



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SOUTHERN AFRICA

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This issue has been prepared for us by members of the Southern Africa Commission ('Libertarians Against Apartheid') to give readers a basic knowledge of the facts behind the situation in Southern Africa (and in Guiné in West Africa). These articles are only meant as an introduction and obviously people working on the Southern Africa scene will realise how the white racists, propped up by their allies, dominate Africa, and will grasp the intricate ways in which independent countries (with, of course, exceptions like Tanzania and Zambia) are pressurised into accepting the racist regimes.

We are very grateful to Roy Heath, Janice Bauer, Jackie Bishop, Dave Cronin, Peter Hellyer, Fiona Yardley, and all the other people who have helped.

Southern Africa

SOUTH AFRICA

Douglas Marchant

IN THE MORNING of the 21st March, 1960, a crowd of Africans including women and children gathered around the police station of Sharpeville, an African township near Vereniging in the Province of the Transvaal. They were there as part of a nationwide campaign against the cement of Apartheid: the "pass" laws. This campaign aimed at getting so many Africans, without their Reference Books, outside local police stations that the South African master race would be unable to imprison them, simply because there would not have been enough cells; hence, the breakdown of the "pass" system was foreseen.

However, the master race had a very effective answer to such campaigns and the massacre they perpetrated at Sharpeville was but, in the words of South Africa's Prime Minister of the time, "a periodic phenomenon", or, in other words, an example of the traditional answer to those Africans who had the audacity to campaign for basic political and human rights.

But the world's reaction to the Sharpeville massacre was of another order. The world was so outraged and left in such a state of shock

and horror that the United Nations has named the 21st March as the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.

What happened at Sharpeville was simply this. News spread that a statement concerning the hated "pass" laws was to be made by someone in authority so the Africans patiently waited around. It was all rather gay. Something like a holiday atmosphere. When aircraft flew back and forth over the crowd, young boys took off their hats and waved at them.

An ominous note! At 11.30 a.m. two Saracen Armoured Cars arrived on the scene followed by three more a little later. Then contingents of armed men and Security Branch officers arrived quickly followed by Lt.-Col. Pienaar who took command. This man didn't waste any time. Within fifteen minutes he gave the order "Load five rounds".

It was all over in forty seconds.

Killed: 69 Africans including eight women and ten children. Wounded: 180 Africans including thirty-one women and nineteen children. From the evidence given at the Commission of Enquiry it was clear that well over 70% of the victims were shot in the back and that not one single African was armed.

A number of people believe that the Sharpeville massacre was a "mistake", that some South African policemen had become "panic-stricken" and pulled the triggers of their guns which moved their colleagues to follow suit. Indeed, that Sharpeville was an "aberration" in an otherwise happy and peaceful country.

They do not seem to realise that the establishing of a ruling elite based on race incontrovertibly leads to all other racial groupings being considered as second-class citizens or, more to the point, non-people. A racial elite becomes psychologically equipped to maltreat their fellow human-beings; just because the colour of their skin is different.

The former Bishop of Johannesburg, Ambrose Reeves, in an account of Sharpeville published by the UN Unit on Apartheid, put it this way: "If it had been a white crowd the police would have tried to find out why they were there and what they wanted. Surely their failure to do so was due to the fact that it never occurred to them as custodians of public order either to negotiate with the African leaders or to try to persuade the crowd to disperse. Their attitude was summed up by the statement of Lt.-Col. Pienaar that 'the native mentality does not allow them to gather for a peaceful demonstration. For them to gather means violence'." And so Africans were killed at Sharpeville!

The only unusual features of the Sharpeville massacre were that it just happened to occur during a particularly tense period and a photographer managed to record the event in a way that required no comment. Warwick Robinson's photographs were flashed around the world, but his own newspaper, the *Rand Daily Mail*, didn't dare publish them—a comment in itself!

After it all, were the whites sorry? Before the one-man Government Commission appointed to investigate the shooting, the Butcher of Sharpeville, Pienaar, was asked: "Do you think that you have learned

any useful lesson?" "Well," he replied, "we may get some better equipment."

However, one white was "sorry". During that fateful day in March 1960 a crowd of some 4,000 Africans had gathered outside the police station of Vanderbijlpark about ten miles from Sharpeville and one African had been shot dead. The MP for the Vanderbijlpark division, Dr. Carel de Wet, who later became the South African Ambassador in London, rose in the South African Parliament during that afternoon and declared: "It is a matter of concern to me that *only* one person was killed."

The Government showed no signs of an apologetic disposition. A special law was passed to ensure that the police wouldn't have to pay any money to the victims' families, 1,900 political leaders were detained without trial for about five months, another 20,000 people were detained for control "purposes" and the Minister responsible for "Bantu Administration" (the man who tells the Africans where they are to live and work) declared that race relations in South Africa were better than ever.

Other Massacres

If there are still people who believe that the massacre at Sharpeville was a "mistake", an "aberration", they should reflect on the history of non-violent protest in South Africa—a history so littered with such incidents that one may say that massacres are part and parcel of South African life. Forget for a moment that the protest against the "pass" laws on the 21st March, 1960, also resulted in the death of two Africans and a further 49 wounded at Langa, a thousand miles from Sharpeville, and consider just a fraction of this history.

In 1920 a group of Africans, known as the Israelites, gathered on the Bullhoek Commonage, near Queenstown in the Ciskei, to celebrate the passover. Afterwards they built huts and squatted upon the commonage. The police took objection to this and asked them to move to which they replied in the negative. The police forced them to move by the simple expedient of shooting at them and killing 163 (more than twice the number killed at Sharpeville) Africans and wounding a further 129 while a cinema film was being taken of the event.

A meeting was called in Durban during December 1930, to organise a protest against the "pass" laws. At the meeting the Africans decided to collect all their "passes" together, put them in a bag, march through the town with it at the head and then burn it. The police had other ideas, and broke into the meeting and killed four Africans and wounded a further 20. They even shot the main speaker while he was appealing to the audience not to offer violence to the police invaders.

Space doesn't allow for mention of the number of Africans killed during the ANC Anti-Pass Campaign of 1919, the 80,000 Rand Miners' Strike and the Port Elizabeth African Workers' Strike in 1920, the Bondelswart bombings of 1922, the Durban Beer Boycott of 1929, the Durban and Potchefstroom incidents during the ANC 1930 Anti-Pass Campaign, Worcester in 1930, Vereeniging location in 1938, Rand

Mineworkers' Strike in 1946, Johannesburg May Day Rallies in 1950, Zeerust, Sekhukhuniland, Witzieshock and Great Marico in 1957 and 1958 and only too many other examples since Mahatma Gandhi's Indian Passive Resistance Campaign of 1906—a campaign that set South Africa's oppressed peoples on a course of non-violent protest that continued unabated for fifty-six years.

This doesn't of course mean that massacres were unknown before 1906. In his book *Travels and Researches in South Africa*, which was published in 1858, David Livingstone said: "When they (the Afrikaners) receive reports from disaffected or envious natives (Africans) against any tribe, the case assumes all the appearance and proportions of a regular insurrection. Severe measures then appear to the most mildly disposed among them as imperatively called for, and however bloody the massacre that follows, no qualms of conscience ensue: it is a dire necessity for the sake of peace."

However, Livingstone does here provide the clue to the question "Why has non-violent protest failed in South Africa?" Gandhi once wrote that "Non-violence laughs at the might of the tyrant. . . . The might of the tyrant recoils upon himself when it meets with no response" but that can only happen if the tyrant is capable of "qualms of conscience"—an abstract quality that Livingstone recognised didn't exist in the make-up of the white tyrant of 1858 and what evidence is there for believing it to exist today?

Indeed, rather than "recoil", the white tyrant has increased his tyranny after each non-violent protest campaign. The Defiance of Unjust Laws Campaign of 1952 led to the Criminal Law Amendment Act No. 8, of 1953 which provided that:

"Whenever any person is convicted of an offence which is proved to have been committed by way of protest or in support of any campaign against any law or in support of any campaign for the repeal or modification of any law or the variation or limitation of the application or administration of any law, the court convicting him may, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any other law contained, sentence him to:

- (a) a fine not exceeding three hundred pounds; or
- (b) imprisonment for a period not exceeding three years; or
- (c) a whipping not exceeding ten strokes; or
- (d) both such fine and such imprisonment; or
- (e) both such fine and such whipping; or
- (f) both such imprisonment and such a whipping."

History

Apartheid arrived early in South Africa. Within a decade of the first Dutch arriving in 1652 slaves were ministering to their needs and from then to the present day, the Dutch mind, with its Calvinist doctrine of predestination, held to the Dutch Reform Church's idea that the African was cursed by God to be a "hewer of wood and drawer of water". The various developments in other parts of the world hardly produced a ripple in this backwater. The French Revolution, the abolition of the slave trade, the wars between France, Spain and

England, the American War of Independence; all these passed by without a moment's thought except for the Napoleonic wars which resulted in the Cape passing from Dutch to British control.

The British were a little more liberal than the Afrikaners, probably as a result of arriving later. The reasoning power of the Dutch or Afrikaner mind was greatly perplexed by the British attitude towards colour. In fact it was too much to endure. To be "placed on an equal footing with Christians, contrary to the laws of God and the natural distinctions of race and colour . . . intolerable for Christians to bow down beneath such a yoke" (Anna Steenkamp—1876). And so they started moving into the interior to get away from the British and their missionary societies and abolitionist movements.

History becomes very complicated at this point, but essentially what happened was that the Afrikaners drove the Africans back and enslaved many of them, but the Afrikaners were quickly followed by the British who contested the Afrikaners' claim to lord it over all he saw. Many wars occurred between all three groups until the British won the South African War of 1899-1902.

But the British, who had shown themselves to promise a better future for the Africans and had actually won the war, did a volte-face and confirmed the exalted position of the whites by giving the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony complete self-government in 1906-7 and by giving the whole country complete independence before the First World War (Union of South Africa Act, 1910) without any extension of the suffrage to non-whites. This they did despite the Africans' petitions requesting, as British subjects, "rights to liberty, freedom and equality" and protesting against racist laws such as the one that made it illegal for them to walk on the pavement. Even warnings from liberal whites were ignored. The Cape Liberal Leader, J. W. Sauer, told the British Government in 1908 that there could not be "fair" or "just" government in South Africa "unless they (the Africans) are represented by their elected representatives". But the imperial hands were washed with the words: "a self-governing state has the right to go to the devil in its own way" (Liberal Colonial Secretary, Lord Elgin). And so Britain gave independence to a white minority with the right to decide who or who should not have the vote and how the country should economically, politically and socially, develop.

Apartheid

Today, one can only make sense of South Africa in terms of a slave state. In 1950 the then Prime Minister of South Africa, Dr. Malan, declared that the country's "whole economic structure is to a large extent based on slave labour" and that admission holds true to the present day. The whites live in the lap of luxury while all others have no vote, they cannot choose their place of work, they are denied entry into skilled jobs, they are segregated into ghettos according to their "official" racial grouping, they are restricted from owning land, they may not live where they wished to, they may be searched in the streets, at home or at their place of work without a search warrant, they can be

arrested without trial and held in solitary confinement for ever without any appearance before any Court of Law, they cannot attend any of the leading universities and they can be deported, banned, banished or house-arrested without trial. In fact the only right that the non-white majority may still enjoy with that of the white minority is the use of isolated telephone kiosks.

But let us look at Apartheid in greater detail. Unfortunately, the last census was carried out as long ago as 1960, but the latest population estimates, based on samples and projections, are:

Whites:	3,563,000	Asians:	561,000
Coloureds:	1,859,000	Africans:	12,750,000
Total: 18,733,000 (mid-1967)			

Education

The enrolment at South African universities and university colleges in mid-1968 was: Whites: 66,569; Coloureds: 1,530; Asians: 3,239; and Africans: 3,836.¹ Remembering that the white ruling clique believe that the Africans are only fit to become "hewers of wood and drawers of water" one shouldn't be surprised at this nor at the fact that "While expenditure on education in general had risen (between 1955-56 and 1963-64) in proportion to the net national income, the percentage spent on African schools was decreasing".² After all, it was Dr. Verwoerd (Prime Minister from 1958 to 1966) who declared, when Minister of Bantu Affairs, that "I will reform it (education system for Africans) so that Natives will be taught from childhood to realize that equality with Europeans is not for them" (17.9.53) and that "There is no place for him (the African) in the European community above the level of certain forms of labour . . . it is of no avail for him to receive a training which has as its aims absorption in the European community" (16.6.54).

Employment

The average wage paid in the mining, manufacturing and electricity sectors of the economy, according to the South African Bureau of Statistics (August, 1967), are:

Whites:	£123 10s. a month	Asians:	£25 0s. a month
Coloureds:	£27 10s. a month	Africans:	£17 10s. a month

The South African *Financial Mail* (21.7.67) confirmed the suspected belief that South Africa's whites earned (sic) more than the average worker in Britain. Also, by relating wages to the cost of specific commodities, the *Financial Mail* found that the differences of income between the racial groupings of South Africa became emphasized:

Number of hours to be worked in order to be able to buy

	Whites	Coloureds	Africans
Man's Suit	40 hrs. 40 mins.	166 hrs. 22 mins.	238 hrs. 8 mins.
1 qt. Milk	7 mins.	28 mins.	40 mins.
1 doz. Eggs	16 mins.	1 hr. 4 mins.	1 hr. 31 mins.

But what does all this mean, really mean to the African? Well! If we forget the cost of clothing, rent, light, fuel, fares and washing and consider just the cost of food. A *minimum* diet sheet drawn up by the official Dietetics and Home Economics Section of the South African

Department of Agricultural Technical Services estimated that £2 2s. 6d. a month is required for each person—a few shillings more than the *maximum* African pension. Of course, for the white it means that his own standard of living goes higher and higher as he climbs even higher on to the back of the African. Verwoerd put it this way: "White South Africa will have two industrial legs, the one being the white industry in the white interior and the second the industries owned by white people and employing Bantu labour coming from the Bantu areas, because those industries are in the border areas. The majority of the workers can be absorbed there *in the services of the white people*" (29.6.59).

Housing and Land

In terms of the Natives Land Act 1913, certain areas became scheduled as Native Reserves—a mere 7.3% of the total land area, but let no one say that things haven't improved in South Africa. In 1936 the South African Parliament passed the Native Trust and Land Act which increased the African's share to 13.7%. However, by the end of 1968, the whites had still to give the Africans 4,358 square miles to fulfil the promise made in 1936.

And when, if ever, the final share-out is completed the whites, who at the moment constitute 19% of the total population, will be in possession of 87.3% of the country. And who can doubt that the whites will be in, as they are now, 100% control of the country when one considers the first Bantu National Unit established as an independent entity—the Transkei. A rather odd independent state for all its laws must be agreed to by the South African State President who is of course a white appointed by whites who are elected by whites. Its Parliament has no power over communications, currency, customs, defence, foreign affairs, immigration and the police even though a majority (64) of the Parliament's "decision-makers" (total 109) are appointed, and can be sacked, by the whites. And on top of all that, whenever a General Election takes place in the Transkei, the whites ensure that the Africans toe-the-line by laying down severe penalties for "statements disrespectful to Chiefs", i.e. the 64 puppets, banning all meetings of over ten people and throwing anyone they like into indefinite detention.

Housing or rather the rows upon rows of one-roomed huts with rows upon rows of lavatories which pass as houses, the transit camps and the shanty towns are too vast a subject to tackle here. Let one quote suffice: "Director of Bantu Affairs at Welkom, Mr. Phil Smit, said today that his department had reduced the number of Africans licensed to sleep with their wives from 1,000 in 1962 to 117 at the end of June this year 'despite an acute shortage of housing'" (*Johannesburg Star*, 28th July, 1965).

Health

According to the *Statistical Yearbook of South Africa* the death rate per 100,000 of population in 1965 of Kwashiorkor (a disease caused by malnutrition) was: White 0.3, Asian 5.0, Coloured 42.3, African 99.6. Because of such a statistical fact, the life expectancy at birth has been estimated by the South African Minister of Planning on 26th May,

1967, as: Europeans (male) 64.6 years, (female) 70.1 years; Asians (male) 55.8 years, (female) 54.8 years; Coloureds (male) 44.8 years, (female) 47.8 years. No information for Africans was available. However, the Infant Mortality rate in Port Elizabeth for 1967 is known; it was (per 1,000) White 13.69, African, 269.18. If we applied this figure to the whole country we come upon a staggering conclusion. If Apartheid did not exist, the Africans would be well fed and would get good medical treatment—after all, South Africa is the richest country in the whole continent. So the African Infant Mortality rate would drop to nearer the present white level. Even if we assume that the African figure would only drop to say 50 per 1,000 it would mean that this year, Apartheid will cost the lives of nearly one hundred thousand African babies alone and at the barest minimum, in South Africa since the Sharpeville massacre *one million non-white babies and children have been killed by malnutrition, disease and poor hospital facilities caused by South Africa's race policies.*

Recreation and Censorship

All films, plays, music festivals, art shows, operatic performances, ballets and all sporting events are segregated. Each racial grouping has its own separate organisation with of course the whites' organisations getting the favoured treatment in grounds, facilities and equipment. One thing that does apply equally to white, brown and black is censorship. During the past 13 years at the very least 13,000 publications have been banned—an average of 1,000 a year. Books aren't the only thing subject to bans. Magazines, newspapers, postcards, calendars, films, plays, paintings, records, posters and sculptures—none of these are missed. Not even the Springboks' favourite—the record *Why Was He Born So Beautiful?* and other rugby songs by the Jock Strap Ensemble.

Nazis in Power

When in 1948 the nations of the world, sickened by the foul philosophies of Adolf Hitler, adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in an attempt to make the world a better place to live in, South Africa cried "Not of us!" and today anyone who attempts to distribute the Declaration in South Africa would be courting the death penalty. South Africa doesn't take care of around 47% of the world's executions for nothing.

There is nothing surprising about this. South Africa now has a Prime Minister who was imprisoned in 1942 by the South African government of the day for pro-Nazi activities. Balthazar Johannes Vorster was a general in the Ossewewa Brandwag, an organisation that busied itself during the Second World War by dynamiting post offices and railway lines in South Africa in order to hamper the country's war effort. Asked what the OB stood for Vorster replied: "Christian Nationalism which is an ally of National Socialism. . . . You can call this anti-democratic principle dictatorship if you wish. In Italy it is called Fascism, in Germany German National Socialism, and in South Africa Christian Nationalism."

Is there any wonder that the two African political organisations, the African National Congress and its offshoot, the Pan-Africanist

Congress, are now, after attempting to change things by peaceful means, organising for the violent overthrow of the regime?

But they are prevented by the West bolstering up the regime by means of trade, investment and other ties. For example, the missile-tracking station near Pelindaba is operated by the regime on behalf of the United States of America.

Britain also helps to bolster up the regime. We have £1,200,000,000 invested in South Africa. General Electric Company and English Electric are interested in the Cabora Bassa Dam project in Mozambique which will, if ever completed, assist the South African regime in strengthening its stronghold over the Africans. Small arms and ammunition are being produced by three factories set up in South Africa in 1962 by African Explosive and Chemical Industries Ltd., a firm jointly owned by Anglo-American Corporation's subsidiary De Beers and the British Imperial Chemical Industries.

Not so long ago, the British Ambassador to South Africa declared that Britain held the major share of the South African market "and we shall do our damndest to keep it".

And what the damndest are we doing about it?

References

- ¹*Apartheid: Its Effects on Education, Science, Culture and Information*, published by UNESCO, 1967, at 8/-.
 - ²*A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa*, 1968, published by the South African Institute of Race Relations at a little over £1.
- Both these books are full of information and are highly recommended for further study.

ZIMBABWE (RHODESIA)

Richard Jannaway

THERE IS A GREAT CLOUD of war rising over Southern Africa. Right in the middle is the breakaway British colony of Rhodesia. This article is an attempt to assess the situation there and put it in perspective.

Part 1 — History

The lands which now form the country of Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) have been the scene of a civilisation which is many centuries old. The Portuguese explorers of the 15th century brought back stories of a vast and powerful empire whose rulers were fabulously wealthy. This empire was centered on the temple fortress of Zimbabwe, the ruins of which stand today. The walls are made of perfectly squared blocks of granite laid with great skill and artistry. Scientific tests have proved them to have been built between AD 500 and AD 700, during Europe's "Dark Ages".

The savage warriors whom Rhodes found when he entered the area in the 1890's had invaded from the south some 80 years before. They had been pushed north by the Zulus, who had in their turn been

displaced by the expanding Boer Republics in the far south. They established themselves by force of arms and became integrated with the former population, rather in the manner of the Saxon invaders of Britain. The white racists of present day Rhodesia do not like to admit the existence of an earlier civilisation but the solid stone proof of the mighty ruins of Zimbabwe stand there for all to see.

The British colony of Rhodesia was founded in 1889 when Cecil Rhodes secured from the British Government a charter giving political powers north of the Limpopo river to the British South Africa Company. This charter he used to exploit Matabeleland and Mashonaland and to push Rhodesia northwards into what is now Zambia. Rhodes had an idealised belief in the British Race and Empire. He had determined to extend South Africa's sphere of interest far into the northern interior of Africa. In a sense then Rhodesia has always been under South African influence and the present military involvement between the two countries is but a continuation of this state of affairs.

The British South Africa Company, after the Africans had been softened up by missionaries and friendly hunters, "bought" the mineral rights in Rhodesia from Lobengula, king of the Matabele tribe, for £100 per month, 1,000 rifles with 10,000 rounds of ammunition, and an armed steamboat to patrol the Zambezi river. Rhodes took the agreement as a right to occupy the country and in 1890 the company moved in with 500 troops and 200 settlers who took land from the Africans to stake out farms for themselves. When the Africans resisted the settlers used force. Within a few years thousands of Africans had been killed and white rule was firmly established in Rhodesia. The British South Africa Company administered the country until 1923 when full internal self-government was given to the settlers.

In 1953 Rhodesia was formed into a federation with what are now Zambia and Malawi. In 1963 the federation broke up and the 1961 Sandys/Whitehead constitution was introduced. This gave the Africans political rights dependent on income and education. In theory this could have led to majority rule, in time, but in practice the government's education policy (see Part 2 below) and their power to alter the income requirements at any time have prevented this from happening.

The City Youth League, established in 1956 and based on Hidare, the African township outside Salisbury, was the first African organisation to declare open hostility to the European system, rather than seek concessions from it. Its first action was to organise a bus boycott which succeeded in getting an increase in fares rescinded. From this successful beginning the Rhodesian ANC developed as a nationwide organisation. The president, Joshua Nkomo, was at first a moderate but later became a militant. The ANC was banned in February 1959 during a state of emergency, it was revived, under various names, several times up to 1962 but was repeatedly banned.

In September 1962 the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), the latest successor to ANC, was banned; but this time they gave up trying to run a public political party and decided to operate

underground. The difficulties of this policy included the frequent arrest of ZAPU leaders. To try to save the movement's executive Nkomo urged the leaders to flee to Dar-es-Salaam. There was a major dispute about this, and about Nkomo's leadership, which resulted in the dividing of ZAPU into two separate organisations; ZAPU, with Nkomo still leader, and ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union) under the leadership of the Rev. Sitole. This split caused splits in the OAU (Organisation of African Unity), some member states supporting each party. When Ian Smith took over the government from the "moderate" Winston Field in April 1964, one of his government's first acts was to attack the nationalist movements and arrest a large number of the leaders and activists of ZANU and ZAPU, including both Nkomo and Sitole. By the end of 1964 about 1,980 Africans had been detained.

Between April 1964 and November 1965, when the Smith Government declared UDI, there were continual comings and goings between London and Salisbury in an effort to reach a settlement for independence. These were all fruitless as the British would not grant independence without a clear move towards majority rule—the one thing which the settlers would not accept. The talks failed and on 11th November, 1965, the Smith Government unilaterally declared Rhodesia to be independent.

Since UDI the Labour Government in Britain has continued to talk with Smith and, through the "Tiger" and then the "Fearless" talks has bent over backwards to reach a settlement on almost any terms which would enable Wilson to save even a little face. Smith, who knew he had the upper hand, refused them all. Meantime Britain waged a sanctions "war" against Rhodesia. However the sanctions always stopped short of anything which could have had any real effect. The Republic of South Africa and Portugal, through her colony Mozambique, stepped in to relieve the effects of sanctions. (The effect of sanctions has been to cause hardship to tobacco farmers and to create a shortage of imported consumer goods; but the chief sufferer has been Zambia whose economy was formerly dependent on Rhodesia.) There has never however been any real possibility of sanctions causing Smith to surrender anything. Over four years after UDI we are now in the position where Rhodesia is even more than ever an appendage of South Africa. Not least because of the development of the guerrilla war (see Part 4 below). This has been further reinforced by the recent declaration of a republic.

Part 2 — The Condition of the African

The settler governments of Rhodesia have never intended the African to be anything more than a second class citizen. Until recently they did not have a theoretical "Apartheid" system, but the practice was little different.

Education is totally segregated, there being a policy of providing mainly primary education for Africans—and this at a price which many cannot afford. The Smith Government proudly claim that there is primary education for 90% of African children, the highest outside South Africa. What they neglect to say is that 75% of these

drop out before they reach the stage of qualifying for secondary education, largely because of the lack of places or their inability to pay the fees. Even the claim above will soon be true no longer as these comparative figures show:—

PRIMARY SCHOOL ENROLMENT

	ZAMBIA	RHODESIA	
1964	378,639	610,268	(In 1969 Rhodesian enrolment
1968	608,893	684,430	FELL to 679,555)
	up 230,254 in 4 yrs	up 74,162	

At the secondary level the difference is even more striking:—

TOTAL SECONDARY SCHOOL ENROLMENT

	ZAMBIA	RHODESIA	
1963	7,050	7,045	The Zambian increase over the period
1968	42,388	16,766	is over three times that of Rhodesia

These figures are the product of the deliberate policy of the Rhodesian Government to restrict the African to a primary education designed to suit him for menial tasks.

The distribution of land in Rhodesia has been manipulated for the benefit of the European from the time of the granting of the royal charter to the British South Africa Company in 1889 to the present day. At first this had no legal basis, but the fact that the need to establish "reserves" for the African to protect him from the settlers was recognised as long ago as 1894 shows how little consideration he got from them. This has been presented as an example of British "progressiveness". In a way it is: it is better to have half your country stolen than all of it.

The major part of the land legislation relevant today was enshrined in the Land Apportionment Act of 1941. This act as amended divides the country into the following areas (January 1970 figures):—

Description	Area (acres)	Use
Tribal Trust land	40,127,600 (41.5%)	Communally owned
African Purchase Area	4,276,700 (4.4%)	Only this land can be used for individual farms
Unreserved land	5,961,900 (6.2%)	
European land	35,661,900 (36.9%)	
National land	10,497,400 (10.9%)	National parks and game reserves
	99.9%	

The Land Tenure Bill now going through the Rhodesian Parliament will re-allocate all the unreserved land to the Europeans. Any Africans owning unreserved land will have it compulsorily purchased and will be evicted as soon as any European wants the land; or even before if his European neighbours object to him.

The significance of these regulations can only be fully appreciated if it is realised that the European land includes the environs of all major towns, most of the best farmland, and those areas along the railways and major roads where commercial development and cash farming are practical. This restriction effectively prevents the African from competing in business with the white man. For example an

African woman must not take her vegetables to market in the European's town. The colourful and useful street market, so common in East Africa, does not exist in Rhodesia. Much of the European land is left unused for future white immigrants. In rural areas tribal groups who have lived for generations in the same area may be summarily evicted. Between 1950 and 1960 110,000 such Africans were expelled from land which although unused by them had been reserved for Europeans. . . . Apartheid?

One of the deliberate results of restricting the land available for Africans is the creation of a pool of cheap labour, for the white farms and for industry which effectively limits the bargaining power of the African for higher pay. This happens even in the industries where the unions are recognised and have legal standing as negotiating bodies. Africans employed in agriculture, the civil service and domestic work (over half of the Africans in employment) fall outside this category: the other half work in industries dominated by white-controlled unions. All this results in wages for Africans which are, on average, one-tenth of those of Europeans. Lack of education and prejudice, including the refusal of the white-dominated unions to accept black apprentices, effectively ban the African from well paid skilled jobs.

Since UDI the Smith Government has introduced a variety of legislation of an "Apartheid" nature, for example they have banned the entry of Africans to private schools and closed those established in European areas for the children of African employees (largely domestic servants). In October 1967 an act was passed allowing segregation in public parks, swimming pools, etc. Most bizarre of all is the 1967 Censorship and Entertainments Act, one clause of which states, "Films showing Europeans and non-Europeans fraternising, shall be banned."

Political and civil rights in Rhodesia are strictly limited. Under the present voting system the right to vote is dependent on educational and income qualifications. Therefore most Africans are excluded from the "A" roll, which elects 50 out of the 65 seats in parliament, because of their poverty and lack of education. A new constitution is in preparation which, after a five-year "preparatory" stage, will divide the country into a "Race Federation" (i.e. Apartheid) state. Under this system there are to be three provincial councils—one White, one Matabele and one Mashona—and a Federal National Parliament which holds all the real political power. People will be entitled to vote for the Federal Parliament according to the income tax they pay, but the vast majority of Africans, although taxed heavily in other ways in relation to their wealth, do not earn enough to pay income tax. The government of course has the power to alter the rate of income tax and in this way can prevent any real African influence.

Apart from electoral representation the people are controlled by a great variety of legislation. For example, under the Emergency Powers Act 1960 a person may be arrested or detained without trial for as long as a state of emergency is in force. There has been a state of emergency in Rhodesia almost continuously since 1964. Other Acts

enable the Government to restrict a person for up to five years, ban public meetings and disperse any gathering of more than three persons. Over this and other repressive Acts the Chief Justice, Sir Robert Tredgold, resigned, saying that the country had become a "police state".

Part 3 — South African Involvement in Rhodesia

The involvement of South Africa in Rhodesia has been considerable since Rhodes first expanded his operations northwards. Industry has always been based on mainly South African companies. The major participant today is the vast Anglo-American De Beers group of companies, one of the largest combines in the world. It controls the major part of the mining and extracting industries and has a large say in real estate, oil, agriculture, chemicals, engineering and most other concerns. Historical and demographic links between Rhodesia and South Africa are strong, more than half the white Rhodesians or their fathers or mothers came from South Africa. These ties are being cemented with ever stronger economic links. There was a trade agreement signed between the two countries in 1964 which resulted in an increase of Rhodesian exports to South Africa of over 45% in the first six months of 1965. This was *before* UDI. Since then South Africa has stepped in to replace the British goods and markets removed by the sanctions policy. The closely integrated company system in Rhodesia, South Africa and, increasingly, Portuguese Africa has enabled Rhodesian businesses to evade sanctions. For example 200,000 gallons of oil are landed every year in Lourenco Marques in Mozambique and openly transported by rail to Rhodesia (*Observer*, 17.3.68).

The projected Cabora Bassa Dam in the Tete province of Mozambique promises to benefit Rhodesia and further cement the economic integration of the "Unholy Alliance" of South Africa, Rhodesia and Portugal. This occurs in three ways: firstly Rhodesia will supply a large proportion of the construction materials for the dam, secondly Rhodesia will receive electric power from the dam which will make her less dependent on power from Kariba on the Zambian border, thirdly the dam will make the River Zambezi navigable right up to the Rhodesian border and thus provide her with an outlet to the sea.

The second arm of the South African and Portuguese involvement in Rhodesia is the military one. As early as 1960 their armies trained together, military missions from both South Africa and the Federation visited Lourenco Marques at the invitation of the Portuguese army command and took part in training involving several units and 2,600 men. Their police forces also co-operate and political refugees from South Africa were always in danger in the Federation.

Since 1967 the South Africans have not only supplied Rhodesia with all the arms she needs, they have sent contingents of security police who operate side by side with the Rhodesians against the ANC/ZAPU guerillas. Reporting on one of the latest incidents in the guerilla war the *Guardian* (23.1.70) stated, "The African nationalists, who are believed to be members of the banned South African party, the African National Congress, have been hunted by South African police and Rhodesian security forces since then. Helicopters and

spotter aircraft have been used and reinforcements have arrived in the area." This gives some idea of the co-operation between South Africa and Rhodesia.

The present ruling party in Rhodesia, the Rhodesian Front is greatly influenced by South African ideas and principles, hence the increase in "Apartheid" terminology and legislation since UDI.

Part 4 — The Guerilla War

A three-week battle began on 13th August, 1967, in the Wankie area of Rhodesia, this was the first phase in a guerilla war which is being waged against the forces of white supremacy in Rhodesia. This battle cost, according to figures released by the Smith regime, the lives of seven Rhodesian troopers and thirty-one ZAPU guerillas. Another nineteen were driven over the border into Botswana and fourteen were captured. The fiction of normality which the Smith Government tried to re-establish after the end of this first battle ceased to be tenable when it became necessary to organize cars entering Rhodesia from Zambia after dark into convoys of six. The guerilla movements changed their tactics after the original skirmish and there have been no more major battles with large numbers of fighters, they are however still very much active.

To ascertain exactly what is happening is impossible but if we look at the reports which we have from the Rhodesian press and compare these with the stated objectives of ZAPU we can get some idea of the situation (ZANU claim they have a similar policy but I have seen no reports of them actually doing anything).

The liberation movements state that their policy at the present time is not to engage the forces of white supremacy directly but to give people hope by contacting them, explaining their programme, circulating nationalist newspapers, involving them in various resistance activities, recruitment, and so on. Also they attack some specific objectives, mainly by sabotage. This would explain why there have been no more battles like the one in Wankie.

An example of a partially successful operation was published in the *Rhodesian Herald* (27.3.68). A party of six Africans had set up camp in northern Matabeleland and built a well camouflaged base with a series of seven dug-outs with roofs of branches. Their leader and one other member were arrested at an early stage without the group as a whole being detected. They set about a programme of education and recruitment amongst the local population and obtained food and other supplies, all without being given away to the authorities. This group was only discovered by accident.

Another example is of a lone guerilla who was detached from his group and lived in his village quite openly, he was only picked up because of a routine police raid (*Rhodesian Herald*, 27.3.68). In both these examples many people knew about these activities but said nothing about it. There must be many other successful cases but of course we can only hear of the failures.

Reports of attacks like the one in Victoria Falls airport last January indicate that the war is still very much on and is spreading

under the surface of comparative calm. It only seems a matter of time before it erupts into more general warfare, as has happened in Mozambique where the liberation movement (FRELIMO) claims to control over a fifth of the country and is holding down over 70,000 Portuguese troops and several battalions of South Africans. South Africa and Rhodesia cannot really be separated and the resources of South Africa are vast so it is a fallacy to believe that they will be easily defeated. It is liable to be a long and bloody war, as bad if not worse than anything in Vietnam. The Africans see no alternative. Is there one?

Many people, while supporting political rights and majority rule for Africans, withdraw this support as soon as violence begins. The violence is something that has grown out of the colonial situation and must be looked at in that context. The power of the settlers was established by violence and is maintained by violence. Not only have the settlers met every political pressure from the African with violence but there is the ordinary, everyday, violence of the master/servant relationship on the farms and in the mines and the psychological violence of segregation and second class everything. It is a wonder that there has not been more uncontrolled violence from the African.

Colonial settlers are not by the nature of their position as masters of exploited servants, the most enlightened and selfless of people. The violence inherent in their situation prevents them from being so. Those people at the lower end of the white scale of employment would have a position in a western country far inferior, in status as well as money, to the one they now enjoy in Rhodesia. They are naturally not keen to lose this status, as they will surely do if the Africans attain equal opportunity through self-government. If the Africans look like getting anywhere the settlers will elect a government who will be prepared to preserve their "way of life" at any cost. They either shut their eyes to the suffering and deprivation of the African or they rationalise by persuading themselves that the African is only half human and does not feel in the same way that they do.

The very nature of the colonial system brutalises both sides. Violence lies at its very core and violence is the only way out that the African can see.

Libertarians will say that violent revolution solves little and only replaces one set of masters with another. This is true but it is doubtful if the revolutionary leaders would disregard the interests of the majority to the same extent as the settlers. Without a real concern for the people they will not be able to inspire the support needed to carry through a revolution.

Violent revolution is already under way in other parts of Southern Africa, if it spreads to Rhodesia and South Africa it will mean death and deprivation for many thousands, black and white. The responsibility lies not with the Africans but with the colonial system. ALL of us in Europe benefit from this system and are thus implicated in it. It is up to us to ensure that the Africans attain power with the minimum of bloodshed and suffering, for attain power they will, eventually. We

can and must do something.

We must do our utmost to put pressure on those economic concerns in this country who support the system in Southern Africa and prevent them from bolstering it up. Barclays Bank DCO are one of the worst offenders. Any other action, like disrupting South African sports can help destroy the confidence of the racists.

Where the war has developed into a widespread conflict, as it has in the Portuguese colonies, the liberation movements desperately need all the medical and material aid they can get to save the people from suffering and to reconstruct those parts of the countries which they control. We must not judge the Africans, all we can do is help them to get it over with.

MOZAMBIQUE: THE ACHILLES HEEL

Simon Hebditch

MOZAMBIQUE IS AN AFRICAN COUNTRY which is at present occupied by the Portuguese. It is a country with considerable agricultural and mineral assets. If the economy was geared to the benefit of the inhabitants of Mozambique, every Mozambican would have a high standard of living. However, the method by which the Portuguese government has organised the economy brings increased prosperity only to an elite of Portuguese business men.

The Portuguese have had contact with Mozambique since 1498. For many years they confined their interest to forcibly replacing the Arab traders on the coast and dominating the trade in slaves, ivory and precious metals. Systematic colonisation of Mozambique took place during the late 19th century in the general European "scramble for Africa". Portuguese administration has always been centralised and authoritarian and they used the traditional position of "chiefs" to communicate their orders to the African population. In 1951 the Portuguese introduced legislation to transform the colonies of Mozambique, Angola and Guiné Bissau into provinces of metropolitan Portugal. This enabled the Portuguese government to create a myth that Portugal had no colonies, only provinces. Needless to say, the methods of administration and control did not change. At the beginning of the colonisation period the whole country was divided into three vast regions and administered by three large companies, but this system was soon penetrated by other foreign companies who now exploit the people of Mozambique. There have been numerous examples of the use of forced labour and forced cultivation, despite the fact that forced labour appears to be illegal according to the Native Labour Act of 1928. This Act and the Constitution of Portugal left significant loop-

holes. The following is a quotation from Article 146 of the Constitution:—

“The State cannot force natives to work except on public works in the general interest.”

This general interest was interpreted to mean anything which was in the interest of the concessionary companies.

The method of forced cultivation was less obvious. The companies obtained their way by stipulating what crops should be grown by the local inhabitants. These crops were not for subsistence, but were cash crops which would have to be sold to the companies.

Owing to a sparse growth of international and internal pressures, the Portuguese were forced to introduce certain “reforms” over the years 1960/62. However, these reforms were more apparent than real, and actual conditions did not change. Forced labour and cultivation are still in practice and it is instructive to note some comments of the new United Nations Special Committee on Territories under Portuguese Administration:—

“It appears to the Committee that although forced labour as an institution sanctioned by the Government has been abolished, practices associated with the institution of forced labour continue to exist.”

The Mueda Massacre

When the people protested against such oppression their protests were met with violence. In June 1960, for example, a delegation from the people met with the administrator of Mueda to discuss the people's grievances. The administrator and the governor of Cabo Delgado invited the people to meet at the Mueda administrative headquarters on the 16th June that year. By 3 p.m. hundreds of people had assembled and the governor spoke to them repeating the dogged themes of the benefits of the Portuguese so-called “civilising mission”; that once they reached the required level of development, they would have the “honour” of becoming Portuguese citizens, etc., and when he discovered that the crowd was not content with these empty words, he fired his pistol in the air and a Portuguese platoon opened fire with machine-guns and grenades. Ten minutes later over 300 Africans had been killed. Needless to add, not one African had been armed.

No wonder the Africans decided that the only way they could free themselves from foreign oppression was to launch a protracted, guerrilla war to expel the Portuguese. FRELIMO (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique) emerged from a unification of a number of nationalist groups in June 1962 and in September of the same year Eduardo Chivambo Mondlane was elected FRELIMO's President. FRELIMO formulated a political programme based on two important decisions. These were (a) that social progress of any sort was impossible under Portuguese administration, and (b) the Mozambicans must liberate themselves by force from Portuguese rule. FRELIMO decided, therefore, on a political education campaign and preparation for military action.

The armed struggle began on September 25th, 1964, with a series of ambushes and other small actions. At this time there were only 250 trained and armed FRELIMO militants. During this early period most of the fighting was concentrated in the northern provinces of Niassa and Cabo Delgado. These provinces are now liberated areas and, in fact one-fifth of Mozambican territory has been freed from Portuguese authority.

Cabora Bassa

In 1968 FRELIMO opened up a new front in Tete province in order to keep its pledge to “harass and destroy all and every phase of the construction that develops in Cabora Bassa”. It is in the Tete province that Cabora Bassa is located and its importance cannot be exaggerated. At the point where the Zambezi river enters a 60-mile-long gorge with steep cliffs on both sides—called Cabora Bassa—it is proposed that a dam be built; a dam which, if ever completed, will enable the whites of Southern Africa as a whole to not only increase their stronghold on the Africans in the areas that they already control, but increase their influence northwards as far as Kenya. To get an idea of the size of the dam, compare its generating capacity with the Kariba Dam (8,000 m.kwh. annually) and the Aswan (10,000 m.kwh. annually). When the Cabora Bassa Dam is completed its generating capacity will be no less than 18,000 m.kwh. annually, and that's not the end. The scheme provides for the construction of subsidiary dams both upstream and downstream from the main dam which will increase the total generating capacity to no less than 45,000 m.kwh. annually. The size of this project can only make sense in terms of a project covering a vast region (Portuguese sources inform us that the region has a radius of almost 1,200 miles, i.e. as far south as South Africa's Cape province and as far north as Kenya) and massive development within the Tete province. Portugal has plans to move 1,000,000 whites from Portugal and Brazil into the area to run the industries brought about as a result of the dam. One million whites, who are prepared to defend their new-found privileges against the legitimate aspirations of the African peoples, would be very welcome by South Africa. Accordingly, two battalions of South African troops are already guarding the site of the dam.

The extent of FRELIMO support and effectiveness can be seen by observing the results of its activities. FRELIMO forces had increased to 8,000 by 1967 from the original 250 men and the Portuguese have been forced to increase their armed forces from 35,000 in 1964 to 70,000 in 1967. The amount of its gross national product devoted to military purposes by Portugal is second only to that of America at 8%. It is necessary to point out the extent of NATO involvement in the fighting on the side of colonialist Portugal. Arms supplied to Portugal for European defence have been used in Mozambique. For example, in 1966 West Germany and Portugal concluded an agreement that involved the supply of 40 Fiat G91 military aircraft. It was stipulated that these were for use within the NATO alliance. A spokesman for

the Portuguese Foreign Ministry, however, said:—

"The transaction was agreed within the spirit of the North Atlantic Pact. It was agreed that the planes would be used only for defensive purposes within Portuguese territory. Portuguese territory extends to Africa—Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guiné."

There is also considerable South African involvement in Mozambique, South African troops are being used to guard and patrol the area designated for the Cabora Bassa Dam.

FRELIMO is not just a military organisation but also a political and social movement. The first Congress, the supreme policy-making body of FRELIMO, was held in 1962, this established FRELIMO as an organisation. The Second Congress, held in 1968, provided a landmark in the freedom struggle. This was because it was held inside the liberated territory of Mozambique. Delegates were able to attend from every area of the country and fully discuss the policy and tactics of the movement. The Portuguese were completely unable to disrupt the Congress as the whole area was firmly controlled by FRELIMO militants. At this Congress there was extension of democratic participation, by the enlargement of the Central Committee to 40 members to include delegates from every province. In addition to the existing departments dealing with specific subjects, a department of co-operatives and trade was set up so as to facilitate the organisation of the economic structure of the liberated zones. Eduardo Mondlane was unanimously re-elected President of FRELIMO.

As in any dynamic movement, FRELIMO has had its fair share of disputes and disagreements. Following the assassination of Mondlane in February 1969 there was a natural drop in FRELIMO morale. The Central Committee decided to institute a three-man collective leadership in the form of a Council of the Presidency. This was an attempt to broaden participation and prevent the creation of an everlasting élite. One of the FRELIMO Provincial Secretaries, Lazaro Kavan-dame, defected to the Portuguese but this was to escape trial because of his attempts to exploit the Mozambican people. There have been disagreements within the Council of the Presidency but FRELIMO morale is now improving and both political and military victories are increasing. Freedom will come to Mozambique as to the other countries in Southern Africa despite the disruptive efforts of some individuals and the activities of the Portuguese secret police to eliminate FRELIMO militants.

In the liberated areas FRELIMO has been building a new society. A new social structure is emerging from the chaos of war. One of the most important elements is the development of agriculture and the people in the free zones have been able to switch to the growth of subsistence crops. When FRELIMO entered a particular area it found that the concessionary company had already left so the way was open for new development and fresh ideas. The people organised themselves into agricultural co-operatives to produce the crops they needed and they were encouraged to produce a surplus so that people who have

been hit by misfortune can still be cared for. The FRELIMO army sets an example by growing its own food wherever this is possible. Not all the people have adopted the co-operative principle, but, if it has not been introduced, they utilise an extra, individual plot for communal purposes. As a result of this reorganisation of agricultural methods, there has been a sizeable increase in the volume of food production, also more land is under cultivation.

Trade is inextricably linked to production and, with the abrupt departure of the European and Asian traders from the liberated areas, FRELIMO had to organise the trading pattern. Market co-operatives were set up and essential tools were imported. In order to help pay for these imports some groundnuts, cashew nuts and oil seeds were exported through Tanzania. Small, local manufacturing industries were established which used immediate material and whatever could be captured from the Portuguese.

For the majority of Africans, education was completely unknown and FRELIMO was faced with the daunting task of starting an educational programme. A primary-school programme has been started and over 10,000 children in Cabo Delgado and 1,000 in Niassa are now being taught basic subjects. These schools are used in the evenings for adult literacy classes and teaching the army. The Mozambique Institute, based on Dar-es-Salaam in Tanzania, provides secondary education for as many Mozambicans as possible.

FRELIMO is also active in the field of health and hygiene. Small medical aid posts have been established in the liberated zones and two groups of trained Rural Medical Aides have returned from Dar-es-Salaam. Over 100,000 people have been inoculated against tuberculosis and also some have been vaccinated against typhoid. When one remembers that the Portuguese never vaccinated anyone, the FRELIMO record is very impressive.

FRELIMO has made great progress over the last few years and Mozambique, being a country of strategic importance, will provide a base for future guerrilla activity against South Africa.

If Mozambique can be freed it can provide a sound jumping off point for the liberation movements of South Africa. It is the weakest link in the chain of defence of white racists in Southern Africa.

ANGOLA

Douglas Marchant

ANGOLA IS A COUNTRY of 481,352 square miles with a population of almost 5,000,000 people, of whom only around 230,000 are Portuguese white settlers. It is one of the richest areas in Africa, with vast oil reserves in Cabinda enclave. There are also very rich iron ore deposits in Central Angola, which is the fourth largest coffee producer in the world, and diamonds account for £14 million of her exports every

year. In fact Angola provides 25% of Metropolitan Portugal's exports, so it is understandable that Portugal does not want to part with this Black Pearl of Southern Africa.

These mainly economic factors inevitably influence Portugal's will to hold Angola at all costs. In the first place South Africa, with its highly modern industrialised economy, lacks a vital mineral—oil. To avoid paying heavily for this she imports from the Portuguese colonies. Some of this oil she obtains from the Mozambique reserves, which are, however, nowhere near as rich as Angola, where she gains the majority of her supply. South African interests in Angolan oil also gives it a very profitable trade balance with Angola. Secondly, the Portuguese expect to double the generating capacity of the Cambambe Dam, which is already one of the largest in Africa, and there are plans for the construction of the £75 million Conene Dam, which envisages the supply of power to SWA and the resettlement of 500,000 whites in a new irrigated area in Southern Angola.

The UK inevitably has large financial interests in Angola, and these ensure a one-sided balance of trade. In 1966 the UK exported £7,835,000 of equipment, mainly transport machinery and engineering goods, but imported only £844,000 of Angolan products, such as coffee and groundnuts. Other big trading partners are the US and West Germany. The USA have large oil interests in Cabinda and, as yet, unsubstantiated reports have been received of Green Berets in action around Cabinda. In 1967 Angola had a trade surplus of £50 million but Portugal itself had a trading deficit. It is obvious that Angola is much too valuable to lose.

Portugal arrived early in Angola, as long ago as 1482, but it wasn't until the end of the last century that the whole country came under Portuguese control. The early 1950s hailed the first stirrings of unrest. News of the political developments in the then British and French colonies began circulating in Angola. The new Africa was beginning to speak and the people of Angola wanted to be part of that voice. Small groups began to meet and to discuss and plan what an independent Angola would be like. Some fifty Angolans sent a manifesto to the Secretariat of the United Nations and a year later the first African political parties were formed—in secret, but the Portuguese discovered this and they didn't like it at all: "Why should these people dream of freedom when we don't allow freedom in Portugal itself." So mass arrests resulted. However, by 1957 hundreds of Africans had joined one or other of these groups—the first crucial steps had been taken. Now, if the Portuguese hadn't been living so far back in the past, a dialogue could have been started which could have led to the situation now existing between Britain and many of her former colonies. But no! The Portuguese not only refused to form a bridge, but did their utmost to destroy the points of contact already in existence.

Arrest followed arrest. Forty-two Africans, three American Negroes and seven white Portuguese were arrested and accused of attempts against "Portuguese national unity". They were to have

been tried in March 1960 (three trials—one for the "whites" and two for the "blacks"—so much for the colour-blindness of the Portuguese), but after a world-wide protest (the lawyer engaged by the International Commission of Jurists was refused permission to leave Metropolitan Portugal to defend the accused) the trials were postponed and later held in secret. Heavy sentences were handed out and there is evidence that at least some of the accused were shot in Luanda jail that November.

Undaunted by the world-wide publicity created by this disgusting episode, the Portuguese secret state police (PIDE) continued their arrests until a climax was reached in June 1960 when fifty-two Africans were arrested. This group included Father Pinto de Andrade, Chancellor of the Roman Catholic Archbishopric of Luanda, and the young Angolan poet, Agostinho Neto.

Neto was one of the very few Africans to overcome all the difficulties involved in becoming an Assimilado and even then it was only as a result of a group of Africans raising a fund that enabled him to study medicine in Metropolitan Portugal.

However, his interest in his people's future brought him imprisonment for a few weeks in 1951. He was arrested again in February 1955. No charge was brought against him, but one shouldn't be surprised at that remembering that South Africa's "ninety-day law" (ninety days detention without trial) was copied from the Portuguese.

In June of the following year an officer of the PIDE arrived at Neto's surgery with a number of men and flogged him in front of his family. He was then taken to jail in Launda.

When the inhabitants of his birthplace, the village of Bengo, came to hear of this they were determined to make a protest and, accordingly, they, with the inhabitants of the nearby village of Icolo, went to their district office in the small town of Catete about sixty miles from Launda.

Who can doubt that this was intended to be a peaceful demonstration when the crowd of about a thousand contained a large number of women and children? The Portuguese, however, were not going to take any chances. Without any warning the military garrison opened fire with sten-guns and killed thirty people and wounded two hundred others.

A mistake! Hardly likely when two hundred soldiers were despatched to the two villages, Bengo and Icolo, the following day and killed or arrested anyone they found and then set fire to all the houses. One is reminded of the fate of Lidice in Nazi Europe.

This, then, is the chain of circumstances that led to the outbreak of fighting in 1961. The people of Angola saw these circumstances and also the economic, social, medical, educational, agricultural and labour situation then existing in Angola as well as events in the other "overseas provinces" of Portugal. They drew the inescapable conclusion that only by taking up the armed struggle would the people of Angola have the chance of obtaining freedom.

Here are a few facts of the situation existing in Angola during 1960. Bringing in a higher revenue than any other product were the

coffee plantations and over four-fifths of them were in the hands of white settlers. More than 100,000 hectares (220,000 acres) of land were reserved for white settlers in the Quanza Valley alone. To make way for white settlers in the Colonato de Cela, more than 14,000 African families had been driven away. Every African over the age of fifteen had to pay a tax—the so-called “native tax”—which often exceeded a quarter of his total income. The setting up of each white settler family was costing the Portuguese one million escudos. To earn this amount an African peasant would have to work continuously for a thousand years. However, the peasant was more than likely to be one of the 250,000 rented out—yes! rented out—to the agricultural, mining and construction concerns. There was one hospital for every 280,000 people, one doctor for every 20,000 people, one nurse and thirty beds for every 10,000 people. Areas larger than Portugal itself were completely without schools and the average wage for the rented labour was making a profit of 1,500 escudos per annum for each African supplied.

As to the events in the other “overseas provinces”. Angola’s Africans saw a history of brutal suppression from the killing of over 1,000 Africans out of a total population of 40,000 in San Tome in February 1953. The arrest of more than two hundred Africans in the Angolan enclave of Cabinda—later they were reported missing—did not go unobserved in Angola either.

No wonder that by the beginning of 1963 tension was near breaking point. In Luanda a curfew was enforced for Africans. A report by an African pastor in January ran, “If an African is found in the street after sunset by the police patrol he is harassed . . . planes fly low so as to create panic amongst Africans . . . censorship is now very strict and I am sending this letter with a friend of mine going to Nigeria.”

The struggle for the freedom of the people of Angola entered the decisive stage of armed revolution with the storming of the Sao Paulo jail in Luanda on February 4. The attack failed, but was renewed the following day. The long-promised massacre of Africans that the Portuguese had promised began. One report states that the Portuguese shot the prisoners in the Sao Paulo jail to the extent that it “still stank like a charnel house” three weeks later.

The events of February 4 was the signal for the little groups of Africans who had been gathering in the northern Angolan forests and the Cabinda enclave during the preceding months to commence a campaign of terror. Within 24 hours there were outbursts of violence in forty places and some 200-300 white settlers were killed.

The Portuguese carried out brutal reprisals. One army officer told a correspondent of the *Daily Mirror* at the time that they had killed 30,000 Africans.

In mid-June the Baptist Missionary Society carefully estimated the number of Africans killed including women and children during the three months as 20,000. The BMS went on to warn of plans for the killing of a further 50,000 men, women and children.

The warning was not an idle one. The Portuguese did have such

plans and they put them into effect. Villages were subjected to napalm attacks and the savannah was set on fire. The elephant grass grows to a height of six feet and in the dry season burns like timber.

The Africans were not prepared for the brutality of the Portuguese, which exceeded any previous reprisals that the Portuguese had made in their other colonies.

Little is known of the conditions, the failures, the successes and the prospects of the war which is now taking place in Angola. To a large extent it has become a stalemate—a war of attrition but it continues nevertheless.

Eighty thousand Portuguese troops with 300,000 white settlers—who even have their vigilante group, the Frente de Unidade Angolana (FUA)—and the able assistance of the PIDE are pitched against almost five million Africans and their liberation movements.

Besides the MPLA there are two others pressing hard on the Portuguese. Holden Roberto’s Angola People’s Union (UPA) which is also called the Angolan Exiled Revolutionary Government (GRAE). The other is Unita (the National Union for the Complete Independence of Angola).

UPA mainly operates in the region of Carmona in northern Angola with some 10,000 militants. However, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) no longer recognises UPA as a genuine movement. How much that decision was influenced by the fact that no less an authority than the CIA has declared that Roberto is a true “anti-Communist” or by the fact that the MPLA—once regarded as “a group of intellectuals”—has become a radical force and has largely eclipsed Roberto’s efforts, it is difficult to know.

Unita launched her part in the armed struggle with a most violent attack on the Angolan town of Teixeira-de-Sousa in the south-east on Christmas Day, 1966.

Immediately after this attack Unita largely limited its activities to attacking the Benguela railway. This tactic caused the wrath of Zambia’s President, Dr. Kenneth Kaunda, to fall on Unita’s leader, Dr. Joseph Savimbi, as, since Rhodesia’s UDI, the Benguela railway had become Zambia’s chief outlet for her copper. Thus, Dr. Kaunda felt forced to expel Unita’s President from Lusaka’s Liberation Centre.

However, recently Unita has made startling progress and a number of areas have been liberated from Portuguese control. This makes Angola the most confusing country in the ASPRO (Portuguese term for the South African-Rhodesian-Portuguese alliance) complex in terms of liberation movements—three, each of comparatively equal strength, attempting to liberate the country and with each justly claiming successes towards this end.

Nevertheless, MPLA has some justification for claiming to be the foremost Angolan liberation movement. It is recognized by the Organisation of African Unity and receives money from OAU’s Liberation Fund and has established rudimentary social structures in the liberated areas which are very similar to those established in Mozambique by FRELIMO (Mozambique Liberation Front) and to

those established in Guiné Bissau by PAIGC (African Party for the Independence of Guiné and Cape Verde)—the two most successful liberation movements in those countries and to which MPLA is linked through the freedom alliance of CONCP (Conference of National Organisations of the Portuguese Colonies). Moreover, the South African newspaper *News Check* (no friend of the Africans) has declared MPLA to be "by far the more effective, efficient and better organised".

At the first National Conference of MPLA, which was held in December 1962, MPLA laid down the following minimum conditions for any negotiation with the Portuguese:

- (a) The recognition of the right of Angola to self-determination and independence. National and international sovereignty for Angola.
- (b) The removal of all armed forces and bases.
- (c) The safeguarding of unity and territorial integrity.
- (d) Unconditional release of all political prisoners and the return to Angola of all refugees and exiles.
- (e) Guarantees of democratic rights, liberty for political action and for trade unions.
- (f) Fixing of a date and guarantees for the election of a national parliament based on the principle of a direct, equal and secret ballot.
- (g) Elections of government organs in every village and town.
- (h) Fixing a date for the attainment of Angola's independence."

The Portuguese have forced MPLA to continue the war. Military camps were actually formed on the Cabinda enclave border and starting with less than 500 militants fighting was originally concentrated in the Cabinda enclave but MPLA has now been able to penetrate 500 kilometres into Angola itself. Reports of fighting have come from the towns of Serpo Pinto and Silva Porto—towns right in the centre of this vast land. However, MPLA's main offensive is in eastern Angola where rudimentary social structures have been established—structures very similar to those established by Mozambique's FRELIMO to which MPLA is linked through the freedom alliance CONCP (Conference of National Organisations of the Portuguese Colonies).

Though the fighting in the Cabinda enclave has dropped off probably as a result of oil being discovered there—which has meant that the Africans working for Cabinda Oil (a subsidiary of American Gulf Oil Company) are now earning 120 escudos a day which is approximately 30/- (riches indeed compared to the payment given to Africans in Angola), the MPLA is placing everything on the success of their eastern offensive.

The Portuguese clearly have no right or duty to be in Angola. We must support the people of Angola to help them in their fight against Portuguese colonialism.

SOUTH WEST AFRICA

Adrian Wolfin

NAMIBIA is the recognised African name for South West Africa. It covers 318,261 square miles, a little more than Great Britain and France put together. To the north it borders Angola; in the north-eastern part it has a short border with Zambia, along the Caprivi Strip to the east it borders the Republic of Botswana, to the south it borders South Africa and to the west the Atlantic Ocean.

The Colonial Past

In South West Africa, the scramble for land occurred over two phases: (1) The German scramble for land, roughly from 1883-1915, and (2) the South African White land rush which followed the German period and reached its height in the 1920's.

German methods of robbing the Africans of their lands varied from cunning trading deals to using fire-arms to subjugate the Africans, after which their lands were taken as spoils of war. Dr. Paul Rohrbach, a highly placed official in the German Colonial Office wrote:

"The decision to colonise in South West Africa could after all mean nothing but this, namely that the native tribes would have to give up their lands on which they had previously grazed their stock, in order that the white man might have the land for the grazing of his stock."¹

When the Herero tribe realised they were losing all their land to the Germans they fought a brave war against German imperialism, in 1904-1907, which they lost. General Von Trotha then issued his notorious Extermination Order. The British government's "Atrocity" Blue Book of 1918 cites the order as having required the extermination of every Herero man, woman and child. The Herero population had been reduced from over 80,000 cattle-rich tribesmen to 15,000 starving fighters and more than half the Nama and Berg-Damara people had died.²

During the First World War South African Troops invaded the German colony of South West Africa. The capital Windhoek, was captured on May 12, 1915. After the war a system of international mandates was evolved by the League of Nations. The basis of the mandate system was to be that "The well-being and development of primitive peoples form a sacred trust of civilization". The mandate for South West Africa was given to Britain who asked South Africa to operate the mandate on her behalf. General Smuts, however, never considered the mandate system in this light for he believed that "South West Africa was inhabited by barbarians to whom it would be impossible to apply any idea of political self-determination in the European sense".³

Smuts and his government saw SWA simply as a country suitable for white settlement. South Africa had acquired a colony. When

South Africa took over the administration of SWA there were 1,138 farms in White use, totalling 11,490,000 hectares. A Land Board was set up to allocate farms to new White settlers, and the land rush began. By the end of the first year of the mandate (1920) 169 holdings had been distributed to 203 settlers, by the end of 1925, 880 holdings to 1,106 settlers.⁴ To move the Africans from the reserves that she "abolished" South Africa used force. The Bondelswarts in the south were coerced by bombings. In areas like Orumbo, and others, where the Africans went to settle in 1917 the government set fire to houses and gardens to drive people away. Hundreds of Boers from Angola were then brought in to replace the Africans in these lands.⁵ It was not a shortage of land that necessitates African removal but racist policy. This explains why the 1937 Land Board Report complained in one paragraph that there was "little land available for allotment", and in another paragraph "over 21 million hectares are unallotted".

The Conditions of the People in the 20th Century

(i) Education

The educational system has been a clear expression of racist rule. Educational policy props up white supremacy while neglecting African youth. In 1962 only 0.03 per cent of African pupils were in secondary classes. Of the children in school 90.7 per cent were in the four lower primary classes.⁶ The purpose of African education was concisely stated in a report of a departmental commission on African education: "The education of the white child prepares him for life in a dominant society and that of the black child for a subordinate society. . . ."

(ii) The System of Forced Labour

The line stretching across the map of South West Africa to demarcate the Police Zone—that area comprising the lower three-quarters of SWA directly administered by government officials, and mark the division between progress planned for and by Whites in the south, and careful stagnation in the northern African part of the land.

In the south are the European farmers, the mining industry, and the fishing industry. For the African worker to enter the white south to seek work means that he must pass through the rigorous labour machine of the territory. He must obtain permission to enter the labour area from the local authority, then his contract must be signed before the New South West African Native Labour Association (NEW SWANLA) which has the sole monopoly of recruiting labour in the north. The labourer will live for 18 months a bachelor's life in a compound, and must return home for three months after the expiry of his contract, later to be redrafted for a further labour term. The worker will repeat this cycle again and again. By 1955 the number of Africans drafted annually through NEW SWANLA had increased to 45,500.⁷

Inside the Police Zone for the indigenous population the contract labour system does not apply, but the African people are enclosed in an iron framework of laws, regulations, and official instructions.

Men must have permits to seek work, service contracts to prove that they are working and so on. In a society where cheap African labour is so essential, any African's failure to work is a crime called vagrancy. This is defined as wandering abroad with no visible means of support and is an offence punishable by imprisonment.

Farm wages fluctuate according to the medical classification of the labourer, from 25s. a month for inexperienced youngsters up to £4 for the "Class A" type labourers. One year's work by a miner or industrial worker at the highest rate paid, will earn £30. The man earning the maximum daily rate gets 35s. a month. While the *per capita* income of residents within the white-dominated Police Zone was £176.1, outside the Police Zone the figure was £8.5. In 1953 an *ad hoc* committee of the United Nations and the International Labour Organisation, argued that the ultimate consequence of the system of forced labour was "To compel the Native Population to contribute by their labour to the economic policies of the country". Naturally, African trade unions are illegal.

(iii) The Inequitable Distribution of Land

Whites, though only 1 in 7 of the total population, enjoy the exclusive use of two-thirds of the land. By 1952 the average White farmstead was 7,500 hectares in extent. By 1962 there were more than 5,000 White farms occupying an area of nearly 40 million hectares. On the other hand 170,000 Africans inside the Police Zone are confined to 5.8 million hectares and 261,000 Africans living beyond the Police Zone to 16 million hectares. Altogether the "Native Reserves" comprise approximately 25 per cent of the total area.⁹ Without exception they are situated in the driest and least productive regions of SWA. Thus there has been an increasing inequitable distribution of the land.

(iv) Western Colonialism in South West Africa

South West Africa possesses a colonial type of economy, with South Africa as the imperial power and a few international corporations sharing the spoils. The country is rich in minerals, e.g. diamonds, copper, zinc, and lead. The fisheries are amongst the world's richest.

Among the mineral companies that drain the wealth away from SWA, one giant towers above the rest: Consolidated Diamond Mines of S.W.A. Ltd., part of the vast De Beers-Anglo-American mineral empire. It makes an annual profit in SWA of almost *double* the entire State Budget. The budget for SWA in 1961 was £8,079,710. The CDM profits in the same year totalled £15,553,197.¹⁰ Dividends earned were 200 per cent of capital invested. Of the total value of exported minerals in 1961 diamonds accounted for about 70 per cent (total value=£26½ million). Of the Territory's total diamond output 98 per cent was produced by Consolidated Diamond Mines.

Other companies with investment in SWA are: South West Africa Co. Ltd., General Mining Corporation, Rio Tinto, Selection Trust, South African Minerals Corporation, Associated Ore and Metal Corporation Ltd., and the Bethlehem Steel Corporation, as well as the giant American Tsumeb Corporation.¹²

The three pillars of SWA's wealth are mining, fishing and agriculture. Together they account for more than 60 per cent of total output in recent years; hence because the economy is not diversified, any serious slide in prices for primary products would be calamitous.

It has been argued that SWA is economically unviable and that it is incapable of political independence. In fact SWA is well off in terms of *per capita* resource endowment. The excess of exports over imports could allow a balanced economic development in the country. Currently much of the surplus goes to the foreign corporations which exploit the country's mineral wealth. In 1962, for example, 32 per cent of the gross domestic product went to foreigners in the form of dividends, interest and other payments. British and United States investors hold a substantial interest in the seven predominant South African corporations.¹³

Military Involvement

A representative of the South West African Peoples Organisation told the UN Special Committee on South West Africa: "In violation of the Mandate, South Africa has established military bases in Windhoek, Walvis Bay and At Katima Mulilo in the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel". The *Johannesburg Star* of September 25, 1962, said: "Walvis Bay is rapidly changing from a fishing town to a military base. . . ." As for the Caprivi Strip, President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia said in June 1965: "I wish to state how greatly disturbed we are here in Zambia, that the South African Government has chosen to build an £8 million air base somewhere in the Caprivi Strip. . . . An air base such as the South African Government is building is a direct threat to Zambia's integrity." Nicholas Tomalin of the London *Sunday Times* reported in December 1965, ". . . Despite the South African denials, the base is a big military operation. . . ."¹⁴

The Rejection of Reformism

In Windhoek where forced removal of the people was attempted, members of SWAPO staged a peaceful demonstration in December 1959. The result of this was what is now remembered as the "Windhoek Shootings" when the police opened fire against the demonstrators killing 13 people and wounding more than 40.

In April 1968, Sam Nujoma (now President of SWAPO) and Jacob Kuangua organised the Ovamboland Peoples' Organisation (OPO) in Windhoek. The following month the South West African National Union (SWANU) was established with Uatja Kaukuetu as President. There was an attempt to merge the two bodies which failed. The OPO expanded into the South West African People's Organisation which was formed in June 1960. Since then SWANU has declined and is now virtually extinct. Its remaining officers outside the country expelled the former president Jariretundu Kozonguizi accusing him of having worked for the South Africans.

The Namibian people led by SWAPO have now entered the fourth year of their armed struggle against South Africa's Nazi rule in their country. It is worth noting that SWAPO has established a series of permanent camps within Namibia in which most of the

freedom fighters are trained. SWAPO now is the only movement from Namibia aided by the Organisation of African Unity. As a result of the intensification of the guerilla activity at the end of 1968 there was an increase of executions of civilians. In January and February 1970, in the latest series of guerilla operations there were attacks in Kaokoveld, north-east of Oshikango; and on the Tsumeb-Ondangua highway. These attacks were followed by reprisals: increasing police raids on the Northern Regions and victimisation of the civilian population. There have been reports that people suspected of having any links with SWAPO members are being refused medical treatment in government hospitals.

There are now about 300-400 SWANU freedom fighters in prison under the South African Terrorism Act, or the Suppression of Communism Act.¹⁵

To those who argue that the Namibians should be committed to non-violence one should point out that every non-violent resistance campaign has been met with greater violence, terror and killings than the one before it. As to quote Fidel Castro: "The 1970's will be the decade of revolution. Because in the world today, people, whatever they have done historically would rather die from a bullet than from the slow agony of starvation."

The total powerlessness of the UN has led the people of Namibia to reject "the reformist approach in the struggle for liberation".

"We also reject the idea that our deliverance should rest entirely with the Big Powers. We appeal to all the states of the UN and particularly our brother states in Africa to *act* against South Africa but the right to *decide* remains vested in the peoples of Namibia. It is for us to find the most effective methods to liberate ourselves."¹⁵

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- ³R. First, *South West Africa*, p. 96.
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- ⁵Michael Scott, *In Face of Fear* (1948). Author's own publication.
- ⁶*Namibia News*, Organ of SWAPO, July-December 1969, p. 13.
- ⁷Charles Kuraisa, "The Labour Force", in *S.W.A.—A Travesty of Trust*.
- ⁸R. First, *South West Africa*.
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- ¹⁰See R. First, *South West Africa*, Appendix D—Foreign Investment in S.W.A.
- ¹¹R. First, *South West Africa*, Appendix D.
- ¹²R. First, *South West Africa*, Appendix D.
- ¹³WAY (World Assembly of Youth) Liberation Series, *South West Africa*.
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LIBERATING GUINÉ

Paul Hodges

THE REVOLUTION in Guiné Bissau isn't so much forgotten as ignored. Most people can only guess even at its location—"Somewhere in Africa, I suppose." Yet this is where the most successful war of liberation of the decade is being fought—by a peasant population against the military might of imperial Portugal. In a country the size of Switzerland the war has tied down 60,000 Portuguese troops—more, proportionately than the Americans have in Vietnam. Not only are the Portuguese troops there, supplied regularly with planes and napalm from NATO, but they are being systematically beaten. The African Party for the Independence of Guiné and the Cape Verde Islands (PAIGC) has now reached the stage where the *Economist* can safely say that it "has now occupied most of the territory it wants and will eventually take the rest". And this was written in 1968 only five years after fighting had begun in 1963 on just one military front.

The reason for the unique success of the PAIGC is its political basis, which is specifically directed against simply creating an African elite to take over from the departed Portuguese elite. They have a concept of "revolutionary democracy", which involved national reconstruction rather than simply national liberation. Thus the PAIGC has deliberately postponed the final expulsion of the Portuguese from the last few towns they hold, until there are enough Africans trained to take over. PAIGC have realized that an uneducated population can easily be dominated by an elite and time is therefore needed to educate the people before they are capable of governing themselves successfully. PAIGC works through the village committees which it helped to set up, but even these remain completely autonomous as one cannot force anyone to join a guerrilla war of liberation. While it would be naively optimistic to claim that the PAIGC cannot degenerate into an elitist structure one can see that all its efforts are directed against this eventuality. It does mark an important stage in the concept of revolution and even if it fails to achieve its specific target after liberation it will have helped towards the time when people do take power into their own hands.

Having seen that Guiné's uniqueness is based on its importance both as an internal revolution which also has great implication for the future of human society we can now look at Guiné itself. It is supposedly called Portuguese Guiné and is situated between Senegal and Guinea on the coast of West Africa. Guiné became nominally Portu-

guese at the "scramble-for-Africa" Congress of Berlin in 1884 but was not "pacified" until 1936 after more than a dozen major wars between the Portuguese and the native tribes. Because of the Salazarist military dictatorship in Portugal (now taken over by Caetano) there is, and was, no prospect of peaceful progress towards even education let alone independence. To evade one United Nations criticism Portugal changed the status of her colonies to make them into "overseas provinces", but she ignores any demands for liberation. It was only after the PAIGC's demands for this were rejected or ignored by Lisbon that it started a military campaign to enforce its political aims. As its Secretary-General, Amílcar Cabral, said, "We are armed militants, not militarists." Guiné's population of under one million, is made up of five main tribal groups and the white Portuguese settlers, who are mostly connected with the monopoly trading company, the CUF. The five African groups range from the semi-feudal state of the Fula to the Balante, where authority is given to all the elders (i.e. all males over about twenty-five years of age). Before the work of liberation started there were at least ten different languages, each one spoken by a different tribe; now one language, Creole, is gradually becoming universal.

The CUF trading company, through its owners, the Portuguese Mello family, is just one example of the links between western capital and the Portuguese repression. CUF itself operates entirely for the benefit of Portugal's balance of payments and therefore has encouraged the growth of a monoculture in Guiné, namely groundnuts. Internationally the CUF has links with Britain, France, West Germany and others who constantly provide credits—first to help expansion and now to protect this investment. It also has ties with the monopoly bank in Guiné, the Banco Nacional Ultramarino which is partly a subsidiary of Barclays Bank DCO. Because CUF concentrated on maximising profit, there has been no economic development of Guiné during the colonial period. (The Portuguese are having to start importing everything they need.) Agriculture is therefore greatly underdeveloped, with the consequence that Cabral foresees a possible need after independence "to stay for a while in a colonial posture from an economic standpoint, exporting raw materials and importing finished goods . . . so our people can actually live better".

On the military front the Portuguese only survive because of the enormous help they receive from the self-styled "Free World". Portugal is also economically underdeveloped, even though in 1970 she will devote almost 60% of her budget to defence expenditure. She can however, call on Fiat jet-bombers, fighters, napalm and other military equipment from NATO; "equipment" which is supposed to be used only in Europe but naturally no government would protest at its illegal use in Africa. Of course when there are things that even NATO can't do, the Portuguese have only to ask the South Africans. Therefore as Portugal must have an offshore airbase when Guiné itself is liberated—and NATO can hardly be seen building that—the South

Africans are building it on the Cape Verde island of Sal. As the South Africans intensify their support for Portugal, so the liberation movements of Guiné, Angola and Mozambique have come together in COMAS against their common enemies. Indeed, the reason Portugal still refuses to decolonize Guiné is that "it might set a precedent for Angola and Mozambique" and when *they* have been liberated there would be no barriers for South Africa to hide behind. Such is the strategic importance of Guiné in the anti-colonial war now taking place in Africa.

How, then, has the PAIGC managed to achieve so much? It has liberated four-fifths of Guiné and is able to control the moment when it takes the other fifth. Its history began in 1956 when Cabral and others started to meet secretly in the capital, Bissau, and gathered impetus in 1959 when 50 Africans were killed after having gone on strike in the Pidiguite docks in Bissau. It moved to armed resistance in 1963 when the first South Front (to the border with Guinea) and then the North Front (up to the border with Senegal) was opened. In 1964 the East Front opened and the military zoning was completed. In all the PAIGC's motto has been "build the revolution as you fight", and they stress the need for national reconstruction as well as liberation. Thus by the school year 1965/66 they had already trained 191 teachers, by the following year the number had grown to 220. By 1967 they had built six field hospitals, 120 clinics and had 23 mobile medical teams: the Portuguese had managed just one hospital and eleven doctors, of whom three were always on leave in Lisbon. These were the tangible benefits which impressed the wavering few among the peasants; it also shows how much more the PAIGC have to do before the task of reconstruction is completed.

Between 1956-65 the only job to be done was the mobilization of the peasants: to convince them that it was worth risking their lives and their lands can hardly have been easy. By 1961 there were a hundred political workers each concentrating on one particular village, gradually convincing the peasants that they didn't need to give their food away in taxes to the Portuguese, but that they could run their own lives. An enormous jump for someone used to being treated as little better than an animal. Naturally the young were more eager to take the risk and usually dominated the village committees which the political workers tried to set up. The instructions which these workers had decided to follow were detailed enough to show again how the PAIGC wanted to evolve:

"We must practice revolutionary democracy in every aspect of our Party life. Hide nothing from the masses of our people. Tell no lies. Expose lies whenever they are told. Mask no difficulties, mistakes, failures. Claim no easy victories."

These, then, are the standards PAIGC has set itself and act as its

contribution to the evolution of revolutionary theory and practice. Firstly, they admit to a need for a vanguard party which goes on to incorporate the whole state inside itself. The immediate problem this involves is that of leaders, and it is impossible to deny the importance of Amílcar Cabral to the whole movement for liberation. In a sense this need for leaders and consequent organisation has come about because there was a need for violence. The Portuguese would never give up Guiné voluntarily, nor admit of reforms which would lead to a situation where Portugal would become irrelevant. The people of Guiné have first to fight for their cultural heritage, and only when they have won that will they be ready to move on. Cabral himself is constantly showing that he is aware of the danger of an elite: the whole evolution of the PAIGC has been to transfer power from the centre to the village committees. When Guiné is free he plans to decentralize as much as possible, seeing no real need to have just one town acting as a capital for a whole people. He can however, only make the practice go towards the theory: the crucial time will come when (and if) momentum builds up to merge the theory with the practice, with or without his consent. Admittedly he will still have the option of reversing this trend, and this must be the difficulty. The military nature of the initial organisation may well outweigh its political objectives. What is needed is *time*, time to explain the message of self-government and collective control—in other words, time to educate the peasants to take power for themselves. This can only be done by being able to cast off the military phase, thus enabling the non-violent transition to take place.

The purpose of the PAIGC in Guiné is that while it wishes to avoid simply having a take-over by an African elite, to wait too long would impregnate the military organisation too deeply into the political spectrum. Even if this balance is managed, there still remains the problem of dealing with the outside world. How it and a truly democratic Guiné will co-exist is yet another question about which Cabral had to think:

"My own view is there are no real conflicts between the people of Africa. There are only conflicts between their elites. When the people take power into their own hands, as they will do with the march of events in this continent, there will remain no obstacles to effective African solidarity. Already we see in our case how the various peoples in Guiné are finding co-operation more and more possible and useful as they free themselves from attitudes of tribal struggle—attitudes that were encouraged, directly or indirectly, by colonial rule and its consequences."

By the process of education we can see that people will not only be able to take power for themselves, but actually want to. This is the lesson of Guiné for the rest of the world. Cabral hasn't yet got a people who want to take power for themselves, but he is succeeding in

taking them towards this goal. They are fighting now against Portuguese repression, but the real battle will come when they have defeated that and must act to take power for themselves. Whether they and the PAIGC structure will be capable of making this change we cannot yet tell. At present we can see that the PAIGC is still a vanguard revolutionary body even though its aim is to merge itself into the people. It is this aim that provides the final point for discussion. The PAIGC is a military and political force which realises that to achieve its declared aims it will have to achieve national reconstruction. This can only be done by the people themselves reconstructing their lives as they want it done.

Thus Guiné provides us with two principles which apply to the achievement of a libertarian revolution anywhere. One is that violence is only self-defeating. Originally we see that the PAIGC "has now occupied most of the territory it wants, and will eventually take the rest", but the time lapse is needed because mere violence—in this case ejecting the Portuguese—is irrelevant to the much bigger task of enabling people to make their own lives instead of having an elite in control. The second principle is the positive application of the idea, and is that of a libertarian revolution when the whole population is educated enough to put it into practice.

These ideas are a valuable enough contribution for Guiné to claim more attention than she does at present from the world. Finally, however, we must not forget that she is also being completely successful in the military field of expelling the Portuguese though her resources are smaller and her enemies more powerful than in other, more publicised, conflicts. Guiné is a small country, a long way off, but her military success and her political objectives mean that she is important enough for the whole world to study.

African facts and figures

SOUTH AFRICA

Liberation Movements: *African National Congress (ANC)*,* spokesman Oliver Tambo; *Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC)*, spokesman Robert Sobukwe. Population: 13,340,000 Africans; 591,000 Asians; 1,959,000 Coloured; 3,728,000 Europeans. Area: 471,445 sq. miles.

SOUTH WEST AFRICA

Liberation Movements: *South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO)*,* spokesman Sam Nujena; *South West African National Union (SWANU)*, spokesman Gerson Kanguuchi. Population: 498,700 Africans; 15,400 Coloured; 96,000 Whites. Area: 316,261 sq. miles.

RHODESIA

Liberation Movements: *Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPO)*,* spokesman Joshua Nkomo; *Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU)*, spokesman Ndabaningi Sitole. Population: 4,210,000 Africans; 225,000 Whites; 22,000 Asians and Coloured. Area: 150,333 sq. miles.

ANGOLA

Liberation Movements: *People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)*,* spokesman Agostine Neto; *National Union for the Complete Independence of Angola (UNITA)*, spokesman Joseph Savimbi; *Union of the Peoples of Angola (UPA)* and the *Angolan Exiled Revolutionary Government (GREA)*, spokesman Holden Roberto. Population: 4,700,000 Africans; 230,000 Whites; 50,000 others. Area: 481,352 sq. miles.

MOZAMBIQUE

Liberation Movements: *Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO)*,* spokesman Uria Simango; *Mozambique Revolutionary Committee (COREMO)*, spokesman Paulo Gumane. Population: 6,300,000 Africans; 130,000 Whites; 50,000 Asians and others. Area: 297,731 sq. miles.

GUINE BISSAU

Liberation Movement: *African Party for the Independence of Guiné and the Cabo Verde (PAIGC)*,* spokesman Amílcar Cabral. Population (inc. Cabo Verde): 768,500 Africans; 10,200 Whites (including troops). Area (inc. Cabo Verde): 15,501 sq. miles.

*There exists a political alliance between the major liberation movements, and this sign indicates that the organisation is one of the 'six'.