

STATE RESEARCH

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THE CONTROL OF LONDON'S POLICE – EUROPE'S ANTI-

TERRORIST PACT – OPERATION COUNTRYMAN – CHANGES

IN THE SPG – P.T.A. RENEWED – THE COLD WARRIORS

**NEWS &
DEVELOPMENTS**

CHEMICAL WARFARE

- The Ministry of Defence announced on the day we went to press that it is studying whether Britain should develop chemical weapons (**Times**, 3.4.80).

The current cranking up of the Cold War is being used as a cover for increased readiness on the part of the Nato alliance to use chemical weapons. In March, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, the military head of Nato, US General Bernard Rogers, speaking in Norway,

called for a build-up of chemical warfare means in Europe as a deterrent to a possible chemical offensive by Russia (**Evening Standard**, 17.3.80).

Since the end of last year, reports have been appearing in the western press focusing on the stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) possessed by the Soviet Union which, it is claimed, is preparing to use them against Nato armies in the event of hostilities in Europe. One central strand in the story has been the allegation that an accident with biological weapons cost the lives of several hundred people in the Russian city of Sverdlovsk, last year. The sequence of appearance of the story was traced by Laurence Marks in the **Observer** (23.3.80). A reference to anthrax, the disease said to have been spread by the alleged accident, was made in a Sverdlovsk paper in April, 1979. No mention of any accident was made nor, of course, of CBW.

These two additions first made their appearance in **Now** magazine, the right-wing weekly owned by Sir James Goldsmith, on October 26, 1979. The author, David Floyd, sited the accident at Novosibirsk, 2,000 miles to the east of Sverdlovsk and gave as a source 'a traveller'. The report was reprinted in the right-wing West German daily **Bild Zeitung** the following day.

The story then appears to have died, perhaps because Novosibirsk is a city to which foreigners are allowed to travel, and an incident which had caused hundreds of deaths could have been concealed only with great difficulty. But on February 14, **Bild** returned to the story, re-siting it in a town near Sverdlovsk, which does have heavy industry, including military industry, and which is closed to foreigners.

The US Government Foreign Broadcast Information Service, FBIS, formerly part of the CIA, but now under the State Department, reprinted the **Now** and **Bild** stories over the weekend of March 17, 1980. FBIS usually reprints only current, if carefully selected, stories from the foreign media. The State Department claimed at the same time that they had 'only recently' obtained enough information to approach the Soviet Union about the incident. This official comment meant that the alleged incident once again featured in detail in the western press.

The Russians, predictably enough, denied all details of the incident, and described it as 'impudent slander'. Reuter reported from Moscow that dissidents with contacts in Sverdlovsk had heard nothing about the incident (**Morning Star**, 20.3.80). And: 'It is conceded in Washington that publication of the incident at this juncture is no accident, but part of a major effort designed to "rev up" public opinion about Soviet capability in biological and chemical weaponry' (**Daily Telegraph**, 20.3.80).

Media Operations

Philip Agee has described how the CIA carries out such media operations, and its methods are similar to those used by many

intelligence organisations. (See, in particular, 'West Germany: an interview with Philip Agee', in **Dirty Work: the CIA in Western Europe**, Lyle Stuart, 1978). Stories favourable to the US, which may originally have been planted by a CIA contact in a friendly publication, are telexed by the Agency to other CIA officers in contact with pro-western journalists, who are encouraged to place them in journals to which they have access. The journalist thinks that he or she has a 'top level security services contact', and the intelligence officer has a 'media asset'.

The 'anthrax incident' was only one of several recent attempts by the US and Nato to justify what seems to be a new commitment to chemical weaponry research and manufacture, one aspect of the new cold war. The Soviet Union has stockpiles of chemical weapons, and the means to deliver them; so does the United States. The USSR may have returned to manufacturing biological weapons, but this cannot be determined from the evidence adduced from the 'anthrax incident.' The USSR and the USA are both parties to the 1972 Geneva Convention on Biological Warfare, which bans the use, manufacture and stockpiling of biological weapons such as anthrax. This treaty was achieved largely because East and West agreed that chemical weapons have and will continue to have the edge over biological, because of the unpredictability of living organisms.

Western intelligence and military estimates of Soviet capabilities have usually been intended to push western governments into increased expenditure on arms research and manufacture. This was certainly true of the alleged 'bomber gap' of the Fifties and the 'missile gap' of the Sixties, and may be true now of current US assessments of Soviet intentions. (See **Dubious Specter**, by Fred Kaplan, Transnational Institute, 1977; Bulletin No 16, 'Labour's Transatlantic Links,' and the Background paper in this Bulletin.)

Whatever happened in the Soviet Union, Nato seems to be making a renewed effort in chemical warfare, and towards achieving its public acceptability.

British Research

In Britain, the Ministry of Defence is to take over facilities at the Porton Down Chemical Defence Establishment for new biological warfare research. Biological weapon research continued at the Chemical Defence Establishment even after Britain became a signatory to the 1972 Biological Warfare Convention.

The Defence Ministry is always anxious to stress that Britain's chemical and biological warfare research is 'purely defensive'. As a result of it, the British Army is said to be well-equipped and trained to withstand both chemical and biological attack.

The Centre for Applied Microbiology and Research at Porton became part of the Public Health Laboratory Service, under the Department of Health and Social Security, in April 1979. A secure laboratory at Porton Down was transferred to the DHSS along with the Centre. At the end of March 1980, that laboratory was returned to the control of the Ministry of Defence. A Defence Ministry spokesperson told **State Research** that this had been foreseen when the original transfer took place. It represented 'no change of policy.'

Under the quadripartite agreement which divides sensitive military activities between the nations of the western alliance, Britain is responsible for the research and development of chemical weapons, while the United States is responsible for production.

Porton is also continuing two other profitable lines of research – into riot control gases and gas-proof suits. The latter at least are also for export to friendly countries.

Britain's expanded role in chemical warfare is underlined by the specially-arranged show for the US military by Ministry of Defence experts and units from the armed services which will take place in Washington between April 14 and 18. They will be 'taking with them equipment showing Britain's lead in the field' (**Daily Telegraph**, 18.3.80).

Before the anthrax story was 'revved up', **The Guardian** had reported that 'Porton Down is to step up its chemical warfare training programme this month. It involves troops from the British and possibly other Nato armies. Simulants will be dropped from aircraft' (3.1.80). Viewers of BBC TV's 'War School' series, about the Army Staff College at Camberley, saw British troops training not to resist chemical attack, but to use chemical weapons. One officer said on the programme: 'It's quite straightforward: It's a gap in our armoury and I think all our views here – every soldier's view – is that it's a gap that should be rectified.' (**Observer**, 27.1.80).

Officially, Nato is 'considering' what its attitudes should be to chemical weapons held by the Russians. A Ministry of Defence spokesman confirmed to **State Research** that the US has stocks of chemical weapons, and the ability to deliver them in combat.

In January this year the United States called off talks at Geneva which were aimed at further exploring with the Soviet Union the possibility of extending the 1972 Biological Warfare Convention to cover chemical weapons (**Daily Telegraph**, 10.1.80).

General Rogers made his appeal for more chemical weaponry in Europe, just as the 'anthrax incident' was featuring prominently in the western media.

● One of the problems of getting disarmament in chemical weapons is that even the most potent nerve gases, the organo-phosphorous compounds, are closely related to widely-available 'commercial' substances, such as the weedkiller 245T – which was used by the US as a defoliant in Vietnam, and is now the subject of widespread demands in this country that it should be banned. This and other details of the campaign against chemical and biological warfare are to be found in Elizabeth Sigmund's recently published book **Rage Against the Dying** (Pluto Press, £1.95), which is recommended reading.

THE CONTROL OF LONDON'S POLICE

London is the only city in Britain where the police are not accountable to a local police authority (largely comprised of elected local councillors). Ever since the Metropolitan Police force was set up in 1829 the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis has been appointed by, and theoretically answerable to, the Home Secretary, who in turn is open to questioning in parliament. This arrangement survived the Royal Commission on the Police in 1962 and thus leaves London borough and Greater London Council elected representatives with no say in how the capital is policed despite the fact that London ratepayers have to bear nearly half the cost of running the Metropolitan Police, which is estimated at £407million for 1980-81.

The basic contradiction in London is that while the 'Metropolitan Police' police the **community** (just under 7 million people), 'Scotland Yard', which is housed with the Met, carries out many **national** functions. Current evidence suggests that there is a strong case for a major re-organisation by separating these two roles.

With 23,900 police officers, and 15,000 civilian staff, London has, in theory, the third highest ratio of officers to the population in the country 309:1. But in practice it is estimated that only 5,000 of these 23,900 are available to patrol the 24 London police divisions (**Police Review**, 8.2.80). In part this imbalance is explained by the fact that 6,000 of the 23,900 officers hold ranks above that of constable, nearly a quarter. This imbalance reflects the national roles played by 'Scotland Yard'.

Not only are less than a quarter of the London police force available for duty on the streets, but London has the worst record in the country for clearing up everyday crime. London's clear-up rate of reported crime is now at a record low – 20 per cent in 1979. In 1970 it was 28 per cent. While the clear-up rate for major and

violent crime is very high (around 70 per cent) the protection afforded to the community in London against burglary, petty thefts, and so called 'vandalism' and 'muggings' is abysmal.

At the same time complaints against the police in London, which steadily increase every year, totalled 8,500 in 1977, making an average of one lodged complaint per three London police officers. Furthermore, a Home Office research bulletin published at the end of 1979 included a study which showed that not a single complaint of racial discrimination by the police was upheld through the Metropolitan complaints procedure in the six years 1973-78.

Corruption

This same Home Office Study showed that arrest rates for black people in London were far higher than could have been predicted from their proportion of the population. And in the case of street arrests for petty theft the ratio was 15 times higher than for whites. The authors of the study while suggesting that high black unemployment might be part of the reason, discrimination by the police could not be ruled out (**Financial Times**, 28.1.80). In its evidence to the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure the Institute of Race Relations concluded that 'the police have not only failed to protect the black community from racist attacks, but have themselves harassed the community' (**Police Against Black People**, Institute of Race Relations, 1979).

London also has the most corrupt police force in the country. Despite Sir Robert Mark's contention that he had effectively 'cleaned up' the Metropolitan Police (see his book 'In the Office of Constable'). As Deputy Commissioner Mark initiated the creation of a special department A.10 to deal with complaints and corruption. Later Commissioner McNee created CIB(2) to replace A.10, and make the system more effective. Despite these formal changes Frank Hooley MP observed in February 1976: 'I wonder if there is any other public

body in this country, employing 20,000 people, which has had 400 members of its staff depart under a cloud of suspicion in the last four years?’

Now, in 1980, the figure has risen to 800 officers who have departed under a ‘cloud of suspicion’ in the past 8 years, and this out of a national total of 1,100. Even this figure does not take into account what may transpire from the 19 month old Operation Countryman which reportedly could effect another 100 officers. London police currently has the largest number of officers in its history suspended pending investigations.

Firearms

In addition to all these factors London’s police use firearms more than any other force in the country – the last published figures (in 1970, 1971 and 1972) showed that between 69 and 76 per cent of all gun issues were in the Metropolitan Police area. As against this in England and Wales between 1970 and 1978 there has been a seven-fold increase in the issuing of firearms, while the reported criminal use of firearms went up three times (see Bulletin No 16). In 1978, guns were issued on 7,462 occasions (excluding protection duties), some three-quarters of these in London.

Furthermore 102 of the 245 deaths in police custody over the past ten years happened in the Metropolitan police area.

Finally, on the available evidence, London police, in this case the SPG, conduct more random ‘stops and searches’ per head of population than any other police force in England and Wales. These searches, over 60,000 a year by the SPG, of pedestrians and cars rest on the contentious use of a section of the 1839 Police Act which was passed to combat Chartism. This technique is just one indication of the reactive or ‘fire-brigade’ policing tactics being employed by the London police because the duality of their role leads to too few police devoted to preventive policing (e.g. patrolling and having links with the local community).

Taken together, these factors alone

make up an unanswerable case for a Metropolitan Police force which is solely responsible for policing the community in London, and one which is accountable to locally elected democratic representatives.

Scotland Yard

Ever since it was set up in 1829 Scotland Yard, as distinct from the Metropolitan Police, has acted both as the fore-runner in developing new techniques of policing and in keeping national records. After the Second World War there was some decentralisation of certain roles: regional training colleges were set up; Regional Criminal Records Offices and Regional Crime Squads were created in 1965; and local Special Branches began to develop from 1961 onwards. Despite these developments Scotland Yard still carries out four major national functions: record-keeping, research, specialist national squads and specialist national duties.

In conjunction with the Home Office, Scotland Yard is responsible for the Police National Computer which holds files on 3.8 million criminals and 19 million drivers and vehicle owners (see Bulletin No.11). Criminal Intelligence and the Special Branch both hold national records in their respective fields some of which are now being transferred onto a national computer, the Metropolitan Police ‘C’ Department Computer (see Bulletin No.11). National record-keeping therefore comprises a major Scotland Yard role.

The Specialist Squads based at Scotland Yard are the National Drugs Intelligence Unit and the National Illegal Immigrants Intelligence Unit, together with the Special Branch and the Anti-Terrorist Squad who both operate nationally. The specialist duties carried out by Scotland Yard include the guarding of royalty, politicians and embassies, for example, by the Diplomatic Protection Squad. All of these functions can be quite clearly distinguished from the everyday policing of London as a community, and are explicitly national in character.

In March, Jack Straw MP introduced a

Bill in the Commons, under the 10 Minute Rule Bill, which proposed that a Greater London Police Force be established for London and a National Police Agency, which would remain accountable to the Home Secretary. The Bill also seeks to remove JPs from local police authorities throughout the country and to extend the powers of police authorities to cover the general operational policies of the police. (Hansard, 11.3.80).

The duality of the roles of policing London and providing national services developed historically because not until 1856 did all areas of the country have police forces and most of these were not fully effective until the end of the last century; because London is the seat of government; and because it is a centre for large-scale demonstrations. The price of maintaining this duality however has been that the community in London is the worst protected in the country and the most open to abuse of police powers.

THE REORGANISATION OF LONDON'S SPG

The results of the review of the role of the Special Patrol Group in London announced on March 10 are likely to make little or no difference in practice. Although greeted by headlines like 'Curb on riot cops' (*Daily Mirror*, 11.3.80) there is no mention of any changes to be made in their training, their use in so-called 'high crime' areas like Brixton, Lewisham and Hackney, and they are still going to be available both for anti-terrorist activities (requiring the use of firearms) and for major demonstrations (for which they are trained in riot control techniques).

The Metropolitan Police are keen to emphasise that their major role is in 'saturation' policing in 'high crime' areas and that their other roles are secondary ones. It is precisely the combination of these three roles which gives the SPG its para-military capacity (see Bulletin No 13). And it is when a specialist squad like this is

used for everyday policing in the community, for 'saturation' policing, that problems arise. While their performance at Grunwick and the killing of Blair Peach at Southall has drawn attention to the excesses of the SPG it is their heavy-handed tactics in policing a community that represents the real dangers of a squad like the SPG.

Stop and Searches

It has not been part of local police practice to set up roadblocks and conduct random stop and searches in 'high crime areas'. In 1976, the last year for which full figures were given in the Commissioners' Annual Report, the SPG carried out 60,898 stop and searches of pedestrians and cars. This led to 3,773 arrests (the number convicted is not known). When McNee became Commissioner, he stopped publishing the full figures of stop and searches but the arrest figures, 4,166 in 1978, and 3,669 in 1979, suggest that the level of stop and searches is still around the 60,000 mark. It was after the SPG were called into Lambeth in November 1978 that the Lambeth borough council decided to set up a public inquiry, which is still continuing, into relations between the police and the community. During the period of the SPG operation, there were 430 arrests from 1,000 stop and searches, 40 per cent of those arrested being black, (see Bulletin No 11). In Lewisham in 1975, the SPG were called into a 'high crime' area and stopped over 14,000 people in the course of their operation. Local objections to the introduction of the SPG into these 'high crime' areas – which also include Notting Hill, Hillingdon and Barnet – which are all working class areas with high unemployment rates and usually a significant black community, is that they have no commitment to the locality and epitomise the 'fire-brigade' policing tactics of the Metropolitan Police.

The review of the role of the SPG, created in 1965, was conducted by the Deputy Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, Mr Kavanagh, following the killing of

Blair Peach and protests about their violent tactics at Southall. According to the Scotland Yard press release (Kavanagh's report is not being published) the report 'has not revealed any serious defect . . . and it has confirmed that since its inception the Group has consistently given excellent support to the Force and service to the citizens of London' (March 10, 1980).

McNee however did announce some changes. First, day to day control of the SPG would come under the four Area Deputy Assistant Commissioners, 'but central control will be exercised when necessary by the Assistant Commissioner A Department' (which is a continuation of the central deployment procedures currently in operation for anti-terrorist work and for demonstrations). This means that instead of the current six SPG bases there will in future be eight, two in each of the four areas. Second, the length of service in the SPG will be limited to four years instead of the present ten years. The Home Secretary, reporting the McNee proposals to parliament, said that this was to 'counter the risks involved in lengthy periods of service in a specialised squad' (*Times* 11.3.80). And thirdly, the number of supervisory officers was to be increased by the appointment of more Chief Inspectors.

Whether the increase in the number of SPG units, from six to eight, will lead to a larger SPG is not yet known. Before April 1979 the SPG had a full complement of 204 officers but after Southall recruitment to the squad was stopped and it currently stands at 183. A major effect of the changes is that because of the new four year rule, more than half of the present SPG will be replaced within the next few months, which could be seen as a major purge of the Group. Equally, it can be argued that the four year rule will mean that more London police officers will undergo SPG training and add to the long-term tendency for London's police to be trained in firearms and anti-riot techniques.

The announcement of the review of the

SPG just a few weeks before the Blair Peach inquest is due to restart is clearly anticipated to forestall any of the possible outcomes. (The *Sunday Times* of March 16, 1980 reported that the investigation by Commander Cass concluded that one of the six named SPG officers was responsible for Peach's death). The real test of whether these changes are more than cosmetic ones will become evident over the coming months, but, in any event, they are unlikely to satisfy those who demand that the SPG be disbanded.

PTA: A SEVENTH YEAR OF TEMPORARY PROVISIONS

On March 4, parliament renewed the Prevention of Terrorism Act for a further 12 months. MPs voted by 115 votes to 26 in support of the government's motion to renew the law, which was first passed in 1974. In a short debate, Home Secretary William Whitelaw confirmed that he has finally rejected the abolition of section 11 of the Act. Section 11 makes it an offence to withhold information about terrorism. After reviewing the workings of the Act in 1978, Lord Shackleton's report recommended it should be dropped. In 1979, Labour's Home Secretary, Merlyn Rees, rejected the Shackleton proposal but said that the position would be reviewed a year later. His successor has now confirmed the original decision. Whitelaw also announced that he has turned down Shackleton's suggestion of financial assistance for the families of people issued with exclusion orders under the Act. 'Such a scheme could not be justified,' he told the Commons. The 26 votes against the Act included a Liberal, Merseyside MP David Alton.

Figures released by the Home Office at the end of January showed that another 857 people were detained in Britain in 1979 under the PTA. This was 38 per cent more than 1978's total of 622, but it still falls well short of the totals detained in 1975 and 1976, the first two years in which the

Act was in force. The total numbers detained under prevention of terrorism legislation since 1974 are 4,524.

As many as 89 per cent of this total were neither charged with a criminal offence nor issued with an exclusion order, 4,031 out of 4,524. However, in 1979 this proportion dropped lower than in any previous year to 82 per cent.

A significant feature of 1979's detentions was that they reversed a trend which has existed since 1975 under which ever-larger proportions of detentions took place at air and sea ports. In 1975, 59 per cent of detentions were made at ports. By 1978, the proportion had risen to 82 per cent, but in 1979 it fell back sharply to 67 per cent. In the first quarter of 1979 port detentions accounted for only 50 per cent of all detentions.

It was in this quarter, too, that the proportion of people detained but neither charged nor excluded reached its lowest point – 74 per cent. This suggests that there may be two principle sorts of PTA arrests: inland arrests which carry a greater likelihood of further charges and port arrests which are essentially an information gathering and monitoring exercise.

OPERATION COUNTRYMAN

The continuing controversy about Operation Countryman – the inquiry into London police corruption – has at last revealed some unambiguous evidence of both its scope and the attempts to frustrate it. Rather than being an open-ended investigation into all the allegations which have been made since it was set up in September 1978, it is now clear that Countryman is concentrating on three major armed robberies: at the offices of the Daily Express and the Daily Mirror (where a security guard was killed) and the headquarters of Williams and Glyn's bank in the City. There may also be a link with the robbery at the Bank of America in Mayfair – the biggest ever bank raid. Serious allegations involving bribery against officers already suspected of having

a hand in these raids are also being looked at. The dozens of other complaints which Countryman has attracted are being referred to Scotland Yard's Complaints Investigation Bureau (CIB2), in which many criminals and lawyers have little faith.

Even though these other allegations include serious claims of corruption, such as the fabrication of evidence, it has been decided that Countryman cannot handle them if it is to be at all effective. The number of suspected policemen, going as high as deputy assistant commissioner level, has been put at 80 by Mr Arthur Hambleton, the chief constable of Dorset who headed the inquiry until his retirement from the force last month. Mr Hambleton revealed this 'staggering' figure during a radio interview which went some way to counter the official assurances that Countryman was not being obstructed. Middle and lower ranking officers had not been helpful, he said, and at least one 'fairly senior officer' had been less than co-operative. He also confirmed that the role of the Director of Public Prosecutions had at times been counter-productive.

Criticism of the DPP's involvement now centres on two areas. The director, Sir Thomas Hetherington, will not authorise a prosecution of police officers unless the evidence suggests a much greater chance of a conviction than the 51 per cent rule he applies to other cases. Secondly, it is clear that the DPP lawyer, Mike Chance, who was attached to Countryman full-time, has not improved matters. His job was to help Countryman prepare their reports for the director and to reduce the antagonisms between the DPP's office and the investigating detectives. Four reports, naming six officers, which were drawn up with his guidance have since been rejected. Countryman officers also appear to resent his advice on purely operational tactics.

One further development which should strengthen Countryman's hand for a change, is a statement by the Attorney General, Sir Michael Havers. In another radio interview he said that criminals who talked to Countryman and then believed

they had been, 'fitted-up' should refer the information to the DPP. They have already been a number of cases where men have claimed they have been falsely charged in revenge.

The conclusions to be drawn from these latest developments over the past month are not optimistic for Countryman's chances of getting to the root of corruption. It is faced with an unco-operative strata of middle ranking officers – where the chief suspects lie; the DPP is insisting on cast iron guarantees of a conviction; criminal informers are being intimidated and, knowing that some of their complaints will be sent to CIB2, they will be even more reluctant to talk. Mr Hambleton suggested that only 25 officers may eventually end up in court. After 19 months work four have been charged.

BILL TO LIMIT MI 5

A private members Bill to 'provide a focus for debate on how the Security Service (MI5) can be brought under control' introduced by Robin Cook MP, was given its second reading on February 28, 1980. The Bill is unlikely to become law but it does provide the framework for the setting up of a Security Service, which is concerned with internal surveillance, on a statutory basis and in a way that places specific limits on its powers.

The 'Security Service Bill' would restrict the activities of MI5 to countering foreign espionage inside the UK and with the detection and prevention of terrorism and subversion. The Director General would be required to present an annual report to parliament recording the number of staff employed, the number of files held on individuals held in its Registry, and the number of applications for permission to institute telephone taps, intercept mail and to install electronic 'bugs'. The power to grant authorisation to undertake these activities would be given to a High Court judge instead of, as at present, to the Home Secretary.

In addition to its annual report to

parliament, the files held by MI5 would be subjected to a five-yearly review by a High Court judge to ensure that the information held was restricted to the remit allowed under the Bill (a similar review of Special Branch records in South Australia by a judge led to 90 percent of files being destroyed (see Bulletin No 4).

During the first reading of the Bill, Mr Cook revealed that under the 1782 Civil Service List and Secret Service Money Act expenditure 'for the purpose of secret service within this kingdom' was limited to £10,000 a year (S.24, 1782 Act). And by the Secret Service Money (Repeal) Act 1886 it became 'unlawful' for *any* money to be spent on an internal security service. The 1782 Act was repealed in 1977, by the Statute Law Repeals Act, when as Mr Cook observed 'the funds released for the Security Service exceeded not only £10,000 but £10 million' (Hansard, 11.12.79). The allocation of funds to MI5 had therefore been unlawful since its formation in 1909.

The fact that the 1782 Act, plus the 1886 Act, was repealed in 1977 may well have been as a result of the secret review of MI5 which Mr Callaghan ordered after Harold Wilson's allegations about certain 'right-wing' MI5 officers. Mr Callaghan only revealed that this review had taken place last autumn during the debate on the Blunt affair.

A NEW FORCE IN THE DEFENCE INDUSTRY

The take over of Decca by Racal Electronics, despite heavy bidding from empire-building Arnold Weinstock's General Electric Company, reveals a picture of increasing concentration in the defence equipment industry.

Racal, described by **The Economist** (23.2.80) as 'Britain's aggressive defence electronics company', bought Decca for £101 million. Its interests lay not so much in Decca's ailing consumer goods production – TV, audio and records – but in its 'capital goods' manufacture. This

innocent-sounding term refers to its radar, navigation and electronic warfare activities

Why did Racal succeed where GEC failed? 'The clincher was Racal's ability to persuade its directors and certain institutions that a Racal/Decca grouping rather than a GEC/Decca get together was preferable from both companies point of view and in the **national interest**.' (*Investors Chronicle* 22.2.80, our emphasis).

The defence equipment companies are becoming increasingly worried about foreign competition. In particular, a contest is looming for the replacement of Britain's radar defence chain. The recent award of a £20 million radar contract to the American firm Westinghouse by the Civil Aviation Authority is no doubt seen as a warning of things to come. (The Ministry of Defence pays 30 per cent of the civil radar cost to ensure compatibility with military systems.)

The Racal takeover of Decca is thus an important shift in the composition of this industry. GEC still dominates in defence electronics — world sales were £400 million plus in 1979-80. The recently merged Thorn/EMI follows with sales of almost £200 million. The new Racal/Decca venture has world sales of about £150 million. Racal directors include admiral of the Fleet Sir Edward Ashmore, chief of defence staff in 1977; and John Cronin, Labour MP for Loughborough until the last general election and a Wimpole Street surgeon. Decca's board included Sir Martin Flett, permanent under secretary at the Ministry of Defence, 1968-71.

ONE DOLLAR FINE FOR NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE

A US Marine who was found guilty of the 'negligent homicide' of a British serviceman after a traffic accident at the RAF base at St Mawgan, Cornwall, was fined \$1 and given a 'punitive letter of admonition' at his court martial. The accident happened last year, when the

marine's jeep, travelling on the wrong side of a road in the RAF base, hit a motor cycle ridden by Leading Aircraftman Matthew Chesher, aged 17, who was killed. The inquest on Mr Chester was stopped by order of Home Secretary William Whitelaw after the US authorities invoked the provisions of the Visiting Forces Act, 1952, which allows US and other foreign troops stationed in Britain to try their own members.

The court martial of the marine took place in London, and the only civilians present were the dead man's father, his solicitor, and a Bodmin police officer.

Commander J.C. Dewey, public affairs officer to the C-in-C, US Naval Forces Europe, said that the court was public, but there was no requirement that its sitting be publicised. The marine, who was not named, was judged by a jury of US servicemen — 'his peers'. The **Cornish Guardian**, the only paper to report the court proceedings and sentence, described the Act as 'obsolete and damaging in its application. It should have been scrapped long ago', (*Cornish Guardian*, 10.1.80).

MP CALLS FOR INQUIRY INTO DEATHS

Revised Home Office figures on deaths in police custody published on March 3, showed 273 deaths over the ten year period from 1970-79. Previous figures (given in Bulletin No 16) only dealt with the period up to June 1979.

The number dying from non-natural causes in England and Wales was 166 (61 per cent). A further 41 (15 per cent) committed suicide. The numbers dying from non-natural causes rose through the decade from 3 in 1970 to 32 in 1978. The Home Office has refused to publish the names of those who died.

However, the new figures may still be an underestimate. Dr Hugh Johnson, president of the British Association of Forensic Medicine and a consultant pathologist at St Thomas's Hospital in

London, told **The Observer** on February 17 1980: 'I personally know of a few cases of people dying in hospitals (after being in police cells) and not being recorded as deaths in custody, and I know of more who died after being discharged from police custody.'

During February and March, the House of Commons Select Committee on Home Affairs continued to take evidence from several sources on deaths in custody. The secretary of the Police Superintendents' Association of England and Wales, said in his written submission that 'exaggerated and distorted attention' was being given to the 'very rare occasions' when arrested people die. 'Understandably,' said Mr John Keyte, 'we become somewhat annoyed when minority groups or Members of Parliament endeavour to undermine the service with views that do not represent the true voice of the majority of people.'

Michael Meacher MP, who has led the campaign for further information on the deaths, called for a public inquiry into the subject, when he gave evidence on March 24. Such an inquiry should concentrate on the 16 cases where coroners returned open verdicts and on the 20 cases where complaints were made to the Director of Public Prosecutions after a person died in custody.

SCOTLAND: DEATHS IN POLICE CUSTODY

Between 1975 and 1979, 48 people died while in police custody in Scotland, according to figures given by the Solicitor General for Scotland, Nicholas Fairbairn MP, to Labour MPs Michael Meacher and John Maxton. (**Hansard**, 25 January 1980). Twenty seven of these occurred in Strathclyde and 14 in Lothian and Borders. The figures compare with 156 people who died in an almost identical period in England and Wales, yet the population of Scotland is only one tenth of that of England and Wales.

According to the death certificates, 25 of the 48 deaths were due to causes which were not natural and all but one of these non-natural deaths is reported by the Scottish Office to have involved the effects of excessive consumption of drugs or alcohol or both. (**Sunday Times**, 27.1.80).

The Scottish deaths will not however be scrutinised by any parliamentary select committee. The Select Committee on Home Affairs which has been studying deaths in custody is restricted to consideration of England and Wales. The chairman of the Select Committee on Scottish Affairs, Donald Dewar MP, told the Scottish Council for Civil Liberties that because of pressure of business it would not be practicable for the committee to mount an inquiry at present, although the position may change if the Select Committee is permitted by the government to set up sub-committees.

HOW NATO FUNDS A PRESS SERVICE

Further information has come to light on the sources of finance of the Labour and Trade Union Press Service (LTUPS) of the Labour Committee for Transatlantic Understanding (LCTU). (The background of the Press Service was described at length in Bulletin No 16).

State Research was told by former US Labour Attache Joseph Godson, regarded as the key figure in LTUPS, that it was financed by 'trade unions and foundations', which he would not specify. This is not the whole truth. The **Sunday Times** (17.2.80) said that Nato sources in Brussels 'reluctantly admitted that they had given "a few hundred pounds"' to LTUPS. One of the former editors of the Press Service, former Labour MP Alan Lee Williams, told the **Sunday Times** that the bulk of the committee's funds, £5,000 per year, came from Nato. Neither of these remarks turned out to be completely true.

Answering a Parliamentary question from Stan Newens MP (Lab Co-op,

Harlow) on February 26, 1980, Foreign Office minister Douglas Hurd admitted that Nato had provided LTUPS with a total of £32,315 between 1976 and 1980, the lowest sum in any year being £6,000. Mr Hurd also admitted that the British Atlantic Youth section of the British Atlantic Committee, had received £6,200 over the same period; that the British Atlantic Committee itself had received £655 for a conference in 1979, and that The European Atlantic Movement (TEAM), which has been organising Nato propaganda courses in schools, had received £3,000 (See Bulletin No 13).

The difficulty of extracting information about such covert official funding of political and educational projects is illustrated by the fact that Mr Hurd had made no mention of the Nato funding of TEAM when, on July 12, 1979, he admitted in reply to a question from Frank Allaun MP (Labour, Salford East) that the Foreign Office had given it £500. It may well be that, taking refuge behind the wording of Mr Newens' question, which specifically concerned itself with Nato funding of 'political and publicity' organisations in the UK, other money is still being concealed.

The American Federation of Teachers

Further information has also come to light on the international role of the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) and its President, Albert Shanker. In Bulletin 16, we outlined Shanker's prominence in the various right-wing organisations in the United States which have close links with LTUPS and LCTU through Joseph Godson and his son Roy.

Shanker became president of the AFT in 1974, taking over from David Selden, who had opposed the Vietnam war and followed a mandate from the AFT's Conference to back George McGovern in the 1972 US Presidential election. Selden was manouvered out of office in 1974 by Shanker, with the backing of George Meany and other leading members of the AFL-CIO, who were incensed at the

independence of the then AFT line on Vietnam.

Shanker's base within the AFT is its New York branch, the United Federation of Teachers. The UFT supported the white backlash in New York schools in the 60s and 70s, opposing community control of schools, which meant teachers and other school workers, mainly white, coming under the control of black parents. Shanker, and many of those in his AFT 'Progressive Caucus' were also members of Social Democrats, USA. This small but influential group happens to be the American affiliate of the Socialist International, to which the Labour Party is also affiliated. SDUSA numbers several leading US trade unionists among its members and has faithfully followed the State Department line in international affairs. Recently, it was the co-sponsor of a trip to the US by Jonas Savimbi, leader of UNITA, the US and South African backed Angolan organisation. (**Covert Action Information Bulletin No.7, Dec 1979**).

Since Shanker's group took control of the AFT, the union has become internationally active in the AFL-CIO's international programmes. This involvement was so complete by 1977 that Irving Brown, long known as one of the CIA's leading labour movement operators, was invited to address a meeting at the AFT's Annual Convention.

More details of the AFT's international activities under Albert Shanker are in a pamphlet, *The American Federation of Teachers and the CIA*, available from Substitutes United for Better Schools, 343 South Dearborn Street, (Room 1503), Chicago, Illinois 60604, USA. The price is \$2, but £1.50 is a reasonable amount to send.

POLICE CHIEFS PLAN TO RESTRICT MARCHES

The police are mounting concerted pressure to impose new legal restrictions on

marches and crowds. Among their demands are the compulsory prior notification of marches, the power to disperse stationary 'assemblies' and an extension of the Public Order Act 1936 to allow for the banning of meetings as well as processions.

In 1974, following the riots in Red Lion Square during which a Warwick University student, Kevin Gately, received fatal injuries, the Metropolitan Police proposed to Lord Scarman's inquiry that march organisers should be placed under a legal obligation to give seven days' advance notice to the police. In exceptional circumstances, the police would be allowed to waive the seven day requirement in favour of 24 hours notice. But Scarman rejected the call. He termed it a 'largely unnecessary provision' which imposed unreasonable constraints on spontaneous demonstrations. And he emphasised that the police normally know about demonstrations in advance in any case, and that that knowledge was no guarantee of the preservation of order, as Red Lion Square showed.

Nevertheless, since 1978, several local authorities have attempted to bring in similar advance notice provisions through the parliamentary private bill procedure (see Bulletin No 13). This piecemeal approach has lately run into problems, with some authorities being unsuccessful in their attempts.

In December, the newly established House of Commons Home Affairs Select Committee began an inquiry into the general state of public order law (see In Brief, Bulletin No 16). And with the Home Office also conducting its own internal review of the law, the police have seized the opportunity to press once more for the seven day notice provisions which Scarman rejected in 1974.

Police Arguments

The Association of Chief Police Officers, which set up its own public order working party last September, told the select committee in February that advance notice

was necessary both on the grounds that there may be disorder – against which the police must plan – and on grounds of 'public safety and convenience.' In its written submission, ACPO states: 'Today the right to demonstrate is widely exploited and marching is the most chosen form of demonstration adopted by protesters. Irrespective of the peaceful nature of the processions, the numbers involved bring town centres to a halt, business is seriously disrupted and the public bus services thrown out of schedule. In short, a general annoyance is created to the normal process of daily life.'

The Metropolitan police too called for seven days notice in their evidence. But they also demanded that the notice provision should apply to open-air meetings and that organisers should not be allowed to advertise marches or meetings before they had consulted the police. The Metropolitan police evidence calls generally for the law to apply to meetings in the same terms as they want for marches. This would allow the police to impose conditions and apply for bans in the same way as the law now allows for marches.

At present, the machinery for banning marches in London is different from that in the rest of England and Wales. Under both systems, the proposal for a ban originates with the police, but whereas in London it then goes straight to the Home Office, elsewhere it goes first to the local authority, and thence to the Home Office (see background paper in Bulletin No 4). Now ACPO is trying to remove the local authority stage of the procedure. 'The principles are, no doubt, sound in terms of political democracy,' says their evidence, 'but nevertheless can hardly be said to be in keeping with the autonomy of Chief Constables on operational matters.'

The other major police demand is a proposed power to disperse 'assemblies'. By assemblies they have in mind, first, counter-demonstrators to a procession and, second, in Sir David McNee's words, 'any form of assembly not protected by the trade dispute immunity.' Such assemblies

'should be controlled in the same way as other forms of demonstration and it would give police far greater powers in dealing with massed 'picketing' such as Grunwicks'. By redefining mass picketing as 'assemblies' covered by public order as opposed to industrial legislation, the police are therefore seeking major powers over picketing by a sleight of hand.

The form of law covering 'assemblies' advocated by ACPO is one which 'should equate with those provided in the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1978.' They point to the fact that 'assemblies in Northern Ireland have been substantially reduced since the introduction of section 24 of that Act.' The section gives senior police the power to disperse groups of three or more people.

The select committee report is due in April. It will be followed by a Home Office green paper on public order. The content of both documents will be an important test of the influence of the police to control changes in the law.

EEC NATIONS SIGN ANTI-TERRORIST PACT

The nine nations of the EEC have now ratified the European Convention on Terrorism. The signing took place in Dublin in December (**Financial Times**, 5.2.79). The Convention abolishes political motives as a defence for certain crimes, such as hi-jacking, attacks on diplomats, and the taking of hostages, and allows the automatic extradition of those accused of such crimes.

The terms of the Convention became part of British law in October 1978, as the Suppression of Terrorism Act (see Bulletins 4, 5 and 8). Fears were expressed that it could be interpreted to cover other political activity – for example, management detained in an occupied factory could be described as hostages.

The Convention, originally drawn up under the auspices of the 19-nation Council of Europe, ran into problems

because Malta and Ireland refused to ratify it. The latter's refusal stemmed from the clause in the Irish Constitution which prohibits the extradition of its own nationals for political offences. This objection has been overcome by modifying the Convention to allow for the alternative of trial in the country to which the offender has fled, rather than that in which the offence was committed. This arrangement parallels that between the United Kingdom and Ireland in the 1976 Criminal Law Jurisdiction Act, which the Republic has never used.

Collaboration

But the Convention serves as a legal underpinning for the close collaboration at official and agency level between police and security services. Home Secretary William Whitelaw told the Commons in March that he had recently had talks with the French and German interior ministers on the issue (**Times**, 6.3.80).

BGS, the journal of the West German Federal Border Guard, reported at the end of last year that Inspector John Rainsbury, head of the Intelligence Unit of the Immigration Service, based in Harmondsworth, and Chief Immigration Officer Brian Smith, visited Holland and West Germany last year to discuss combating illegal immigration and particularly the problem of forged and stolen travel documents (see Bulletin No.10). A similar visit was paid by Peter O'Toole, head of the Irish Republic's Immigration Office. (**BGS**, February 1979).

BGS also reported that 'from the good contacts between Irish security services and the German Federal Criminal Office (BKA) arose the thought 'to lend' Federal Border Guard helicopters on the occasion of the Pope's visit to Ireland in September last year (**BGS**, 2/1980).

These good contacts have allegedly included the training of an Irish police unit, the Special Anti-Terrorist Task Force, by GSG-9, the anti-terrorist unit of the German Border Guard. The Irish

Police central computer is also said to be linked to the BKA computer in Weisbaden. (*Libération*, Paris, 7.12.79).

IN BRIEF

● **Public Order Ban in Strathclyde:** The Secretary of State for Scotland imposed a ban on processions in Strathclyde Region for one month from 14 March. The ban, under section 3(2) of the Public Order Act 1936, is the first of its kind in Scotland and was granted on an application from Strathclyde Regional Council. This followed advice from Chief Constable Patrick Hamill that he would not be able to prevent serious public disorder occurring if a planned National Front 'Smash the IRA' march and counter demonstration went ahead on 15 March. All marches other than those of an educational, religious, festive or ceremonial nature, customarily held in the region are affected.

Police preparations for any infringements of the ban included the use of a helicopter hired from the Metropolitan Police and a force of 500 police standing by. Fifty eight 'Scottish Loyalists' were arrested and charged with taking part in a disorderly crowd and causing a breach of the peace.

● **Police files:** In his annual report for 1979, the chief constable of Cumbria, Mr

W.T. Cavey, has called for the police to be allowed to maintain computerised records of personal and family details. Such information would enhance the effectiveness of the 'community policing' in which many police forces are increasingly engaged, he claims. But Mr Cavey, who has recently retired as chief constable, admits that his proposal is likely to attract 'substantial opposition'.

● **Police costs:** Devon and Cornwall chief constable Mr John Alderson has revealed that the visit of South African Barbarians rugby team to Exeter and Camborne in October 1979 cost the public about £20,000. He told the Police Authority Finance Committee in February that there were about 150 policemen on duty in Exeter and nearly 200 at Camborne, and that much of the £20,000 had been paid out in overtime.

● **Spy cameras:** Local government workers at County Hall, headquarters of the Greater London Council, have called for the GLC to stop the use of Council property by the police for filming demonstrations. The demand is made in the February edition of their union branch magazine, *GLC Nalgo News*, which printed pictures of a plain clothes police unit on top of a County Hall building filming a demonstration by the Inner London Teachers Association against cuts in the ILEA budget.

THE COLD WARRIORS

BACKGROUND PAPER

Is there a new Cold War? Or is the present level of international tension simply a return to normal after an atypical period of detente? This background paper examines evidence from Asia, one of the

theatres of major western success and of Cold War excess which is contributing more than its share to the rebuilding of Cold War anti-Communism.

Western media have distorted the situation in the Middle East (in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and Turkey, particularly in regard to Soviet intentions) and western propaganda about the overall East-West strategic balance allowed a major escalation of Nato nuclear

capabilities to be slipped through the December Nato summit without any substantial debate. This, together with the apparent Chinese alignment with the west against the Soviet Union, suggests that the Cold War is not just rhetoric. The Soviet Union is ringed by new threats arising from instability on its borders and from western escalation and assertiveness. What is in doubt is whether recent developments are entirely new. Nixon and Kissinger needed detente with the Soviet Union and a new opening towards China in order to settle the war in Vietnam. Having achieved this, the US is now returning to the traditional tight encirclement of Soviet borders. Starting in the East, US and Western policy has been to encourage first Sino-Soviet and later Sino-Vietnamese border confrontation; to thoroughly misrepresent recent events in Afghanistan as an alleged threat to the Middle East in general from Soviet expansion; and to escalate Nato nuclear weaponry aimed at the Soviet Union from both western Europe and north America. Similar major rounds of encirclement, immediately after the Russian revolution and World War I, and after World War II, were both accompanied by 'red scares' in the west which treated criticism of western policy at home or abroad as an extension of Soviet 'subversion' or as 'Communism'. It is not yet clear how far the present round of western pressure on the Soviet Union will likewise be used against domestic opposition in the west, but the precedents are not encouraging. Anti-Communism abroad has usually meant anti-socialism at home.

Resistance 1970

Ten years ago, while Prince Sihanouk was out of Cambodia, his defence minister, Lon Nol, led a pro-United States coup. The US Air Force had then been secretly and illegally bombing alleged Vietnamese headquarters in Cambodia for a year, without conspicuous effect on the war. After the coup, US and Saigon forces invaded hitherto neutral Cambodia in

violation of the US constitution's requirement that war be declared by Congress. President Nixon and Henry Kissinger, who made this decision with the advice and support of Britain's Sir Robert Thompson, claimed then, and still claim, that the invasion of Cambodia was a success. It was, they say, essential to the Nixon Doctrine – the withdrawal of US troops from Indochina and their replacement by US-backed Asian troops whose casualties would not threaten continued US involvement in the war. The coup and invasion in Cambodia enraged the international anti-war and student movements. In the United States, state governors called out the National Guard to pacify campuses in revolt, and at Kent State University and Jackson Community College these troops killed students in the process. The killings further incited resistance to the widening of the war in Indochina.

In response to the anti-war upsurge at home, the White House produced the Huston Plan for 'domestic intelligence gathering': 'the President approved the use of illegal wiretapping, illegal break-ins and illegal mail covers . . . (despite being) fully advised of the illegality' (**Senate Watergate Report**, Dell, New York, 1974, vol 1 p54).

These points are recalled here for two reasons. First, they serve to illustrate the apparent transformation of the public mood in the US, and perhaps throughout the west, over the decade. The thorough-going and soundly-based distrust of the Nixon-Kissinger regime has been converted into broad support for, or at least acquiescence in, recent Carter-Brzezinski-Vance-Brown foreign policy. The mood has changed, but the policy hasn't – there have been no major changes in US intentions or personnel. The way this change of mood was engineered raises important questions about the manipulability of both western public opinion and western democratic processes.

The national security managers of 1970 still run US foreign policy. Their legitimacy depends very much upon the popular understanding of events in Indochina since

1970, and this has yet to be settled. Kissinger has certainly been damaged by William Shawcross' book on the US destruction of Cambodia, **Sideshow** (reviewed in Bulletin No 13, and now in paperback). Kissinger is still at the centre of US foreign policy-making with a base at Georgetown University's Centre for Strategic and International Studies and executive role at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) on the Bilderberg Group and the Trilateral Commission; he also chairs the advisory board to the Chase Manhattan Bank, whose chairman David Rockefeller has more say than most in foreign policy, not least as chairman of the CFR. The clear historical record of US destruction of Indochina (and of close British support) is important to the understanding and limitation of the resurgent Cold War, and is hardly getting full and fair coverage in the loyal western media. Media treatment (or neglect) of various aspects of the Watergate investigations, of Trilateralism, of human rights and Carter's foreign policy has made a crucial contribution to the reconstruction of US imperial ideology and to apparent popular support for renewed US global interventionism since 1975. The media build-up of this support through its coverage of the Iranian revolution, of the Vietnamese boat-people, of the Afghanistan crisis (see two excellent articles by Fred Halliday in **New Left Review**, Nos 112 and 119) has a character of which Goebbels would have been proud.

The British

While the United States is still the overwhelming force in the West ('exercising Western leadership'), Britain's important role should not be underestimated particularly when the US needs dirty work done by others. Lord Carrington played an active role in the propaganda war about the Vietnamese boat-people and in the UN conference, and has (somewhat ludicrously) been offering, as if it were his to offer, the neutralisation

of Afghanistan in return for Soviet withdrawal. Throughout the postwar history of Vietnam, that is, since 1945, Britain had a *direct* role. Moreover, events in Indochina during the whole period have come to the British people through a genuinely Western system of news management and distribution in which the British and the US worked closely together. Counter-insurgency 'theory' and practice were worked out cooperatively as British experience in Malaya (for example) was compared with American experience in the Philippines and Vietnam.

In Britain, counter-insurgency theories have been assiduously promoted by the Institute for the Study of Conflict (See Bulletin No 1). This body shares its political position, and much of its leadership, with the Freedom Association – formerly NAFF. Though the grassroots of the organisations approach blimpish absurdity, the leadership is capable of astute media and political interventions.

Despite the organisation's known CIA pedigree, ISC material is still reprinted without question by the western press; (See, for example, **Daily Telegraph**, 25.3.80). The need to rebuild US capacity to intervene in the internal affairs of other countries, either by military or covert means, has been a recent central theme of ISC material (see **The Crisis in US Intelligence**, by David Rees, ISC Report 114).

Margaret Thatcher's election as Tory leader, and the eclipse of those like Edward Heath, who at least in international affairs represent a more 'liberal' position, was certainly aided by NAFF's top-level entryism. In 1980, the Tory Government has stated, as recently as Sir Geoffrey Howe's Budget speech that it will accept Nato policies and increase defence spending by three per cent per year for the next four years (**The Times**, 27.3.80). NAFF is quiet now – but always has the potential for revival if its leaders loose their access to the corridors of power. In 1976-77, it effectively harassed both the Government and the Labour movement.

Sir Gerald Templer, former British Commander in Chief in Malaya, was the Chairman of NAFF; Sir Robert Thompson and Brian Crozier are on the councils of both NAFF and ISC. Both practitioners and chroniclers of counter-insurgency figure largely in ISC circles. Former Defence Intelligence chief Louis Le Bailly, ex-Ambassador to Nato Sir Edward Peck, a former member of the Chiefs of Staff Committee Air Chief Marshal Sir Christopher Foxley-Norris, rub shoulders with academics like Sir Max Beloff, Soviet expert Leonard Schapiro, ex-Professor of War Studies at King's College, London Laurence Martin, and historian of the Malayan emergency Richard Clutterbuck on ISC's council.

Sir Robert Thompson was knighted by the British government in 1965 for his long service to Asian counter-revolution. He had drafted the Briggs Plan for counter-revolution in Malaya. When carried out by Sir Gerald Templer, the only man ever given complete civil and military control of a British colony, this produced what the British Army call, in the manual they use in Northern Ireland, 'the only clearcut success yet achieved in counter-revolutionary operations'. After rising to become Deputy Secretary of Defence for 'independent' Malaya in 1957 and Permanent Secretary for Defence 1959-61, Sir Robert transferred to Vietnam to head the 'British advisory mission' in Saigon, 1961-65. By 1970 he was the only figure who would publicly defend US government policy in the American media. ISC documents show Thompson acting as intermediary between a Chicago industrialist and the ISC in getting \$25-30,000 for an ISC study 'on the development of a winning strategy for the West and the outlines of a program to accomplish the objective of regaining the initiative' immediately after the Americans left Indochina in 1975.

The Americans

At the same time, Thompson's friend George Tanham agreed to head the

Washington Institute for the Study of Conflict, whose original committee included Carter's Assistant for National Security Affairs, Zbigniew Brzezinski (then director of the Trilateral Commission), Admiral John S McCain, who had been commander in chief for the Pacific during the Vietnam war, and Kermit Roosevelt, who organised the 1953 Iranian coup that re-installed the Shah and Robert Komer, President Johnson's pacification chief in Vietnam – whose study of the Malayan 'Emergency' for the RAND Corporation in 1972 was a celebration of Thompson's counter-revolutionary expertise. Komer, President Johnson's ambassadorial appointee to head the pacification programmes in Vietnam, is now US ambassador to Nato.

Two other original members of the Washington Committee of the Institute for the Study of Conflict, Richard Pipes and Frank R. Barnett of the National Strategy Information Center, are key figures in the Committee on the Present Danger, the primary source of scare stories about the alleged Soviet nuclear threat (See Bulletin No 16, Labour's Transatlantic Links, for their influence on the British Labour movement, and Bulletin No 14, New Look for a Cold War, on the Soviet threat).

Henry Kissinger is still at the core of the US foreign policy establishment, as an executive member of the Trilateral Commission, adviser to David Rockefeller, to the Chase Manhattan Bank, and to the Washington Center for Strategic and International Studies – and as the Shah's best friend. Cyrus Vance was Defence Secretary McNamara's deputy during the escalation of the war in Vietnam, Harold Brown the present Defence Secretary was in charge of the air 'war', Bill Bundy who headed the group which planned the escalation of the war for President Kennedy is now editor of **Foreign Affairs**, long the most prestigious western foreign policy journal, a product of the Council on Foreign Relations whose chairman is David Rockefeller and to which all these men belong (see Laurence H. Shoup and William Minter, **Imperial Brain Trust**,

Monthly Review Press, New York and London 1977, on the importance of the CFR). Paul Nitze, also of the Committee on the Present Danger, is a former Navy Secretary.

Vietnam 1945-75

In 1945, the late Lord Mountbatten was the Supreme Allied Commander in South East Asia in the final stages of the war against Japan. Winston Churchill had worked throughout the war to circumvent the US interest in 'anti-colonialism' (otherwise known as opening the colonies to American firms and banks) in the interests of restoring European colonial rights at war's end. This meant preventing independence or even UN trusteeship for Vietnam in favour of re-establishing the French. When the Japanese surrendered following the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs, the Viet Minh briefly took power and declared their independence in the August 1945 Revolution. Mountbatten's South East Asia Command was responsible for taking the Japanese surrender in the south of Vietnam, and the 'British' command used its 20th Indian Division and the surrendered Japanese to put down the Viet Minh from September 1945 until the French returned in sufficient force by early 1946. 'Without the British intervention it is most unlikely that the French could ever have returned to Vietnam . . . And if the French had been forced to assume a moderate position in 1945, would the world have seen the protracted Franco-Viet Minh war of 1945-54 and the American-Vietnamese war of today?' asked George Rosie in **The British in Vietnam** (Panther, 1970).

The French were decisively defeated at Dien Bien Phu in north Vietnam in 1954. A Geneva conference was then in session to work out a settlement of the Korean War, and it turned its attention to Vietnam. The resulting treaty, the Geneva Accords, temporarily divided Vietnam pending elections in 1956 which were universally expected to lead to reunification with a government led by Ho

Chi Minh (but including non-Communists). The US refused to sign the Accords. Senator Joseph McCarthy's attacks on the men who had 'lost China' by advising that the Chinese Communists were a popular and successful national movement were fresh in American minds. The US government, having just covertly organised the overthrow of the Arbenz government in Guatemala, set about creating a permanent regime in the supposedly only temporarily-demarcated south of Vietnam. They imported Ngo Dinh Diem, a Vietnamese Catholic who had been living in the United States, to head the new regime. The elections promised for 1956 were refused because the US knew that the Vietnamese nationalists would never vote for Diem. Diem's regime was buttressed by a CIA counter-insurgency and psychological warfare team led by Colonel Edward G Lansdale which also operated against north Vietnam. Lansdale ensured Diem's survival, for example, against a 1955 uprising in Saigon. Increasing numbers of US military men joined the pro-Diem forces from 1956 onwards.

By 1956 the Diem government was already giving an official figure for its political prisoners of fifteen to twenty thousand, many of them former Resistance fighters. Details are readily available in the 'Pentagon Papers', a history of the US involvement in Vietnam commissioned by Defence Secretary Robert S McNamara in mid-1967 and published in 1971. Western media are now trying to forget or rewrite this 7000 page history (which, even in 1971, only added details and authentic documents to a picture pieced together by the anti-war movement).

The Conservative French writer Bernard Fall estimated a death toll between 1957 and April 1965 of over 150,000 Viet Cong. This death toll under the Diem (and the succession of generals who replaced him after he was deposed by the Americans in 1963) was the cost of the US-created and British-aided regime **before** the massive escalation of the US 'defence' of 'freedom' and western interests beginning in 1965,

when the US claimed to detect the first North Vietnamese battalion in South Vietnam. Diem's 'constructive bloodbath' went unreported in the Western press. (See Chomsky and Herman, **The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism**, Volume 1 of **The Political economy of Human Rights**, reviewed in Bulletin No 16, for the classification of bloodbaths in the Third World according to their importance for US foreign policy and the corresponding differences in the way they are reported – or not). Sir Robert Thompson and Dennis Duncanson were members of the British advisory mission which suggested that Diem introduce 'strategic hamlets' in 1962; and Patrick Honey was friend and advisor to Diem even earlier. All are still respectable British counter-insurgency experts.

The 1964 US election was won by Lyndon Baines Johnson who successfully stood as a peace candidate by portraying Republican candidate Senator Barry Goldwater as the extreme hawk that he was and is. Johnson already planned, before the election, to go ahead with a massive invasion and bombing of Vietnam in defence of the US-created Saigon regime as soon as the pretext was engineered and Congress passed what became the Tonkin Gulf resolution authorizing 'retaliation'. Operation ROLLING THUNDER, the bombing of North Vietnam on a 'firehose' basis, began in February 1965. The full-scale invasion was decided upon in July, after Congress had given the President *unspecified* powers (which were redefined by the war-makers as *unlimited* powers). By early 1968 the failure of the US army, half a million strong, and of the air 'war' (if bombing territory that is not defended by air power can be called war) led to a reassessment. Johnson decided, after the Tet offensive, not to stand for re-election as President, to stop the bombing of the north and to start peace talks in Paris. Richard Nixon was elected in 1968 on his promise to 'bring our boys home'. In 1969 he announced the Nixon Doctrine – replacement of 'our boys' with Asians backed with US aid and firepower

with continuing commitment to indefinite preservation of the Saigon regime. The essential problem, of course, was how to do it.

Detente as a Strategy

There were two major components of the Kissinger-Nixon strategy. One was to offer concessions: to the Soviet Union – 'detente'; and to China an opening to the west, in each case in return for pressure on the north Vietnamese to confine their ambitions to the north. The other was a change of military strategy in the south towards British-style counter-insurgency to smash the PRG.

The US had refused to deal with China at all since the 1949 revolution; contrary to western media presentation of US policy as a reaction to changes in China it was US policy that changed. From 1949 onwards US policy promoted a Sino-Soviet 'split' not least by dealing with the Soviet Union and treating it as if it controlled China as part of the 'Soviet bloc'. Meanwhile the US recognised only Taiwan as the legitimate representative of the Chinese people. US policy of isolating new revolutionary governments (or any which refuse their allotted role in the western-defined international system) has not changed since the Russian revolution. The US did not recognize the Soviet Union until 1933, or China until the late seventies, and has still not recognised Cuba, Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia. All these governments were more than anxious for trade and aid from the west, but each was subjected to a US-led economic blockade. Allende's Chile got the same treatment – plus the Kissinger-organised coup.

China, then, did not 'open to the west' in 1971. For the first time the US had a compelling reason to deal with China – to persuade it to allow the US-Saigon regime to get on with destroying the People's Revolutionary Government in the South. This kind of diplomatic manoeuvre features in the British Army manual on counter revolutionary operations (**Land**

Operations, Vol III, Ministry of Defence, London, 1969).

With the Russians, the same end was pursued. Kissinger and Nixon backed the Strategic Arms Limitation process between them and their Soviet counterparts. They encouraged the West German **Ostpolitik** whereby German boundaries, which had never formally been settled because of the importance of the division of Germany in the history of the Cold War, were finally formalized. (Under West Germany's Hallstein Doctrine, West Germany had not recognised countries which recognised East Germany).

The withdrawal of US troops from Indochina was accompanied by the building of Saigon's airforce into the third largest in the world, and by the Phoenix programme, a vicious assassination campaign against the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) of the south. Phoenix was directed by William Colby, later director of the CIA, and the programme was advised and is still commanded by Sir Robert Thompson.

The peace treaty was not signed in October 1972. Instead, after the election Kissinger launched the terrible last-fling bombing campaign against the North over the 1972-73 festive season. When the treaty was signed in Paris in January 1973, 'fire-hose' bombing was redirected to Cambodia in an illegal assault which was only halted by a deadline imposed by Congress during the Watergate crisis. (This redirection of bombing cannot have improved relations between the Vietnamese and the Khmer Rouge.) The Paris Treaty provided for parallel and equal authorities in South Vietnam, Thieu and the PRG, which were supposed somehow to reach a peaceful political settlement. The problem remained what it had been under Diem – **La Monde** reported that Thieu knew he could not compete with the PRG on a political basis: 'If we let things go the population may vote for the Communists, who know how to make propaganda'!

The US government announced that it would disregard every essential provision of the treaty (which encapsulated the NLF

programme of the early sixties). The US were repeating their subversion of the Geneva Accords of 1954, proceeding again to try to conquer South Vietnam with the vastly expanded military forces it organized, trained, advised and supplied. 'In a remarkable display of servility, the Free Press misrepresented the new agreement in accordance with the Kissinger-Nixon version, which was diametrically opposed to the text on every crucial point, thus failing to bring out the significance of the US-Thieu subversion of the major elements of the agreement.' This shifted the blame for the failure of the peace and the subsequent victory of the Vietnamese nationalists from the internal collapse of the Thieu regime and the failure of the US subversion of the Paris Agreements to 'North Vietnamese aggression' (See Chomsky and Herman, **After the Cataclysm: Postwar Indochina and the Reconstruction of Imperial Ideology**. Vol II of **The Political Economy of Human Rights**, Spokesman, Nottingham, 1979).

Attack the People

At no time after 1945 did the British, French or Americans find Vietnamese who could rule on their behalf with enough political support to survive against the national movement. This was why US policy of building and then 'defending' the Saigon dictatorships against their people required genocidal policies and forced removal of the people. The British Army's manual on Counter Revolutionary Operations pays serious attention to this problem for counter-revolutionary governments of inadequate political support or apathy. The manual was amplified for the Vietnamese situation in a series of books by Thompson, the head of Britain's official 'advisory mission' in Saigon. One of the things he and the army manual stress is the need to destroy the infrastructure – the actual organization of supply, printing, transport, food and so on in the revolutionay movement – as part of an overall counter revolutionary plan. In

Vietnam the Phoenix programme was but one of the elements advocated by the British. Following the Malayan example, the American programme gave 'dead or alive rewards' – 'specific prize money of \$11,000 for a live VCI and half that for a dead one'.

In Thompson's contribution to a Canadian army symposium on **Regular Armies and Insurgency** (edited by R. Haycock; Croom Helm, London, 1979, £7.95), he told of his proud role in South Vietnam:

'In 1968, just after the Tet Offensive and the implementation of the 'search and destroy' policy, Henry Kissinger was advised that US strategy in Vietnam was misdirected to the extent that a policy of 'clear and hold' was far more efficient than one of 'search and destroy'... Kissinger was also told that if such a course was adopted, within one year one hundred thousand US troops could be withdrawn without jeopardising the situation. As events turned out, in 1971 after such a 'clear and hold' scheme had been in effect, all but about 50,000 Americans had departed Vietnam without causing the situation there to collapse. It is quite clear that a regular force, by securing its own bases, can indirectly impede the infrastructure of an insurgency. However, that infrastructure must be attacked directly. If a guerrilla unit is going to operate it has to have easy sources of supply, food, ammunition, information and recruits, and some organisation has to provide these just like a government provides them for its own forces. It is this organisation that has to be broken.'

During the war Saigon grew from a city of some half million in viable relation to the rice-growing countryside to a city of three and a half million dependent upon rice imported from the United States. The cause of the growth was the policy of forced urbanization made necessary, as Robert Komer (of the Washington committee of the ISC and the chief of the pacification programme) explained,

because it was a 'revolutionary, largely political struggle'. This required that the US 'step up refugee programs deliberately aimed at depriving the VC of a recruiting base' – that the US drive people from the countryside by bombing and 'free-fire zones' in which anything that moved could be destroyed. The end of the war cut swollen Saigon off from its sources of supply of rice and consumer goods.

To justify continuation of the war, ISC-connected propagandists always claimed that the US could not leave without a dreadful bloodbath which would accompany the 'imposition of communist control'. Top CIA analyst Frank Snepp pointed out that the Americans simply fled. They made scant efforts to protect their erstwhile allies and agents, even leaving intact the files which would allow the 'vindictive' Communists to identify Vietnamese who had worked for the CIA, the Phoenix programme and the Thieu repressive apparatus. No doubt many of these people are among the 'boat-people'. Despite this exhibition of US concern, there is no evidence of a postwar bloodbath in Vietnam.

Boat People

Western media selectivity and subservience to western reasons of state was well demonstrated by the reporting of and 'concern' for the Vietnamese 'boat-people', a tale of almost unbelievable cynicism on the part of the media with a prominent role played by Lord Carrington. Western reporting simply ignored the reasons for the exodus and their relation to the developing situation in Indochina, and between China and Indochina. As yet the only serious attempt to chronicle these developments in this country has been made by **Vietnam South East Asia International**, who have held two international consultations of scholars, visitors to Indochina and aid workers. (Reports of these discussions are available from ICDP at 6 Endsleigh Street, London WC1, subscriptions costing £4).

The threat of invasion of Vietnam from both the north (China) and the south (Cambodia), and economic disruption which war and the failure of the 5-year plan brought go a long way to explain the exodus of the 'boat-people'. The invasion threat is related to the US opening towards China, to the internal shift to the right in China, and to the return of Pol Pot to primacy in the Khmer Rouge leadership in early 1977.

The Khmer Rouge in 1977 seems to have purged its cadres of pro-Vietnamese and Sihanoukist cadres; to have embarked on more thorough-going executions, calling upon ethnic Khmer residents in South Vietnam to reassert their Cambodian loyalties, and shelling and invading South Vietnam in quite large units. The Vietnamese stuck to their policy of not publicly arguing with their socialist 'allies' so none of this was reported.

Equally, China was calling for renewed loyalty to China from ethnic Chinese long resident in Vietnam. Vietnam's Chinese produced the bulk of its coal in the North and controlled the trade of Saigon. After Cambodian rejection of Vietnam's February 1978 peace plan – including a proposal for international policing of the border (despite Vietnamese national pride) – the Vietnamese invaded Cambodia. The Chinese retaliatory invasion had western approval.

The West wins the peace

In the south, the Government had not forced the population of artificially-swollen Saigon into agricultural production. The country failed to achieve the necessary level of food production. The problem was exacerbated by the refusal of western aid, the economic blockade, the border war with Cambodia, and the unusually bad weather. Chinese and western radio stations broadcast continual calls to ethnic Chinese to leave; the Vietnamese government nationalised small businesses on a non-racist basis, and many of the Chinese business class left – the boat-people!

The US always argued that 'communist expansion' in Asia had to be stopped in Vietnam because South-East Asia was a row of dominoes and if one fell, so did they all. In fact, as we have seen, Vietnam in 1975 was in no state to expand and was subject to external attack from Cambodia and China – with US encouragement.

The CIA sponsored a coup in Thailand in December 1976. Robert Gene Gately, a CIA officer known to have been stationed in Bangkok in the months leading up to the coup, had been Treasurer of Forum World Features, the London based CIA-front news agency in the late 1960's. Forum's assets were used to create the Institute for the Study of Conflict, and Brian Crozier was head of both organisations (See Bulletin No 1).

The Thai coup solidified the Association of South East Asian Nations. Since 1975, both Vietnam and China seem to have reduced their assistance to revolutionary movements in South East Asia (see **Vietnam South East Asia International** consultations on these matters).

United States policy in Asia follows the precedent of earlier policy towards the USSR and China – promoting and exacerbating splits among socialist countries. Five years after the Vietnamese victory, the long-term strategic concessions made to China by Kissinger in order to settle the war have allowed the US to win the peace in Asia, at least for the present.

An excellent study of US National Security Council planning of the Vietnam war, **Washington Plans an Aggressive War** (Davis Poynter, London, 1972), identified particular war planners with particular policies: to emphasize a fundamental point: The war in Vietnam was the product of individual decisions of identifiable men'.

As we have seen, various of the planners are in important posts in Washington today. Several of them are key hawks in the 'new' Cold War. Their British supporters, at the Institute for the Study of Conflict and elsewhere, are at the core of the official British support for US policies.

REVIEWS & SOURCES

BOOKS

CALLING A TRUCE TO TERROR: The American Response to International Terrorism, by Ernest Evans. Greenwood Press, 180 pp, no price.

HOSTAGE-TAKING, by Ronald D. Crelinsten and Denis Szabo. Lexington Books, 160 pp, £10.50.

POLITICAL TERRORISM AND BUSINESS: The Threat and Response, edited by Yonah Alexander and Robert A. Kilmarx. Praeger, 345 pp, £14.25.

Academic scholarship, like the mass media, has developed of late a vast sub-industry on 'terrorism' which shows no sign of going into recession, since new capital is constantly available. **Calling A Truce to Terror** is mainly a discussion of official US attitudes to 'Terror', underpinned by sundry tables, bibliographies and academic appurtenances. **Hostage-Taking** derives from an international seminar held in Italy in May 1976. It includes contributions from police officials in Italy, Holland and West Germany. **Political Terrorism and Business** is a contribution to 'the stability of our economic system' and offers much advice to business executives and governments.

Such books pour out because they are a contemporary refinement of an established role of the mass media and academic scholarship: engineering political consent. Terrorism is first defined in terms which exclude official violence: only the use of violence by individuals or at most by marginal groups is to be considered as terror. It follows from the definition that the state and its agencies are reassuring protectors of the public, striving courageously to cope with 'terror'. There is

a most valuable discussion of this in **The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism** by Chomsky and Herman, who write: 'This process of thrusting a frightening symbol before the public, and simultaneously assuring them that their government is busily engaged in dealing with the problem, is an example of political action in which "a semblance of reality is created, and facts that do not fit are screened out of it. Conformity and satisfaction with the basic order are the keynotes; and the acting out of what is to be believed is a psychologically effective mode of instilling conviction and fixing patterns of future behaviour"'. (The quotation is from Edelman: **The Symbolic Uses of Politics**.)

Those involved in the mobilisation of opinion in the service of state ideology will increasingly see independent analysts as turning a blind eye to 'terror', which is the other side of their own coin. Ernest Evans publishes a prefatory quotation from President Kennedy's 1961 address at the United Nations, 'Let us call a truce to terror' and uses it as the title of his book. This was the same Kennedy who invaded Cuba, waged secret war in Vietnam without the authorisation of Congress, developed an arsenal of anti-personnel weapons, presided over espionage organisations which planned the assassination of foreign heads of state, and threatened world nuclear war unless his demands were met. But this was not terrorism, by definition.

THE HUMAN RIGHTS HANDBOOK: A Guide to British and American International Human Rights Organisations, compiled by Marguerite Garling for the Writers and Scholars Educational Trust. London: Macmillan Press, 299 pp, £4.95.

This handbook lists, with brief descriptions, voluntary and professional organisations working in the field of human rights from the United Kingdom, the United States and internationally. There are also sections on refugees' organisations, and the text of the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights is reproduced. The UK section was completed in September 1977.

It is notable how many of the organisations listed are concerned exclusively with circumstances in dictatorships and in countries within the Soviet sphere, and how few are involved in examination of abuses initiated by the US or UK governments. There is scarcely a single reference to American Indians or to Ireland.

THE FALCON AND THE SNOWMAN, by Robert Lindsey. London: Jonathan Cape, 358pp, £6.50.

This is the story of Boyce and Lee, two Californian college drop-outs, one with a passion for falconry and the other for dope dealing. They were arrested in January 1977 for selling information to the Soviet Union through its Mexico City embassy. Boyce had obtained a job with an aerospace company, TRW, which gave him access (via cryptographic equipment linked to Central Intelligence Agency headquarters) to a clandestine espionage operation: the ferreting of secrets by satellite from the Soviet Union and China, as well as from nations such as France and Israel. Lee was the courier and salesman.

One discovery which increased Boyce's disenchantment with the CIA was the Agency's deception of the allied Australian government. In 1968 the US and Australian governments signed a secret agreement for the establishment near Alice Springs of CIA bases to control and gather data from spy satellites. Following the election of Gough Whitlam's Labour Government in 1972, the CIA began to limit the information it passed to that government.

Whitlam's withdrawal of troops from Vietnam and his public denunciation of the US bombing of Hanoi in 1973 appeared to confirm the worst fears of the CIA, which poured secret money into the Australian Liberal and National Country parties. When strikes threatened to disrupt the movement of equipment and personnel to the bases, the CIA planned to block the

strikes through its agents who had infiltrated the leadership of Australian unions.

Nevertheless, pressure increased for an explanation of the bases, and Whitlam began making public charges about CIA funding of his opponents. In early November 1975, the Prime Minister confirmed publicly that the CIA had built the facilities, and on November 11, he was scheduled to make another speech about the CIA and the installation when the Governor General, Sir John Kerr (ex-World War II military intelligence) removed him from office.

Lee was sentenced to life imprisonment and Boyce to 40 years, but recently Boyce escaped from jail and disappeared.

PAMPHLETS

Support the Leicester 87! Leicester April 21st Defence Committee, c/o 74 Highcross Street, Leicester. 20p. April 21, 1979 saw a bitter confrontation between police and anti-fascist demonstrators in Leicester, raising once again the question of the price paid for police protection of the National Front's right to march provocatively in immigrant areas. This pamphlet details police tactics against the demonstrators (including deployment of the SPG). Four of the 87 arrested have been jailed and fines imposed average £250. The Campaign concludes that the courts are being used to intimidate anti-fascist demonstrators, and appeals for funds.

The Arms Traders, Campaign Against the Arms Trade, c/o 5 Caledonian Road, London N1. £1.50. A unique and invaluable alphabetical and geographical listing of more than 2,000 military exporters in the UK. It is intended both as a reference work and as a basis for local campaigns. This guide breaks through the secrecy surrounding arms manufacturers by providing information in an easily accessible form. Highly recommended.

Criminal Justice (Scotland) Bill: Analysis and Commentary, Scottish Council for Civil Liberties, 146 Holland Street, Glasgow G2 4NG. A clause-by-clause analysis of the proposed Bill, intended mainly for those with

some knowledge of the law but useful for the campaign against this pernicious legislation. So far public attention has focused on the Bill's legitimisation of existing police practices which endanger civil liberties. The SCCL also draws attention to other areas of concern such as continuation of a trial in the absence of the accused, curtailment of the right to challenge jurors; and the prosecutor's right to appeal against sentence.

Imperialism in the Silicon Age, by A. Sivanandan, Race & Class pamphlet No.8, Institute of Race Relations, 247 Pentonville Road, London N1, 40p. Sivanandan argues that the 'microchip' technological revolution will be based on the super-exploitation of cheap third world' labour which will produce not only profits but money to finance unemployment in the advanced capitalist states. Central to this system will be microelectronic surveillance to facilitate the social control necessary to sustain mass exploitation and unemployment.

Breeders for Race and Nation: Women and Fascism in Britain Today, by Women and Fascism Study Group, Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, Birmingham University, 50p. The authors of this stimulating pamphlet argue that the fight against fascists on the street is not enough: we must analyse the reactionary sexual politics at the heart of fascism. They examine fascist attitudes to women and the family and suggest that the emphasis of the Women's Liberation Movement on cultural resistance and struggle against authoritarianism is a vital part of building a mass campaign to confront the real fears and insecurities that provide the basis for fascism's appeal.

The Rossing File, by Alun Roberts, Namibia Support Committee, 188 North Gower Street, London NW1. 60p. Sub-titled *The Inside Story of Britain's Secret Contract for Namibian Uranium*, this is an excellent, thoroughly researched pamphlet. It shows how the British Government came to sign illegal contracts for 7,500 tons of Namibian uranium mined by Rio Tinto Zinc at Rossing. The pamphlet highlights the roles played by Lord Carrington, Jim Callaghan and Tony Benn and exposes the powerful influence of RTZ and their allies in the Civil Service. A decision to terminate these illegal contracts would have to come from the government and particularly the Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington. A few days after

his Cabinet appointment, Carrington resigned his directorship of a large multinational mining company called Rio Tinto Zinc.

23rd April 1979, a report by Southall Rights, 54 High Street, Southall, Middlesex. 80p. These factual accounts of the experiences of members of Southall Rights provide vivid and detailed background to the tragic events of that day. They demonstrate the colossal misjudgment made by Ealing Council in allowing an NF meeting to be held at the Town Hall, and provide a complete indictment of police tactics in handling the counter demonstration.

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Government

The Mandarins, Tony Benn, *The Guardian*, February 4, 1980. Text of Benn's lecture to the Royal Institute of Public Administration in which he set out his fears about civil service powers.

The Last Redoubt: the state emergency planning network, Duncan Campbell, *Time Out*, March 21, 1980.

Judicial system

Politics and the Judges – The European Perspective, Giuseppe Frederico Mancini, *Modern Law Review*, March-April 1980. Important, mainly Italian, comparisons with John Griffith's book on politics and the British judiciary.

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Arms sales Involve more than the Trade in Weapons, Frank Gregory, ADIU Report, March 1980. The role of British military expertise and arms sales in Iran.

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Emergency Powers Act: Ten Years On, Kevin Boyle, Tom Hadden and Paddy Hillyard, *Fortnight*, December 1979-January 1980.

Important research on Diplock courts and emergency legislation.

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Speak for Yourself, Brian Hilliard, Police Review, March 14, 1980. Profile of Warwickshire constabulary.

The Corps of Royal Military Police, H.L. Wickes, Police Review, February 15, 1980.

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This Sinister Plot to Knock our police, Peter Burden, Police Review, February 29, 1980. Daily Mail's crime correspondent unearths a conspiracy.

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Policing with the People, Doreen May, Police Review, January 25, 1980. Even more about John Alderson.

The Village within the City, Doreen May, Police Review, March 7, 1980. Four community policing experiments in the West Midlands.

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Proceeding in an Orderly Fashion, Alfred

Horobin, Police Review, February 22, 1980. Chief superintendent explains police public order tactics in Derbyshire 1977-79.

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The Anti-union League, Labour Research, March 1980. Detailed analysis of the aims and funding of the Economic League.

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Big Buzby is Watching you/Big brother's many Mansions, Duncan Campbell, New Statesman, February 1, 8, 1980. Seminal articles on phone tapping, surveillance and the security services.

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Every Name To Be Seen On File, Duncan Campbell, New Statesman, March 21, 1980.

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