that it is men that change circumstances, and that the educator himself needs educating. Hence this doctrine necessarily arrives at dividing society into two parts, of which one is superior to society (in T Parsons or L Althusser, for example).

The coincidence of the changing circumstances and of human activity can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionary practice.

IV
Ethnomethodology and so-called Phenomenological Sociology start out from the fact that men construct and present the world to themselves in consciousness, duplicating the world into symbolic constructions which are partly (and could, hypothetically, be totally) imaginary, and an infinitely differentiatable

real world. Their work consists in laying bare, at the level of very local and immediate interrelations, the assumptions and ground rules implicit to those interactions. They overlook that, after completing this work the chief thing still remains to be done. For the fact that certain constraints on behaviour, certain implicit assumptions and rules, are to be discovered beneath situations of interaction, is really to be explained by the self-cleavage and self-contradictoriness of the material and ideal interests of the differentially powerful, privileged and hence interested parties to social life. The real needs, commitments, powers and interests of people must therefore be made explicit and understood in their contradictions and revolutionised in practice.

V

Ethnomethodology and so-called Phenomenological Sociology, not satisfied with macro-Sociologising, appeals to the construction of realities for all practical intents and purposes, but relativistically and individualistically, at the micro-level and 'within situations', as if any construction of reality is as good as any other, and as if our beings are only constituted in parochial and immediate situations, not trans-situationally and historically in relation to wider networks of interdependency. They do not conceive of sensuousness as practical, human-sensuous activity.

VI

Ethnomethodology and so-called Phenomenological Sociology resolve human essence into the rules implicit to local and immediate relationships which they have documented. But the rules are no abstraction inherent to the 'Society'. The reality of the rules is to be understood as the contingent practical agreements of the more and less powerful, needy and committed parties to social organisations around practical functions. The Ethnomethodologists and so-called Phenomenological Sociologists who do not enter upon a criticism of this real essence, are consequently compelled:

1. To abstract from the historical, or even inter-biographical, process and to fix the rules as something by themselves, and to presuppose abstract and isolated forms of sociation.

2. The human essence, therefore, can by them only be comprehended as 'rulefulness', with behaviour naturally complying to internalised, static assumptions and rules 'given' to each individual 'by his social context'.

VII

Ethnomethodology and so-called Phenomenological Sociology consequently, do not see that the rules themselves are social products, and that the abstract rules they analyse belong in reality to a particular form of society.

VIII

Social life is essentially practical. All mysteries which mislead theory into mysticism or cynical or desperate relativism find their rational solution in human practice and in the comprehension of that practice.

IX

The highest point attained by contemplative materialism, or bourgeois Sociology, that is sociologies which do not understand sensuousness as practical activity, is the contemplation of single, isolated, individuals in 'Society'.

X

The standpoint of the old Sociologies (which includes the 'new' Sociologies) is the reified thing-like and determinative 'Society'; the standpoint of science is

human society, or socialised humanity.

XI
The Sociologists have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however is to change it.[17]

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FOOTNOTES

1. C W Mills, The Sociological Imagination, New York, Oxford University Press, 1959. This includes a lucid exposition of the ideology within Sociology at that time, and is still very relevant.

2. M Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences, ed and tr E A Shils & H A Finch, Chicago, Free Press, 1949. That and the next cited book remain classic arguments covering just about all the angles anyone could take were they to address themselves to the problems of being scientific about social life.

3. E Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method, ed G Catlin, tr S Soloway & J Mueller, Chicago, Free Press, 1938.

4. T Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, Chicago, Free Press, 1937. Underpinned modern Sociology's theorising for a quarter of a century or more.

5. T Parsons gives up doing Sociology, as a sort of culturally-biased and more conservative Weberian history, and lays the 'logical' grounds for Normative Functionalism in "The Present Position and Prospects of Systematic Theory in Sociology", one of his Essays in Sociological Theory, New York, Free Press, 1949. His The Social System, London, Tavistock & RKP, 1952, lays Normative Functionalism out as a general cosmology.

6. H Garfinkel, Studies in Ethnomethodology, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall, 1967. Garfinkel's text is my main target because he was the most original of the group of originators of that sort of Sociology: he invented the term 'Ethnomethodology' and his style, if not a single-handed creation, is archetypal to his school of thought. If you are looking for useful Sociology, others, such as A. Cicourel, might have provided more, and more relevant, research and methodologising. But Garfinkel's arguments exemplify 'pure' Ethnomethodology. The quote is Garfinkel, p ix.

7. Garfinkel, p vii.

8. T Parsons, The Social System, "Psychoanalysis and the Social Structure" in his Essays, op cit, and T Parsons & E A Shils, Toward a General Theory of Action, Cambridge, Mass, Harvard UP, 1951.

9. See, for example, E Husserl , Ideas, London, Allen & Unwin, 1967, and A Schutz, Collected Papers, vols

1-3, The Hague, Nijhoff, 1962, 1964, 1966.

10. Garfinkel, pps vii-viii.

11. ibid, p 185.

12. Y Bar-Hillel, "Indexical Expressions", Mind, vol 63, pps 359-79, 1954.

13. The relativistic path is taken by European- and theoretically-oriented Sociologists, and perhaps is more English than American. That way of doing Sociology was established in England by the Goldsmith people: P Filmer, M Phillipson, D Silverman, D Walsh, New Directions in Sociological Theory, London, Collier-MacMillan, 1972. Phenomenological Sociology can take other names - indeed, the invention of terms becomes a sign of 'originality' - such as 'theorising', 'pure analysis'.

14. Garfinkel, pp 32-33, for example.

15. L Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Oxford, Blackwell & Mott, 1953.

16. A research method that Garfinkel recommends is the subversion of people's expectations in order to reveal their very assumptions. He seems to see it literally in terms of some sort of an enactment, but only quite trivially and momentarily. This is quite different from any definite critical theory and practice.

17. Thanks to K Marx for providing at once the most succinct critique of idealist Social Science and the most useful social science methodology, in his "Theses on Feuerbach", pp 121-23 of K Marx & F Engels, The German Ideology, ed C J Arthur, London, Lawrence & Wishart, 1970.

This brief account of how Freud became a scientific analyst necessarily throws concentrated light upon the ideological appropriation of the concepts and procedures of science. These days, in the false consciousness of 'common sense' knowledge, Truth can only arrive as Empirical Science. Eysenck is particularly concerned to play upon our awe of the magical powers of natural scientific production, but he is merely a publicity-conscious example of the crass and vicious ideological mainstream of dogma that rules the Social Sciences. This consensus practices a bad sorcery which it calls the Science of humanity, of the subject, and which is always a deformed view of an aspect ('variable') of a whole life. In this impoverished ideated magic the absence of the subject within the natural sciences - characterised in its reports by the absence of the "I" - is, in Social Science, translated either into a fetish of absolute Objectivity or into the attitude of the cynical, relativistic Know-Nothing. The living subject hence takes an existence only as a pure, reactive object to a somehow privileged Knowledge, or, in the hands of weary sophisticates, 'because of its subjectivity' disappears within a realm that can never be known. Both attitudes deny the subject - the prime purpose of ideology.

Social Science is, in the following essay, shown to be a twin to the equally necessary popularisation of Science. So long as it does not practice science the public can have no real idea of the actual meanings of the theories of science, which are always in dialogue with the practices of science. Hence popularisation cannot but pass on a myth of Science, never science itself. Correspondingly, so long as Social Science pretends it is, could be, or should be divorced from political practice, it too delivers a myth: that of the Truth of its versions of human reality and of its methods in The Science of the life of people. The established Social Sciences conspire to produce the illusion that political and moral questions can be reduced to technical ones - for example by spending most of their energies in rituals which mimic the supposed practices of the natural sciences. Scientific popularisation, meanwhile, is a public relations exercise aimed at persuading the public that, through the magic of Science, all technical problems have their painless solutions. Both enterprises suggest that so long as things (which includes people) are left to the experts, everything will be alright.

The hierarchical order of exploitation, private property, needs to constantly encourage irresponsibility, in a blanket control over all politics and culture, if it is to maintain the illusion of its own necessity. Both the Social Sciences and the popularisation of Science are ideological repressions of the question: "Where is the subject of science?", which is to say the question: "Where am I?". As such, they join older institutions of ideological control, such as religion, school, monarchy, the media of news

and entertainment, the drug and mental health industries...The function of knowledge in a class society has to be the maintenance of class repression. Its structure as privilege and its function as ideology will poison real knowledge whatever its declared intentions.

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FREUD AND SCIENCE[1]

BY BAUDOUIN JURDANT

Everybody must hide a little I-senck inside himself if Eyesenck is to be provided with an empirical basis for his scientific psychology. In a sense, his objective eye is a logical implication of our subjective I, even though the implication has then to take the form of this biblical formula: an eye-senck for a sick I, or, in Eyesenck's words, "the form of behaviour therapy and the theories associated with it".[2] This is the new paradigm[3] on which psychologists are invited to work paradogmatically for a human paradise where everyone will find his right place in society, or, where every IQ will get its right score for an optimal use.

Before that can happen though, it is necessary to refute Freud, once more, although Eyesenck kindly reminds us that he, Freud, is not refutable, and therefore not scientific. The paradigm seems to turn into a paradox and the paradise seems to be lost.

In the Foreword of their book, Eyesenck and Wilson quote Freud's reply to Rosenzweig's account of his experimental attempts to study repression:

"I cannot put much value on these confirmations because the wealth of reliable observations on which these assertions rest makes them independent of experimental verification. Still it can do no harm."

Eyesenck's comments:

"Nothing could demonstrate more clearly the non-scientific character of Freud's thinking (...); in his view experiments were not needed to confirm his hypotheses, nor could they infirm them. No other discipline claiming our attention has ever so clearly and decisively cut itself off from experimental testing of its theories - even astrology and phrenology make claims which are empirically testable."

Eyesenck forgets however that neither astrology nor phrenology have gained any kind of scientific credibility through their claiming to be empirically testable. These claims did not help them to acquire a scientific status. Why should psychoanalysis fall into the same trap? And it is not because Eyesenck

"in spite of Freud's disclaimer", tries to push Freud into it, that Freud is in it.

The only thing that Eyesenck has to say about psychoanalysis is this:

"The answer to the question which forms the title of this chapter - What is Wrong with Psychoanalysis? - is simple: Psychoanalysis is unscientific."

Eyesenck said that in 1952. More than 20 years later, he is still saying the same thing, as if psychoanalysis was dust stuck in his eye which he would like desperately to cry out.

Ebbinghaus, quoted by Eyesenck and Wilson (op cit, p 391), said about Freudian theory: "What is new in these theories is not true, and what is true is not new".

"This is a serious matter", add the authors, "because what attracts many people to Freudian theory is precisely those aspects which are 'true but not new'; they are then willing to swallow also those bits which are 'new but not true'."

In this statement, the authors acknowledge that there is some truth in psychoanalysis. They even say that this truth has been known for centuries before Freud. The problem remains, however, of making this commonly-held-true-knowledge scientifically true, since, in our times, there is no knowledge which can claim the status of truth without the mediation of a scientific discourse. Science is (wrongly or rightly) the only way in which knowledge can acquire universal validity from human beings. That is to say that any knowledge (either old or new) which claims universal validity must be mediated by science in order to satisfy this claim. And it is no use saying that it does not hold for all kinds of knowledge. No knowledge can escape the question of whether it is true or not, and the question itself cannot escape the fact that its relevance must be provided by science and science only.

We are confronted here with the key-element of what could be named a scientistic ideology whereby truth-values are given to any discourse through the mediation of an imaginary representation of what science is. I refer here to an incidental note of R Barthes about ideology[4]:

"So, what is ideology? It is precisely the idea in as much as it is a ruling idea: ideology can be but a ruling ideology. One might speak about the ideology of the ruling class, because there is indeed a class which is ruled. But it is inconsistent to speak of a ruling ideology, since there is no ideology to be ruled: on the side of the ruled people, there is nothing, no ideology, except precisely - and that is the last degree of alienation - the ideology that they are forced to borrow from the ruling class in order to symbolise, hence, in order to live. The social struggle cannot be reduced to the struggle between two rival ideologies: it is the subversion of all ideologies which is at stake."

Here is an example of what I mean by scientistic ideology[5]:

"Just as sleep refreshes the system, and prepares it for more activity, so TM, being a physiologically deeper state of rest than sleep, rejuvinates the system, making it capable of more activity than before. When you sleep, the mind is dull and unaware; in meditation, awareness in fact increases as has been shown by investigations into the brain-wave

patterns of meditators. These describe a unique pattern in which theta-waves - usually indicative of sleep or relaxation - coexists with low frequency alpha rhythms, which show the subject is awake and alert. These, and other tests on oxygen consumption, heart-rate, skin resistance and blood chemistry have shown that meditation is a state clearly distinguishable from the three normal states of consciousness - waking, sleeping and dreaming - in fact it is a fourth major state of consciousness." Etc, etc...

TM is valid, since science says it is. But let us take out of this passage all those brain-wave patterns, low frequency of alpha-rhythms and other tests of oxygen consumption, heart-rate, skin resistance and bloody chemistry, etc, and we are left with a very dull paper, coloured with a little mysticism that one can only take or leave.

In other words, science is not to be defined only with reference to the practical and theoretical activities associated with it, but also, with reference to the ideological manipulation of the notion of science itself. And there is no ontological way to make a clear-cut distinction between the two kinds of definition involved here, because it is a matter of definition and, as such, it involves different social groups with different premises.[6]

This leads to various distortions of the concept science, which result from the ideological interests involved in its manipulation. There is a terminological game with a word. It reflects the ideological load of science rather than the genuine epistemological problem raised from the recognition by human beings of the specific form of the knowledge which results from scientific practice.

For any science to be made in clarifying the concept itself, we have to assume first that science during the 18th and 19th centuries was no less science than it is in the 20th century. Newton was no less scientific than Einstein. That means that the positivistic ideas about objective truth and universal knowledge are not to be dismissed merely on the grounds of some kind of qualitative change having occurred since then. When confronted with these recent changes, scientists themselves tend to question the objectivity of the knowledge which results from their practice. But this puzzling uncertainty could not be explained without reference to persisting expectations of objectivity. The question would not be raised at all if it were not linked to some essential aspect of science, referrable to all existing sciences in spite of all the differences that affect their subject matter as well as their methods and their results. If there is such an entity called science, which is realised in all existing sciences without regard to their differences, such an entity requires special attention, irrespective of its identificatory function towards those sciences.

It should be noted here that this identificatory function of the concept science, seems to have emerged out of some kind of inherent ambiguity about the scientific status of the so-called social sciences. Nobody has ever had any doubt about the scientificness of any of the natural sciences. The question of their scientific identity is not even asked. By contrast, it seems that a great deal of intellectual energy has been and still is spent by social scientists in order to reassure themselves and their readers about the scientificness of their activity. They could not, and still cannot achieve the same kind of objectivity as in natural sciences. And they

defend themselves by arguing that there is an unescapable element of reflexivity in social science. But, who ever asked them to be objective or scientific?[7] Certainly, not anybody in particular. Possibly, some sort of internalised ideal of what science is. But if that is the case, where does this ideal come from? Why is it that natural scientists cannot really bother about such an ideal, especially since they seem to have some doubts about objectivity? These doubts do not lead them to any vindication about the scientificness of their practice whereas the same doubts are the sources of many comments and epistemological reflections on the part of the social scientists. In short, why do social scientists need the label "scientific" in order to say what they want to say. It cannot possibly make their discourse truer. Or can it?

Objectivity is a feature which is usually attributed to the statements of science, even though it is widely acknowledged that the form of these statements can be motivated by consensus-convenience. Scientific knowledge seems to lose its universal validity, since it is relatable to the way some groups of people, within the scientific community, choose to name the truth in accordance with the scientific and technological interests which are involved in its manipulation.

But objectivity does not refer only to the statements which are produced by science, but also, and more important, to the absence of subjectivity in the production of these statements. At the very place where the discourse of science has its origins, there is no subject who could possibly claim the discourse to be subjectively his own. Science confronts us with a human discourse whose origin cannot be discovered in any particular human subject,[8] since it has the same meaning for anybody willing to produce or reproduce it, within the limits of the conventional apparatus which have been set up for the purpose of its production. Man as a subject is excluded from the discourse of science since this discourse does not have to refer to any particular subjectivity as defined by social context, in order to make sense. Which means further that if man is present within the discourse of science, it can only be under the form of an absence of what makes him precisely a subject.[9]

Such an absence, however, is fundamentally inconceivable and will have to be translated into some kind of presence. There are two possible translations:

(1) The subject of science transforms his absence into the presence of himself as an object. In this case, the discourse of science becomes an objective human reflection of the objective world. All scientific knowledge as produced by all existing sciences not only reveals nature as an object but man himself as an object in terms of species-being. The structural properties of the discourse of science <u>are</u> the structural properties of human mind coming into existence through the mediation of a universal reference to the universe. Science becomes the real object of psychology, and psychology therefore, <u>is</u> epistemology.[10]

But this first translation (whereby the absence of the subject of science transforms itself into the presence of man as an object) presupposes that this object is such only in terms of the place it can occupy for a subject who himself might, in return, conceive of this place as empty.[11] This new subject is the Subject of Absolute Knowledge, namely God himself (the God of Descartes, Bacon, Newton, Bentley, Hegel, etc...), who created man in order to fill up the place that His infinite desire had conceived of as empty. God is the necessary condition for man to be an object, created by the

desire of someone else, God, and that science uncovers. It implies also that man is a universal being[12] in as much as every human being is an objective realisation of man as a concept in the mind of God and generated by His desire.


(2) The second translation of the absence of the subject of science is to transform this absence into a presence of the subject. We shall meet such a subject in scientific communities which have a social location and which can offer to what is left of the subject after his specialised practice the warmth of a social atmosphere and the values which are naturally attached to heroes.[13] Meetings and congresses are organised. Scientists talk to each other. The discourse of science makes itself reflexive. One or two philosophers are invited to the meetings. They know how to talk. They are the specialists of reflexivity. They are mandated by society to give to the discourse of science its full social significance. Scientific knowledge gets organised. Science becomes a giant kaleidoscope where paradigms are created and discarded according to the way it is knocked about by epistemologists. Scientists become relativist, then subjectivist. They adopt an idealist view of science even though they are basically materialist in their practice. They adopt it for social convenience. After all, the place is empty. So, why not? Out of the contradiction, they write epistemological books about science and themselves, sometimes autobiographical, always full of inevitable modesty and concern about humanity. These books take their place on the shelves of philosophers, sociologists, politicians, psychologists and popularisers. In brief, scientists get their part on the social international stage where universality is rehearsed in front of the whole world.

These two possible translations of the absence of the subject of science from his own discourse are the ways in which science becomes meaningful, socially relevant and ideologically invested. They cannot, however, completely obliterate this absence of the subject. Scientific activity continues and the discourse which bears witness of this activity is still carrying this absence in all its developments. That means that science cannot escape the question which constitutes the grand theme of epistemology since Hegel: where is the subject of science? This question is not incidental but essential to science itself. It is inherent to the scientific discourse in as much as this discourse entails the disappearance of the subject who, as a subject, produced it.

So where has he gone?

Before looking at Freud's response to this question and in order to be clearer, I shall indulge myself in the diagram.

The middle line is the difference between man and nature, a difference which is localisable neither in man nor in nature. G Bateson[14] says that the difference is "an abstract matter". Actually, the difference is an act in as much as no act is ever completely reducible to a knowledgable fact. It is negativity which, in science, comes into existence through its formalisation into a zero concept, that is, a concept which designates nothing. This "nothing", however, is purely formal. That means that any object that might be subsumed by this concept will have to submit its existence not so much to the test of reality (a reality which cannot escape ideological categorisation) than to the test of its structural integration into the scientific discourse. A colour owes its scientific existence to the place it occupies in the spectrum. In a sense, the place ought to be determined before the object can occupy it. The empirical test which


The Subject of
Absolute Knowledge, ie.
(GOD)
object
(the objective but
incomplete reflection
of nature by man)
object
(nature)
the subject of science as
$
excluded from his discourse
Subject (S)
(scientific
community,
consensus)
(O) Object
(the acted upon
universe, man
included)
(?)

will be carried afterwards, will relate the global structure of the discourse to what will become, if it is successful, the structure of reality. From that it follows that the discourse of science has to be able to symbolise the absence of the objects it wants to find the truth about. Now the symbolisation of this absence has to come first since it is a necessary condition for the objects to acquire a scientific existence. So, it is the subject himself who is at the same time producing the discourse and produced by the discourse who will manage his own disappearance from the discourse in order for the objects to use his place in the language. Of course, the subject is still there for producing the discourse, but he is not any longer produced by the discourse, as a subject. Or, the subject is still there for the act of production, but the facts which are produced do not carry any longer the subjective marks of the producing process.

The two circles in dotted lines articulate the two systems of mediations whereby science is represented in human consciousness, or the two possible translations of science as a difference, negativity, absence of the subject, etc...The first translation is represented by the vector which affects the rotation of the lower circle.

Special attention should be paid to the lower relation between the Subject (S) and the Object (O) which is the result of an "ideological contract" (Althusser) whereby science is deprived of the possibility of subverting all ideologies (Barthes) and therefore of changing the social world.

The lower circle is the symmetric image of the upper one with an axis going through S and perpendicular to the difference. The mediative element of the relation between (S) and (O) in the lower half-circle (?) is absent. Ideologically speaking, this element is determined by two functions inverse of each other which are respectively "social science" and "popularisation of science". The two functions meet at the point of intersection between the difference and the lower half-circle. This point (?) designates the way in which science becomes a myth, an autonomous entity, fundamentally anonymous, that popularisers mediate for the layman and that social scientists transform into ritual practices.

Ostracised from the scientific community, Freud was struggling between 1887 and 1902 in order to create a scientific psychology. He certainly wanted to discover the principle of a science of the subject, not yet aware, when he writes his Project for a Scientific Psychology in 1895, that the only road which was to lead to his science of the subject, had to conform to a Moebius-strip design and that the result of such a design would be the discovery of the subject of science.[15]

Where has he gone? That is the question.

Freud was indeed in a very difficult position to answer that question. Where was he, Freud himself, overfed by a whole century of positivism, entirely committed to the search for truth, completely trapped into the scientific ideology of his times?

He was in Vienna, painfully trying to feed his growing family with the fees of a few patients, deeply affected by the failure of his dearest ambition of becoming a Professor, writing complicated scientific letters to his friend, Wilhelm Fliess who was starting a promising medical career in Berlin.

The subject of science is there, without any accepted science to back him up, except the science of himself, without anybody to get his scientific-status from, except Fliess for whom Freud had the greatest and quite

misplaced admiration.

The Project of 1895 starts in the following way:[16]
"The intention of this project is to furnish us with a psychology which shall be a natural science: its aim, that is, is to represent psychical processes as quantitatively determined states of specifiable material particles and so to make them plain and void of contradiction."

Here, Freud wants to meet the requirements of a science in the strict sense which is given to this word by positivism. The two notions of quantity and determinism ought to give us the rigour of a scientific method with a theoretical possibility for measurements and predictions. The specificity and materiality of an object, to give this science an empirical basis, is stated. Freud will assume that these specifiable particles are the neurones. Finally, Freud recognises the necessity of a theory that would have to be articulated in accordance with the most appropriate principles of formal logic.

Freud abandoned explicitly this line of thought. As Ernst Kris puts it, quoting Freud himself:[17]

"He abandoned the idea 'of proclaiming cells and fibres or the systems of neurones which nowadays take their place...as physical paths, though it must be possible to represent such paths in terms of organic elements of the nervous system in some not yet assignable way'."

This rejection is not without having had any effect on the developments of psychoanalysis. It seems on the contrary that this rejection will come back constantly into the later works of Freud. This rejection is not a rejection of science as Eysenck seems to believe it is. It is instead, an acceptance of science in as much as science is indeed the only way in which the question of the human subject can acquire its scientific, and therefore universal, relevance. This is the very subject who is the support of the difference between life and death, presence and absence, knowledge and ignorance, man and nature, male and female, sleeping and waking, science and non-science, etc... This support is not pure contemplation of the difference, but the dialectical acting of it, without the actor knowing what it is that makes him act although he will not escape, in the afterglow of the act, the question of knowing (or ignoring?) what had been acted. The difference here is not reducible to a semantic opposition between the terms themselves and which could be graspable through some sort of right distribution of the attributes belonging to each of them. The difference between life and death is not more in life than in death, the difference between male and female is no more in male than in female; and the difference between science and non-science - that Eysenck is so keen to master in order to refute Freud - is no more in science than in non-science.

Let us take, then, with Freud, "the royal road to a knowledge of the unconscious activities of the mind", in order to meet this subject of science who is the support of the difference. The action takes place at the end of the first dream related in the Interpretation of Dreams, which Freud had dreamt in July 1895:

"Not long before, when she was feeling unwell, my friend Otto had given her an injection of a preparation of propyl, propyls...propionic acid...trimethylamin (and I saw before me the formula for this printed in heavy type...Injections of that sort ought not to be made so thoughtlessly...And

probably the syringe had not been clean."

Now here is Freud's interpretation of "trimethylamin":

"Trimethylamin. I saw the chemical formula of this substance in my dream, which bears witness to a great effort on the part of my memory. Moreover the formula was printed in heavy type, as though there had been a desire to lay emphasis on some part of the context as being of quite special importance. What was it, then, to which my attention was to be directed in this way by trimethylamin? It was to a conversation with another friend who had for many years been familiar with all my writings during the period of their gestation, just as I had been with his. He had at that time confided some ideas to me on the subject of the chemistry of the sexual processes, and had mentioned among other things that he believed that one of the products of sexual metabolism was trimethylamin. Thus this substance led me to sexuality, the factor to which I attributed the greatest importance in the origin of the nervous disorders which it was my aim to cure...

"I began to guess why the formula for trimethylamin had been so prominent in the dream. So many important subjects converged upon that one word. Trimethylamin was an allusion not only to the immensely powerful factor of sexuality, but also to a person whose agreement I recalled with satisfaction whenever I felt isolated in my opinions. Surely this friend who played so large a part in my life must appear again elsewhere in these trains of thought. Yes. For he had a special knowledge of the consequences of affections of the nose and its accessory cavities; and he had drawn scientific attention to some very remarkable connections between the turbinal bones and the female organs of sex..."

Here, "trimethylamin" reminds Freud of Fliess, and more precisely, of Fliess' scientific knowledge of the chemistry of the sexual processes. Not long before the dream, Freud had had a conversation with this friend during one of these meetings that he himself used to call "congresses".[18] The formula "in heavy type" which appears in the dream, unveils the function of Fliess' knowledge with regard to Freud's own desire to discover the sexual origin of the neuroses. In other words, the science of Fliess seems to constitute the mediation through which Freud's own discourse will have to find its truth. This mediation is the knowledge of Fliess whose scientificity is attested by the appearance in the dream of the formula itself as a result of "a great effort" on the part of Freud's memory. Fliess is the supposedly knowing subject[19], who, from the place of God, confronts Freud with his own desire for a scientific psychology. The fact, however, that this very place was occupied by a real man and a mediocre scholar, under the guarantee of what was believed to be his scientific knowledge by Freud, deprives the story of its almost natural theological outcome.

"Trimethylamin" seems to represent symbolically the dialectical connection of two opposite movements: the first is the movement of Freud himself in his search for a science which could bring him the scientific guarantee that he, Freud, is a subject (and not an object, as the scientific practice would imply automatically): this first movement is the movement of the interpretation itself; it is also a response to the other movement as it is attested in the dream itself and which shows science (the formula in heavy type that no subject can claim to be subjectively his own) in its search for a subject (a man, a social dimension) who could provide it with the ideological guarantee that it is science, by contrast with non-science. This second movement is the way in which science is looking for its ideological integration

through what could be opposed to it as being non-science.

The first movement is what characterises the birth and the growth of social science in its various forms, in so far as it can only be interpretative. It is the movement of the scientific community - constituted by the subjects of science (S) in terms of their social status - in its search for a science that could provide its members with the scientific reassurance that they are human subjects, or, that the practice of science did not deprive them of their subjectivity, as the result of this practice would normally imply. The social symptoms of this movement are to be found in the professional organisation of sociology, psychology, economics, etc...[20] In the case of Freud, this scientific community is reduced to its simplest expression. The paradigm on which he works is Fliess' scientific knowledge as Freud supposes it to be. In a way, Fliess was functioning as a psychoanalyst with regard to Freud. The fact that he was unaware of this role, should not come as a surprise, since most psychoanalysts now, would show the same kind of unawareness. That unawareness however does not invalidate the psychoanalytic process, since its undertaking depends on the patient's response to science rather than on the scientific authority of the analyst.

The second movement is ideologically attested by the popularisation of science whereby science becomes functionally equivalent to a myth, that is, the place assigned to truth by ideology. The two movements are symmetric in relation to each other, although they have an independent empirical existence which makes it extremely difficult to recognise their specular reciprocity. They fulfill the same ideological function of repressing the epistemological question which is at the core of science: Where is the subject of science? "Here", is the answer of Freud[21], where the perceptions of the dream meet the memories which are triggered by free associations on the part of the dreamer, where the subject responds to the challenge of his own absence from a discourse which he must necessarily support.

Science itself is a question about truth, that is- a question about the way in which language can be related to truth thanks to the formalisation of the difference whereby scientific practice can escape the ideological control over its activity. Its result is objective knowledge, that is, the residue of a practice which ignores its internal motivation through the formalisation of this motivation within the discourse itself. Hence, the logical implication of its infinite progression.

Similarly, psychoanalysis is a question about truth, that is, a question about the way in which language can be related to truth thanks to the materiality of the difference whereby everyday speech escapes the ideological (hence phonological, grammatical and semantic) control over the speech act, eg slips of the tongue, forgetting of names, jokes, style, etc...

Instead of being formal, the difference is here material since it reveals itself whenever the language becomes nonsensical, that is, whenever the language is there forthe sake of its own materiality rather than for the sake of meaning. This difference is constituted by all these little mistakes which escape our conscious control, but which we cannot help making (under the control of whom, if not the supposedly knowing subject?) and which reminds us of a fundamental ignorance of ourselves that a scientistic ideology, or even theology, equates with the absolute knowledge of somebody else. This is the unconscious, "something which we really do not know", says Freud[22], the unexpected, the

unpredictable, what we cannot help ignoring within the paradigm of our own selves. These mistakes do not fit the theory of ourselves that our parents, our brothers and sisters, our friends, our colleagues, our masters and slaves, our comrades, imposed upon us through language and culture. They escape the knowledge that we hold about ourselves and as such,

NOTES

1. This is a modified version of a paper that I gave in December 1973 at the English Department University of York. I would like to thank the students who invited me for their interest and open-mindedness.

2. Eysenck & Wilson (eds), The Experimental Study of Freudian Theories, Methuen & Co, London, 1973, p 393.

3. Notice the epistemological sophistication of the authors who appeal to Kuhn in order to support their views while appealing to Popper in order to refute Freud. Times are changing.

4. R Barthes, Le Plaisir du Texte, Seuil, Paris, 1973, pp 53-4 (my translation).

5. J Murdoch, "Transcendental Meditation - Just what is it?", in Nouse, York, 1973. (I chose this example for its contextual proximity with the date and the place of this seminar.)

6. As a premise for a definition of science, actual commitment in a scientific practice does not give more validity to this definition, as compared with other premises. In order to give a definition of what they are doing, scientists have to reflect their own activity in their consciousness. The end-product of such a reflection is therefore subjective and likely to be influenced by the social and psychological position that they have in society. Why would a surgeon or an astronomer - who are respectively involved in very different practices - be in a better position than anybody else for defining science as a concept?

they ask us a question whose answer will be considered as being scientific, if and only if, it allows every human being, every subject, to reproduce the question.

Such an answer has been provided by Freud, as Lacan has shown.

7. The idea of marxism as a science, which has been advocated by many marxists, and with particular conviction by Althusser, must be submitted to the same questions. If marxism were a science, would it become truer than if it were not? The answer must be no. But in the context of a scientistic ideology, the answer is yes.

8. From now on, the term "subject" will be used in order to define the "speaking subject", that is, the source of a human discourse under the form of the personal pronoun I, and more generally, under the form of any speech element that would refer the discourse to the subjective context of its production, eg "today", "yesterday", "tomorrow", "here", "there", "you", etc...

9. Such a conception has been explicitly defended by Lenin in Materialism and Empirio-criticism. I would also argue that it is implicitly the conception of Marx in his Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 (tr McLellan, Blackwell, 1972: "The practical creation of an objective world, the working over of inorganic

nature is the confirmation of man as a conscious species-being, that is a being that relates to the species as to himself and to himself as to the species", (p 139); "Thus, it is in the working over of the objective world that man first really affirms himself as a species-being. This production is his active species-life. Through it nature appears as his work and his reality. The object of work is therefore the objectification of the species-life of man", (p 140); "Man is the direct object of natural science...", (p 155); etc...

10. Ironically enough, Eysenck says this in Uses and Abuses of Psychology (Pelican, 1953, p 16), when he argues that if his reader is not satisfied with his popular exposition of scientific psychology, "...he may find it necessary to spend a few years on courses in mathematics and statistics, followed by work in physics, chemistry, genetics, sociology, economics, physiology, neurology, anatomy, biology, and a whole host of other sciences which have a very close and direct bearing on modern psychology." When saying that, of course, Eysenck did not mean what I interpret as being what he meant. No doubt that whenever Eysenck is right, it is unconsciously! With regard to the same problem, Piaget is undoubtedly more consistent when he recognises the inherent overlapping of epistemology and psychology.

11. An object is something which can be absent from the place it occupies (cf Frege); the place itself is determined by the expectation of an object on the part of the subject (cf Piaget).

12. One of the greatest discoveries of Marx is that this universality has an historical context and that man is a social being. For man, universal means social. The place of man is not universally determined by the Desire of a Necessary God, but is socially determined by the movement of history and the class struggle.

13. In his sociology of science, R K Merton paid special attention to the ambivalence of scientists towards their own discoveries: although they usually claim not to be concerned by the questions of priority - following the pattern inspired by a disinterested pursuit of objective knowledge per se - this claim is often contradicted by a series of long and sometimes bitter arguments on this very question of priority and originality. This ambivalence possibly has its roots in the fact that scientists cannot possibly claim subjective responsibility for what is considered, according to themselves, as objective knowledge. The content of their scientific discourse is not relatable to their subjectivity. Being the first in saying this or that, becomes the only criterion for the attribution of subjective ownership. And the criterion is only applicable through the socialisation of knowledge which leads scientists to the discovery of their social position. Incidentally, in his discussion of this ambivalence of scientists, R K Merton has centred the debate on the case of Freud in his relation to Breuer. Why is it, in spite of his unscientificness, Freud is yet eligible for representing the symptom of ambivalence in the subject of science? (cf R K Merton, "Resistance to the Systematic Study of Multiple Discoveries in Science", in European Journal of Sociology, 4, 1963, pp 250 - 282).

14. G Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind, Paladin, 1973, p 427.

15. This is the best place for me to acknowledge my debt to the reading of J Lacan's Ecrits (Seuil, Paris 1966), with regard not only to the epistemological ideas in this paper but also to what will be said about Freud. My attempt to convey part of Lacan's thought in English had to overcome many difficulties among which the possibility of my personal misunderstanding of Lacan is not the least.

16. S Freud, The Origins of Psycho-Analysis, Imago, London, 1954, p 355.

17. E Kris, "Introduction" to The Origins of Psycho-Analysis, op cit, p 45.


18. E Kris, ibid, p 9.

19. Cf J Lacan, "The Mistaking of the Supposedly Knowing Subject", in Italian Lectures (Tr A MacKenzie & B Jurdant), unpublished mimeo:
13 'Yet wouldn't we be able to see the only difference, the difference without which Freud's unconscious is futile, which reduces to nothing what this difference is different from, that is, the difference of being? To see that this difference lies in the fact that, contrary to all that was produced before Freud under the label of "Unconscious", he notes well that it is from a place which cannot be taken by the subject that knowledge is released, since it only surrenders where the subject makes a mistake. The Vergreifen (cf Freud: The 'mistaking' is his word for the symptomatic acts) going beyond the Begriff (or the 'taking'), brings out the evidence of a nothing (a 'nonsensical' utterance intruding upon the speech). This nothing affirms and imposes itself by the fact that its very negation singles it out for the confirmation which will not be able to suppress the effect of the nothing on the sequence of the utterance." (p 8)

20. Cf among a number of references, M Nicolaus, "The Professional Organisation of Sociology: A view from below", in R Blackburn (ed) Ideology in Social Science, Fontana, 1973, pp 45-6.

21. That is, at the very place and the very moment, within the context of which anybody, having to share the symbolising force of a scientistic ideology, decides to respond to the challenge of this question.

22. S Freud, Jokes and Their Relation to The Unconscious, RKP, London, 1966, p 162.



THE ROAD OF EXCESS LEADS TO THE PALACE OF WISDOM

Stoned genius? Stoned genus.

This idea first occurred as a section in some assessment work on science fiction that Sean was writing last year.

BENTSCRIPT

BY SEAN FLETCHER

TRANSCRIPT FROM THE FIRST LECTURE IN A SERIES GIVEN AT THE LONDON SCHOOL OF DEVIANCE

JAN/FEB 1987

Slapstick Harry is 24 and immortal. He is a time traveller; he lives at the end of time. Harry all too often gets bored so he likes to travel. Picking up some strange vibes way back in the 19th century he decides to drop in at the British Museum.

Ten minutes to 3 pm one bleak November day in 1850 sets the scene: Harry decides to rap with an advanced brain called Mr Marx, the proponent of some advanced notions about society. Slapstick Harry, being a pretty shrewd entrepreneur, soon susses the selling power of this deviant weirdo sitting straight-laced and manic, scratching furiously at a replica of foolscap. Yet another paradox, thinks Harry, slightly unsettled as he discorporates in the Reading Room. This boy is cut to manipulate the future. Ho-hum!

And reified knowledge gives new meaning to life - novel scientific disciplines expanding on every lectern stand - but our Karl, he's having more trouble with his translations than his distinguished, learned colleagues. "Could be its his accent they mumble ...", rhubarb rules, o.k.! Maybe he just could be on the spot with this thing?

So there they go, S.H. and the Marxman arm-in-arm, burbling in a corner and propogating god know's what, culture-shocking devices to frig our grandchildren. Regard: "Manuscripts on Economics and Philosophy" - Now Slapstick Harry really got enthused about that. And Karl's ideas on alienation really fried his brains ("That doctrine's gonna hit it big in Sociology" - that famous line oft quoted by countless historians).

So Harry says to Karl how he's got to groove with it and think big and all. "Cultural social revolution," he whispers in the old fogie's ear. "Tell you what Marxman", he insists one day, "For 60% of the profits I'll be your business Manager?" "Fine!", says the Marxman.

*

3.05 on the Museum wall and S.H. and Karl are tuning into some new angles for selling the word. They settle on a textbook/handbook that the people can handle - a handbook on revolution - something the WC can get their oppression into. Old Karl, his hair is bristling with delight at his own genius, immediately signs up for a life in real-time pursuing his scholarly attributes. Pure perfect script. A walking socio-scientific thought development programme. Slapstick Harry could dig that, he wanted to give dirty little homo-sap yet another cultural upheaval.

Harry should've known better than to flash his stash right in the old fella's eyes so he plants a doobie in him and lights the touch paper...
"Dis pretty good stuff", quips Karl doing a dance on the Rights of Man, nonchalantly giving birth to a typewriter or two. S.H. realises he's blown it and shifts to a fine drizzly tea in the Museum gardens - The Marxman dangling nicely out of tyme.

Dan Dare and his boys handle the distribution down the timeways. "Down the line! You drug-crazed creeps", he burbles, pulling up his pants and stepping out into 1955. S.H. hit by all the cranial activity, lights up another, proudly meditates on the soundly based rationale entwined in Karl's methodologies of research.

One day Harry says to Karl at tea - "Ever tried this?"

The old solid Museum clock tic-tocked round the sun backwards. Karl has a theory concerning social revolution over time. He had just discovered intersubjectivity. Yeah. Now its 1848 and here comes Dan with the newly published "Communist Manifesto" and Harry is constantly obsessed with pushing transcendence beyond the de-limitations of socially contrived languages - silence the spoken word. Urban guerillas steal the handbook and shoot the curator.

Karl Marx gets eaten by a proscribed language and takes three days coming out again - O! The deprivations the old aesthete must endure in said British society of the said time while suffering from one overloaded brain. "Flip it Karli" says S.H., "one might do well to follow noble advanced guard of those deemed insane insomuch as it frees one from the duty of being socially entertained by pissed-up middle-class toadies from Henley-on-Thames."
"Ho-hum" says Karl.
"One-to-one relationships must vanish in the night and social harmony endure!!"
"Yes sir", says Karl.

Time passes. Karl and Harry grow old and fat together, forcing their abilities to the outer extremes.
"Use everything that logic and investigation can provide!", shouts the depraved Marxman, playfully tweeking the tea-lady's rather large posterior.
"Mimicry and mime", guffaws Harry, changing into Queen Victoria for the occasion.
Karl Marx endorses "Das Kapital", his most mature work and contained within it an insistant positive approach to global evolvement.

*

"Take this", said Harry.
"Re-birth", laughs Karl.

They pursue the formula for walking upright on mother earth.
They assess the relevance of societal pressures found to be socially cohesive.
They take off their clothes.
They kiss.
Karl left his body in the Museum Clock for safe-keeping

leaving his greatly lightened mind to soar higher than ever before - assisted by S.H., unashamed pedlar in situations of a temporal nature. Attentive to imaginations and hallucinations, Karl Marx formulated a doctrine transgressing time-barriers. Behold the Man who was not ensnared by his own mortality.

Mankind, thirsty for knowledge, yet basing investigation on past and present; these two factors being determined, the number of possible futures is minimised - the need to know prevents us attempting the impossible and the unknowable.

Our powers of deducing and placing logic and meaning to a moment or episode makes it a distasteful, singular affair. Homo sapiens has a tendency to decrease the wonders we might otherwise witness. Man deals in the probability of some action occurring, not, the inevitability .

Two figures alone - moving amongst swollen larvae in their stasis state.

Structures dissolve. The Marxman trades reason for chaos. Possibilities are infinite since no artificial barriers remain. Man as basic mind; gut animal - he is too cumbersome for movement through time.

How must we measure time? Seconds. Minutes. Hours. Weeks. Centuries. Millenium. Centinium - Aeons of time.

This small capsule could change revolutionary thought development association in the Marxman's head. A withered hand. A gnarled tree. Chronicles of linear histories shaped by the ascent of Man. Words.

We speak with many words. Regard: the mushroom ceremony of the Indians; words are no longer necessary but mere indicators of socialising processes.

S.H. cannot focus.
K.M. is filled with innocence and wonder.
Discovery for its own sake without scientific investigation is more than satisfying.

K.M. sits at his favourite table in the British Museum - The dripping of the clock slicing his psychedelic. Each word he writes is immortalised...slowly...very slowly, the ink clots on his nib and he moves beyond reason or documentation. Barriers are made to be transcended. He writes with his blood - the future will not allow Man to be dictated by the present as a foundation for reality. Marx sees in the future possibles an indicator of radical change - shifts in the established reality picture. Blind and hungry Man stumbles into the enticing web of time only to be abused and abandoned. Karl Marx now rides the circular stallion of time. All comes round again.
"Goodbye Slapstick Harry!"
"Hello."
"Ho-hum!"

And next week my lecture will cover the Rise of the Third Reich. Class dismissed."

So far the book has concentrated upon the analysis of the Social Sciences and education. But all good things, including navel exploration, should extend themselves. The method of analysis can be taken into wider world. I could have offered here, as instances of real science, any of a number of classic texts. But here is some recent writing, to show that the spirit still lives.

This final piece is a brilliant example of good sociological scheming. It is an analysis of the dialectical necessities of sex and culture. Specifically, it understands our fuckups as the false resolutions of greed - or, if you prefer - of possession and capitalism. The author shows us the particular ways we avoid each others' eyes as we rip a profit from each encounter. He maps the limited routes we take as we more or less desparately try to appease the separate beasts of our individual lusts. And since you and I, to the nth power, are this thing called culture, the article suggests a scheme for interpreting world history and any event within that totality.

If he is to deliver the goods Michael Kosok needs a very attentive reading. His tight argument is a good step beyond the more diffuse writings of the great Wilhelm Reich who, at his most lucid, still failed to systematically explain each of the structurally limited paths to the 'resolution' of any sexual or imaginative event outside of the righteous interchanges of love, orgasm or ecstasy. Naturally, Michael Kosok leaves the reader to work on his own way to will and revolution.

The article is from TELOS, number 8, summer 1971. The editor of that journal feels Kosok has written better stuff, and doesn't want people to "come to the erroneous conclusion that we are the academic version of Playboy". If Kosok has written better, that's great. And TELOS is no Playboy magazine. But I can't agree the following piece is "downright inferior". Its own ideology or rationalising (manifest, for example, immediately in the choice of words for the title - why "phenomenology" instead of, say, "logic", and why "fucking" when the article treats that as only one of five forms of sexuality?) should interest thoughtful subversives. Kosok is talking from and for the intellectual left.

THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF FUCKING

BY MICHAEL KOSOK

In response to a rather abstract and effete presentation of man's erotic nature,[1] I shall take refuge in my own symbolic world of non-linearity and use the intentionally erotic nature of the "dialectic matrix" to explicate the complexities of man's quite obvious erotic condition. The picture isn't too pretty.[2]

In our story the scene opens in a field of "universal energy" or Eros, which we shall refer to by the symbol "e". This ever present state of existence is the natural state of objective dialectics or interactions. Nature is thus characterised as a non-linear field of presence, the stage from which and on which further determinations will arise. Being a dialectic field, nature gradually develops its oppositions and mediations to the point at which a natural process of mating or "energy exchange" occurs between opposite poles or sexes, expressing the natural unity these opposed poles periodically manage to bring into existence, out of which newer poles emerge, etc. Symbolically speaking, e now appears differentiated into +e and -e poles, and is reunited into a +-e synthesis through mating. Because this represents a higher order

energy-unity (bringing into being the creation of novel units of energy), +-e will also be called e', indicating that it is a qualitatively newer state of energy reached through a self-differentiation and then integration of the previous state,e.

We begin with our female and male characters, playing in the (non-linear) fields of paradise, doing what comes naturally. However, with the relentless development of simple animal consciousness into self-consciousness and especially after tasting the fruits of abstract knowledge, sin, separation and alienation begin to set in. Female and male now appear in a self-conscious relation called Self and Other; and they are continually screwing things up by trying to have their apple and eat it it at the same time. The dichotomy between idealism and materialism springs into being: should one merely look at the apple, admiring its image and form but not touching it or getting "involved", or should one consume it, nourishing oneself, but destroying the beautiful form? The apple has ceased to exist as a natural and integral process of emergence and transformation in which both form and function are mutually co-related: beauty is severed from existence and safely packed away into a kingdom of ends. Just as the heavens were parted to create distance between earthly and divine, now function, activity, and passion, the"feminine" principle of"mothering", natural growth, life, and Eros, full of inner feelings and sensitivity, is also set as a ground-base against an idealistic "masculine" or superstructural principle of "fathering", conscious control, Spirit, and Logos, which operates on sensuousness seen as external sense information and its abstract thought structures. Feeling and life are condemned as animalistic and irrational, whereas thought and rationality become preoccupied with systems, law and order, God and death. Sensual object relations are severed from reflective image formation; as a result, the feminine and anything immediate, sensuous, and earthy tends to be reduced to a mere object of possession, whereas the masculine turns into the proprietor and producer of images controlling the direction of conscious activity.

In this alienated condition, the dynamic archetypes of awareness (Eros and Logos), like each conscious individual self, fear being what they are, perceiving the other as their enemy. As a result no one participant can see itself as a functioning totality in which all contrasting archetypes or individuals constituting a universe of interaction are mirrored in itself relative to its own uniqueness;the logic of feeling and the sensitivity of reason are eclipsed. The whole falls apart and we are left with a"market principle" of separate atoms or interests operating in a void. Instead of merely mating as a natural unity or pair blessed in their sexual nakedness, which is both primordial and implicitly spiritual,a game called intercourse is invented by the estranged Self and Other. Civilisation arises and one puts on clothing and masks in order to start the long, meandering, difficult path of human history. As Nietzsche discovered, the object of the game, which is hidden from most mortals, is to go beyond the game of respectable civilised behaviour and to re-establish paradise on earth: the point is to see man as "a rope tied between beast and overman" and thus as a bridge and a self-sacrifice to his higher nature as a man who has transcended the contradictions of civilised behaviour as we know it. This transcendence of civilised behaviour will not reduce man to an ape again (ie. to state e'), but rather will develop a higher modality of naturalism (e") which is now explicitly aware of its spirituality and at the same time a self-consciousness which is naturally conscious of itself: Human history and alienation is thus the price one pays to gain this state. Most of us, however, tend to get caught in the trap of civilisation and bourgeois behaviour and there-

fore know neither the simple act of mating (e') or the more transcended act of love (e"). The transition from animal to human history begins with the universal energy state (e) already in its integral biological form e'; now a more complex division appears in which e' in turn becomes self differentiated, but also self-alienated because of its complexity into a +e' and -e' self-opposition leading or attempting to lead to a higher order self-unification e".[3] The original self-opposition of nature or e into a "materialistic" female principle (the ground of mating and the peaceful 'womb" of herd existence) and an "idealistic" male principle (the superstructure of mating and the "protectors" of herd existence giving coordination and "law and order") can be called +e and -e respectively. As a social level of inter-individual organisation, e' expands beyond its mere biological herd existence and soon develops into an organised culture in which a new self-differentiation into +e' and -e' appears: +e' represents the object-centered, materialistic ground or economic structure of society (concerned with object production from nature), while -e' represents the idealistic, image-centered political superstructure of society (concerned with coordination and control of the directive image-process). In terms of possible class-opposition (materially bound workers vs idealistically oriented ruling structure), this division reflects biological sexual opposition possible on a personal level where any actual opposition on one level reinforces opposition on the other. In an alienated state, biological reproduction sets +e and -e against each other as social production sets +e'and -e' against each other.

But what happens to man's erotic nature in a personal-social condition, in which a double-dialectics of opposition, and hence a double-alienation, can appear? Using the dialectic matrix of forms (e, e', e", etc) - itself a product of an alienated society which, however, recognises its own dialectic limitations and hence posits any one form as but a transformation and not a trap - we can analyse the predicament of what takes place between the original paradise of simple mating and the paradise in the process of coming - known as love. Simply put, this involves an awareness of the fact that civilised behaviour, no matter how you clothe or polish it, is a phenomenology of fucking. And surely, we are all fucked up: the least one can do is recognise it in all of its various forms, which can then be used as a basis of intelligent action and not merely action whose only result is a transformation from one version of fuck-ticity to another.

When female and male exhibit themselves sexually once civilised behaviour arrives on the scene (even if "actual" females or males are not involved as in homosexuality, auto-sexuality, or object-sexuality), then the immediate unity of natural mating or physical unity through contact that underlies all sexual activity is transformed, no matter how much one attempts to "regress to animal behaviour." The die has been cast. Precisely because a civilised relation entails a relation between two or more ego-centers, each with his or her own personal world more or less definitely separated from his or her public world, any inter-personal relation between such egos must either repress or display the public images each has of himself or herself and the others. Sexual unity is a direct attempt to transcend the isolated existence of man in the public domain of civilisation. But no matter how much sex he has, as long as man continues to constitute his private world in opposition to his public domain (separating feelings from thoughts, material objectivity from ideal reason, and the objects of relation that induce passion from the images that impose control), then sex will amount only to fucking, the temporary repression and the attempt at mutual possession. Fucking is a sexual act in which each attempts to devour the other in an impossible attempt to be the other, without either giving himself or herself to the other. Blind passion is mistaken for genuine intimacy. Using matrix terminology, fucking is mating, or the immediate unity of sexuality (e') now appearing in a schizophrenic condition in which each partner takes himself

or herself to be the object-center of the act and claims the entire relation of object-immediacy for himself. Both the Self and the Other it is relating to, as a result, act only as positive, sensual immediacies lacking any of the distance of recognition that comes when consciousness and imagination negates the immediacy of existence: e' is now +e'. Within this relation, however, neither civilised ego can transcend itself, because it has simply repressed and not changed the image-forming immediacy. Indeed, fucking reinforces civilised behaviour in that it serves as a sedative and temporary relief from the antagonisms of civilisation and makes one all the more ready to continue the ratrace of public existence. Fucking is therefore a blind unity of mutual object-possession dependent solely on the physical energy of the participants; and thus it is a unity bound to collapse into the two unrelating centers a fucking pair really is as soon as the available energy runs out.

The failure of fucking to re-establish genuine natural unity increases the self-conscious distinction already present; and in order to bear the pain of separation, the separation itself tends to become normalised into a socially approved state of mutual alienation. Here, both Self and Other deny their physical immediacy or any notion of being an object-center of presence, and instead relate to each other as projected-images within a public space. Hence, each individual sees himself only as an image within the other; and since the other in turn is seen only as functioning through the image his others have, social relations become (a la Laing) an idealistic mirror world of image structures with no recognisable source or receiver. In this respectable, detached world, the desire to fuck is obscured by a patterned routine called "having intercourse" (like "having tea"), whose socially validated form is marriage. During intercourse, the highest goal of the game is to so completely integrate sexuality into civilised behaviour that, should Aunt Sally step into the wrong room at the right time, she could easily think that one was simply making one's bed instead of one's partner. And no one would really notice much difference since, during intercourse, one doesn't give a fuck!

Whereas fucking is a blind unity of two centered objects mutually possessed and void of genuine consciousness, intercourse is the reverse side of this double immediacy, an empty unity of two projected images mutually dispossessed, a state of mere consciousness: e' now appears as the total opposite of +e', called -e'. Whereas fucking attempts to merge two into one with no distance of recognition, intercourse is a game in which there is only the distance of recognition but nothing is recognised. While it may be true that during intercourse one doesn't give a fuck, during fucking there is really no genuine inter-course. Fucking is a combination of two attempting to be one (which is complete but inconsistent) whereas intercourse is a combination of two seen only as two (which is consistent but incomplete).

Humanity, caught between these two alternatives, constantly shifts back and forth, first having intercourse, which is safe but not exciting, and then fucking, which is exciting but not safe since too much of it tends to break down the pretenses of civilised behaviour, which is predicated on obscuring the failure of fucking or any other kind of mutual possession to overcome the separation between Self and Other. Man is caught in a double bind. The only resolution, of course, is to achieve a true unity (+e' and -e' as e"), in which Self and Other are both one and yet two: ie, a state in which each comes to know himself in a mutual relation through the other in real intimacy. This, however, would mean seeing his being as a dynamic being whose properties are not either private (his) or public (the other's) but a state of relation and movement in which to be means to relate and to become, and all becoming and

relation a state of being; then one can be both an immediate center and a reflection of the other - both object and image - and hence a state of trans-formation of each into the other, and each into itself through the other, neither element existing as a "thing in itself". Not only does this mean going beyond the division into object and image sense and thought or private and public; on a political-economic level it also means going beyond the division into individual vs state's rights and on a psychological plane going beyond the separation into life-giving Eros and reason-oriented Logos. Sexually, it means that a true unity between male and female permits each to exhibit sexual characteristics of any specific sex without reducing one to the other, isolating one from the other, or merging both into one grey asexual glob. Finally, it would mean regarding with Nietzsche, Eros or the Dionysian as the immediate objective basis of all existence out of which, yet within the context of which, the image-making Logos called the Apollonian appears as its reflection and self-differentiation increasing the complexity of Dionysian existence by giving formed expression to its inherent logic. This is but a dramatic way of expressing the fundamental nature of non-linear reflection: all reflection of experience is always reflection within experience. It is precisely the dialectic self-opposition of objective immediacy and the Dionysian (where all being is a field of interaction represented symbolically by any kind of non-positive, non-negative e term) which permits a self-confrontation between itself as the immediate process of existence (now a + term) and its inverse as the reflected structure of existence (a - term), whose ever-present telos consists in expressing its objective immediacy as an integral field through its own positive and negative self-differentiations: it thus appears as a + term, which is nothing but any original non-positive and non-negative immediacy now giving expression to its possibilities on a more explicit and developed plane. The Apollonian aspect of formation (+ vs -) is dialectically an expression of any pre-formal immediacy, and this Dionysian objective basis is revealed when the forms or images themselves are seen as a +- transformation state revealing the dynamism of the + and - forms. As the dialectic matrix will show, either self-realisation into more comprehensive transforming unities or self-alienation into one-sided, relatively static unities always faces man.

Sexuality as the primoridal opposition between immediacy and reflection is therefore not an arbitrary matter of male or female genitals (nor does it exclude them as having nothing to do with this opposition considered in terms of their organic function). Nor is sexuality simply a biological reproduction technology: as Eros and Logos, the sexual poles are the fundamental archetypes of existence whose functioning unity must be grasped in order even to see them as individual expressions. However, with all this "unity" and "re-conciliation" of opposition which aims at eliminating isolated existence, a fundamental mistake can be made by individuals torn by division and exploitation in their attempts to transcend opposition. Thus, the greatest cop-out for the exploited class is to become in turn an exploiter, setting up a "workers" state with public property instead of private property: the idea is to work towards getting rid of property and the image that existence, physical or otherwise, is owned and thus abused and not simply "used" or experienced-as-relation. Likewise, women's liberation would exhibit nothing but extreme male chauvinism if its purpose was to prove the alienated male's contention that man is better than woman by denying her femaleness and converting her into a surrogate male. The idea is to be a female, woman, and mother without exploitation. Two things must be kept in mind. Masculinity and feminity must cease to be regarded as properties owned exclusively by subjects called male and female and must instead be seen as character-functions and relations distributed throughout all subjects. At the same time, it must be

realised that this distribution of femininity and masculinity beyond private ownership could also lead to individual suppression, if it resulted only in public common ownership of all sexual characteristics in identically the same way: this would be like the "crude communism" Marx referred to and would be the most extreme case of asexuality and depersonalisation. The private is not transcended by making it public, for both the personal or private and the impersonal public are mutual co-existing oppositions: the existence of public property merely hides a private"cult of the individual" in charge of personal dispossession and thus makes it that much stronger, since it has no publicly recognisable source which one can pin down as a responsible element functioning within the public. As the private is made into the public, the public in turn becomes the hiding place of the private. A human relation is always explicitly inter-individual and neither "collective" or "individual", but easily degenerates into one vs the other as love degenerates into intercourse vs fucking.

6

Because genuine unity cannot mean reducing one member to another (like the plurality of differences to simple-minded commonness) but instead means grasping and transforming each through the other, the rationality and Logos of femininity is different from (not inferior to) man's, just as the feeling and eros of the masculine is different from the woman's. A true unity is achieved only when each member gives birth and brings into view its contrasting companion or opposite and hence gives rise to a higher type of interaction. Through genuine love and unity, the interacting polarity of life will increase as each pole generates the other within itself and does not only confront it externally as "the enemy". Conversely, only through this unity can each dynamic element express itself and its "will" most fully by giving birth to itself through the other. Any 'easy' solution to unity (be it simple mysticism or imposed communism), leading to public depolarisation or depersonalisation, merely annihilates the very persons or individuals for which unity was to serve as a solution. As Nietzsche showed, genuine unity is precisely that which makes passion, individuality, differences and uniqueness grow with an organic logic in which each new distinction is open and in relation to all others and never a mere substance, owned property, or "thing-in-itself". The unity of sexuality might even bring into existence physical sexes much more complex than our simple two-valued variety: male-female, female-males and other subtle combinations (reflecting the Eros-Logos interrelatedness) can produce an infinite variety of sexuality, making the standard distinctions into heterosexuality, homosexuality, bisexuality, asexuality, and autosexuality a poor image of what a truly erotic universe could be like. One need not be a dialectician to say "viva la difference!" but one has to appreciate its subtleties to see that is precisely through genuine unity that the state of differentiation grows even more! True unity is therefore not "common-ism", ie it is the ability to commune and generate from a living and erotic unity the infinite plurality of existence. Too many revolutionaries still carry with them the dichotomy between private relations and public intercourse and dismiss as romantic nonsense Che's acute observation that intimacy and love must power revolution and radical change. It also takes genuine humility. In his own way, each profound thinker - Lao Tzu, Nietzsche, Buber and Marx, for example - speaks the essential truth: the transcendence and not repression of what is limited, owned and reified into an image increases the subjectivity, freedom and spontaneity of humanity.

However, as the dialectic matrix will show, the reason love (or any revolution in ownership) is difficult to achieve even when one knows of the need for Self-Other unity, is that alienation or self-opposition into stabilised one-sided "resolutions" and "reformistic" tactics can be devised between the Self and Other which continually displace

the tension that builds up in the constant opposition between fucking and intercourse, causing love and any radical transformation to be continually shifted and put off into the "future". Thus, not only can there be a unity between Self and Other in which both are object centers, as in fucking, and another in which both are image projections, as during intercourse (neither of these unities expresses any kind of object-image unity): it is also possible to get into a rut which suspends one's attempts at genuine unity. A rut is an alienation from the alienation or self-opposition already existing and is therefore an alienated "resolution" of alienation, which remains present precisely because it has become hidden and not open, recognisable, and visible as a condition to be changed. In this "resolution" or rut one can have an object-image unity between Self and Other, but only in two opposing forms: one is a unity only relative to the Self and the other only relative to the Other. In the first case, the Self is the object-center and the Other merely appears projected within it (ie introjected) as an image. In the second case, the Other is perceived as an object center, with the Self merely projected out as an image. With the Self only as an object to be possessed and the Other merely as an image within the Self, the tension between pure object-oriented fucking and pure image-oriented intercourse appears eased: what issues is sexuality in the mode of masturbation or the Romantic Fantasy. Conversely, with the Other as object to be possessed and with oneself merely projected as an image within the Other, sexuality displays itself as rape or the Conquest Fantasy. In both masturbation and the Romantic Fantasy, the Self regards itself as the object to be possessed, with the other functioning as the motor or power image within the Self. This relation is masochistic, in that the Other is not taken as objectively real - only the Self is - and consequently only the relation of "being-acted-upon" can exist in awareness. The cause is the other qua image, while the effect is only a self-effect. Not only is the Other not-objectively real, but the Self in turn is impotent in projecting its image or effectivity to the Other: the Other appears as objectively invisible and subjectively unreachable, and consciousness tends to become catatonic: in the battle between the Self and the Other, the Self simply takes the other as an unreal idealisation and the problem appears dissolved.

On the other hand, in both rape and the conquest fantasy, the Other is regarded only as the object to be possessed and the Self as the image projected into the Other powering the act of possession: in rape, the idea is to conquer the other in order to find the objective identity you have denied yourself to be. This relation is sadistic in that the Self is not taken as objectively real - only as the Other - and as a result, merely the relation "acting-on-something" can exist. The cause is oneself as a directive controlling image, while the effect is only on the other. But in a rape relation not only is the Self objectively not present as an object to be effected, but the Other is impotent in projecting its image or subjective demands to the Self in question. Consequently, the Self is itself objectively invisible and subjectively unreachable, and its consciousness appears totally externalised as an image projection upon outer objectivity: ie it is as paranoidal as masturbation was catatonic. In the battle between the Self and the Other, this time the Self denies its own reality and immediacy and functions instead as the image within the objectivity of the Other: in this battle the Other appears as the object of idealisation (one's project) and the problem appears resolved. Just as the catatonic romantic sees the world's objectivity and immediacy only as a mirror imaging and reflecting his own immediacy and thus cannot speak to a real world, the paranoid and conqueror sees the reflectivity and images of awareness within the world only as an object of his own reflection or intentionality, and as a result he cannot really listen. Neither can he comprehend something being both object and mirror. Thus, a la Sartre, one must look or be looked upon; and any particular relation between Self and Other is

bound to be asymmetrical and exploitative.

Together, rape and masturbation, or in more sociable terms, a Romantic-Conquest integration of persons or lovers, consequently constitute a "master-slave" dialectic in which neither Self nor Other is a complete object and image totality; although between the two of them, such a totality is shared by two half-persons. The master, rapist, or conqueror must feed on the objectivity of the possessed, having no being himself; while the slave, romantic idealiser, or vanquished deludes himself by the controlling images and awareness. Thus, the resolution found between ruler and ruled, male and female, exploiter and exploited can mutually reinforce the alienated state of each, displacing any moves for genuine transformation unless this cosy "hostile integration" is uprooted at the source.

We can now trace the dynamics of the entire Self and Other dialectics to see how four opposites yield four simple but incomplete alternatives to sexuality, once the animal level of mating disappears but while the human modality of love has not yet fully asserted itself. Fucking, intercourse, masturbation, and rape are the four primary modalities of "unenlightened" sexuality; and all four are predicated on the impossibility of the non-reflective state of fucking replacing direct and immediate mating, once explicit self-consciousness has entered the scene. Self-consciousness introduces a focusing process of reflectivity and image-formation into the implicit state of subjectivity that characterises all objective processes. Subjectivity (as opposed to localising ego-consciousness) is nothing but a field of non-localisable immediacy characterising the state of interaction between and among objects of interaction, all objects being defined in terms of its energies and all particle localisation in terms of their field-states).[4] In this state of interaction, all objects mirror or reflect the entire field of energy or "eros" present in their own specific and unique ways, even if an ego-state of explicit image and self-image formation involving large-scale memory retention is not present. Mating is such an immediate state of energy-interaction without the intervention of explicit self-images. But once conscious-focusing, begins to form self-sustaining images and once these images begin to acquire more and more autonomy, then the reflected, mediated state of "imagination" involving the introjection and projection of previously defined images begins to obscure the more immediate subjectivity present in direct energy-interaction. God, the state, and all sorts of idols are now worshipped as images of man, instead of man seeing the direct immediacy of objectivity or Eros (which includes imagisation or Logos as one of its activities) as the true cosmic subjectivity at the ground of being. In totally different ways, Nietzsche, Marx, and Zen share with Kierkegaard and Buber what many would call the authentic "religious" quest: the destruction (not repression or reform) of all "graven images" which delude man from facing the immediate subjectivity of the cosmos, although the images these various thinkers use in describing this imageless immediacy naturally contradict themselves. But he who merely reads or listens to the images that people create, mistaking the pointing finger for the reality pointed to, will never comprehend existence. He will be forever trapped in an imaginary battle with elaborate formalisations of existence and will never be in touch with that creative immediacy which, laughing and weeping, continually creates and destroys these very forms behind the backs of the self-deluded.

Self-consciousness about eating the apple in the original non-linear field of paradise has, therefore, generated a delicate if not absurd situation: because of the way self-consciousness tends to fixate its images outside the immediate context of objective existence from which they are created, tension between the object apple and its image arises; likewise, a tension within any Self and any Other, between its object and image nature, also appears. The four obvious relations now possible between any Self

and any Other who have not resolved their own object and image natures into a functioning unity are, therefore: (1) the crude but hypnotic mode, with Self as only object and Other as only object, called fucking; (2) the refined but boring style with Self as only image and Other as only image, called intercourse; (3) the autistic dreamworld with Self as only object and Other as only image, called masturbation; and finally (4) the violent rejoinder with Self as only image and Other as only object, called rape. This means that fucking has a zero state reflectivity of imagization (due to the temporary repression of image formation), intercourse has a full or double state of pure reflectivity (and hence the total madness or "unreality" which characterises the normalised person who has completely adjusted his immediacy to the "Laingian" social image-game), while masturbation and rape each have a single state of reflectivity. However, because the last two bring about a combined state of imagisation and objectivity, they tend to prevail as image-object resolutions of human behaviour. But because the unity acheived in them is only a one-sided unity of submission or domination between two individuals in which one reflects and the other is reflected, and not a full unity between and within each, they are dangerous as the false gods of unity.

This is the key to all alienation,whether from love, ones's will, revolution or enlightenment.5 Objectification or the process of dialectic polarisation into opposites is not automatically alienation. Mating is an immediate unity of two objective oppositions not yet possessed by alienation. What characterises the possibility of alienation is a double polarisation, ie.,the formation of a complex state of interaction in which two elements (such as individual A and individual B) originally present in an immediate condition of complementary but oppositional interaction (eg mating) develop self-sustaining sub-oppositions within each of them. Thus the immediate objectivities A and B develop an image-function within each such that A is now "object-A and A imaging" in opposition to B as "object-B and B imaging".Before imagization, any immediate and simple moral opposition between A and B is also an immediate unity: however, with imagization and mediation developing out of immediate objectivity, a complete unity between A and B must now be a four element unity of A, B, and their images. But the relationship between any A and B capable of this higher order unity need not express it.Thus, the degree of alienation refers to the "measure"of concretely possible unities over those concretely actualised: the greater the divergence, the greater the alienation. At no point is there a lack of unity of function; at no point is mere objectification into opposites automatically a state of alienation. Dialectic movement is hence not a transition from pure unity without objectification into alienation without any unity of movement, and then a final return to pure unity. Rather, any actual unity (such as e') is an inter-active state of opposition, and any state of alienation (such as e" in the process of realisation) still displays its previous states of unity. Thus, relative to the telos concretely possible, in any given situation one can depict the actual modalities of alienation: there are four such alienation states possible in the transition from e' to e", each of which expresses the previous e' unity between Self and Other as a Self-Other unity (showing that unity is present), but only as unity between Self and Other which is not itself divided and in need of a higher-order unity in order to express a complete e"unity.

Not only must A and B in our example express between them as Self and Other but as well, A and B must bring about an internal unity of a qualitatively different kind within each with regard to their own states of imagization and objectivity, before they can face each other in a genuine immediate unity (love or e") as two singular individuals, each in a state of integrity. Two self-divided individuals lacking a singular will to integrity will not be capable of exhibiting unity of relation (and true I and Thou communion a la Buber), since each will be preoccupied (if not actually occupied) by his or her own disharmonies, projecting and introjecting their alienated

images onto the concrete immediacy in its process of existence and forcing external image-object unities into existence which lack self-integration within any one self or other.

Therefore, any attempt to,bring about an object-image unity by persons, social groups, or movements which themselves are not either object-image integrated or actively tending toward such a unity (whether one is attempting an object-image unity of a person's will through psychoanalysis, of a human relation through love, of a society through revolution or one's entire cosmos through enlightenment), will only bring about alienated, one-sided unities in which one person, class or element functions as object and another functions as the image-maker or image centre. As long as there is a separation between leaders and led (the unconscious and the ego-conscious, master and slave, ruling state or party and its followers, "God" and World) nothing can be done by either member to acheive unity. Thus "the gods that fail" and the continual re-examination necessary for anyone engaged in radical transformation: it is constantly endangered by what appears to be transformation but only involves its superficial drama.

The ground for all exploitation and alienation is the inability to effect self-integration of objectivity and imagization or immediacy and reflection on all levels (personal, social, economic, political, psychological, cosmological). Moreover, what continues to prevent self-determination and freedom is precisely the external unities between object and image, since they obscure the reality one is attempting to create. Finally, precisely because a dialectic unity of immediate objectivity and reflective imagization means a unity of relation between any self and its world context , this automatically makes that self an expression of a self-world unity. Thus, it is not a question of first finding the "correct" world-context and then transforming oneself within it: genuine self-integrity means self-world integrity as a singular project. Imagization is an integral aspect of an immediate relation between mutually conditioned elements, being only an expression of the way each element makes the other, and itself through the other, a function of itself - thereby expressing immediacy as a dynamic state of self-becoming. Only when these images of reflection take on an independent idealism of forms, hypothesising an imagization process into dead-end stasis, do the objects or elements of which they express relation appear in turn as isolated, antagonistic elements in contradiction producing, for example, ego vs super-ego antipathy. Self-determination, therefore, is not private, self-contained ego-determination, nor is it public super-ego counter-determination or conditioning. Self-determination refers to the condition of integrated co-determination that must exist between and within all oppositions and elements such that each element expresses the totality in its own unique way (as an Eros) and the totality in turn is expressed within each aspect (as a Logos). In this condition of self-determination, love as the archetype of transcendence is the experience of oneself in a dynamic state of I and Thou resonance or mutual imagization , which is now an integral aspect of the concrete immediacy underlying all imagization. A non-ending feedback loop of inter-action (and hence intersubjectivity) then occurs, in which all things become explicit functions of themselves exactly to the degree to which they become functions of their co-determining world, which in turn is a function of any of its elements. The place to start the revolution or love is therefore with whatever one is in immediate relation to, since it is there that one's imagization must be re-integrated. Attempting to start with one's images and ideologies merely alienates these images further from their immediacy. The return to immediacy, however, must not replace sterile image intercourse with hypnotic object-fucking or object-devouring since, as we have seen,

this does not destroy images. Nor must it yield to partial integration, in which some images continue to dominate over their objects and which mistakes the master-slave relation of duty and obligation for a genuine relation. Responsibility comes only with the end of"duty" seen as image imposition, since only then will one experience responsibility as the ability to respond. As Gramsci shows, only by patiently making oneself aware of the necessity to destroy one's fixed thoughts in every possible situation and in minute detail will one slowly, quietly, but definitively bring into being a dynamic imagization process that transcends object-possession and hence fixation. Only then will one be ready for any decisive moment requiring a large-scale change. One does not wait for the right situation or the right person, for revolution or for love: one must become the revolution.

We have now come to the grand finale: the unveiling of the nine-term matrix presenting the two-dimensional dynamics of a double polarisation in a singular structure. Summarising this matrix and our entire argument in terms of the transcendence of possession and referring to the four alienated modes and the two non-alienated modes of mating (e') and love (e"), the following sequence appears: mating is the pre-possessive state of sex; fucking is mutual possession; intercourse and marriage in general is mutual dis-possession (or negative possession, of one's objects through their negating images); masturbation and romance is self-possession; rape and conquest is other-possession, and finally, love is trans-possession and a higher form of natural pre-possession. What happens from then on as a new cycle opens itself up as a concrete possibility, need not be our immediate concern - although the dynamics of transition from e to e" is rather suggestive of the totally newer dimension the erotic condition of "man" could express once it has achieved a stable e" form and is hence ready for e'" transformation: consciousness as a three dimensional polarisation. Actually, any "e state" of any dimension is an immediacy and a functioning totality, and as a result this matrix is not a "progress theory" advocating the ever-present deficiency of man and the need for him to reach for his essence that is, nevertheless, forever dangling above him as an unattainable"tease". Nor is man "complete". Instead the very notions of completeness and incompleteness are fixed images fucking up our genuine self-imagization as a dynamic immediacy simaltaneously revealing both self-opposition ("incompleteness") and and self-integration ("completeness") as possibilities, with man himself being the paradoxical edge of opposition in a genuine existential task: the point is to wake up and see that reality is never given in any image and therefore is that which is-being-created in immediacy - including the images about that creation. All the matrix as a logic of creation, and indeed all that any image can say is: should this happen that could follow, and this image in turn only has force to the degree to which it relates to one's own immediacy. Otherwise one will not be studying a matrix of fucking, but only a fucked-up matrix!

(SEE THE DIAGRAM ON PAGE 13)

NOTES


1. Edmund Husserl, "Universal Teleology", in TELOS No. 4, Fall 1969


2. See Michael Kosok, "The Dialectic Matrix", in TELOS, No. 5, Spring 1970


3. As we shall see, it is precisely this higher order self-opposition producing levels of opposites (ie. fair opposites will emerge in an e" matrix form) that permits alienation to set in as a possible one-sided "solution" to genuine unity.

4. See my article, "Dialectics of Nature", in TELOS, No. 6, Fall 1970

5. As studied by Buber, Nietzsche, Marx and Zen respectively, all four positive states (love, will, revolution and enlightenment) are different modalities of transcending ownership or possessiveness, which delimits immediacy into fixed states. It can be shown that these four positive states correspond to the overcoming of the four alienated modalities of Self-Other relatedness already described. A genuine relation involving both Self and Other as immediately present requires enlightenment: a genuine relation involving both Self and Other as reflectively present through each other in an I and Thou activity is love; to overcome romantic Self-possession requires a self-commanding will capable of self-objectification and transformation; to overcome the violently imposed exploited state in which the Other is possessed requires revolution and a return of the genuine subjectivity of the Other. Actually, all four modalities of transcendence ultimately imply each other to varying degrees. The question, however, remains: how does alienation appear from dialectic objectification, thus requiring its transcendence?


e
immediate nature
universal energy
or Eros
S as female
O as male
(SO) mating
+e
-e
+-e or e'
The self differentiation of nature into paired opposites: the prepossessed natural unity of mating
Civilisation as "rope between beast (e') and overman (e")
to e''' etc.
Self as centre object
Other as centre object
Fucking
S ⟷ O
Self and Other unity only one: blind object-unity and mutual possession
Intercourse
S ⟷ O
Self and Other unity as only two: empty image unity as mutual dispossession
Other as projected image
Self as projected image
Masturbation
S ⟵ O
Self and Other unity relative to only a Self possessed romance
Rape
S ⟶ O
Self and Other unity relative to only Other possessed conquest
Love
S ⟷ O
Self and Other unity Both one and two and thus a transforming unity which is human and trans-possessed


NOW LET ME RETURN TO MY OWN MOMENT IN TIME!
FOR THERE IS MUCH THAT I MUST THINK UPON!
WHAT IS REAL -- AND WHAT IS FANCY?
DID I SAVE A UNIVERSE -- OR HAVE I AWAKENED AS FROM A DREAM?
CAN A FUTURE THAT WAS -- BE FOREVER ERASED??
IS THE COSMOS ITSELF BUT A FLICKERING EMBER OF IMAGINATION -- IGNITED BY A RANDOM THOUGHT -- ONLY TO BE SNUFFED OUT AT WILL?
WHEN ALL'S SAID AND DONE WHO IS THE DREAMER -- AND WHICH IS THE DREAM?
PERHAPS -- IT IS BETTER -- THAT WE SHALL NEVER KNOW!



TIGER PAPERS PUBLICATIONS takes apart reality. This issue clears the ground by putting its teeth around the unrealities of education and the social sciences.