




# CAMPAIGN

# AGAINST THE MODEL WEST GERMANY

## Nr. 5



## Foreword

A CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE MODEL WEST GERMANY cannot be centred exclusively around the increasingly repressive conditions in this country. Demonstrators are beaten up by the police, teachers are disciplined, political prisoners are held in prison and censorship laws exist in other countries too.

In view of the fact that in many countries all over the world, also in Europe, many people - individuals, groups and entire populations - are trying to find and develop an alternative to capitalism and imperialism, West Germany, with her economical strength, social-liberal government, and her generally high standard of living and progress, represents an attempt to find an alternative to the choice between a constant crisis in capitalism on one hand and dictatorship or a socialist development on the other. This new development in West Germany within the last 10 years is not one of an open dictatorship of a fascist or Latin-American type, but one of integration of the people through the integration of all relevant organizations in the state, by guaranteeing a high standard of living providing that no disruptions are caused by social unrest, and through an extensive control of newsmedia and other forms of publicity.

If the political prerequisite for this model, namely the end of class struggle and consensus among the people, is only symbolically or marginally questioned, the state or the institutions incorporated in the state, react with extreme severity, a severity aimed at destroying a socialist alternative before it develops. Characteristic for these repressive measures is that they are not carried out in contradiction to existing laws as measures in a dictatorship, instead, they are legally permitted. If necessary, legislation to cover particular measures is passed within a few days. Just as Hitler came to power legally in Germany, Berufsverbote are legal today as is censorship, as are union expulsions, as is solitary confinement in prisons, as is forbidding demonstrations against atomic energy plants. Everyone who rejects the consensus is considered an enemy of the state.

With the use of new technology, especially that of the computer to collect data about every individual living in this country, the state has developed methods to register and to control the entire population, both technically and politically. The West German left, already weak and not likely to become powerful, is not the only target. In coalition with various parties and reactionary sectors in other countries, West Germany is putting all her efforts into fighting socialist perspectives and experiments in Europe: financial support is given to bankrupt regimes, and attempts are made to force unions and socialist parties to copy the West German model, and both technology and experience in repressive measures are being exported. Protest against the Model West Germany is not only an act of solidarity with the West German left; it is protest against building Europe up based on this model.

## CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE MODEL WEST GERMANY

### CONTACT ADDRESS

c/o Evangelische Studentengemeinde (ESG)

Querenburger Höhe 287

4630 Bochum 1

WEST GERMANY

July 1978

## PART 1: The Demonstration in Kalkar

On September 24, 1977, over 50,000 people had reached the town of Kalkar in order to demonstrate against the fast-breeder reactor which is being built near this small town in the north of Germany. Another 20,000 people who had started out for Kalkar that morning were held up along the way and never reached their destination. And it is impossible to estimate how many people, who considered or might have considered taking part in the demonstration, were put off by the ominous predictions that had appeared in the press prior to this day.

### *Preparation from all Sides*

The demonstration was organized by the Bundesverband der Bürgerinitiativen Umweltschutz (Federal Union of Citizens Environment Protection Committees) and supported by 38 ecology organizations in the 9 common market countries and in Austria. (1) The steering committee proposed that the demonstrators gather in the town of Kalkar and then march to the construction site to assemble on the large field belonging to the farmer Mr. Maas across from the fast-breeder reactor. Mr. Maas, who has been fighting against the construction of the reactor in court for years, agreed with these plans. It was emphasized from the very beginning that the 24th. of September was to be a peaceful protest and an opportunity to inform others about the facts. (2) Mr. Renken, the chairman of the North Rhine Westfalia branch of the Bundesverband der Bürgerinitiativen Umweltschutz, explained: "It is to be a festival with stands and games; we want to sing instead of throwing stones." (3)

But more than a month before the demonstration was to take place, ominous reports began to appear in the press. "Left radicals systematically plan to storm the reactor in Kalkar" reported the Neue Westfälische Zeitung on August 18, 1977. One day later, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung wrote: "After Brokdorf<sup>\*</sup>, the next battle ground threatens to be in Kalkar." A week later, Die Welt maintained: "Demonstration planned in Kalkar probably won't run peacefully."

Some two weeks before the demonstration was to take place, even before the demonstration was officially registered, reports of preparations from the side of the government began to appear. "In Kalkar, the radicals want to storm on September 24" reported the Neue Ruhr Zeitung; the Minister for Interior Affairs for North Rhine Westfalia, Mr. Hirsch, stated that "the Bürgerinitiativen [citizens committees] against atomic energy must be protected" and for that reason it "had been decided to mobilize the largest possible show of police." (4) This was confirmed several days later as Mr. Hirsch explained that he had access to "'documents and information' out of which the conclusion had to be drawn, 'that some groups, which wanted to take part in the demonstration, were out for a violent confrontation from the very start.'" (5)

At this time, Mr. Hirsch made the recommendation, that the demonstration should take place on the bank of the Rhine across from the nuclear reactor and not in Mr. Maas' field as planned. In this way, the object of the demonstration could be well seen, but at the same time, a separation between demonstration and object could be assured. Mr. Hirsch declared that he was "determined to go to all lengths to protect the rights of the citizens from any violence." (6)

\* In October 1976, November 1976 and February 1977, mass demonstrations took place protesting the building of a nuclear power plant near this village.

In the following two weeks, the "citizen" was bombarded from all directions with frightful predictions as to what was going to happen in Kalkar:

Bild, September 9, 1977:

"Kalkar - why a small town is afraid of the weekend"

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, September 21, 1977:

"Worries about Kalkar Demonstration.

The people should stay away/Warning of Violence"

Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, September 21, 1977:

"10,000 Policemen will be in Kalkar"

Westfälische Rundschau, September 21, 1977:

"Watch on the Rhine - Citizens Anxious about Peaceful Weekend"

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, September 22, 1977:

"The Fast-Breeder Reactor becomes a Fortress.

10,000 Policemen for 40,000 Demonstrators?"

Die Welt, September 23, 1977:

"Since yesterday, the children in Kalkar have school holidays!"

Bild, September 23, 1977:

"Kalkar: The first ones came with keds, gas masks and scarves for disguise. Interior Minister is afraid of a 'slaughter' around the atomic power plant."



Fig. 1

The location of planned and already existing nuclear reactors referred to throughout the article are indicated in this map.


On September 11, 1977, the demonstration in Kalkar and the assembly on Mr. Maas' field across from the construction site was officially registered as requested by law. Nine days later, the township director announced the following restrictions: "vehicles arriving and departing [from the demonstration] in West Germany are not allowed to drive in a convoy without special permission; ... it is forbidden to bring iron bars, clubs, kedges and other weapons as implied in the assembly law; ... it is forbidden to bring articles of camouflage (masks, scarves), gas masks and hard hats; vehicles of all kinds (including sanitary vehicles and vehicles with loud speakers) are not allowed to accompany the march; ... all marches from Kalkar to the construction site and any assembly on Mr. Maas' property and in all other areas bordering on the nuclear reactor are forbidden." (7)

Prohibiting self-protection (both against physical injury and against being photographed), driving in convoys (also a method of self-protection) and prohibiting an assembly on the field across from the nuclear reactor construction site was all in the name of protecting the public from danger which was "certainly" to be expected: "for those who come to this demonstration in order to express their opinions and convictions, it is primarily important that it is possible to do this effectively at all. The restrictions in those areas named, only minimally effect the character of the rally. The heart of the Assembly Law is not only not being restricted, only through the restrictions themselves is it possible that a large number of people will be able to exercise their rights. At the same time, dangers to the public interest and general strain on the population can at least be minimized through these regulations that have to be tolerated in order to make such a demonstration possible." (8)

An appeal was submitted on September 21 and the court decision, which wasn't made until the day of the demonstration, was in favour of the restrictive regulations. First the restrictive measures; then, the legalisation. And the court's decision legalized everything the police were to undertake on the day of the demonstration.

The tactic was a clever one - forbidding the demonstration entirely wouldn't look good at all; after all, West Germany is supposed to be a democratic country, but certain "minimal" restrictions, in the name of law and order and protection for the people would allow the democratic face to be kept and at the same time would give those opposed to the nuclear reactor an opportunity to express their opinions in a harmless way thus giving them the feeling of having done something against the building of the fast-breeder reactor and diverting their energies from perhaps less harmless forms of protest.

Mr. Maas in his field across from the fast-breeder reactor



*Last-Pitch Effort*

The Social Democratic Party (which, in coalition with the Liberals, has a majority in the parliament in North Rhine Westfalia) passed a decree forbidding the members of its youth organization to take part in the demonstration in Kalkar. "The Jusos [Jungsozialisten] can't be so naive as to think that they can make peaceful citizens out of political criminals." (9) The Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (German Federal Union of Trade Unions) followed a remarkably similar line in an attempt to prevent its members from taking part in the demonstration in an appeal which appeared nation wide in the press: "Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund: In Kalkar, there threatens to be a slaughter." (10)

In a final effort to reduce participation in the protest, the last warnings arrived on the breakfast table with the Saturday morning newspaper on September 24, the morning of the demonstration. Both the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund and Mr Hirsch (Minister for Interior Affairs of North Rhine Westfalia) appealed to the people not to take part in the demonstration: "Interior Minister of North Rhine Westfalia, Mr. Hirsch, and the German Federal Union of Trade Unions have appealed to all citizens to stay away from the nuclear-power opposers' demonstration at the fast-breeder reactor in Kalkar. There have been definite indications for planned violent activities: In the announcements for participation in the demonstration, there was talk of the necessity of 'militant occupation of construction sites' and of 'a solid and determined march' through the police barricades. In a small truck, the police found kedges, knuckle-dusters, police hats and all the materials necessary for building molotow cocktails." (11)

And so the preparatory campaign through the mass media, which has been the longest and most extensive one of its kind up till now in West Germany, came to an end. The campaign in the mass media was a systematic attempt to defame the wide anti-nuclear power movement as being almost criminal, to associate the movement with "terrorist" activities thus making demonstrating, in fact a legal form of protest, seem, in practice, illegal.

But not all were intimidated by the warnings in the press; not everybody was prepared to back down for fear of the predicted "terror" or for fear of being labelled a "terrorist" themselves. In the night of September 23 and on the morning of September 24, thousands of people started to make their way for Kalkar in buses, in cars - both singly and in convoys, and by train.

*Off to Kalkar*

For many of those travelling by car or by bus, the first controls took place before the journey had even begun at the meeting points arranged for filling the buses and cars and organizing convoys in cities often hundreds of miles from Kalkar (Hannover, Hamburg, Bochum, Lübeck, Kiel to mention but a few). For the rest, the first controls came shortly after they left the city or as they drove onto the highway. All these controls, carried out by policemen armed with machine guns, consisted of an examination of identity cards (or passports for foreigners) of all vehicle occupants which usually included verification with the Federal Criminal Department's central computer and an inspection of the vehicle itself to see "if it met with the safety requirements".\* Armoured tanks, water canons and vehicles full of police on stand-by were often posted nearby. In the state of Lower Saxony, the highway itself was blocked and the buses were controlled once again. The police dragged out these bus controls so long that the number of consecutive working hours legally permitted for a bus driver were exceeded and continuing the trip would have been an illegal act punishable by law. The buses from Hamburg which had two drivers took

17 hours to drive 500 kilometers (310 miles) to reach Kalkar.(12) Approx. 10,000 people were forced to turn back before ever reaching Kalkar. Those who came from France, Belgium and Holland were submitted to extensive controls at the border and many (486 persons according to official reports, several thousand persons according to demonstration organizers) were refused entry and were turned back with "undesirable Person" stamped in their passports.(13)



The controls that followed came about 30 - 50 kilometers (18 - 31 miles) from Kalkar. The controls had been systematically set up in a ring around Kalkar; barricades had been erected on all roads, including the highways, leading to Kalkar. In addition, policemen were inconspicuously posted at most highway exits near Kalkar to count the number of cars leaving the highway and possibly to note their license numbers. The main bridge across the Rhine at Rees (see map on page 8) was entirely blocked off preventing the traffic from crossing over the Rhine at this point.

Not far from Kalkar, a train which was heading in this direction, travelling through a residential area, was suddenly surrounded by 8 helicopters from the Bundesgrenzschutz (Federal Border Police) and 2 police helicopters; a transport helicopter landed about 20 meters (20 yards) from the train and 20 to 30 policemen streamed out and

★ The controls had to be carried out under the pretence of a traffic control. It wasn't until April 13, 1978, that a new law was passed permitting "the erection of control stations during searches for terrorists or armed robbers on public streets and grounds. ... At a control station, everyone must allow verification of his identity and searching through his belongings." (Das Parlament Nr. 8, Feb. 25, 1978)



headed for the train which had come to a stop. More police poured out of two more transport helicopters and a police helicopter which had landed near by. They were armed with chemical mace, clubs, shields, helmets and some with grenades. Thorough identity controls were carried out and the compartments were searched for weapons but nothing was confiscated. The residents hanging out of windows and balconies watched the entire manoeuvre.

Those who managed to pass all these hindrances were confronted with yet another control, this being the most extensive of all and accompanied by the largest display of armaments and technical equipment. This last series of controls was again set up in a ring around Kalkar at a distance of 5-10 kilometres (3-6 miles) from the town. Not only were participants in the Kalkar demonstration subjected to these controls. The residents in the area themselves were subjected to these controls, too. And not only did they drive into the police road controls in the third and most intensive ring of controls when they were travelling about; the police also carried out house raids in the area immediately surrounding Kalkar, apparently searching for weapons.





Fig. 2

The immediate area surrounding Kalkar

"147,000 times, persons from all over West Germany had to show their identity cards, open their car trunks and their bags." (14) During all these controls, the police confiscated countless numbers of objects as so-called passive weapons. Passive weapons?! - hard hats, plastic rain coats, scarves, gloves, goggles, lipsticks, axes, trowels, wooden tent pegs, camping cookers, jacks, screw drivers, car-repair kits, first aid kits, note books, coke bottles, lemons, hardboiled eggs (to mention a few).




Arriving at the train station in Kalkar

"You pigs don't need to eat" said one policeman as he threw the sandwiches and fried pork chops of demonstrators out of the window from a bus coming from Göttingen (approx. 400 kilometers or 240 miles away from Kalkar). (15) A car from Hamburg was confiscated because it contained four plastic hard hats; "Now see how you can get to Kalkar" said the officer encouragingly to the four occupants. (16) "We have the right to detain you for as long as we want" explained the police officer to a Dutchman who was held for several hours because he was carrying headache powder in his pocket. (17) Photographers who wanted to "shoot" the police in action had the films ripped out of the cameras and trampled on with the comment, "now the film is at least exposed." (18)

The procedures at the last control points were continuously filmed by police officers with cameras perched on top of tanks. Others took close-up films of selected cars from outside and inside and from the occupants often while they were being given a body check with arms stretched out on the car roof. Everyone who passed the control point was registered on film photographs or on Video-tape. A total of 112 persons were arrested on "suspicion of having committed criminal acts" according to the official police reports. (19)

The final stretch of the journey between the last control points and Kalkar took place without further hindrance. Aside from the occasional police squadron doing physical exercises in fields some distance from the roadside, nothing more was to be seen of the war-like conditions a few miles earlier.

Throughout the day, the demonstrators slowly gathered in the market place in Kalkar. Everywhere you looked, there were plain clothes men filming from the windows of the houses and shops surrounding the square, without even attempting to conceal their activities. And what an assortment of equipment! Cameras, film cameras, T.V. cameras and telescopic lenses of all sizes. But other than intensive filming and numerous helicopters that kept circling overhead at regular intervals making a terrible noise, there was no sign of the 10,000 police officers involved in this operation.



### *The March*

By late afternoon, the market place was filled to overflowing; even the side-streets were packed with people. At last, at about 5 o'clock in the afternoon, after hours of travelling and hours of waiting, the march began. The 50,000 people who had made it to Kalkar began to stream onto the road to march to the fast-breeder reactor. The demonstration stretched over miles. At several points, the marchers passed filming crews with large cameras, very much like T.V. cameras. Several times, one or two VW buses were seen parked in fields, looking slightly out of place in the flat agricultural landscape. Not a single uniformed policeman was in sight. Not a single police vehicle could be seen. All paths and roads leading directly to the fast-breeder reactor were barricaded with barbed-wire and boards. There was no choice but to continue to march along the asphalt road as had been ordered; this road, previously cobble-stone, had been asphalted especially for the demonstration to prevent demonstrators from having easy access to stones which could be used as projectiles.(20) The demonstration was to end some 100 yards before the side road which lead to Mr. Maas' field. It had been forbidden by court order to go any further. But upon arrival at this point, it was plain to see that the road was only blocked off with a few bails of hay and nothing more. The demonstration organizers directed the people to the left and to the right of the bails of hay and the marchers triumphantly continued on their way. After a short distance, they reached the little side road leading to the field which, surprisingly enough, was not barricaded at all. And so the march continued. And still no policeman to be seen.

After another half hour of marching, the fast-breeder reactor came full into sight. And there they were. Policemen armed with guns, riot shields, helmets and clubs, standing shoulder to shoulder in four rows forming a solid wall around the entire nuclear plant. More were standing in a cluster on top of a mound of earth within the construction site. Others were pacing back and forth with walky-talkies. Armoured tanks surrounded with barbed-wire stood about here and there filled with armed police; one was strategically placed just a few yards from a point which the demonstrators had to pass. A massive wall rose behind the heads of the rows of policemen, a wall made of concrete reinforced with steel, 5 yards high surrounding the construction site - a distance of over 1.5 miles and costing 127 Deutschmarks (about 63

### The wall around Kalkar

dollars) for each inch, a total of 10 million Deutschmarks (about 5 million dollars) of tax-payers' money.(21) And behind the wall there was a moat, 2 yards wide and 2<sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub> yards deep.(22)



It was obvious that the police had learned from their experiences with anti-nuclear power demonstrators in the past. In Brokdorf, on two such occasions (in October 1976 and November 1976) and in Grohnde (in March 1977), the demonstrators were successful in gaining access to the construction site by tearing down parts of the barricade which had been erected. The barricade was of a much simpler type; the wall consisted of an iron frame covered with wire netting; rolls of NATO supplied barbed-wire were stretched out along the bottom and top of the framework; a moat also surrounded the construction site. The demonstrators were able to cross the moat by placing planks or their flag and banner poles across it. They went to work on the barbed-wire and the wire netting with wire cutters. Anchors attached to long sturdy ropes which could be thrown into the netting proved to be most effective; concerted tugging usually resulted in a break in the wall.(23) Such actions were out of the question in Kalkar.

The marchers fanned out onto the "forbidden" field. By this time, it was dark and the people were tired and hungry. The police had certainly done their utmost to exhaust the demonstrators just as they had done in Brokdorf, which came into the open after a small local newspaper printed a secrete police report of the operation in Brokdorf: "There was nothing left but a 1<sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub> hour march on foot for the demonstrators. The exhaustion thus produced was planned by the police."(24)

The goal had been reached and before the last demonstrators had arrived at the field, those who had arrived earlier began to leave spreading out in all directions, in small groups over the fields taking short cuts back to the town - a bad mistake which could have been very dangerous. Helicopters swooped down on the isolated, defenseless demonstrators; in Brokdorf, homeward-bound demonstrators were pelted with tear gas grenades thrown from circling helicopters. But this wasn't Brokdorf 1976, it was Kalkar 1977! In Brokdorf and Grohnde (both in states with a Christian Democratic government), the tactics used were different; they were based on provoking and then hitting hard; the police were looking for a confrontation. In Kalkar (in a state with a Social Democratic majority), the confrontation was to be avoided. An attack on the demonstrators at this point would have certainly aroused some public criticism, which would have detracted from the waves of praise which followed one of the two biggest police manoeuvres in West Germany's history:★

★The other was carried out directly after the Schleyer-kidnapping in search of the "terrorists" and the kidnapped, which took place only three weeks before the Kalkar demonstration.

Die Welt, September 26, 1977:

"Minister Hirsch praises the police in Kalkar.  
The slaughter in Kalkar didn't take place."

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, September 26, 1977:

"Violence in Kalkar was prevented early enough. Police success with the tactic of controls/not visible during the demonstration."

Bild, September 26, 1977:

"Kalkar: the six tricks with which the police prevented a blood bath."

Westfälische Rundschau, September 26, 1977:

"'Slaughter in Kalkar' didn't take place - police secured tons of weapons."

Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, September 26, 1977:

"Police and nuclear-power opposers avoid 'Slaughter in Kalkar'.  
Interior Minister Hirsch: Success through defensive tactic and thorough controls."

Frankfurter Rundschau, September 26, 1977:

"Mass demonstration in Kalkar ran peacefully."

Police chief Wilhelm Lemberg who "had led the police operation for the mass rally against the planned atomic energy plant in Kalkar received the Bundesverdienstkreuz (Federal Distinguished Service Cross) for his work." (25)



Mound of earth within construction site  
with police



## PART 2: West Germany's Energy Policy

The work of 10,000 policemen and countless numbers of people behind the scenes, the use of all sorts of technical equipment, hours, days, weeks of planning and millions of German Marks went into the operation involving the demonstration in Kalkar. Why such an intensive effort to "control" a demonstration? Certainly, it was foreseeable that this was to be one of the largest demonstrations to take place in post world war II history in West Germany. But this wasn't just any demonstration; it was a demonstration against a fast-breeder reactor. This is important for two major reasons.

### *The Anti-Nuclear-Power Movement*

Firstly, the anti-nuclear-power movement has been the first in this country to mobilize a very large number of people since the student movement of the late 1960's. Unlike the student movement, however, the anti-nuclear-power movement has united people from numerous sections of society. Farmers, civil servants, workers, scientists, teachers and students are struggling for one common interest - preventing the building of atomic energy plants. Those opposing atomic energy have come to realize that this form of energy threatens the existence of all forms of life; it is a threat to one's very own existence. West German capitalism, however, is determined to utilize and to expand atomic energy, which means that this system is headed in the direction of self-destruction on the long or on the short run. Someone who has grasped this is forced to question the validity of this system itself. This means that on this one point alone, that of atomic energy, the fundamental capitalist ideology can be seriously damaged, even destroyed for thousands and thousands of people. This is certainly a historically new quality. No other single conflict has been able to make the basic political and economical contradictions of capitalism so clear. This is indeed a threat to the system.

Up till 1971, nobody was very concerned about the developments in the atomic energy policy in West Germany which had begun in the 1960's and were to be expanded in the 1970's. In 1971, it was announced that a nuclear power plant was to be built in Wyhl. At that time, the majority of people living in the area didn't even know what a nuclear power plant was. But the few environmentalists who were in the area kept insisting that nuclear reactors are harmful for the environment. The people began to inform themselves about the nuclear reactors and their dangers. They learned that nuclear reactors not only produce radioactive waste products that escape into the air and into the rivers but they also cause increased cloud cover and rain due to the steam that escapes from the water-cooled reactor. Such a radical change in climate was a question of existence for those living in the area around Wyhl; most of the inhabitants are wine-growers and a reduction in the number of sunny days would most certainly affect the quality of their crop.

The first Bürgerinitiativen (Citizens Committees) were formed in 1974. In April, 1974, a tractor demonstration took place and 100,000 signatures against the nuclear reactor in Wyhl were collected. After more demonstrations and rallies, a referendum was carried out: 55% for and 43% against the sale of the land for the construction site, a decision which was largely influenced by promises of jobs, roads, a swimming pool, a sewerage plant and subsidies for the wine-growers from the side of the government. In January, 1975, the Bürgerinitiativen took their case to court. In February, 1975, before the court had made a decision, the land was sold and construction began on February 17. One day later, the construction site was occupied by 100 people. Two days after the occupation, 700 policemen brutally

cleared the construction site. The Bürgerinitiativen demanded that construction be stopped until a court decision had been made. A second occupation of the construction site followed on February 23 and an attempt by the police to clear the site was prevented by mass mobilization of the inhabitants. The occupation lasted several months. The court case lasted years, but at last the decision went in favour of the Bürgerinitiativen - the construction was to be stopped. (26)

The experiences made by the Bürgerinitiativen proved that the fight against the building of nuclear reactors through legal channels was a time-consuming and costly one. This continued to be the case with the appeals submitted against the building of other nuclear reactors such as those in Brokdorf, Grohnde and Kalkar. While the question as to whether the reactor could be built or not was being argued in court, construction itself was hastily being continued. The legal fight against nuclear reactors has, however, had some success. In Wyhl and Brokdorf, construction has been stopped by court decisions; in Grohnde, construction has been stopped until an adequate solution to the problems of atomic waste can be found; but, in Kalkar, the court decided that construction could be continued.

The uncertainty as to the ultimate success of legal battles against the construction of the reactors, the length of time that passes before the courts make a decision, the cost of such legal adventures have resulted in many nuclear power opposers losing their faith in the struggle in the courts. Many see themselves forced to turn to more militant forms of struggle.

The consequences of this learning process can be seen in the forms that the demonstrations took in Brokdorf in October 1976 and again in November 1976 and in Grohnde in March 1977. All of these demonstrations ended with attempts to occupy the nuclear reactor construction sites in order to prevent further construction and with a subsequent confrontation with the police. In the meantime, the number of anti-nuclear-power demonstrators has rapidly grown. The first demonstrations in Wyhl in 1971 began with only 2000 people; by 1976, there were 20,000 people prepared to go onto the streets to protest against the building of nuclear power plants; in 1977, the numbers had swelled to over 50,000.



The beginning of the march in Kalkar

At first, the government welcomed the Bürgerinitiativen and saw them as a possibility to channel protest spread diffusely throughout an area into an institutionalized organization. It is much easier for the government to deal with and to bargain with the representatives of a specific, recognized organization rather than countless numbers of individuals. However, the government underestimated the determination of the Bürgerinitiativen and the individual nuclear-power opposers. The integration tactics, which have been so successful in West Germany with the trade unions, have failed to function with the Bürgerinitiativen. The government also underestimated the influence that the Bürgerinitiativen could exercise on the public opinion and is now confronted with the problem of coping with tens of thousands of active nuclear-power opposers spread over the entire country.

### *Big Business at Home and Abroad*

Secondly, the anti-nuclear power movement is aimed at and seriously threatens West Germany's energy program. The groundwork for West Germany's energy policy had already been laid in the late 1950's. In 1959, the Atomic Law was passed which stipulated the promotion of research and use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. In the same year, the Deutsches Atomforum (German Atomic Forum) was founded; it consists of a union of four non-profit organizations (Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Kerntechnik, Atom für den Frieden, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Atomenergie, Physikalische Studiengesellschaft) for the purpose of uniting and promoting organizations in West Germany dealing with the peaceful use of atomic energy and supporting their work concerning the accumulation of scientific knowledge, the solving of technical-scientific problems and the publication of scientific knowledge. The Deutsches Atomforum was initiated by representatives from all the major companies concerned with atomic energy; for example, Siemens, which builds the nuclear power plants; Hoechst and Bayer, the chemical companies dealing with the technical side of uranium reprocessing; the metal company, Mannesmann; and the three largest construction companies, Bilfinger & Berger, Philip Holzmann and Hochtief.(27)

Prerequisite for the growth of a particular industrial branch is the demand for the product being produced; when a market is already saturated, new shortages have to be discovered; the shortages can either be real or artificially created. In the case of energy supply, which is presently more than adequately covered by coal and oil in West Germany, it was necessary to create a shortage. The "oil crisis" of 1973/74 served this purpose very well. With the sky-rocketing of petroleum prices and the banning of Sunday driving in January of 1974 in order to save fuel (two things which personally affected everyone living in West Germany), it was much easier to convince the public that West Germany had to develop its "own" source of energy to avoid being dependent on the big oil nations for its source of energy. The demand to substitute an "uncertain" source of energy for a "certain" one was awakened. The way had been cleared for the practical development of atomic energy plants. In order to reinforce the demand for an independent energy supply, the public is periodically confronted with warnings such as: "Heating this winter will be more expensive than ever!" (28) or "Electricity shortages possible if nuclear power plants are stopped." (29) Although "there are incredible coal reserves in the Federal Republic of Germany, that alone could cover the West German energy demands for many hundreds of years" (30) no one hardly ever mentions West Germany's coal resources anymore and the coal mines continue to be shut down, one after the other.

Certainly, it would be an illusion to pretend that an energy problem does not exist. Fossil fuels will not last forever especially at the rate they are being used in the present consumer society where no serious attempt is being made at conserving the fossil fuel reserves that are still available. The world demand for coal was 3 billion tons and for oil 2.7 billion tons in 1975.(31) With the total world fossil fuel reserves estimated at 10,640 billion tons (32), it is clear that the energy shortage, even with the same wasteful rate of usage, is not an acute problem for the immediate present. Just as clear, is that energy shortage will be a problem at some time in the future. The capitalist solution to this problem is the development of nuclear energy instead of the development of other forms of energy such as solar, hydro or windenergy. The energy shortage is made to seem acute for the present so as to justify the building of nuclear reactors at the present time and at the same time, it is argued that the technological developments are not yet far enough advanced to make the immediate use of solar energy, for example, possible.

Nuclear power plants do not necessarily assure a self-sufficient energy supply. The light-water reactors run on uranium-235. Uranium in its natural form consists of only 0,7% uranium-235; the remaining 99,3% is uranium-238 which is unsuitable for the fission process in nuclear reactors. The fuel elements for light-water reactors are made of enriched natural uranium so that uranium-235 makes up 3% of the uranium. Since only traces of naturally occurring uranium have been found in West Germany, this country is dependent on other countries rich in uranium for her nuclear fuel supply, that is the USA, Canada and South Africa. (From an estimated 761,400 tons of natural uranium resources in the world, 226,800 tons are found in the USA; 210,500 tons in Canada; 181,400 tons in South Africa; 40,800 tons in France.) (33) Thus a self-sufficient supply of energy has still not been reached; the dependency has merely shifted from those countries rich in oil to those rich in uranium and the supplies of uranium-235 are definitely limited. At this point, the significance of the fast-breeder reactor becomes clear.

The fast-breeder reactor utilizes plutonium-239 and not uranium-235. The fuel elements are made of plutonium-239 and uranium-238. Through the fission of plutonium-239, energy is released and usually three neutrons moving at a very fast speed are set free. The absorption of one of these neutrons by a uranium-238 atom results in the isotope uranium-239. Uranium-239 is very unstable (with a half-life of only 23 minutes) and through the loss of an electron, uranium-239 becomes neptunium-239 (with a half-life of 2.3 days). When a neptunium-239 atom loses an electron, it becomes plutonium-239. Through this "breeding" process, plutonium-239 is made out of uranium-238, which means that more fissionable material can be produced than used.

The fast-breeder reactor can make much better use of the natural uranium resources and if atomic energy is to have a future, it can only be with the use of fast-breeder reactors on the long run. So if West Germany is to build her economy on atomic energy, it is essential that fast-breeder reactors, such as the one planned in Kalkar, be built. However, the fast-breeder reactor doesn't end but only reduces the dependency of West Germany on other countries for a supply of nuclear fuel. It is still necessary to import uranium in order to have uranium-238 which can be converted into plutonium.

The "necessity" to develop a self-sufficient supply of energy is not the only intention behind the expansion in the field of nuclear power. The export of nuclear power plants opens up a whole new dimension; West Germany, the most advanced country in nuclear research and technology in Europe, intends to expand her nuclear power industry in other countries thereby building a firm economical basis in a market in which she can play a dominating role. At present, 62% of the

65,000 megawatts to be supplied by nuclear reactors built by the Kraftwerk Union ( a subsidiary of Siemens, the largest of the West German companies building nuclear reactors) is for foreign countries. (34) However, in order to sell a product to other countries, it is necessary to be able to demonstrate that the product is a good one. This is also true for nuclear power plants. The saleability of West German technology is dependent upon the practical application in West Germany itself. A country without functioning, profitable nuclear power plants at home can't make a very convincing sales pitch when trying to land a contract from a foreign country.

The Biblis reactor was also built for the purpose of serving as a demonstration nuclear power plant. The company RWE (Rheinisch-Westfälische Elektrizitätswerke AG) submitted a request for the building permit for the first section of the planned four part reactor complex in 1968. The permit was granted in 1970. In 1972, the permit for the second section was granted. By the end of 1974, the first section had been built and was operating. (35) On June 27, 1975, the contract between West Germany and Brasil was signed for the building of 8 light-water reactors of the Biblis-type in Brasil (36), a contract for 12 billion Deutschmarks (approx. 6 billion dollars) (37). Credit for the first two reactors has been provided by the German bank consortium, a co-operative union of the large private banks, the German Federal Union of Trade Unions' own bank, the state owned Transfer Institution and the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (Credit Institute for Recovery). (38) The bank consortium has provided a credit for a total of 4.3 billion Deutschmarks (2.15 billion dollars) for the first two reactors. (39)

Not only is West Germany to supply and finance the 8 nuclear reactors; in addition, the facilities for "uranium enrichment , a demonstration station in Brasil, the development of a reactor industry, the establishment of an engineering company for the field of nuclear technology, production of construction parts, reprocessing of radioactive nuclear fuel" (40) are to be provided by West Germany. In short, the West German imperialists are to supply all the technology and equipment necessary for Brasil to develop her own atomic energy.

In return, West Germany is to have access to Brasil's uranium resources, making West Germany less dependent on other countries rich in uranium such as Canada and the USA (both of which have threatened to cut off their supply of uranium and have put political pressure on West Germany because of this country's export policy regarding atomic energy). Nuclam, a new Brazilian-German company has been founded with 51% participation from Brasil's Nuclebras and 49% participation from West Germany's Urangesellschaft (composed of VEBA - metal and STEAG - nuclear energy). Nuclam is to take over uranium prospecting and mining in Brasil (41). The West German imperialists have Brasil's uranium resources under direct control.



West Germany selects the countries with which she does business. Not all countries are suitable for investment, especially when the investment is in the form of nuclear reactors. Aside from the big contract with Brasil, West Germany has a contract with Iran for four nuclear reactors (42) and secretly supplied South Africa with the scientific knowledge and technology for a uranium enrichment plant which had been developed in a research project begun in 1959 in Karlsruhe. (43) Iran, Brasil and South Africa - fascist regimes. Hardly a coincidence.

Countries under fascist regimes offer a much larger degree of security than democratic or socialist countries. The possibility of resistance from the people impeding the erection of a nuclear reactor is minimal. Investment is safer.

The investment in this case concerns atomic energy and not cars or chemicals or anything else. Every country which is supplied with the technology and equipment for a complete atomic industry is also potentially capable of producing atomic weapons:

"Only since September 1977, when it became known that the Americans had set off a bomb in July on the test-grounds in Nevada that was only filled with plutonium of 'normal reactor quality', were all doubts refuted as to the utilization of 'normal' reactor plutonium for military purposes. Such bomb-plutonium is already being produced today in Mühleberg (Switzerland); Biblis (West Germany); Latina (Italy); Vandellós (Spain); Barsebeck 1 (Sweden); Takahama 1 (Japan); Kanupp (Pakistan); Atucha (Argentina) among others - that is, in 'peaceful' nuclear power plants in countries which do not yet have atomic weapons.

Should, however, the 'second Stage' of reactor technology be realized, that is based largely on the building of fast-breeder reactors, then plutonium of a much more effective quality will be produced and will come into circulation" (44)

Consequently, West Germany will only give this advantage to countries with which there is political consensus, countries which represent a strong counter-revolutionary force in the regions in which they are situated. This is particularly important for West Germany since after World War II, West Germany was not allowed to have any armed forces of her own; this ban was lifted in the 1950's but in the Paris Contract of 1954, West German production and/or possession of ABC weapons (atomic, biological and chemical weapons) was expressly forbidden.

Although it is always emphasized that the atomic energy shall only be used for peaceful purposes, there is no guarantee that this will be done. "South Africa will not do without nuclear weapons for all times. The Finance Minister for South Africa, Owen Horwood, explained at a meeting of the governing national parties in Durban, that South Africa reserved the right to make use of its nuclear potential also for purposes other than peaceful ones. South Africa rejects a dictatorship in this question. His country has given the world the assurance, said the Minister, that its nuclear program is directed towards the peaceful use of nuclear energy. 'When, however, South Africa should decide to use its nuclear potential in another way, this will be because she is in a position in which she is forced to do so', emphasized Horwood, 'and she will make this decision alone.'" (45)

The determination to carry out this energy policy in West Germany is unmistakable. The government has made its position clear:

"Growing energy demands for reactor construction. Federal Minister [for research and technology] Matthöfer emphasizes the necessity for further high investment in nuclear research." (46)

"Nuclear reactor will be built. ... According to the words of Minister President Gerhard Stoltenberg, the government of Schleswig-Holstein is determined to continue the construction of the nuclear reactor in Brokdorf."(47)

Minister President of North Rhine Westfalia "Kuhn states: no referendum for nuclear reactors!"(48)

"Kuhn reinforces: Construction of nuclear reactors only a matter for the government."(49)

"Kuhn: Not possible to get by without nuclear reactors."(50)

Federal Minister for Economy, Friedrichs: "There is no economically supportable alternative to atomic energy."(51)

Even the trade unions support the government's energy policy. The German Federal Union of Trade Unions organized a demonstration for nuclear energy in November 1977 and demanded that the government speed up the construction of the nuclear reactors.(52)

The development of atomic energy has one characteristic which has appeared for the first time in history. A reactor, once put into operation sets off a sequence of reactions that can't be stopped. The process of nuclear fission results in radiation which has to be constantly controlled. The waste products, which remain radioactive for generations, have to be stored and guarded. This characteristic of irreversibility is new. With increasing numbers of reactors, re-processing plants and waste depots, the amount of control and surveillance must increase as well, which will affect the political climate on the long run. "Energy politics will become politics itself, will become of central significance in the question of maintaining power for the large nations."(53)

Dr. Robert Jungk explained in a television interview in March 1977:

"One can only protect this source of energy when one tries to protect it one hundred percent. I am personally convinced, that one can never reach 100% security, and that it is certainly lightheadedness to have anything to do with this new form of energy, because it inevitably leads to more and more totalitarian measures. ... That means, he who works in any way in a sensitive position, let's say in a nuclear power operation, that doesn't only mean in the plant itself but also in the supply companies or with transport, he must be prepared to be observed. He will be informed of this and then he'll be observed. That means he has to leave his bureau open, he has to open up his private life, he won't only be investigated for political trustworthiness but also for so-called moral, so-called character trustworthiness. ... When you know that you are being observed, you won't dare to go to a pub or go to a club that you don't know and talk with someone you don't know. That means, there is something known as a pair of scissors in your head, self-censorship. ... In order to keep your job you censor yourself. You're bribed, so to say, by the job into giving up your freedom. And this already affects thousands today and will, of course, affect tens of thousands perhaps hundreds of thousands with the increasing number of nuclear energy facilities, because it doesn't only concern those people which work there but also those who, so to say, live around them, who are in contact with them; they also have to be investigated. That means, that something is spreading here which is unforeseeable."(54)

Just how far the observation is being carried out came suddenly and shockingly to the surface just two days after the demonstration in Kalkar. The Minister for Interior Affairs for North Rhine Westfalia made known that all "violent demonstrators" are being registered in the central computer of the Federal Criminal Department.(55) Some time later, it became known that all participants in the demonstration in Kalkar who had been controlled by the police had also been registered in the computer.



### *Kalkar Forever*

As Dr. Robert Jungk has pointed out, the intensive controls and investigations will inevitably affect the daily lives of those not only directly involved with the nuclear reactors but also those living around these facilities. Dr. Jungk's predictions are in the process of coming true.

The people living in the areas immediately surrounding the construction sites for atomic energy plants (nuclear reactors, fast-breeder reactors, reprocessing plants, enrichment plants and atomic waste depots) have put up a lot of resistance. Around these sites, usually chosen in sparsely populated country areas, at least a large minority if not well over half the resident population has indicated that it is against the construction of the planned atomic energy facilities.

The atomic energy concerns and the police consider this problem under both psychological and military aspects. In order to gain influence over the residents in a township bordering on a proposed construction site, promises of swimming pools, new city halls and the like are made. And one shouldn't underestimate the power of bribery for the local politicians in such a situation.

More important, however, is the military aspect. In future, the entire population resident in an area surrounding atomic facilities will be treated permanently just as the participants in the Kalkar demonstration were treated on September 24, like "terrorists". The

measures taken in Kalkar for one day will be carried out permanently in the areas surrounding the atomic facilities; they will become a part of everyday life.

The first symptoms have already appeared. In Gorleben, the proposed site for West Germany's first combination reprocessing plant and atomic waste depot, the DWK (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Wiederaufbereitung von Kernbrennstoffen - The German Concern for Reprocessing Nuclear Fuel) employed a private detective firm, with over 1000 employees, to spy on the resident population. Residents were tailed when they drove about in their cars, farm houses were spotlighted at night, the license numbers of cars parked in front of the local pubs were registered. One of the security men explained, "We have to note the numbers of all cars coming from another area that drive in and out of here." (56) After knowledge of these quite illegal measures came out in a newspaper report, public criticism grew to such an extent that the measures had to be stopped, at least temporarily.

The police were able to legitimize similar observation tactics after a report from the Verfassungsschutz (Department for Protection of the Constitution) appeared in the local newspaper, in which it was revealed that more and more "extreme leftists" with "contacts to terrorist circles" were renting flats in the area, making it necessary for the police to observe these people. That other residents would be "accidentally" observed along with the "leftists" was unavoidable. (57)

New police headquarters have been established in what was once the courthouse in the nearby village Lüchow, which was to have been turned into a museum. In addition, barracks are being built, which can house and feed 100 police officers without contact to the resident population for a period of 12 weeks. A squadron from the Federal Border Police (Bundesgrenzschutz) will also be stationed in the area near Gorleben. (58)

The police have worked out plans of action to combat different forms of resistance against the planned atomic facilities including peaceful demonstrations, occupying the construction site and attacks with explosives. (59) The headquarters in Lüchow are to be equipped with telephone, telex and radio equipment which will provide a direct connection with the Federal Criminal Department.

While making an official tour of the township offices in Lüneburg, two journalists from the local newspaper for the city of Stade were mistakenly led through a room not open to the public, where a special department has been established to deal with security problems concerning the planned reprocessing plant. "The visitors saw on the wall of the secrete side-room:

- an appointment calendar with various dates entered ranging from the date on which the DWK submitted its request for a building permit for the project in Gorleben to the dates of the Grohnde trials [see p. 29] and the dates of the scheduled meetings for the Bürgerinitiativen and the Green List Party;★
- a diagram illustrating the organization of the Green List Party in Lower Saxony with the names, addresses and telephone numbers of the leading officials;
- aeral photographs of the Gorleben area with places suitable for demonstrations and with routes to be taken by the police marked in with coloured arrows;
- detailed maps of the Gorleben area with dozens of coloured flags marked as 'anonymous dwellings' in the legend which were to represent political living communities with fluctuating occupancy! (60)

★ The Green List Parties have recently been formed for state and local elections in several parts of Germany and campaign on a platform based on environmental protection.

Where the police is to settle permanently, as in the case of Gorleben, there likely won't be any massive police manoeuvres such as the one which took place in Kalkar. It isn't possible to hold such numbers of police resident in an area necessary for such a manoeuvre. Instead, it is to be expected, that the surveillance of the population with numerous technical possibilities will be intensified. This method has the advantage that it is carried out constantly but quietly and causes much less public criticism. The technical possibilities for a total surveillance are far from being exhausted. The use of computers locally to establish a complete picture of the connections among the people both resident and non-resident in the area, expansion of aeral surveillance are just two of the possibilities which are technically possible today. Every step in this direction, brings the realization of an "atomic state" a little bit closer.



### *PART 3: Coping with Protest*

Although an economy based on atomic energy will inevitably lead to more and more totalitarian measures, to maximum surveillance, to state protection of nuclear power plants before, during and after their construction, West Germany is presently confronted with the problem of coping with protest from an anti-nuclear power movement of tens of thousands of people, a movement which can neither be integrated nor ignored. Large demonstrations in opposition to the atomic energy policy must be prevented but without outright abolishment of democratic rights and, when prevention is not successful, then controlled such that the construction of the nuclear reactors is not impaired. This affords the development of definite tactics which, although principally applicable to all exhibitions of protest, can be demonstrated using the example of the tactics concerning the protest against the fast-breeder reactor in Kalkar.

#### *Preserve the Democratic Rights!*

The right to demonstrate is principally guaranteed in the West German constitution from 1949 under a combination of Article 5: the freedom of expression and Article 8: the right to assemble. However, the West German state supporting parties are in agreement that actual demonstrations of protest are undesirable. Dr. Ulrich Eichstädt, president of the Academy for Civil Defense in Bonn, states the following:

"No country in the world, whose inner structure is unstable and disorganized, can carry out an effective foreign policy and build up an effective defense. Weakness on the inside means powerlessness on the outside.

The inner stability is dependent on a series of factors. The political stability must be named first here. As experiences in the Weimar Republic showed, the political stability presupposes a deeply rooted democratic consciousness in the population.

In addition, it demands a certain degree of agreement among the largest state supporting parties in essential questions for the nation. This applies to defending the democratic principle against left and right radical groups,

which, in reality, don't want to change our form of state and society, but want to do away with them.

No country that is troubled with inner unrest, social struggles, revolutionary activities, terror and violent crimes has a solid basis for its security policy."(61)

The special significance of struggles against atomic energy which impair construction of nuclear reactors at home thereby threatening the establishment of a firm basis for West Germany's economy have been discussed in Part 2.

The struggle against the utilization of atomic energy falls under the category of subversive activities and those who participate in this struggle are considered to be enemies of the state and are treated as such. This doesn't only apply to the struggle against atomic energy. The governing director of the Academy for Civil Defense, Mr. Wolfgang Siedschlag, defines subversion as being "the recipe used by the opposite side to interfere with defense efforts in the Federal Republic of Germany"(62), whereby defense is not to be understood in a strictly military sense but in the sense of defending the "democratic principles" against left and right radical groups (see p. 22). Considered to be subversive practices are: "agitation and propaganda; meetings, rallies and demonstrations with such aims; wild cat strikes, infiltration and espionage; sabotage and terror."(63)

### *Prevent rather than Repress!*

The strategy aimed at combatting such "subversive actions" developed in West Germany is based on the principle of preventing such activities from happening at all rather than dealing with them once they have begun.

The preparatory campaign in the mass media prior to the demonstration in Kalkar is a prime example of how this strategy can be employed in practice. The reports in all the daily newspapers, in television and radio before the demonstration did not differ basically from one another; they all maintained that violence was to be expected in Kalkar, which served to create the association of anti-nuclear power demonstrators with violence, with "terrorists" in the mind of the public. It should be pointed out that this association was made much easier because just at that time, Hanns Martin Schleyer had been kidnapped and the vision of "terrorists" at large and "terrorist activities" was being cultivated in the media paralleled to the defamatory campaign against the nuclear reactor opposers. Thus, the shadow of illegality was thrown over a perfectly legal form of protest, namely that of demonstration, minimalizing the alliance between convinced and active nuclear power opposers and the silent majority, a tactic employed to reduce the number of participants taking part in the demonstration in Kalkar. "The police must intervene at such an early stage, so that solidarity between those taking part in an activity and those not yet participating doesn't come about."(64) But this tactic was to do more than deter people from coming out to the demonstration against the fast-breeder reactor in Kalkar on September 24, 1977. It was part of a long term, general prevention strategy to deeply root the association of the anti-nuclear power struggle with "terrorist activities" in the minds of the people in order to prevent further displays of protest.

It wasn't realistic, however, to expect that the demonstration in Kalkar on September 24 could be prevented entirely by an intimidation strategy. Thus, it was necessary to prepare for the police operation that was being planned for the day of the demonstration. "Agitation and propaganda, meetings, rallies and demonstrations are principally allowed in West Germany as provided for by the appropriate laws. Interference by the police is only permissible in the case of factual findings representing a danger to the security or violation of penal regulations."(65) Since police intervention in a

demonstration is only possible when public security is threatened, the impression created through the media that the planned demonstration in Kalkar was to be a violent one also served the purpose of preparing the public for accepting the police manoeuvre as being justified, even necessary.

Creating the desired atmosphere through the media before a demonstration is part of the field work carried out by specially trained officers whose job is to "cultivate good relations with the press".(66) But the mass media campaign was only the visible part of the preparatory work carried out by the police before the Kalkar demonstration. Most certainly, Discussion Commandos were busy with under-cover work well before the demonstration took place. It is difficult to observe such under-cover work directly, but Gerhard Garboty, a high ranking officer in Berlin, describes in an article for the professional magazine, Die Polizei Nr. 7, 1976, the way in which the Discussion Commandos in Berlin operate; the methods used elsewhere in West Germany are most likely identical or very similar, perhaps even more refined at the present time:

The Discussion Commando consisted of a "group of officers, who volunteered for the work, for the purpose of preventing violence by involving the potential disturber in discussion. Special training preceded the work. Aside from internal administrative difficulties at the beginning, this experiment was very successful. Later, the personnel for Discussion Commandos was increased and the training became more extensive....

It has often happened, that just before a demonstration important information was obtained, which directly influenced the [police] operation. ...

[In Hamburg], the field work palet was enriched with some variations. I would like to mention them as an inspiration for discussion purposes:

- confusing those intended to be reached by spreading rumours (every now and then they do have to be true)
- the police distribute leaflets (avoid official German)
- telephone calls to irritate certain groups of disturbers. ....

Intensive contact between police administration with the universities and academies, and especially the cultivating of good connections to the press also belong to field work and not to the preparatory phase. ...

Cultivating contacts with the organs of justice is also important. Related to this, I'd like to point out one experience in Berlin. Since 1969, it has been possible to establish a continuous service with the office of the district attorney. When unpeaceful demonstrations of large dimensions are expected, a district attorney attends the conference for planning the operation; in addition, it can be requested that the district attorney carry out his duties at the depot for arrested persons. ...

The same basic principles apply to the preparatory phase as to the field work, since the latter is of a permanent character. ...

From the numerous activities which must be carried out within the preparatory phase, only the following are highlighted:

- young plain-clothes officers are present at the teaching. Their information supplants the findings of the Landesverband für Verfassungsschutz [State Department for Protection of the Constitution];
- alert study of newspapers and journals. Left printed matter supplies special findings;
- evaluation of all placards and leaflets;

- following radio and TV programs. Here, the sensation items are of interest, since they can give occasion to spontaneous demonstrations. Especially interesting programs are taped for later evaluation."(67)

### *Proper Planning!*

The information gathered during the field work is used to plan a concept for the police operation for the particular demonstration in question, in which three different police forces can be involved.

Each state has its own police force, with a total personnel of 148,000 for the entire country (68) responsible for "public security and order" (69) within the boundaries of the state. Thus, maintaining "public security and order" during a demonstration is among the duties of the state police. However, the Bundesgrenzschutz (Federal Border Police) can be brought in to reinforce the state police "when the state police cannot fulfill an assignment or can do so only with great difficulty without such support."(70) "Such occasions [where participation of the Bundesgrenzschutz can be necessary] are, for example, large meetings, state visits from endangered guests, search actions and rallies with a high risk of imminent danger."(71) The Bundesgrenzschutz was established in 1951 and its duties then were strictly those of a border police force. Today the Federal Border Police Force has been expanded to include 22,000 officers and it is engaged not only along the national border but throughout the entire of West Germany and in airports and embassies in foreign countries.(72) Contrary to the state police, the Bundesgrenzschutz is legally a part of the West German armed forces. The members of the Bundesgrenzschutz are recognized as combatants and are consequently trained and qualified in military combat.(73)



In addition the Bereitschaftspolizei (Reinforcement Squads) can also be used on occasions such as "large assemblies of political, athletic, cultural and economic art; catastrophies, severe accidents; state visits, protection of persons and objects".(74) These squadrons with a total of 22,000 officers, are independently organized divisions of the state police and are housed in barracks.(75)

For a large demonstration, such as the one in Kalkar, it is not difficult to produce the requirements necessary to legitimize the participation of all three police forces: a political demonstration with a large number of participants expected (also from outside the state boundaries), imminent danger for public security (as claimed in press reports), protection of an object (the fast-breeder reactor). And all three police forces were involved in the operation around Kalkar: state police for the "traffic" controls; Bundesgrenzschutz with their tanks and combat uniforms; Bereitschaftspolizei on stand-by doing warm-up exercises in fields near by; helicopters from the state police; helicopters from the Bundesgrenzschutz; and most likely a combination of all three for protecting the object itself.

In an article written for the journal Kriminalist in 1977, Criminal Inspector Manfred Ganschow from Berlin outlines the basic concept recommended for planning the operation for a demonstration:

1. infiltration by plain-clothes men;
2. documentation using film, television, photographs and tapes;
3. securing evidence at or near the scene of the crime by criminal detectives;
4. taking arrested persons to an arrested-persons-transport-commando where further evidence is to be secured;
5. transporting the arrested persons to a depot;
6. here criminal detectives carry out all further processes including procedures involving laying charges, release, further detention etc. (76)



"Traffic Controls"

Ganschow describes in detail the activities of the various squads involved in an operation planned according to this concept. A summary follows.

#### 1. Arrests

Plain-clothes men dressed so as to conform with the participants as closely as possible accompany the demonstration.

Their job is to observe and to identify disturbers. Arrests themselves are to be made by special Intervention Commandos that are placed strategically at suitable points along the route which the march is to take. The plain-clothes men must transfer exact descriptions of disturbers to the Intervention Commandos without being noticed; for this purpose, a mini walky-talky is advisable. Intervention Commandos can only act at a time and place where the danger of a massive, aggressive reaction from other participants is reduced. For this reason, the arrested persons are transported as quickly as possible to a depot organized previous to the demonstration, far away from the actual march and usually in police buildings where uniformed police take over further proceedings.

## 2. Documentation

Aiding in securing evidence, are the special Documentation Squads of which there are two sorts: Filming Squads and Photography Squads. Each squad consists of two to three officers and is protected by five additional officers in plain-clothes, who are specially trained in Judo.

The Filming Squads are responsible for a more global documentation for the purpose of:

1. identifying disturbers and recording punishable offenses which are much more likely to be caught on a moving film rather than in single photographs, thus providing evidence necessary to convict offenders;
2. providing material covering the entire course of the demonstration enabling study at a later date for the planning of further operations.

The Filming Squads are equipped with 16mm film cameras which can shoot pictures with nearly portrait quality from a distance of 200 yards. In addition, the Filming Squads have a very robust tape recorder and a VW bus which is connected via radio to a central station from which the squad can receive orders. "That the VW bus shouldn't be identifiable as a police vehicle, is obvious." (77)

The Photography Squads are equipped with cameras of different makes and with different lenses. They are to make close-up photographs to be used to identify participants.

A newer development is the use of video-cameras with tape recorders. These cameras can transmit directly to a special picture transmitter vehicle over a cable with a maximum length of 300 yards and, if necessary, a two-wire system can transmit over 1000 yards. In the transmitting vehicle, the films are either recorded or transmitted further over a 29 metre high antenna to police stations or other control points where the films can be viewed immediately on monitors.

Video-cameras were definitely used for the Kalkar demonstration, if not during the march itself then for the filming from buildings around the market place in the town where problems involved with transmitting the films would be minimal as monitors could be set up in the same buildings. The VW buses seen along the demonstration route could have been transmitter vehicles for video-films or they could have been mobile stations belonging to the Filming Squads.

The film material that is made during such a demonstration is not only used to provide evidence to convict criminal offenders. It is often the case that Berufsverbote (ban on practising a profession) are based entirely or partly on evidence of participation in a demonstration. This was the case of an employee who was dismissed from the TÜV (a private organization which carries out the legally required safety controls necessary for every vehicle every 2 years) because he attended a demonstration in Brokdorf organized to protest the

building of a nuclear power plant in this area. This means that the job security of everyone who takes part in a demonstration is potentially endangered which intimidates a large number of people.

The film material can also be studied in order to develop even more effective strategies to combat these "subversive activities". This material can be made available to other countries so that they can learn, not only what a large demonstration looks like, but also how to combat it. In this way, West Germany can easily export her recipe for dealing with social unrest. This has long been the practice as the anti-nuclear demonstration in Malville, France on July 31, 1977 proved. "Authorities in West Germany sent French officials a film of recent anti-nuclear protests there, to help identify some participants and give an idea of tactic used." (78)

## *PART 4: One Aspect of Model West Germany*

The strategy developed in West Germany to suppress demonstrations as a form of protest is only one aspect of the Model West Germany; it is, however, one aspect which characterizes the strategy behind the entire model in many ways.

### *Legality*

Tactics employed are legally permissible. All measures carried out by the police are done so within the realm of legality. No step is taken in contradiction to existing laws. If doubt as to the legality of certain measures does arise (as was the case regarding the restrictions imposed on the demonstration in Kalkar), legality is established by court decision after the measures have been imposed.\* Legalization of repressive measures has been the case with Berufsberbote, whereby a decree from the ministers of each state and the Chancellor made it legal to prohibit people with particular political views from working for the state, that is, from becoming civil servants; this has also been the case with Paragraph 88a, a law passed in 1976 making the production or distribution of printed matter propagating the use of violence punishable with a fine or a sentence of up to 3 years. The most spectacular example was the Kontaktsperre-gesetz (Contact Barrier Law), a law making it legal to deny a prisoner all contact with the outside world (no newspapers, no radio, no television, no letters, no visitors, no legal consultations, no contact with other prisoners) when the life, health or freedom of a person is endangered and it is suspected that the danger stems from a "terrorist organization"; this law was passed in Parliament within a record three days after it had been introduced in practice one month before, namely when Hanns Martin Schleyer was first kidnapped.

### *Criminalizing Protest*

All forms of protest and expression of criticism are made to look as though they are illegal, although they are in fact legal. The campaign in the mass media before and after the demonstration in Kalkar is a prime example of such an "illegalization". But not only did the association of demonstrators with "terrorists activities"

\*On June 12, 1978, a law was passed making the possession of weapons or objects bearing a resemblance to weapons in a demonstration illegal, making the confiscation of such objects as so called "passive weapons" legal, which had been practised before the Kalkar demonstration 8 1/2 months before the law was passed.

before the demonstration and the long lists of confiscated "weapons" after the demonstration help to "illegalize" the demonstration in the public mind. Many people saw how the participants came into the controls themselves; the police attack on the train as it neared Kalkar took place in the middle of a residential area and not in an open field so that the residents could see just how the police dealt with these people. Shortly after the demonstration, it was reported in the newspapers, that the names of all those whose identity papers had been examined in the controls had been registered in the central computer of the Federal Criminal Department.



Kalkar!

Criminalizing of opposition, in particular opposition to nuclear power, continues. The first verdicts in the cases resulting from charges laid against 11 people who took part in the anti-nuclear power demonstration in Grohnde in March 1977 have been made. Gerd Schulz has been sentenced to 1 year and 10 months imprisonment without probation on the grounds of attempted extortion, resisting arrest and disturbing the peace because the court maintains that he took part in a "sit-in on the railroad tracks and, as an 'accessory', in attacks on the fencing around the construction site of the nuclear power plant and that he kicked and hit a police officer while he was being arrested." (79) Andreas Hande has been sentenced to 1 year of imprisonment without probation because the court maintains that he "knocked a police officer unconscious with a wooden club and hit another officer at a road barricade." (80) Christian Gehrke has been sentenced to 11 months imprisonment without probation for hitting a policeman with an unknown object. Helmuth Oldest has been sentenced to 1 year imprisonment without probation because he is supposed to have hit a policeman with a rope and to have bitten him in the leg. (81) The remaining court cases connected with the Grohnde demonstration have not yet come to an end, but the tendency is obvious.



Demonstrators attempting to kick and bite police officers in Grohnde!

The sentencing of some of the Grohnde demonstrators is to serve a special purpose. They are to serve as an example to show what can theoretically happen to everyone who is an opposer to atomic energy. Their cases show the determination of the government and the judiciary to carry out the atomic energy program even if it is with a great deal of repression. This would only be an abstract awareness if it weren't for at least some demonstrative verdicts. The trials can be seen as a political, psychological ritual of intimidation in order to prevent future demonstrations. It is often argued that the intimidation is directed only at the militant sections of the movement; but even those prepared to restrict their protest to a peaceful one have realized (in Kalkar, if not sooner) that, in this country, their resistance borders on criminality and is regarded as both senseless and punishable.

Attempts to defame resistance against the atomic energy policy in West Germany are so successful because all governmental and social institutions and influential organizations, with the exception of the Protestant Church support rapid development of atomic energy. Even the trade unions, the official representatives of the working population, have demanded the construction of atomic energy plants. (See p. 14) Despite the growing unwillingness among the people, despite the massive demonstrations in 1977, despite the increasing numbers of nuclear-energy opposers even among the simple Social Democratic and Liberal Party members, the three biggest parties (CDU, SPD AND FDP) have reinforced their decision to support the atomic energy program.

Those in opposition to the atomic energy policy are consequently also in opposition to the three major parties; since these three



parties represent the state, opposers to atomic energy are opposers to the state and opposers to the state are treated as "outlaws". Thus presently, the anti-atomic energy movement lies outside the organizations and institutions provided to absorb protest, a situation which can be very dangerous for the movement or which can open up a whole new possibility. The big danger is that the movement could get labelled as a "terrorist" movement through propaganda and police actions and subsequently could become isolated. The big chance is that lots of people could see and experience the almost perfect agreement and co-operation between the atomic energy industry, the political parties, the unions and the judiciary in continuing with the development and practical use of atomic energy and that this could develop into a massive learning process with consequences directed against the "Model West Germany".

### *Intimidation and Prevention*

Closely tied with criminalizing legal forms of protest, is the deterrent effect intended with this tactic. Intimidation plays a major part in the West German strategy of suppressing expression of discontent. Fear of personal consequences is to become so deeply rooted in the mind of the individual, that the individual doesn't dare to criticize the system in any way at all. People with built in control mechanisms minimize the amount of overt repression necessary to suppress undesirable criticism. Preventing protest before it arises is better than combatting it when it is already visible.

The demonstration in Kalkar provides a good example for the well co-ordinated work aimed at "intimidation and prevention" between the police, the political parties, the trade unions and the media. The continuous and, to a large extent, hysterical reports in the newspapers about predicted "blood baths" in Kalkar, the detailed interviews with the Interior Minister for North Rhine Westfalia which came over the radio almost every day just before the demonstration indicate that the major branches of the mass media (daily newspapers, radio, television) are all working together to support the government's atomic energy policy. The work of the police was also woven into this scheme. 10,000 policemen wouldn't be sent to Kalkar for no reason at all; and according to the saying "Where there's smoke, there's fire" it could be expected that the average citizen would not conclude that the police were the ones with the criminal determination but rather that the demonstrators were the ones.



"Where there's smoke, there's fire!"  
(Train station in Kalkar)


Intimidation is of course a tactic which is applied in other countries as well. However, in West Germany, extensive use is made of this tactic and with considerable success up till now (eg. Berufsverbote and Paragraph 88a - the censorship law). It remains to be seen if intimidation will be as successful with atomic energy opposers.

### Surveillance

In order to make a strategy of prevention possible, constant observation for "trouble spots" is essential. Model West Germany is progressing towards total surveillance of all those living in the country. "At the present time, more than 30,000 computers are storing official or private personal data about German citizens: name, address, profession, also religion, political tendencies, shopping habits, financial situation, health. Complete character analyses are transmittable within a few seconds over large distances." (82) Approximately 200 pieces of information are presently being stored about every person living in West Germany in government offices ranging from the Residents Registration Office to the Finance Department. (83)

The controls and investigations which are being made in connection with atomic energy supply more statistics to make a better picture of the individuals living in this country. "Presently, approximately 60 persons are being investigated per nuclear power plant for their technical security. ... This number will increase to about 100 persons per nuclear power plant when the measures recommended by the Interior Ministers' conference for protection of the nuclear facilities are realized." (84)

But the surveillance related to atomic energy covers a much broader spectrum of people than just those directly connected with the nuclear reactors themselves. The surveillance, aimed at gathering



information about every atomic energy critic, involves methods from filming, taping and identity controls during atin-nuclear energy demonstrations, as was done in Kalkar, to "noting the car license numbers at meetings of Bürgerinitiativen."(85)

The surveillance of atomic energy critics represents only appart of the constant information gathering carried\$ in a country, where the state is striving to collect as much information about its residents as possible and will go to all lengths to get this information. For example, 700 residents in the city of Speyer were investigated by the Department for Protection of the Constitution (Verfassungsschutz) because they "had signed a petition from a Bürgerinitiative in which employment was demanded for the art teacher, Uta Boege, a member of the German Communist Party"(86); anyone renting a car in West Germany is also investigated: "his personal data given when renting the car wanders automatically into the so-called Pios-System of the Search Computer in the State Criminal Departments"(87); "all hotel guests are required to fill out andsign registration forms by hand"(88) which are then controlled by the police.

## Export

Unlike some aspects of Model West Germany, the strategy and technology developed to deal with social unrest is one that can be directly exported to other countries. This not only can be done, it is being done. Not only is co-operation between West Germany and France a reality (eg. the demonstration in Malville) but the co-operation between West Germany and Italy became evident with the parallels in the tactics employed by the Italian police during the Moro kidnapping and those employed in West Germany during the Schleyer kidnapping some months earlier.

Other aspects of the Model West Germany cannot be as easily directly exported. For instance, the practice of Berufsverbote in the legalized "West German" form is unimaginable in Italy or in France; one would expect much to much resistance from the people if Berufsverbote were to be introduced there at the present time. However, Anti-Terror Laws, first introduced in West Germany in February 1978, also seemed to be unsuitable for introduction elsewhere at that time; but only one month later, similar Anti-Terror Laws came into effect in Italy. Conditions can change much faster than expected.



## REFERENCES

- 1 Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung (August 30, 1977)
- 2 Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung (August 17, 1977)
- 3 Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung (August 17, 1977)
- 4 Neue-Rhein Zeitung (September 9, 1977)
- 5 Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung (September 13, 1977)
- 6 Ibid.
- 7 Ermittlungsausschuß der nordrhein-westfälischen Bürgerinitiativen gegen Kernenergie, Wir das Volk (Cologne), p. 8-9.
- 8 Ibid., p.9.
- 9 Westfälische Rundschau (September 19, 1977)
- 10 Westfälische Rundschau (September 24, 1977)
- 11 Die Welt (September 24, 1977)
- 12 Stern Nr. 42 (October 6, 1977), p. 273.
- 13 Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung (September 26, 1977)
- 14 Stern Nr. 42 (October 6, 1977), p. 271.
- 15 Stern Nr. 42 (October 6, 1977), p. 269.
- 16 Stern Nr. 42 (October 6, 1977), p. 273.
- 17 Stern Nr. 42 (October 6, 1977), p. 273.
- 18 Stern Nr. 42 (October 6, 1977), p. 274.
- 19 Kalkar am 24.9 Verlag J. Reents, Hamburg), p.9.
- 20 Westfälische Rundschau (September 21, 1977)
- 21 Ibid.
- 22 Ibid.
- 23 Bürgerinitiativen aus: Bielefeld, Münster, Kassel, Göttingen, Hameln, Hannover, Hamburg, Bremen; und Vertretern der Verkehrsausschüsse, des Sanitätsausschusses und des Ermittlungsausschusses, Grohnde 19.3.77 Dokumentation (Hannover), p. 13.
- 24 Rendsburger Tageblatt (December 1, 1976)
- 25 Bild (May 12, 1978)
- 26 Nina Gladitz, Lieber aktiv als radioaktiv, Wyhler Bauern erzählen (Berlin, 1976), p. 48-51.
- 27 Susanne Polke, Wer braucht Atomkraft? - oder: Ist der Aufstieg der Bundesrepublik Deutschland unaufhaltsam? in Kritisches Tagebuch Heft 1/1977 (Tübingen, 1977), p. 31.
- 28 Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung (September 24, 1975)
- 29 Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung (November 29, 1976)
- 30 Das Parlament Nr. 1/2 (January 31, 1976)
- 31 Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung (May 27, 1976)
- 32 Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung (April 14, 1976)
- 33 Der Fischer Welt-Almanach '75 (Frankfurt am Main, 1974), p. 310.
- 34 Welt der Wirtschaft (June 12, 1978)
- 35 Bürgerinitiativen im Rhein-Main-Neckar Raum, Umwelt akut Nr. 1 (September 1976), p. 2.
- 36 Amnesty International, Arbeitsgemeinschaft katholischer Studenten- und Hochschulgemeinden, Bundesverband Bürgerinitiativen Umweltschutz e.V., Das deutsch-brasilianische Atomgeschäft (Cologne, 1976), p. 9.
- 37 Ibid., p. 11.
- 38 Susanne Polke, Wer braucht Atomkraft? - oder: Ist der Aufstieg der Bundesrepublik Deutschland unaufhaltsam?, ed. cit., p. 32.
- 39 Amnesty International, Arbeitsgemeinschaft katholischer Studenten- und Hochschulgemeinden, Bundesverband Bürgerinitiativen Umweltschutz e.V., Das deutsch-brasilianische Atomgeschäft, ed. cit., p. 22.
- 40 Süddeutsche Zeitung (June 28, 1975)
- 41 Amnesty International, Arbeitsgemeinschaft katholischer Studenten- und Hochschulgemeinden, Bundesverband Bürgerinitiativen Umweltschutz e.V., Das deutsch-brasilianische Atomgeschäft, ed. cit., p. 15.

- 42 Welt der Wirtschaft (June 12, 1978)
- 43 Arbeiterkampf, Warum kämpfen wir gegen Atomkraftwerke? (Hamburg), p. 44.
- 44 Robert Jungk, Der Atomstaat (Munich, 1977), p. 138.
- 45 Die Welt (August, 31, 1977)
- 46 Frankfurter Rundschau (May 19, 1976)
- 47 Frankfurter Rundschau (November 6, 1976)
- 48 Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung (November 6, 1976)
- 49 Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung (November 12, 1976)
- 50 Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung (November 25, 1976)
- 51 Frankfurter Rundschau (February 28, 1977)
- 52 Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung (November 11, 1977)
- 53 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (September 23, 1975)
- 54 Westdeutscher Rundfunk köln, Tagesthema-Sendung "Vom Rechtsstaat zur Atomdiktatur?" (March 2, 1977)
- 55 Spiegel Nr. 42 (October 10, 1977), p. 19.
- 56 Stern Nr. 18/78
- 57 Stern Nr. 22 (May 24, 1978), p. 245.
- 58 Ibid., p. 246.
- 59 Arbeiterkampf Nr. 130 (May 29, 1978)
- 60 Stern Nr. 22 (May 24, 1978), p. 244-245.
- 61 Dr. Ulrich Eichstädt, "Die Grundlagen der zivilen Verteidigung" in Die Polizei 1/76.
- 62 Reg. Dir. Wolfgang Siedschlag, "Öffentliche Sicherheit im Spannungs- und Verteidigungsfall" in Die Polizei 1/76.
- 63 Ibid.
- 64 "Demonstrative Aktionen" (Die Zusammenfassung der polizeilichen Einsatzgrundsätze und taktiken gem. der neuen PDV 100 in Die Polizei 7/76.
- 65 Reg. Dir. Wolfgang Siedschlag, "Öffentliche Sicherheit im Spannungs- und Verteidigungsfall", ed. cit.
- 66 PR Gerhard Garbotz, "Die polizeiliche Bewältigung von demonstrativen Aktionen" in Die Polizei 7/76.
- 67 Ibid.
- 68 Hans-Günther Merk, Bundesministerium des Innern, Innere Sicherheit (Mannheim, 1977), p. 15.
- 69 Ibid., p. 29.
- 70 Ibid., p. 54.
- 71 Ibid., p. 57.
- 72 Ibid., p. 39.
- 73 Ibid., p. 60.
- 74 Ibid., p. 63.
- 75 Ibid., p. 62-63.
- 76 Kriminalobererrat Manfred Ganschow, "Einsatzverfahren mit Dokumentation und Beweissicherung" in Kriminalistik Heft 11/1977, p. 485.
- 77 Ibid., p. 485.
- 78 Herald Tribune (August 1, 1977)
- 79 Frankfurter Rundschau (April 18, 1978)
- 80 Frankfurter Rundschau (April 25, 1978)
- 81 Informations-Dienst Nr. 230 (May 20, 1978), p. 16.
- 82 Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung (December 7, 1977)
- 83 Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung (January 31, 1978)
- 84 Frankfurter Rundschau (August 10, 1977)
- 85 Frankfurter Rundschau (January 25, 1978)
- 86 Frankfurter Rundschau (December 15, 1977)
- 87 Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung (April 4, 1978)
- 88 Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung (January 31, 1978)



The CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE MODEL WEST GERMANY has published five reports dealing with the repressive developments in West Germany

- Nr. 1 Berufsverbote (English - Greek)
  - Nr. 2 Computerized Surveillance (English - Greek)
  - Nr. 3 How to Burn Books without Getting your Fingers Dirty  
(English - French)
  - Nr. 4 The Stammheim Death (English - Greek - German)
- Nr.1 and Nr.2 in English are out of print. Copies of the other brochures can be obtained by writing to:

Campaign against the model West Germany  
c/o Evangelische Studentengemeinde (ESG)  
Querenburger Höhe 287  
4630 Bochum 1  
Bundesrepublik Deutschland