

the European defence industries have to rationalise or die and that 'The US Industries has learned how to survive in the post Cold-War world; they have shown us the future'.

For people working in the defence industries and for trade unionists demonstrates a very very real set of dangers. The US defence industry has been maintained by a system of hidden subsidy and by a very large domestic defence budget. It is designed to maintain a global military dominance

The United States coupled its defence industry strategy with a strategy for the protection of their domestic industrial base, something which is not just absent from Britain is completely at odds with the monetarist 'free market' policies pursued by the current and previous governments. In the US for instance the rationalisation in the defence industries ran in parallel with measures to encourage the use of technology developed for military purposes within civilian industry and other measures. A National Shipbuilding initiative was developed which military procurement played a part - as a way of developing the domestic merchant shipbuilding industries. Nothing of this nature exists in Britain.

To some extent the US policies were fueled by a desire to expand their share of the world's market for civilian manufactured goods, but another factor was certainly a desire to do something about the very large

number of jobs lost in the process of rationalising the defence industry. Nothing of this nature is on the cards for Britain.

France and Germany are a difference kettle of fish. Both their governments are keen to make sure that their own industries are protected and their own share of the world market for manufactured goods is defended. This is especially the case with the Socialist government in France where large swathes of the defence industries, especially the high tech end, remain as nationalised industries.

Unless Britain is to do likewise getting into bed with France and Germany is rather like locking yourself in a room with a couple of hungry bears. The results are predictable.

According to Germany's junior minister for Aerospace (Britain has no equivalent government post which itself shows a huge difference in attitude towards industry) Dr Norbert Lammert, Europe's largest Aerospace companies have 'no future in the next century', without integration. This is clearly the case but that does not mean the integration therefore has to be based upon the production of weapons. The question has to be asked as to why defend our defence industries?

A number of ministers have made it clear that the Defence Review is predicated on a review of foreign policies. Locking Britain into an industrial policy with France and Germany means that that policy may well determine foreign policy rather

than the other way round.

Currently Britain has a gross overdependence on the manufacture of weapons. It represents a huge proportion of our manufacturing exports, being one of the few, if not the only, area where we enjoy a trade surplus. What happens to that manufacturing capacity currently producing weapons hold the key to Britain's future prosperity and the possibility of ever turning round from being a declining economy.

What George Robertson proposes will inevitably lead to substantial job cuts. It could well leave us as the junior partner in a system dominated by France and by Germany.

If you draw a graph of the cost of fighter aircraft from the time when they were first developed as separate entities in the 1920's you get a straight line, which the cost will probably continue to rise at the same rate. If it does then we fairly rapidly move to a point where the whole of the defence budget will be able to afford one aircraft in the not too distant future. Points such as this clearly show that there simply is no substantial future for Britain in trying to compete with the United States in military production.

What Mr Robertson is proposing is flogging a terminally ill horse. There are other ways of protecting the jobs, the skill base and the manufacturing base without making weapons which should be pursued instead.

AFFILIATION TO TUCND

TUCND is the section of CNL which deals with the trade union movement. Some years ago we broadened our aims to include campaign work around peace issues generally and ceased to be an exclusively anti-nuclear power organisation.

The threat to peace in the world changed with the end of the cold war, but it didn't go away. Now more than ever before, Britain needs a peace movement coupled to the Trade Union movement. If your branch is not yet affiliated to TUCND please raise with them the possibility of doing so.

We would like to affiliate to TUCND.

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Fees for affiliation to TUCND are - 12 for trades councils and branches with up to 300 members. 17 for branches with up to 1000 members. 45 for branches with up to 5,000 members. 75 for branches with up to 10,000 members. 100 for branches with up to 20,000 members. For more than this, contact the office.

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TUCND NEWS

NOTTS UNION

- 7 APR 1998

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Spring 1998 issue

APPEARANCE AND REALITY WITH THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY

By Lionel Trippet

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was presented for signature at the United Nations in New York on 24th September 1996. Yet this treaty will almost certainly never come into force.

What has happened and why....

There had been an on-again, off-again negotiations for a CTBT from 1977. Sometimes there would be progress, then the talks would collapse, depending very much on how good or bad relations were between the US and what was then the Soviet Union.

Then in the late 1980's, with the ending of the Cold War and the nuclear arms race between the US and Russia, everything changed. Both sides were cutting back on their nuclear weapons and were genuinely interested in a test ban.

The three smaller nuclear powers, Britain, France and China, were less enthusiastic, particularly since they were all in the middle of developing new nuclear weapons.

However there was growing worldwide pressure for an end to testing. In the South Pacific, South America and Africa, countries were coming together to agree to nuclear free zones (NFZ). In 1994, with all

the nuclear weapons states (NWS) except China accepting a moratorium - a temporary halt on testing, negotiations began in Geneva with every hope of success. But from the start it became clear that there were two widely diverging views of what a CTBT was for.


Most countries, including in particular, the non-western and developing states, saw a CTBT as a step towards worldwide nuclear disarmament.

The NWS, on the other hand, were determined to keep their

nuclear weapons. To them, the purpose of the CTBT was to prevent any new countries developing their own nuclear weapons.

This fundamental disagreement - also surfaced during the 1995 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Negotiations, when the long-standing failure of the NWS to fulfil their disarmament obligations under Article 6 of the existing treaty, for the 26 years since the existing treaty was signed, was a major bone

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Clinton is probably genuinely committed to a CTBT. Britain, France and his own Republican dominated Congress have done their best to wreck it.

Campaigning for Peace and for Nuclear Disarmament

of contention.

When, immediately after the NPT conference, both China and France resumed nuclear testing, while Britain persisted in bringing the new Trident system into service, there was considerable anger around the world.

This clash lies behind many of the highly technical and often jargon ridden argument that followed over issues such as

Scope, monitoring, On Site Inspections (OSI), National Technical Means (NTM), Entry Into Force (EIF) and Linkage.

Scope describes what the treaty should cover. The US, Britain and France wanted as Zero Yield treaty - one covering all explosive tests, however small. However these are all nuclear states with by far the most advanced computer technology. They are confident that, using computer simulation and other laboratory techniques, they can continue to upgrade their nuclear weapons without explosive testing.

Already there is increased technical cooperation between the three. For example, data from the recent French tests is likely to be shared.

Russia, and in particular China, far less advanced in computer technology, wanted a treaty with a loophole allowing very small explosive tests.

China also wanted a treaty that allowed Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNEs) - that is the use of nuclear explosions for large scale engineering projects such as blasting out harbours or artificial lakes.

India was also interested in the idea and has always maintained that its one nuclear test in 1974 was for PNF.

CND and other peace and environmental groups have always regarded this distinction between peaceful and non-peaceful nuclear tests as nonsense. All tests are equally damaging to the environment and identical as regards developing a country developing its own nuclear weapons.

After much argument, the Zero Yield option was accepted by everyone while a face-saving

formula postponed the PNE issue until a review conference in ten years time. The general feeling was that China had quietly conceded the point.

Verification and international Monitoring Systems (IMS)

Any test ban treaty has to include a series of verification measures to make sure no one cheats.

Satellite Photography will almost certainly reveal the flurry of activity that leads up to any test. Seismic monitoring equipment, similar to that which detects earthquakes will pick up the earth tremors caused by a test. Other systems can detect radioactive traces in the gases that generally escape into the atmosphere, as well as the electromagnetic pulse (EMP) produced by any nuclear explosion. There are also hydroacoustic and infrasound detectors.

The technical problems had already been largely solved although there were still political differences concerning the numbers and siting of these automatic devices.

More important differences concerning the issue of On-Site Inspections (OSI), when a country is suspected of breaking the terms of a CTBT and a team of experts has to be flown in to uncover what is going on.

No country is happy at the idea of having outsiders crawling all over its secret military or nuclear bases. So the question arises of what evidence is needed to trigger off an inspection and who exactly can order one.

Most of the evidence would be provided by the monitoring systems. The major arguments concerned the additional evidence which would be provided by what are called National Technical Means (NTM). This curious phrase means evidence gathered by national Intelligence agencies such as Britain's MI6; spying, in everyday language.

The problem here is that the world of secret intelligence gathering is dominated by a few countries, and

particularly the US, with its huge, worldwide CIA as well as its own commercial and electronic espionage networks.

Thus any of the world's smaller countries can be spied on by the US while completely lacking the means to retaliate. Since the CIA, like other intelligence services, has a long history of either misinterpreting or inventing facts, many countries would not regard it as a safe and unbiased source of evidence on which to base any demand for OSI.

All these issues were the subject of much debate but in the end a series of compromises were reached. The area where it was impossible to get agreement was linkage.

This term describes the attempt, led by India but strongly supported by many of the non-nuclear states to build into the treaty a series of specific, even timetabled disarmament obligations on the NWS.

Entry Into Force

Treaties are first signed and then ratified by the legislatures of the signatories. In Britain this process is usually painless and quick, since the political head of state, the Prime Minister, can command a majority of votes in the House of Commons, a ratifying bill will generally pass with little trouble.

However in countries where head of state and legislature can be from different parties, the process is much more problematic. IN the US for instance, bills signed by Clinton have been routinely held up and often rejected by a republican dominated Congress. Hence the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START 2) signed in 1993 was only ratified by Congress in 1996 and is still held up in the Russian Duma.

All international treaties include and EIF clause. This typically states that the treaty will come into force so-many days after a total of so-many unspecified countries have ratified. Such a formula has been standard in all arms control treaties such as the NPT and the chemical Weapons Convention.

However, uniquely, the CTBT

text included a list of forty four named states, all of whom must ratify before the treaty can come into force. Each of these states has effectively been handed a veto.

The list includes both India and Pakistan - which has always said it will not sign a CTBT unless India did so. Other states include Columbia, Zaire, Israel, Iran and both North and South Korea.

Britain, backed by Russia and China, took the lead in insisting on this treaty-wrecking clause.

So the well publicised signing session in New York presented the appearance rather than the reality of a treaty. The chances of it ever coming into force are very small indeed. But until it does, none of the inspection and verification systems will be set up, and even the countries that have signed can in fact resume testing if they so decide.

What lies behind this?

All, five nuclear powers are publicly in favour of a test ban. But, whilst much of Russian and the US

leadership are genuinely in favour of a treaty, both face strong internal opposition from Russian nationalists and American Republicans.

Britain has never really accepted the idea and is determined to continue developing new nuclear weapons. France was clearly startled by the waves of protest around the world when they resumed nuclear testing. China is also rather more influenced by world opinion that they may admit.

So faced with popular pressure for a test ban treaty, none of the NWS was prepared to come out against it in public.

With the US Presidential elections only months away, President Clinton was anxious to be seen as signing a treaty. When the Geneva negotiations effectively broke down, a procedural device was used to bring the text to the UN General Assembly where it could be voted on and opened for signature, even though it was in a form that meant it was unlikely ever to come into force.

And in the Future ?

Although this is a treaty in appearance only, the bad publicity that would follow if any of the NWS resumed testing, means that, at least in the near future, they are likely to behave as though the treaty is actually in force.

Britain in any case, can't start testing again without US permission, while France is actually closing down its Pacific testing site. Both could, in theory, develop new sites but it is hard to see where. Australia, where Britain used to test back in the 1960's, would never allow more testing on its soil.

India may or may not begin nuclear testing. Only they can make that decision. But as long as Britain and the other nuclear states insist on keeping their own weapons, they are in no position to object. The present nuclear status quo is inherently unstable and only a commitment to progressive nuclear disarmament by the NWS is likely to stop the spread of nuclear weapons to more countries.

TEN POINTS FOR WORKERS IN DEFENCE

In the run up to last years Labour Party conference three national unions placed an advert in the New Statesman under the title of 'ten points from workers in Defence' which was in practice intended to lobby for an increase in defence spending. The three unions were ISTC, MSF and the AEEU. While some of the points they made were valid some deserve a response. There is a justifiable need by those unions to defend their members in the defence industries, but those needs would not be well served by what the advert was asking for.

One of the points states that "Too many of the arms sold around the world are made and exported by unstable, authoritarian states with none of the checks and balances Westminster and the British press provide". Up to the invasion by Iraq of Kuwait British had consistently sold potent military equipment to

Iraq. This included the chemical component parts for a number of nerve gas weapons and the relevant ministers were fully aware of this happening at the time. Iraq actually used substantial amounts of nerve gas against Iran and used it against Kurdish villages in the North of the country. British companies have also found to have been supplying

material to Savimbi in Angola, to Poll Pot in Cambodia and to the ousted genocidal regime in Rwanda. In some of these cases the Government not only allowed the trade to go ahead but there are strong indications that they initiated and made possible to supply of these weapons.

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Bro Jackson at last years Labour conference

TRIDENT COSTS £1 BILLION PER YEAR TO RUN

In the run up to Christmas the Government gave a written reply to a question asked by Field Marshal Lord Carver, admitted that Trident would cost £1 billion per year to run. Carver was at one stage the Commander in Chief prior to entering the House of Lords and has consistently made it clear he felt that Trident had no discernable military function. He is quoted as saying "what the bloody hell is it for". Although Carver is one of only a few senior military personnel who have made their opposition to Trident

publicly clear there are strong rumours that there are a substantial number who agree with him but feel constrained by the fact they are still serving officers. There have also been strong rumours of incidents where Margaret Thatcher, while she was prime minister, slugging off those who expressed dissent over her nuclear weapons policies in meetings with military personnel.

The previous government had consistently maintained that Trident's running costs would be considerably lower than this, roughly

a couple of hundred million a year. However, a number of experts in the field and peace movement organisations, including TUCND, maintained that the figures they were quoting were wholly unrealistic.

The reason that the MOD give for the discrepancy between the figures they gave in response to Carver's question and the figures previously given is that Carver had apparently asked specific and detailed questions. In reality what it means is the previous government

One of our major competitors in the world of arms sales is no South Africa. The idea that in some way Britain's government is somehow more responsible than others is undermined somewhat by experience where the British government, sometimes out of sight both of the press and of Westminster, have been prepared to sell to vicious murderous people in the midst of bloody conflict. Britain had Margaret Thatcher as the prime minister for many years and presumably it is possible such a creature could be elected again. The idea that Margaret Thatcher is somehow to be trusted while, for instance, Nelson Mandela is not, is absurd.

Another point the advert makes is "Training planes and electronic equipment are not weapons of war and to stop exporting them would be to destroy the skills base, the jobs, and the communities where defence workers live". This points to a very real problem indeed in that the skill base which the defence industry in Britain represents is absolutely vital to the possibility of a decent life in the future for ordinary working people here. But it is thoroughly wrong to characterise equipment such as that referred to as being benign. In some cases offensive military capability is hugely enhanced by non weapons exports. For instance, some years ago Britain

sold Indonesia a second hand supply ship. By doing so they extended the range of Indonesian warships considerably opening up the possibility of armed conflict with a number of neighbouring states as Indonesia began to press claims for ownership over several sets of islands. Indonesia has a history of invading where it thinks it can get away with it. It invaded the former Portuguese colony of East Timour in the mid 70's and has killed a third of the population since then. The military significance of equipment depends on a host of issues not simply just whether a bullet comes out of the end or not, and these certainly should be taken into account by our government when deciding whether to allow such sales.

One of the sales in the offing at the time of the advert was that of Hawk aircraft to Indonesia. BAe and the Indonesians have consistently maintained that these are used for training purposes only while a number of sources in Indonesia have consistently maintained that they are being used as ground attack aircraft against people fighting the government.

The final point made in the advert was "Arbitrary, one sided decisions will reduce the power of Britain's new foreign policy to get support for its human rights and trade union message to those struggling for democracy and trade union rights

in authoritarian regimes". It is difficult to see how the development of a political environment where democratic rights are enjoyed by trade unions and the population by the gift of arms (in many cases arms sales have turned into gifts as the governments concerned don't pay) to the people responsible for suppressing those rights. Those struggling for democracy in many of the countries which Britain does sell arms to have consistently asked Britain to cease the sale of weapons to their governments.

The unions concerned have made a big mistake in trying to defend jobs by trying to defend the export of weapons. At the Labour Party conference the AEEU actually published a press release claiming that the life expectancy of those living in East Timour had risen since the Indonesian invasions. In other words it has allowed itself to be drawn into repeating propaganda from people guilty of genocide and who have been heavily criticized by United Nations:

Britain is in a very dangerous state in relation to the future of our industry etc. The way out is not to continue supplying the perpetrators of genocide, its to rebuild our civilian manufacturing base by the type of consistent governmental support industries in successful manufacturing economies enjoy.

were far more keen to suppress information as to Trident's real costs.

This is a very significant move by the Government. The costs for Trident have always been politically sensitive. At one stage the government even argued that the costs were coming down. It was difficult to argue that the fundamental cuts in services such as health and education, were essential while continuing to spend huge sums on Trident. So they doctored the figures to make it look less significant.

They also grossly inflated the figures of those who would be employed by Trident both in its construction and its refitting and maintenance. One of the reasons why the government figures were consistently questioned was that while they maintained that vast numbers would be employed in the Trident programme, the costs they published wouldn't sustain the figures for those employed.

However, the Trident programme does employ significant numbers of people in the use of types of


technology which are very important to the economy overall. Dropping the Trident programme and spending the money saved on running costs in services would mean that those skills and those facilities would be lost to the rest of the economy. The major problem with the British economy was that Thatcher, Major and the current government have consistently underfunded civilian manufacturing base to the point where industry here can not compete with that based in countries where they do enjoy adequate government support.

For the past ten years there has been a grave need to re-equip the world's merchant shipping fleets. The successful manufacturing nations have recognised this and frameworked their legislation so that they have a healthy merchant shipping and merchant shipbuilding industry. For instance Japan has 40% of the world's shipbuilding orders. Many of those are from Japanese companies who are encouraged by legislation and

subsidies to invest in modern shipping. This has not been achieved by using cheap labour. Japan's labour costs are 50% higher than in Britain and their use of machines far more intensive than in Britain. For instance in the large Japanese yards 85% of the steel will be cut by computer controlled machines and 65% of the welding done by similar machines.

Scrapping Trident and shifting the resources currently devoted to it to Merchant Shipbuilding and to developing a merchant shipping industry could well see the employment of very large numbers of people and the redevelopment of a skill base in Britain vital to our future prosperity.

Service industry is vital. But it can not exist without a strong manufacturing base and both of those are now need to be rebuilt. With the government now admitting that Trident costs a billion per year there is a very powerful argument indeed in favour of scrapping it and redeploying these funds in the way outlined above.



The only real alternative for British shipbuilding, working to the now massive market for merchant ships

IS THIS GOVERNMENT CAPABLE OF DELIVERING AN ETHICAL FOREIGN POLICY

Britain's economy is virtually unique in the world. No where else is the level of dependency on the export of weapons as significant as it is here. We have half the graduate engineers and scientists working on weapons development and production. 10% of our manufacturing workforce make military equipment. Weapons sales is the only area where Britain has a surplus in the balance of trade. The arms industry represents a pool of skill and has the ability to function in modern materials and techniques which is unquestionably vital to the coherence of our economy - we cannot do without them. Or rather doing without them means economic and social degradation on a scale beyond our worst nightmares.

There are two major reasons why we ended up in this appalling mess, with social collapse firmly on the long term agenda. One was Thatcher's desire to defeat Communism and the other the long established desire to retain the illusion that Britain was a major actor internationally - a superpower.

The end of the Second World War established a system of international trade which gave the western developed capitalist countries a very privileged position internationally at the expense of the rest of the world. The backbone of this was the Bretton Woods agreements which established the Dollar as the international currency, the World Bank, the IMF, the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GAAT) and a number of other measures. The United States underwrote this system with international military force establishing a huge network of bases throughout the world. They looked to Britain and France for support for this. To do this Britain maintained a disproportionately high defence budget - under Thatcher

this was twice the average proportion of GDP than other European states and five times that of Japan.

But if you are to spend such huge sums on weapons you have to make the bulk of them yourself, otherwise you place a burden on the Balance of Trade, to the point where you could wreck the economy. But an arms race is essentially a race in technology, to gain a technical edge over the what the opposition has available. That means the cost of research and development increases constantly. Thus to manufacture a tank, for instance, at a competitive price requires a long production run so that you can spread the cost of R&D. But Britain can only use a limited number of tanks and we passed the point some time ago where we could afford to develop one exclusively for our own use and that means we have to export - to keep the production runs high. That also means that we gain an income from a product whose development has been underwritten by the Government. So there is a two way encouragement to export.

The result for our Government is that arms sales have become both a tool and an aim of foreign policy. An aim in the sense that it was designed to promote weapons sales and a tool in the sense that it helps maintain vicious and repressive regimes in power which are sympathetic to Britain's business. This is something we are locked into. It wasn't a moral choice, it was done for straight commercial, economic and political reasons.

The Monetarist policies which came with Thatcher meant that the only industry in Britain receiving the level of

governmental support which would allow it to retain a competitive edge in the modern world were the arms industries.

Britain now has the eighteenth largest economy in the world and its sliding. Five years ago it was the thirteenth and in 1979 the eighth. Yet we are the second largest exporter of weapons, which means no one else has this level of dependence of weapons exports. But we can't continue like this. "The money game is fine but industry is the only way a country can survive and I really don't see how the British will make a living in the future". That's a quote from the President of the Honda Motor Company. Modern industry in Britain now, to a large extent, means the arms industry but that is now under serious threat.

Defence cuts at home have reduced the amount of R&D cash available. There are now seven or eight Third World countries manufacturing tanks for export. We face sharp competition from the other NATO producers with France, Germany, and America producing better tanks than Britain and, certainly in the case of the US, have far more political clout and cash for bribes than Britain. At the end of the cold war the US reduction in arms spending left a huge overcapacity in arms production and vast stocks of surplus equipment. In some cases they were prepared to give away tanks in order to gain markets. For instance they gave 600 M60 tanks to Egypt, and that meant the US manufacturers got the market for spares and ammunition which was worth about as much as the value of the tanks themselves.

In addition a number of former Warsaw Pact countries produce better tanks than Britain except they have less political clout and no money to bribe. But their armour's good, the fire control systems are excellent and the ammunition formidable. Then there is Russia. Some of the aircraft

they have on offer now would mean someone piloting a Eurofighter entering a conflict against aircraft at a similar stage of development, arguably some of the stuff they have available now, would mean they would they would be committing suicide. It looks likely the Eurofighter would be trying to dodge incoming missiles from the Russian export before it even knew it had upset anyone.

To keep up with the game Britain sells to people who can't get the stuff elsewhere but that doesn't work terribly well. For instance Britain used to have a substantial market for tanks in the Middle East because the US wouldn't sell to Arab states, but that changed after the Gulf War. Out of orders that were placed for 2,500 tanks Britain got 18, France got 300 and the US had orders for the rest.

Britain doesn't make the best. Short-termism in the City means that while British producers are producing upgrades of older equipment our competitors are developing completely new systems. But it isn't just that we sell weapons to repressive regimes, we create those regimes and through diplomatic activity engineer the

circumstances which makes repressive governments possible - in some cases inevitable. Britain is therefore economically dependent on a process which makes and ethical foreign policy very difficult to achieve. The Labour Government are defining this simply in terms of not selling weapons of mass destruction to psychotic nutters but it cuts much deeper than that, which is partly why they have not been terribly successful at maintaining this policy.

To break the cycle is going to take a great deal of political effort. The industrial implications are massive and the future of manufacturing hinges on whether this cycle is broken. In other words the future viability of our economy hinges on breaking the cycle too.

It can be done. Japan doesn't export weapons and has a much more potent economy than Britain. A move away from selling to repressive regimes means a change in the fundamentals of the foreign policy to a one which breaks with the tradition established after the Second World War and to the establishment of policies which nurture industrial development at home and fair trade abroad.

An 'Ethical' foreign policy means nothing if it's just the glitzy feelgood measure offered by the government up to now because the issues cut much deeper than such a policy could address. The future viability of our economy depends on it. These changes are desperately needed in Britain and it could give hope for a solution to problems like the fact that a billion people live in absolute poverty (which means there is no guarantee they will be alive in a years time) and one death in three is of a child below the age of six in the world.

That poverty and misery is largely as a result of military conflict, fuelled by an arms trade which encourages conflict. Britain's current foreign policies have done a great deal to encourage this situation. There could be immense benefit for humanity resulting from changes in those policies but we have to recognise that they are deeply bedded into the way our economy has been shaped over the past 50 years and changing the foreign policy will mean changing the industrial, economic and defence policies too - and that means fundamental change in those policies.

EUROPEAN DEFENCE INDUSTRY RATIONALISATION WILL COST JOBS - DOES MR ROBERTSON KNOW WHAT HE IS DOING?

Surprisingly before the results of the Defence Review currently underway the Defence Minister George Robertson has joined the ministers of France and Germany to issue a statement saying that the defence industries of the respective countries must rationalise to become European entities rather than national industries.

This has a certain logic but only if the path pursued over the past couple of decades is continued unchanged. But if the basis for this direction of development is flawed,

or has run its course, then there is little point in trying to perpetuate it.

George Robertson has said that
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The Tornado, an early attempt by BAe at collaboration with European manufacturers.