BIESTON ANTI-NULLING GROUP, NO. O ***SUNDAY 21ST JUNE. EAST MIDLANDS DISANIAMENT CARNIVAL AT ALVASTON PARK, DERBY.

BANG meets in the car park in Foster Avenue at 9.30am. Those with cars please give lifts to those without. Some will want to join the march from Osmaston Park to Alvaston Park, but some will be needed to put up the BANG tombola stall, for which we also need PRIZES!! The theme is what you need for your fall-out shelter, so anything from a can of beanz to a packet of sticking plasters will do. Please give them to Bob Cann, 104 Denison St, or bring with you. It is hoped to raise enough money to pay for a hoarding advertising not beans but peace.

***SUNDAY 4TH JULY. Seminar for potential disarmament speakers at 19 Devonshire Avenue, 10.30am.

***TUESDAY 14TH JULY, BANG meeting at the Victoria Hotel, Dovecote Lane, 8.00pm.

At Newsletter No 10, we realise that many potential supporters, sympathisers, activists, friends etc still do not know that there is a disarmament group in Beeston. In this issue we are trying to publicise our existence by calling on churches, ALL political parties, trade unions, and other organisations for moral, practical and financial support. In return we will supply speakers on disarmament, infomation on all aspects of the issue, and give notice of meetings and events taking place in the area. The group's policy is: BEESTON ANTI- NUCLEAR GROUP IS OPPOSED TO ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS, EAST OR WEST. WE WANT BRITAIN TO RENOUNCE POSSESSION OF SUCH WEAPONS AND TO CLOSE ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS BASES. WE SEE A NUC-LEAR WEAPONS FREE BRITAIN AS AN ESSENTIAL STEP TOWARDS A NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE WORLD, AND THE END OF NUCLEAR ALLIANCES. THE ONLY DEFENCE AGA-INST NUCLEAR WAR IS NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT.

Our immediate objective is to get Broxtowe declared a Nuclear Free Zone, like Sheffield and Derby. This means that the council bans or at least vigorously opposes:

- * The siting, storage or manufacture of nuclear weapons, or any parts or equipment to do with nuclear weapons.
 - * Research into nuclear weapons.
- * The transport of nuclear waste through the Broxtowe area. This applies to civil and milit

- -ary waste, since the two are not separated.
- * Civil defence. The area would be so devas tated in a nuclear attack, that any attempt at this would be useless.

The establishment of NFZ's throughout the UK would clearly make it difficult for the state to maintain, develop and augment its nuclear weapons systems.

Ultimately, the goal is make the whole of Europe a Nuclear Free Zone, to prevent the superpowers turning it into a nuclear battlefield, which is now the only way they can fight world war III without destroying each other. BANG is just one of thousands of peace groups throughout Europe engaged in this struggle, and we need your supp-ort.

- * We call on all churches and religious organisations to support our opposition to the weapons of mass destruction; to help us by displaying the poster that is on the last page of
 this newsletter, and announcing our meetings
 and events.
- * We call on local political parties, trade union branches, and other organisations to tell their members about our meetings and affiliate to the group. For the annual fee of £5, you will get our newsletter and posters and leaflets advertising events. Please fill in the application form below and return it to Peter Fallon, 28 Wallet Ave, Beeston.

We wish	to affiliate to Beeston Anti- Nuclear Grou	lp.
Name of	Organisation	
Name of	Contact Person	
Address		
		Telephone
We enclo	ose the affiliation fee of £5.00	Date

PROGRESS IN DIPLOMATIC DISARMAMENT ...

Many people say "Who would not be in favour of nuclear disarmament, but the unilateral
approach is impractical and would leave us
defenceless. It can only be done gradually
by negotiation". Since the superpowers now
have the ability to destroy each other several times over in half an hour, and smaller
nations are scrambling to get their own bombs, the gradual approach does not seem to
have worked terribly well. Perhaps by review
-ing the progress of some past negotiations,
we can see what they have really achieved and
if there is any hope for their success in the
future.

At the end of world war II, the United Nations was founded to ensure the future peace of the world. Article 26 of the UN Charter provides for the setting up of a system to regulate armaments, but, thanks to the right of veto enjoyed by the superpowers, the Security Council, with its various commissi -ons and committees, has never been able to do this. Ironically, Hiroshima and Nagasaki were destroyed by atomic bombs in August 1945, a few weeks after it was signed by 5 | nations. In January 1946, the UN General assembly passed its very first resolution establishing the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), to make proposals "for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction". At that time, only three atomic devices had ever been exploded, and full scale production had not yet begun. It was therefore a unique opportunity which will never occur again to eliminate the risk of nuclear war for ever.

The United States presented the Baruch Plan, as it was later known, to the first meeting of the AEC in June 1946. Although seeming . to be magnanimous, the US retained its monopoly of atomic secrets, and would, with UN support, go to war with anyone who violated the proposed treaty. The Russians suspiciously regarded the UN as American dominated, and took "anyone" to mean themselves. Nevertheless, they tabled a counter proposal for the destruction of all existing nuclear weapons and an end to their production. The US answer was to explode their fourth bomb over Bikini on July 1st, 1946. The AEC was merged in 1952 with the Commission for Conventional Armaments, and the International Atomic Energy Agency was established, whose main function was not disarmament but promoting the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Later that year, the US exploded its first hydrogen bomb followed by the USSR in 1953.

All subsequent disarmament negotiations seem to follow this pattern; each side regards itself as the "goodies" and the other side as the "baddies", and makes sure that their plans- at first sight generous and ambitious-contain something the "baddies" will object to. In this way, disarmament negotiations are not just ineffective but can be used as a way of justifying the arms race, by forcing the other side to reject apparently reasonable proposals.

The next significant disarmament initiative was taken by Britain and France in 1954. The Korean war had ended, France was about to quit Vietnam, both the US and the USSR had the hydrogen bomb and could afford to relax. The Russians surprised everyone by accepting the Anglo-French proposals as a basis for negotiations. The Americans offered several important concessions in March 1955 and on May 10th the Soviet Union presented a comprehensive and detailed plan which included a 75% reduction of nuclear and chemical weapons, major reductions in conventional armaments, armed manpower ceilings of 12 millions, and the installation of control posts. If they had hoped to prevent West Germany from joining NATO, they were to be disappointed, but negotiations still went on. In America however, McCarthy was persuing a vicious witch hunt against anyone whose views could be described as vaguely left, and opinion at all levels was suspicious of Russian intentions. On September 6th, the United States suddenly withdrew all its proposals, and the painstaking work of many months lay in ruins.

Emphasis now switches from disarmament to the banning of nuclear testing. The Bikini test of 1954 killed and injured some Japanese fishermen who were 85 miles away from the centre of the explosion, and narrowly missed killing numbers of Marshall Islanders. Non-aligned nations and Yugoslavia called for a complete ban on testing, but Russia had included test ban proposals in its May 1955 plans. America could then safely accuse the non-aligned nations of being pro-Soviet, and reject their demand. However public concern over the atmospheric polution from testing increased, so a voluntary ban was observed by the super-

powers between 1958 and 1961, but America re
µmed testing in 1962. By these early sixties,

it is estimated that Russia and America had

enough weapons to destroy each other complete
ly. The limit needed for deterrence had been

reached, but the arms race continued unabated.

In April 1962, eight non-aligned nations submitted a proposal for a complete test ban treaty, with monitoring by existing seismic stations and weather ships. If any nation was suspected of breaking: the treaty, it had to allow inspection, or the other signatories wou -ld no longer feel bound by their agreement. Finally, the only difference between the superpowers was the number of inspections. Suddenly, the Americans and Russians abandoned the Geneva talks and adjourned to Moscow, where a partial test ban on atmospheric testing was agreed in a few weeks. This seemed a step forward, but actually no one was giving up very much. Kennedy assured the Senate that underground testing would be continued "vigorously and diligently", while also claiming that the treaty would "radically reduce nuclear testing ... on both sides". The Russians had already completed high altitude tests for their anti- ballistic missile system. China and France did not sign the partial test ban treaty and are still testing. In fact when I began writing this, the newly elected French government announced that testing would cease. Now, some 850 words later, president Mitterand says that testing will after all continue, in spite of all the election promises. Since 1962, the General Assembly has repeatedly voted for a complete test ban, but the promises that this would be developed from the partial ban have come to nothing.

In the summer of 1967, arms limitation negotiations began with a meeting between Johnson
and Kosygin, which developed into the well
known strategic arms limitation talks (SALT).
Britain was initially the only other nation
taking part, but was soon excluded, so our bom
-bs do not even buy us a seat at the conferen
-ce table.

The SALT-I agreement signed in May 1972 by
Nixon and Brezhnev was in two parts. Firstly,
each side was limited to 200 ABM's. ABM's can
be confused easily and are regarded by both
sides as not very effective. America didn't
have any, and the Russians only 64. So in disarmament newspeak, "limited" means "increased".

Later in 1974, both sides agreed to reduce the ABM limit to 100. The second part of SALT-I put limits on the number of strategic missiles that left both sides considerable room for increase. Nothing was said about technical improvements, and the development of missiles with multiple warheads has made a complete nonsense of the SALT-I numbers agreement.

In 1974, at Vladivostock, the superpowers agreed to negotiate further "limitations" for the period up to 1985. The result was SALT-II which contains some references to cruise missiles, but they are not scheduled to arrive in Europe until 1982 and this part of the agreement is only valid until 1981! Reagan has in any case refused to ratify the treaty even though by it, each side will be allowed 2400 missiles of which 1320 may have multiple warheads. It is estimated by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, that this would allow the number of warheads in 1985 to be double that of 1974. How many bombs do they need?

disarmament negotiations have got us precisely no where. The two superpowers have no will to disarm and only seem to cooperate to prevent any actual disarmament occurring. Treaties have only been successfully concluded in areas and times of no military interest; the ABM's that don't work, cruise missiles not deployed until 1982, atmospheric testing which is no longer essential, nuclear free zones in the Antarctic and outer space where no one lives. The sea bed treaty of 1972 prohibited the siting of missiles on the sea floor without saying anything about detectors, fuel storage or all the missiles floating about in submarines.

As for defence, how are we defended? What act would one side have to commit against the other that would warrant the destruction of the world in a nuclear war? Kisinger himself admitted: "What in the name of God is strategic superiority? What is the significance of it politically, militarily, and operationally at these levels of numbers? What do you do with it?"

INTERVIEW WITH BRUCE KENT

Karen Goddard has finished the mammoth task of transcribing the recording of Tony Claydon and Ross Bradshaw's interview with CND secretary Bruce Kent. Read it in the May 29 issue of "Peace News".

